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ABSTRACT 
 
It has been increasingly argued that international commercial arbitration is stripping 
off its intrinsic features of an alternative dispute resolution method and turning into a 
mechanism that is almost indistinguishable from litigation. The development 
describing the metamorphosis of international commercial arbitration into a method 
that is very similar in process and substance to national litigation is referred to as the 
judicialisation of international commercial arbitration.  
 
The focus of this research is the process of judicialisation. The thesis questions 
whether it exists at all and, if yes, to what extent it has permeated both international 
arbitration proceedings and arbitral decision-making. While attempting to answer 
those questions other salient considerations are raised, such as: 
 
 Which characteristics of international commercial arbitration are fundamental 
for this method of dispute resolution and should remain intact;  
 What are the driving forces of the process of judicialisation; 
 Is the judicialised approach entirely consistent with the benefits of 
international commercial arbitration and to what extent? 
 
The ultimate objective of this thesis is to answer the question whether the 
judicialisation of international commercial arbitration is a positive development and 
thus be encouraged. Where negative implications are recognised, an attempt is made 
to identify the causes of the judicialisation process and offer solutions, if attainable.  
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
 
It is claimed that the growing popularity of international commercial arbitration
1
 is 
rooted in the flexibility that both parties and arbitrators enjoy in the arbitration 
proceedings. In particular, some of the characteristics that make international 
commercial arbitration more attractive to businesses than national litigation are the 
international enforceability of arbitral awards, the confidentiality of the proceedings 
and the possibility parties to select a neutral seat of arbitration and to appoint 
arbitrators to their liking.
2
 According to recent surveys international commercial is 
not merely a popular choice, but often even the preferred dispute resolution method 
for some industries.
3
  
 
According to a survey conducted in 2008, 88% of the participants used international 
arbitration as the default method for dispute resolution in industries such as 
insurance, energy, oil and gas, and shipping
4
. Those findings are supportive of a 
study conducted 2 years earlier, namely in 2006, in which 73% of the respondents 
indicated that arbitration alone (29%) or in combination with other ADR 
                                                 
1
   See Edward R. Leahy and Carlos J. Bianchi, ‘The Changing Face of International Arbitration’ 
(2000) 17 Journal of International Arbitration 19–62; Benjamin Hayward, ‘New Dog, Old 
Tracks: Solving a Conflict of Laws Problem in CISG Arbitrations’ (2009) 26 Journal of 
International Arbitration 405–436, 405, Elena V. Helmer, ‘International Commercial 
Arbitration: Americanized, “Civilized,” or Harmonized?’ (2004) 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 
35–68, especially at 38: “(…) during the last few decades, the number of arbitrations worldwide 
has increased dramatically. For example, between its founding in 1923 and 1976, the ICC 
International Court of Arbitration received three thousand requests for arbitration. In 1998 the 
ICC received its ten-thousandth case. (...) The number of requests for arbitration filed with the 
ICC in 2002 reached 593 – up 31% from the 452 requests filed in 1997. The international 
caseload of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) reached 649 cases in 2001 (…). 
During the 2001-2002 period, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) received 
159 cases – an 8% increase over the previous 24-month period.” 
2
  See Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and 
Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) paras 1.86-1.98. See also See QMUL 
Survey, ‘Corporate Attitudes and Practices’ (2006), available at: 
<http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123295.pdf> 6. 
3
  QMUL Survey ‘International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices’ (2008), available 
at: <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123294.pdf> 
4
  Ibid 2.   
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mechanisms (44%) was their choice for resolving international disputes.
5
 Statistical 
data available on the websites of the major arbitration institutions is also very 
reassuring as to the rising popularity of international arbitration.
6
  
 
Other studies demonstrate that although litigation remains the primary dispute 
resolution method in many sectors, there is still a steady increase in the use of 
arbitration. In one recent survey the percentage of interviewees from UK, USA, Asia 
Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe, Mainland Europe and Middle East showing 
preference for arbitration over litigation was respectively 18%, 6%, 14%, 7%, 16%, 
and 29%
7
, while the percentage of participants involved mostly in litigation was 
respectively 38%, 81%, 45%, 62%, 25%, 57% (in the same order as above).
8
 
Arbitration was the preferred dispute resolution mechanism only in the shipping 
industry, while litigation dominated in sectors like retail, property, insurance, 
government and public sector, energy, banking and financial services, aviation, 
technology and media and telecommunications
9
. 
 
The proliferation of international commercial arbitration is well documented in the 
literature.
10
 In Husain M. Al-Baharna’s view: 
                                                 
5
  2006 QMUL Survey (n 2) 2. 
6
 For ICC statistics see: <http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-
ADR/Arbitration/Introduction-to-ICC-Arbitration/Statistics/>; for SCC statistics see: 
<http://www.sccinstitute.com/statistics/>; for SCAI statistics see: 
<https://www.swissarbitration.org/Statistics>; for SIAC statistics see: 
<http://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-43/facts-figures/statistics/64-why-siac>; for LCIA 
statistics see: <http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx> etc.     
7
  See participants’ responses as to whether they are primarily involved in arbitration or litigation, 
and in particular the answers that indicate whether the respondents are being mostly involved in 
litigation with some arbitration, or mostly involved in arbitration with some litigation. Mazars 
LLP Dispute Resolution Survey 2013 available at: <http://www.mazars.com/Home/News/Our-
publications/Surveys-and-studies2/Mazars-Dispute-Resolution-Survey-2013> 20. 
8
  Ibid. 
9
  Ibid. The difference between the predominant use of litigation as oppose to arbitration was as 
follows: retail – 56% to 2%, property – 49% to 14%, insurance – 55% to 10%, government and 
public sector – 43% to 12%, energy – 35% to 26%, banking and financial services – 52% to 6%, 
shipping – 34% to 44%, aviation – 36% to 14%, technology, media and telecommunications – 
49% to 12%. 
10
  Bernard Hanotiau, ‘International Arbitration in a Global Economy: The Challenges of the 
Future’ (2011) 28 Journal of International Arbitration 89–103, 89: “increased use of arbitration 
has been stimulated by what were considered its intrinsic qualities: the speed of the process, its 
privacy and confidentiality, the neutrality of the arbitral forum, the possibility of choosing one's 
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[t]he phenomenal rise of trade and commerce across national frontiers during the 
second half of the twentieth century has witnessed a spectacular growth in the law and 
procedure of international commercial arbitration (hereinafter the "ICA"). Today ICA 
constitutes by far the most popular method for settlement of international commercial 
disputes.
11
  
 
Lord Justice Kerr also maintains that “[i]nternational commercial arbitration appears 
to be eclipsing litigation in national courts in many parts of the world.”12 Some 
authors provide empirical evidence for the growing popularity of international 
commercial arbitration and explain the latter with the increase of international trade 
transactions – both in terms of volume and stake. According to a study conducted by 
                                                                                                                                          
own specialised judge speaking the relevant language(s), the flexibility and adaptability of the 
procedure to meet the parties’ various expectations, the finality of the award, and the ease of its 
enforcement. The forces of globalization have fuelled the development of international 
arbitration all over the world.”; Laurence W. Craig, ‘Some Trends and Developments in the 
Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration’ (1995) 30 Tex Int’l L J 1–58, 2: 
“[t]he growth of international commercial arbitration is largely a post-World War II 
phenomenon, fuelled by the explosive growth of international trade and commerce and foreign 
investment in both developing and developed countries. While trade and investment were 
becoming increasingly transnational, and the multinational corporation was developing with an 
interest in promoting business and profits without regard to national boundaries, national courts, 
at least from the foreign trader's or investor's point of view, remained resolutely local in outlook. 
In many jurisdictions the judiciary was slow to change, ill-informed about modem commercial 
and financial practices, and hesitant to abandon local traditions and procedures that often seemed 
arcane or unbusinesslike to outsiders.”; Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Beyond Contract - The Case for 
Default Arbitration in International Commercial Disputes’ (2009) 32 Fordham Int’l L.J. 417–
488, 417-418: “It is commonplace to state that the essential features of the process make it the 
most suitable mode of dispute resolution in this context: neutrality and independence of the 
adjudicators, seriousness and flexibility of the process, higher prospects of enforceability of the 
decision in the majority of the world's jurisdictions. It may also be that the development of 
international trade has led to a significant increase in the number of the cases resolved by way of 
arbitration. Even though it is almost impossible to assess the number of cases that are arbitrated 
each year, as the process is both confidential and decentralised, there is some anecdotal evidence 
that international commercial arbitration has exploded over the last forty years.”; Leahy and 
Bianchi (n 1), 19: “(...)globalization has contributed directly to the rapid and broad growth of 
international arbitration. As many businesses have become inherently international, they have 
sought more effective and efficient means of resolving disputes without having to utilize 
national litigation systems that are often expensive and slow, and may be rife with national bias 
and political considerations. Often, these businesses have chosen the dispute resolution 
mechanisms embodied in international arbitration.” 
11 
 Husain M. AI-Baharna, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in a Changing World’ (1994) 9 
Arab L.Q. 144–157, 144. 
12 
 Lord Justice Kerr, ‘Commercial Dispute Resolution: The Changing Scene’ in Liber Amicorum 
for Lord Wilberforce, Marten Bos and Ian Brownlie (eds.) (Oxford, 1987), 111- 130, 120 
 
Page 12 
Prof Schwenzer between 2004 and 2008 the sales law litigation and arbitration 
experienced growth of approximately 5% per year and this percentage almost exactly 
equalled the development of world trade during that period.
13
  
 
Together with the positive attitude towards international commercial arbitration, 
however, concerns have been continuously raised about the increasing length of 
international arbitration proceedings and the costs associated with them.
14
 The 
process of “judicialisation” was expressly identified as an adverse development in 
international arbitration in a survey conducted in 2013
15
. According to the study: 
 
[s]ome interviewees have expressed concerns over the ‘judicialisation’ of arbitration, 
the increased formality of proceedings and their similarity with litigation, along with 
the associated costs and delays in proceedings. This trend is potentially damaging to the 
attractiveness of arbitration. In-house counsel value the features of the arbitration 
process that distinguish it from litigation.
16
  
 
Interestingly the respondents in the study also complained about the lack of clear-cut 
decisions, as well as the shortage of arbitrators with the requisite expertise.
17
 The 
significance of the 2013 QMUL Survey
18
 lies in the fact that it is the first empirical 
study indicating that international commercial arbitration is undergoing some 
changes that can potentially undermine its own foundations. The study suggests that 
the judicialisation of international arbitration is not just a warning or a premonition, 
but an ongoing development that transforms the international commercial arbitration, 
as we know it. It appears that the fear of judicialisation might be justified. 
                                                 
13
  Ingeborg Schwenzer, ‘Global Sales Law – Theory and Practice’, available at: 
<http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences2/IACCL10-Schwenzer.pdf> 
14
 2008 QMUL Survey (n 3) 2. 
15
  QMUL Survey ‘Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry Perspectives’ (2013), 
available at: <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123282.pdf> 
16
  Ibid 5. It is interesting to note that despite the fact that interviewees were discontent with the 
length of arbitration proceedings, they showed preference for appointing arbitrators with 
relevant experience, albeit a tight schedule, over ones that can guarantee no obstructions due to 
their availability: “this does not mean that corporations were unconcerned about availability but 
that, on balance, in-house counsel felt that it is more important to appoint the arbitrator best 
suited to the case rather than one who could potentially complete the mandate faster” at 5.           
17
  Ibid 9. 
18
  Ibid. 
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In fact, although the 2013 QMUL Survey marks a milestone in arbitration users’ 
awareness of the process of judicialisation, it was a book published in the early 90’s 
that was seen as a harbinger of the metamorphosis that international commercial 
arbitration was about to experience. In International Arbitration in the 21st Century: 
Towards ‘Judicialization’ and Uniformity? 19  it was suggested that international 
arbitration is heading towards judicialisation and the preoccupation with the issue of 
uniformity might not be entirely beneficial to arbitration users. The rising popularity 
of international commercial arbitration is measured by the increase in the caseload as 
well as the commensurate growth in the number of arbitral institutions, arbitration 
rules, arbitration laws and arbitration practitioners.
20
 There appears to be, however, a 
downside of this exponential success. According to C. Brower:  
 
[t]wo consequences of this proliferation have become evident. One is the increasing 
“judicialisation” of international arbitration, meaning both that arbitration tend to be 
conducted more frequently with the procedural intricacy and formality more native to 
litigation in national courts and that they are more often subjected to judicial 
intervention and control. (…) The other consequence is a rising preoccupation with the 
issue of uniformity, most currently epitomized by national debates over whether or not 
to adopt the Model Law on Commercial Arbitration prepared by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (…).
21
 
 
C. Brower further questions whether “arbitration has become ‘an engine of 
adjudication indistinguishable from its judicial counterpart’”. 22  In the following 
years red flags about the impending judicialisation have been raised by several other 
scholars and practitioners.
23
 Redfern and Hunter anxiously noticed that some new 
                                                 
19
  Richard B. Lillich and Charles N. Brower, International Arbitration in the 21st Century: 
Towards ‘Judicialization’ and Conformity? (Richard B. Lillich and Charles N Brower (eds), 
Brill 1994).  
20 
 Ibid ix.  
21
  Ibid. 
22
  Ibid where “the provocative phrase of Professor Carbonneau” was quoted. 
23
  See Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial 
Arbitration And The Construction Of A Transnational Legal Order (Language & Legal 
Discourse) (2nd edn, University of Chicago Press 1998); Fali S. Nariman, ‘The Spirit of 
Arbitration - The Tenth Annual Goff Lecture’ (2000) 16 Arbitration International 261–278; 
Edward Brunet, ‘Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration’ (2000) 
 
Page 14 
trends in international arbitration are changing “the simple, almost rudimentary 
system of resolving disputes”24. They argue that: 
 
[t]he arbitral process (…) has changed, from being a system in which the arbitrator was 
expected to devise a satisfactory solution to the dispute, to one in which the arbitrator is 
required to make a decision in accordance with the law; and in reaching that decision, 
the arbitrator is required to proceed judicially – giving each party the opportunity to 
present its case and treating each party equally, on pain of having his or her arbitral 
award set aside for procedural irregularity.
25
 
 
It is, therefore, suggested that “the creeping legalism”26 is affecting both the arbitral 
process and arbitral decision-making, which raises the question whether the process 
of judicialisation is consistent with the characteristics of international commercial 
arbitration. Although attempts have been made to shed some light on the 
implications of the judicialisation process on international arbitration proceedings 
and arbitral decision-making, the analysis is often generalised and thus of limited 
help to assess the driving factors behind this trend as well as its impact on arbitration 
users.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
74 Tul. L. Rev. 39–84; Katherine Lynch, The Forces of Economic Globalization - Challanges to 
the Regime of International Commercial Arbitration (International Arbitration Law Library) 
(1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2003); Gerald F. Phillips, ‘Is Creeping Legalism Infecting 
Arbitration?’ (2003) 58 Dispute Resolution Journal 37–42; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, ‘Not 
Quite a World Without Trials: Why International Dispute Resolution is Increasingly 
Judicialized’ (2006) 1 J. Disp. Resol. 119–129; Charles N. Brower, ‘W(h)ither International 
Commercial Arbitration?’ (2008) 24 Arbitration International 181–197; Alan Redfern, 
‘Stemming the Tide of Judicialisation in International Arbitration’ (2008) 2 World Arbitration & 
Mediation Review 21–37; Thomas J. Stipanowich, ‘Arbitration: The “New Litigation”’ (2010) 
2010 U Ill L Rev 1–60; Thomas E. Carbonneau, ‘Judicialization of the Process’ in Carbonneau 
on International Arbitration: Collected Essays (1st edn, Juris Net LLC 2011); Hanotiau, 
‘International Arbitration in a Global Economy’ (n 10); Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Arbitration and 
Judicialization’ (2011) 1 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1–23; Günther J. Horvath, ‘The 
Judicialization of International Arbitration: Does the Increasing Introduction of Litigation-Style 
Practices, Regulations, Norms and Structures into International Arbitration Risk a Denial of 
Justice in International Business Disputes’ in Stefan Michael Kröll and Loukas Mistelis (eds), 
International Arbitration and International Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and 
Evolution (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2011). 
24
  Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter 
on International Arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) 41. 
25
  Ibid. 
26
  Phillips (n 23).  
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Furthermore, in order to determine whether the judicialisation of international 
commercial arbitration is an entirely adverse development or it has features that are 
favourable and a result of natural evolution of the dispute resolution process, it is 
important to establish what participants’ expectations of international arbitration 
proceedings are. The 2013 QMUL Survey and the available scarce literature on the 
subject indicate that industries and scholars might have different perception as to 
what judicialisation of arbitration means and what the consequences of the 
judicialisation process are.  
 
In businesses’ view the process of judicialisation seems to be almost entirely 
associated with high costs and delays, while scholars raise alerts about the 
increasingly formalised or legalised process, renewed spur for regulation and over 
preoccupation with the issue of uniformity. A shared concern about the spreading 
process of judicialisation in international commercial arbitration appears to be the 
growing rigidity of the arbitral process. Still, several unanswered questions remain, 
namely what the other implications of the judicialised international commercial 
arbitration are, what aspects of the arbitral process and arbitral decision-making have 
been affected by the process of judicialisation and to what extent. Given the 
divergent views about what the implications of judicialisation, it is also interesting to 
examine whether arbitration users have intentionally pursued some of the 
consequences of this trend or contributed to its development in other ways.  
 
While one survey suggests that the costly arbitration process can be attributed to the 
high fees for external legal counselling
27
, some authors argue that the American 
influence on international arbitration is to be blamed for the lengthy and formalised 
arbitration proceedings.
28
 Thus, Bernard Hanotiau contends that:  
                                                 
27
  CIArb Costs of International Arbitration Survey 2011 at 10, some of the results of the survey are 
available at: <http://uk.practicallaw.com/1-508-6210> 
28
  See e.g. Lucy Reed and Jonathan Sutcliffe, ‘The “Americanization” of International 
Arbitration?’ (2001) 16 Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep. 37; Nicolas. C. Ulmer, ‘A Comment on "The 
“Americanization” of International Arbitration?’ (2001) 16 Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep. 24; Susan 
L. Karamanian, ‘Overstating the “Americanization” of International Arbitration: Lessons from 
ICSID’ (2003) 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 5–34; Lynch (n 23); Roger Alford, ‘The American 
Influence on International Arbitration’ (2004) 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 69–88; Helmer (n 
1); Cesare P. R. Romano, ‘The Americanization of International Litigation’ (2004) 19 Ohio St. 
J. on Disp. Resol. 89–120; Eric Bergsten, ‘The Americanization of international arbitration’ 
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[t]here is an increasing concern over what is referred to as the “judicialization” of 
international arbitration. In other words, the arbitration process has changed from 
relatively informal to increasingly formal and complex. This generates extended delays 
and increased costs. It is generally considered that this is to be attributed to what is 
often referred to, rightly or wrongly, as the “Americanization” of international 
arbitration.
29
 
 
Due to the globalisation of international trade international commercial arbitration 
has inevitably become the point of convergence of legal traditions, different cultures, 
and competing legal principles. Thus, it is justifiable the process of judicialisation to 
be to some extent associated with the American influence on international 
arbitration
30
, however, the latter seems to affect only a few of the aspects of the 
arbitration proceedings, such as counsel’s requests for disclosure, the adversarialism 
of the proceedings, etc. This is why some authors search for factors driving the 
judicialisation process beyond the proliferation of American-style arbitration. They 
find them in the businesses’ need for legal certainty and predictability and contend 
that those aspirations have brought overregulation in the international commercial 
arbitration. Interestingly, it is maintained that what is affected is not only the 
flexibility of the proceedings but also the way arbitrators reach their decisions. In 
Elena V. Helmer’s opinion: 
 
[j]udicialization (“legalisation” or “processualisation” in the words of Pierre Lalive) is 
described as an effort to make arbitration “become more like litigation”, in order to 
                                                                                                                                          
(2006) 18 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 289–301; William Park, Americanization of International 
Arbitration and Vice Versa Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and 
Practice (OUP 2006); Kevin T. Jacobs and Matthew G. Paulson, ‘The Convergence of Renewed 
Nationalization, Rising Commodities, and Americanization in International Arbitration and the 
Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses’ (2008) 43 Tex Int’l L J 359–397; 
Bernard Hanotiau, ‘The Conduct of the Hearings’ in Lawrence W. Newman and Richard D. Hill 
(eds), The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (2nd edn, Juris Publishing, 
Inc. 2008); Steven Seidenberg, ‘International Arbitration Loses Its Grip: Are U.S. Lawyers to 
Blame?’ (2010) 96 A. B. A. J. 50; George M. von Mehrem and Alana C. Jochum, ‘Is 
International Arbitration Becoming Too American?’ (2011) 2 The Globul Business Law Review 
47–58; Amalia Kessler, ‘Arbitration and Americanization: the paternalism of progressive 
procedural reform’ (2015) 124 The Yale Law Journal 2940–2993.  
29 
 Hanotiau, ‘International Arbitration in a Global Economy’ (n 10) 98.   
30
  See e.g. Helmer (n 1) 36, where it is stated “‘Judicialization’ is a term frequently associated with 
Americanization.”  
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increase its predictability, reliability, and equity. The result of judicialization in 
arbitration is ‘formalism, judicial style, and diminished flexibility’, (...)
31
 
 
It becomes evident from the above that there are conflicting or divergent views as to 
what judicialisation in the context of international commercial arbitration means, 
what causes this development and what its implications are. Furthermore, it is not 
clear whether the consequences of the judicialisation process affect, and as such 
transform, the whole arbitration process, or only some aspects of it, and to what 
extent. Further research is necessary to examine whether (and how) the process of 
judicialisation influences not only the conduct of international arbitration 
proceedings but also parties’ substantive rights as a result of it.32 Finally, it is to be 
considered whether the judicialisation process can be pinpointed to particular 
branches of international arbitration or whether it has a spillover effect. Taking into 
account the differences in arbitration users’ interests and needs, it could potentially 
be argued that while in some areas of international arbitration limited judicialisation 
is beneficial, in other areas (perhaps international commercial arbitration), this may 
be detrimental
33
. 
 
 
Rationale for the Thesis 
 
This thesis attempts to fill the gaps in the available literature and examine to what 
extent the process of judicialisation has permeated international arbitration 
proceedings and arbitral decision-making. The aim is to demonstrate whether the 
                                                 
31
  Ibid. 
32
  See Roy Goode, ‘Litigation or Arbitration? The Influence of the Dispute Resolution Procedure 
on Substantive Rights’ (2007) 19 Pace Int’l L Rev 53–62. 
33
  In Lillich and Brower (n 19) it is argued that traces of the judicialisation process are spotted in 
both international commercial and international investment arbitration. Other authors, however, 
suggest that the judicialisation trend is better manifested in employment, consumers and 
financial/securities arbitrations rather than commercial ones. See e.g. Allison Anderson, ‘Labor 
and Commercial Arbitration: The Court’s Misguided Merger’ (2013) 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 1237–1275; Anthony F. Bartlett, ‘Labor Arbitration: The Problem of Legalism’ (1983) 62 
Or. L. Rev. 195–230; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, ‘Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create 
Precedent’ (2011) 90 N. C. L. Rev. 1091–1146; David S. Schwartz, ‘If You Love Arbitration, 
Set It Free: How “Mandatory” Undermines “Arbitration”’ (2008) 8 Nev. L.J. 400–426; Edward 
Brunet, ‘Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration’ [1996] Brook. L. Rev. 1459–1494. 
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process of judicialisation is consistent with the benefits of international commercial 
arbitration or not. If certain aspects are considered to be detrimental to the interests 
of the international arbitration community these developments should be 
discouraged.  
 
At the beginning of the thesis a working definition of “judicialisation” in the context 
of international commercial arbitration is adopted in order to clarify the scope and 
objectives of the research. The latter then continues with an analysis of the sources 
of law in international commercial arbitration and their role in arbitral decision-
making. If the process of judicialisation is found to transform international 
commercial arbitration into a mechanism akin to national litigation, it is expected 
that it will have effect on arbitrator’s use and interpretation of the sources of law. In 
a judicialised arbitration proceedings arbitrators will be perceived and/or encouraged 
to interpret and apply the sources of law in a way similar to the one employed by 
national judges. Arbitrator’s approach to the sources of law will be manifested both 
in the way arbitral tribunals manage arbitration proceedings and reach their 
decisions. Where arbitrator’s interpretation and application of the sources of law 
furthers the judicialisation agenda, this will have implications not only on the style 
of dispute resolution procedure but also on the parties’ substantive rights. In light of 
the effect that the dispute resolution mechanism has on the substantive rights 
particular attention is given to the factors driving the process of judicialisation in 
international commercial arbitration, such as the pursuit of fair and just process, the 
regulation of international arbitration proceedings and the evolution of arbitrator’s 
vocation. The analysis on the new developments affecting the conduct of 
international arbitration proceedings and the mechanics of arbitral decision-making 
aims to reveal whether the process of judicialisation has transformed international 
commercial arbitration into a litigation-like mechanism and who is to blame for this.   
 
The importance of this thesis is considered to be three-fold. Being the first in-depth 
research on the process of judicialisation, this thesis fills gaps in the literature and 
adds to the level of knowledge of international commercial arbitration. Given that   
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the transformation of “folklore”34  arbitration into a litigation-like mechanism for 
resolving disputes causes constantly growing concerns about its implications and the 
future of international commercial arbitration in general, there is an undoubted need 
for a detailed analysis that addresses those fears and offers some clarification and 
guidance. By answering the research questions, this thesis not only provides an 
explanation as to what causes the process of judicialisation and whether the latter is 
beneficial to arbitration users, but it also demonstrates how a formalistic approach to 
the sources of law, the pursuit of fairness, justice and the truth in the arbitral process, 
the increasing regulation of arbitration proceedings, the introduction of litigation-
style practices and the professionalisation of international commercial arbitration are 
shaping the arbitration system.  
 
Secondly, arbitration providers may find this research informative. International 
arbitration institutions play a significant role in supervising and regulating 
international arbitration proceedings. Since the majority of international arbitrations 
are conducted under the auspices of arbitration institutions, the latter actively 
participate in fostering new developments in international commercial arbitration. 
This thesis aims at shedding some light on the effects that these developments have 
on arbitration users and the arbitration system in general. In addition, the research 
demonstrates how arbitrators have been approaching decision-making and their 
perception of the role and function of an arbitrator. In view of the latter arbitration 
institutions will decide whether they would like to foster the judicialisation process 
or not. While at the beginning of its Golden Age, modern international commercial 
arbitration might have benefited from some judicialisation in order to build respect 
in the eyes of the institutions and arbitration user, this appears to no longer be the 
case.  
 
Finally, this research informs arbitration users of the effects of judicialised 
arbitration. The primacy of principle of party autonomy guarantees that the 
                                                 
34
  The term “folklore arbitration” established by Edward Brunet in Brunet, ‘Replacing Folklore 
Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration’ (n 23) 40, describes precisely the halo that 
surrounds the simplistic model of arbitration: “‘Folklore arbitration’ (...) is characterized by the 
choice of expert decision makers, a speedy process, privacy, informal presentations of evidence, 
little or no discovery, no right of judicial review, and the application of equitable rather than 
legal principles to resolve the dispute.”  
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arbitration proceedings can be tailored to the needs and requirements of arbitration 
users. Parties may want to contract out or curb the judicialised aspects of arbitration 
proceedings in order to maximise the benefits of a speedy and low-cost dispute 
resolution process. On the other hand, arbitration users that value precision and 
accuracy over time-efficiency may express preference for a judicialised arbitral 
process. 
 
 
Methodology and Limits of the Thesis 
 
This thesis will seek to achieve its objectives in three stages: Chapters 2 and 3 
analyse the interaction between the judicialisation process and the sources of law in 
international commercial arbitration; Chapter 4 examines the factors driving the 
judicialisation phenomenon in international arbitration proceedings and provides an 
example of judicialised practices; finally, Chapter 5 considers the mechanics of 
arbitral decision-making and whether public’s and institutions’ perceptions of 
arbitrator’s function and the way arbitrators see themselves influence the way 
arbitrators approach legal and non-legal issues and ultimately reach their decisions.  
 
The methodology followed in this study is: analytical, in the sense of analysing main 
works in the area of this study, numerous number of articles published in specialised 
journals and various ICC arbitral awards; critical, by critically analysing the opinions 
and writings; and comparative, by examining the rules of different institutions and 
national arbitration acts. In the course of this study a theoretical analysis of different 
types of sources has been conducted. Primary sources include a great number of 
published and some unreported arbitral awards, court decisions, and the texts of 
arbitration rules, arbitration acts and international conventions. The secondary 
sources include the main works in the area of this study, numerous articles published 
in journals and reviews, opinions presented at lectures or conferences, guidelines and 
other non-binding instruments. The analysis will be informed by two other methods 
of research, namely fact-finding and opinion sourcing, and supporting statistical 
analysis. Evidence for the fact finding and opinion sourcing will be drawn from 
newspaper articles, blogs, conference talks, debates, etc., while the statistical data is 
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obtained from surveys, in particular the 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2015 
QMUL Surveys, the 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 BLP Surveys, the 2011 CIArb 
Survey and the 2013 Mazars Survey. Institutional reports and statistics published by 
arbitration institutions and especially the 1997-2013 ICC Statistical Reports will feed 
the statistical analysis. 
 
Examination of arbitral awards will be of great importance in considering the 
arbitrator’s approach to the sources of law in international commercial arbitration 
and the mechanics of arbitral decision-making. Despite the great efforts put in 
finding as many awards as possible, there are some limitations to the research of 
arbitral awards. Firstly, the pool of arbitral awards is limited due to the 
confidentiality of arbitral decisions and the fact that only few of the awards are ever 
published. Of those awards that are published a great number of awards are 
considerably redacted, which prevents the researcher from conducting a profound 
and meaningful analysis. In addition, the author of the thesis is proficient in English 
and Bulgarian only, which limits their ability to conduct research in other languages. 
 
In the examination of the secondary sources the author aims at achieving a balance 
between analysing materials written by scholars/practitioners/academics trained in 
the common law systems and such written by scholars/practitioners/academics 
trained in the civil law systems. It has to be taken into account that the legal and 
cultural background of the authors may have an impact on their opinion as to 
whether judicialisation exists and what it is precisely. Then again, differences in the 
attitude to judicialised arbitration may be related to the occupation of the participants 
in arbitration proceedings as well. Thus, what industries perceive to be judicialised 
arbitration might not necessarily be similar to the meaning that arbitrators or 
academics affix to the same term.  
 
Finally, the methodological approach to the research questions will take into account 
the fact that the focus of the thesis is international commercial arbitration. What this 
means is that there may be a need to conduct comparative and interdisciplinary legal 
research regarding concepts of source of law, res judicata, stare decisis, issue of 
jurisdiction, arbitrator’s role, etc. With this regard traditional concepts of law, 
international private laws, national laws, if applicable, and uniform laws are going to 
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be analysed and compared. Theories about the foundations of arbitration, kompetenz-
kompetenz, public governance, etc. are also of relevance, as they might have effect of 
the application of the legal provisions related to the research question.  
 
The scope of the thesis will be limited to international commercial arbitration; 
however, comparison with other branches of arbitration will be necessary to 
distinguish how the kind of arbitration correlates with the process of judicialisation. 
Thus, if it is found, for example, that the judicialisation process is more prominent in 
shipping and maritime arbitration than in international commercial arbitration it will 
be important to consider what fosters the judicialisation agenda in former and why 
the latter is less susceptible to effects of this development.  
 
Throughout this thesis limited references will be made to investment arbitration. 
This is because international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration have 
different dynamics and a much greater degree of judicialisation is observed in 
investment arbitration as opposed to international commercial arbitration. This often 
makes the comparison between the two branches of arbitration inadequate and 
inappropriate.  
 
The high degree of judicialisation of investment arbitration is demonstrated by the 
proposal for establishing a permanent investment court system to replace the existing 
investor-to-state dispute settlement. In addition, due to the publication of many 
awards and annulment decisions in investor-state cases de facto precedents play a 
more prominent role in investment arbitration than in international commercial 
arbitration. Finally, it could be argued that there are difference between arbitrator’s 
role and functions in investment arbitration and international commercial arbitration. 
As investment arbitration usually involves public interests, arbitrators often help 
shape the content of substantive investment law through the interpretation of open-
ended norms in investment treaties. There are strong supporters of the proposition 
that arbitral tribunals should make efforts to further the development of international 
law when writing their awards. In contrast, the principle of party autonomy is of 
paramount importance in international commercial arbitration and arbitrators are 
wary of stepping outside their mandate by “making law” through the way they 
interpret and apply the law. Arbitrator’s function is perceived to be deliverance of ad 
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hoc justice in view of the specific facts of the case and arbitration’s ambition to 
develop the law is much more limited. Policy considerations rarely play a role 
because arbitrators are called to settle private business disputes. 
 
The reasons for examining the process of judicialisation particularly with respect to 
international commercial arbitration are the following: 
(i) International commercial arbitration is a well-established branch of 
arbitration characterised by long tradition, strong support for the principle 
of party autonomy and profound customary practice; 
(ii) International commercial arbitration is a great example of a field where 
industries opt for procedural flexibility but also want to be guaranteed 
legal certainty and predictability of the outcome. Hence, it is a suitable 
area to examine as to whether business’ needs boost or suppress the 
judicialisation process; 
(iii) There is no mandatory commercial arbitration, few mandatory rules and 
limited public policy considerations in international commercial 
arbitration. Thus, this will not leverage the results of the analysis towards 
a presumptive answer to the question as to whether there is a process of 
judicialisation in international arbitration. Policy considerations do not 
play a significant role in international commercial arbitration, which is 
often the case in consumer and labour arbitration and even in 
international investment arbitration.  
 
With the popularisation of international arbitration, parties have started to resort to it 
in legal relations that are not typically associated with this method of dispute 
resolutions; neither did arbitration historically emerge for resolving such conflicts
35
. 
 
 
                                                 
35
  See Stipanowich, ‘Arbitration: The “New Litigation”’ (n 23) 11 “Since arbitration processes 
took over the territory historically reserved for litigation in the public forum, the character of 
arbitration has changed.” 
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Terminology – Legalised, Formalised, Contractualised, 
Americanised, Harmonised or Judicialised International 
Arbitration? 
 
Apart from “judicialisation” 36 , commentators use terms like “legalisation” 37 , 
“formalisation”38, “Americanisation”39, “contractualisation”40 and “harmonisation”41 
                                                 
36
  See e.g. Lillich and Brower (n 19); Dezalay and Garth, Dealing in Virtue (n 23); Nariman, ‘The 
Spirit of Arbitration’ (n 23); Schneider, ‘Not Quite a World Without Trials’ (n 23); Redfern, 
‘Stemming the Tide of Judicialisation in International Arbitration’ (n 23); Brower (n 23); David 
W. Rivkin, ‘Towards a New Paradigm in International Arbitration: The Town Elder Model 
Revisited’ (2008) 24 Arbitration International 375–386; L. Tyrone Holt Esquire, ‘Whither 
Arbitration? What Can Be Done to Improve Arbitration and Keep Out Litigation’s Ill Effects’ 
(2009) 7 DePaul Bus. & Comm. L.J. 455–480; Stipanowich, ‘Arbitration: The “New 
Litigation”’ (n 23); Carbonneau, ‘Judicialization of the Process’ (n 23); Vijay K Bhatia, 
‘Judicialisation of International Commercial Arbitration Practice: Issues of Discovery and 
Cross-examination’ (2011) 1 Lapland Law Review 15–29; Maurizio Gotti, ‘The Judicialization 
of Arbitration Discourse in the Italian Context’ in Christopher N. Candlin and Vijay K Bhatia 
(eds), Discourse and Practice in International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Routledge 
2012); Sundaresh Menon, ‘Keynote Address’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), ICCA Congress 
Series No. 17 (Singapore 2012) (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2013); Alec Stone Sweet, 
‘The Evolution of International Arbitration: Delegation, Judicialization, Governance’ in Walter 
Mattli and Thomas Dietz (eds), International Arbitration and Global Governance: Contending 
Theories and Evidence (1st edn, OUP 2014); Rémy Gerbay, ‘Is the End Nigh Again? An 
Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of International Arbitration’ (2014) 25 The 
American Review of International Arbitration 223–247. 
37
  See e.g. Perry A. Zirkel and Andriy Krahmal, ‘Creeping Legalism in Grievance Arbitration: Fact 
or Fiction?’ (2001) 16 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 243–265; SI Strong, ‘Increasing Legalism in 
International Commercial Arbitration: A New Theory of Causes, A New Approach to Cures’ 
(2013) 7 World Arbitration & Mediation Review 117–130; Dezalay and Garth (n 23); Helmer (n 
1).  
38
  See e.g. Bruce H. Mann, ‘The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration before the American 
Revolution’ (1984) 59 New York University Law Review 443–481; Bernhard E. Meyer, 
‘Formalism in Arbitration - Good or Evil?’ in Marcus Wirth and others (eds), the Search for 
‘Truth’ in Arbitration - ASA Special Series No. 35 (1st edn, Juris Net 2011); Christopher Clarke, 
‘Formalism in Arbitral Proceedings - Good or Evil?’ in Markus Wirth and others (eds), Search 
for ‘Truth’ in Arbitration: Is Finding the Truth What Dispute Resolution Is About? - ASA 
Special Series No. 35 (1st edn, Juris Net 2011); Jean D’Aspremont, ‘The Emergence of Formal 
Law-Ascertainment in the Theory of the Sources of International Law’ in Formalism and the 
Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (1st edn, OUP 
2011). 
39
  See e.g. Reed and Sutcliffe (n 28); Ulmer (n 28); Karamanian (n 28); Helmer (n 1); Romano (n 
28); Alford (n 28); Park, Americanization of International Arbitration and Vice Versa 
Arbitration of International Business Disputes (n 28); Bergsten (n 28); Hanotiau, ‘The Conduct 
of the Hearings’ (n 28); Seidenberg (n 28); Pierre Bienvenu and Martin Valasek, ‘Witness 
Statements and Expert Reports’ in R. Doak Bishop and Edward G. Kehoe (eds), The Art of 
Advocacy in International Arbitration (2nd edn, Juris Net 2010); von Mehrem and Jochum (n 
28); Kessler (n 28). 
 
Page 25 
when analysing the transformation of international commercial arbitration from an 
informal ADR mechanism into a litigation-like system. It is maintained in the thesis 
that the forces driving the process of judicialisation in international commercial 
arbitration also foster the processes of legalisation
42
, formalisation
43
, 
Americanisation
44
, contractualisation and even harmonisation
45
. The latter terms, 
however, fall short of explaining the complexity of factors that contribute to the 
transformation of international commercial arbitration. Taken separately they present 
a sketchy picture and indicate just some of the processes that are shaping the system 
of modern international commercial arbitration.  
 
In contrast, the term “judicialisation” encompasses the characteristics of legalisation, 
formalisation, Americanisation, contractualisation and harmonisation without 
overplaying the importance of one factor or another. Thus the concept of 
judicialisation is not unnecessarily curbed, which allows approaching the research 
questions from different angles. For the purposes of this thesis the term 
judicialisation denotes the process of increasing formalisation, legalisation, (self-
)regulation and institutionalisation of international commercial arbitration and the 
ever-growing resemblance to litigation. Judicialised international commercial 
arbitration stands in contrast to the bygone Golden Age of cheap, fast, efficient and 
less regulated international commercial arbitration. 
 
Having this working definition of judicialisation in mind, it would still be helpful to 
distinguish between the various terms and ascertain how each development affects 
international commercial arbitration. Legalisation, for example, is considered to be a 
                                                                                                                                          
40
  See e.g. Brunet, ‘Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration’ (n 23); 
Jack M. Graves, ‘Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive 
Set of Statutory Default Legal Rules’ (2011) 2 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 227–289. 
41
  See e.g. Craig (n 10); Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, ‘Past, Present, and Future Perspectives of 
Arbitration’ (2009) 25 Arbitration International 293–302; Daniele De Carolis, ‘The Process of 
Harmonisation of the Law of International Commercial Arbitration: Drafting and Diffusion of 
Uniform Norms’ (School of International Studies 2010); Helmer (n 1); Ranata Brazil-David, 
‘Harmonization and Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration’ (2011) 28 Journal 
of International Arbitration 445–466; Leahy and Bianchi (n 1).  
42
  See p 217, 236, text to n 64, 371, 566. 
43
  See p 63, text to n 286, 360, 499, 566, 593, 656, 698, 783. 
44
  See text to n 591, 619, 620. 
45
  See n 185, text to n 451, p 221, 228. 
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particular form of institutionalisation, which is characterised by three components, 
namely obligation, precision and delegation.
46
 What this means is that states and 
other actors are legally bound by a set of rules that unambiguously define the 
conduct they require or prescribe and third parties are granted authority to 
implement, interpret and apply the rules. Third parties are also delegated the 
authority to resolve disputes arising out of or in relation to the rules and possibly to 
make further rules. Thus, legalisation is usually associated with the proliferation of 
legal norms, on the one hand, and courts and/or tribunals that supervise the 
application of legal rules, on the other hand. By institutionalising usually informal 
relations between states or any other actors, the process of legalisation contributes to 
their formalisation and the development of a hierarchical system. 
 
This is why the term “legalisation” 47  is often used in international commercial 
arbitration to describe a process that fosters formality and rigidity in arbitration 
proceedings. In legalised arbitration precision and accuracy are more highly valued 
than time-efficiency. This inevitably increases the costs of arbitration and can lead to 
unnecessary delays. Participants in legalised arbitration proceedings usually have 
solid legal knowledge and litigation experience. They employ in international 
arbitration proceedings the same tools they use in litigation. This formalises the 
arbitral process and leads to proliferation of practices that are not typical for 
international commercial arbitration, such as prehearing motions, discovery, witness 
preparation, etc.  
 
The extensive length of legalised arbitration proceedings can also be attributed to the 
use of legal manoeuvres and dilatory tactics. Together with the lack of cooperation 
between the parties this makes the arbitral process highly adversarial and 
cumbersome. The reliance on legal formalities in legalised arbitration is enhanced by 
                                                 
46
  Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and 
Duncan Snidal, ‘The Concept of Legalisation’ (2000) 54 International Organization 401–419. 
See also De Carolis (n 41) 69 et seq. 
47
  See Stipanowich, ‘Arbitration: The “New Litigation”’ (n 23) 28: “Similar to litigation, modern 
‘legalised’ arbitration tends to work against ongoing relationships. They are both formalised 
adversary processes aimed at adjudicating rights and obligations, and thus are narrowly and 
backward focused. Legal counsel, not the parties themselves, drive the process. The question is 
not whether arbitration will improve an underlying commercial relationship, but how much harm 
it will do.” 
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the transposition of the notion of “fair and just process” applicable in litigation to 
international arbitration proceedings without any adjustment and consideration as to 
what fairness and justice mean in the context of international commercial 
arbitration.
48
 The implications are increased formalisation
49
, rigidity, and 
litigiousness
50
.  
 
                                                 
48
  Tom Tyler argues that fairness is dependent on the process and as long as individuals have a 
voice in the process and are convinced that they have been heard, the process as well as the 
outcome will be fairer (in Tyler Tom R., Kenneth A. Rasinski, and Nancy Spodick, ‘Influence of 
Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control’ (1985) 48 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 72–81, 80). In view of this it is suggested that arbitration users with 
extensive litigation experience will expect from the arbitral process to provide the same 
guarantees for the right to be heard as litigation does and will, therefore, actively encourage 
practices that, in their view, contribute to fair and just arbitration proceedings. See also 
Schneider, ‘Not Quite a World Without Trials’ (n 23) 127 in which the author argues that “the 
move toward ADR in the U.S. reflects a substantial interest in letting parties control their own 
destiny in disputes. (Of course, actual control might be illusory.) Nonetheless, ADR offers 
parties at least a perception of substantive control through the ability to speak for themselves and 
be heard in a respectful manner. Parties can decide when and how to settle, and meet their needs 
for cost savings, quick resolution, and an agreement directly crafted to meet their interests. 
Recent writing on ADR also focuses on the fairness of the process and the need to give parties a 
voice in the process. Research indicates that when parties perceive that they have exercised 
process control, they are also more likely to assume that they have a level of control over the 
outcome. And, even if the outcome is unfavorable, parties are more likely to perceive that 
outcome as substantively fair.”  
49
  See e.g. Fali S Nariman, ‘The Influence of Civil Lawyers on International Commercial 
Arbitration’ in Gerald Aksen and Robert Briner (eds), Global Reflections on International Law, 
Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Brinerinternational 
law, commerce and dispute resolution : liber amicorum in honour of Robert Briner (1st edn, 
ICC Publishing 2005) arguing that in modern international commercial arbitration arbitral 
awards have become “tedious, voluminous and too full of legal props in the form of quotations, 
as in court judgments”, while in the arbitration proceedings “’ceremonies’ are multiplying; 
‘formalities’ are on the increase; and much time is spent mirroring the arts of litigation, thus 
often missing the true quest – the ‘discovery of right’”. 
50
  The legalisation of international commercial arbitration appears to adversely affect arbitrator’s 
conduct as well. Arbitrators are becoming insecure about their inherent powers and hesitant to 
take a proactive approach in managing the arbitration proceedings in fear of being challenged. 
Thus, it becomes ever more difficult to limit the negative effect of litigation-like practices, such 
as pre-hearing motions, discovery, witness examination, etc.: “Arbitrators, intent upon striking a 
balance between fundamental fairness and efficiency, may be reluctant to push parties to limit 
such practices or to keep to schedule. Arbitrators' concerns about having their award subjected to 
a motion to vacate likely reinforce these tendencies, especially among arbitrators who lack the 
confidence of long experience. The reluctance to limit discovery may also reflect an arbitrator's 
desire to avoid offending anyone in the hope of securing future appointments.” in Stipanowich, 
‘Arbitration: The “New Litigation”’ (n 23) 13. With regard to the requirement arbitrators to 
impartial and independent, see 4.1.1 Arbitrator’s Vocation and the Double Standard for 
Arbitrator’s Impartiality and Independence on p. 188 et seq. 
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The process of legalisation is often associated with the American influence on 
international commercial arbitration and considered to be a result of the 
“Americanisation” of international commercial arbitration.51 Some authors argue that 
with the growing significance of Anglo-American law firms, there has been a 
proliferation of practices borrowed from American style litigation, such as 
prehearing motion practice, extensive discovery
52
, witness preparation
53
, 
sophisticated and eloquent style of pleading
54
, etc. 
 
Although the presence of an “American factor” in international commercial 
arbitration is undeniable, the arguments in favour of an on-going process of 
Americanisation are often exaggerated and one-sided. By its very nature 
international commercial arbitration is a forum where different legal traditions and 
cultures meet and, as such, the proliferation of certain practices is inevitable. 
Americanisation, however, appears to be only one of the dimensions of a more 
complex development changing the face of international commercial arbitration. 
 
While discussions about the Americanisation of international commercial arbitration 
focus entirely on the area of procedure
55
, attention should also be given to matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the sources of law in international 
commercial arbitration, regulation and harmonisation of the arbitral process, arbitral 
decision-making, etc. This is why some authors contend that international 
                                                 
51
  See generally Alford (n 28); von Mehrem and Jochum (n 28); Helmer (n 1); Ulmer (n 28); Reed 
and Sutcliffe (n 28); Romano (n 28); Seidenberg (n 28). 
52
  See e.g. Park, Americanization of International Arbitration and Vice Versa Arbitration of 
International Business Disputes (n 28) 8: “one frequently hears complaints about the 
‘Americanization’ of arbitration, usually related to aggressive litigation tactics that include hefty 
boxes of unmanageable exhibits, costly pre-trial discovery and disruptive objections to 
evidence.” 
53
  See e.g. Hanotiau, ‘The Conduct of the Hearings’ (n 28) 365 stating that ‘Until a few years ago, 
however, members of the Bar in various civil law countries were prohibited from having direct 
contact with a potential witness. In other words, preparing a witness was strictly forbidden and 
any one who breached the rule would incur disciplinary sanctions. Recently, the rule has been 
relaxed in international cases to avoid putting civil law lawyers at a disadvantage with English 
barristers or American attorneys.’ 
54
  See generally R. Doak Bishop, ‘United States’ in R. Doak Bishop, The Art of Advocacy in 
International Arbitration (R. Doak Bishop (ed), 2nd edn, Juris Net 2010). 
55
  Helmer (n 1) 37: “The differences between the two legal systems are most visible in the area of 
procedure, and, not surprisingly, the majority of publications discussing the Americanization of 
international commercial arbitration concentrate on procedural issues.” 
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commercial arbitration is not being influenced so much by the Anglo-American style 
of conducting arbitration, rather the new practices are the result of a process of 
harmonisation: 
 
(...) American influence on international arbitration is significant, but falls short of 
Americanization. Rather, the current trends and developments in international 
commercial arbitration demonstrate an ongoing process of harmonization in many areas 
of international arbitration. This includes national arbitration laws, rules of major 
arbitration institutions, and arbitration practices, as demonstrated by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and International Bar 
Association (lBA) documents as well as procedures adopted by international arbitral 
tribunals.
56
  
 
Undoubtedly, there have been continuous efforts to achieve a greater degree of 
harmonisation in international commercial arbitration in the last 50 years. The NYC 
and the UNCITRAL ML are considered as major milestones in the development of 
international commercial arbitration by contributing to its harmonisation in a number 
of areas, such as the enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, the 
role of national courts and their supervisory powers, the constitution and challenge 
of arbitrators, etc. The process of harmonisation of “arbitral procedural law”57 is 
further complemented by the continuous standardisation of institutional arbitration 
rules. The latter is demonstrated by the regularity with which arbitration institutions 
have been updating their sets of arbitration rules in the last 10-15 years. 
 
The level of harmonisation achieved in the field of international commercial 
arbitration has reinforced the primacy of the principle of party autonomy. This 
encourages greater procedural flexibility, while also providing some certainty and 
predictability in the parties’ contractual relations. The term “harmonisation” gives an 
account of the fact that the forces driving this process might be either external or 
internal. The concept of harmonisation, however, is not particularly helpful when 
                                                 
56
  Ibid 37, 38. 
57
  The concept of arbitral procedural law is a reference to the laws or the rules of law governing the 
arbitration proceedings. See also Richard Garnett, ‘International Arbitration Law: Progress 
towards Harmonisation’ (2002) 3 Melbourne Journal of International Law. 
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analysing the mechanics of arbitral decision-making. Furthermore, it undermines the 
role that cultural and legal diversity play in international commercial arbitration
58
. 
 
In light of the above, it is considered that the term “judicialisation” will best serve 
the objectives of this thesis. As indicated above, in contrast to the terms 
“legalisation”, “formalisation”, “Americanisation”, “contractualisation” and 
“harmonisation” the term “judicialisation” is capable of indicating phenomena that 
can be observed both in the conduct of international arbitration proceedings and in 
the arbitral decision-making. In addition, the concept of judicialisation is broad 
enough to appreciate the relevance of competing developments, such as the cultural 
diversification of international commercial arbitration, on the one hand, and the 
process of harmonisation, on the other hand, or the establishment of the primacy of 
party autonomy, on the one hand, and the formalisation of the arbitral process, on the 
other hand.  
 
The term “judicialisation” will be used in this thesis as a generic concept. It will 
encompass the meanings attributed to all other terms, i.e. “legalisation”, 
“formalisation”, “Americanisation”, “contractualisation” and “harmonisation”. By 
using judicialisation in its broad sense, the thesis will examine the various causes 
and implications of the developments shaping the face of modern international 
commercial arbitration and will not be limited by the definition that it adopts. Thus, 
“judicialisation” will be understood to indicate a process resulting in a displacement 
of the inherent and widely appreciated characteristics of international commercial 
                                                 
58
  In John M. Barkett and Jan Paulsson, ‘The Myth of Cultural Clash in International Commercial 
Arbitration’ (2009) 5 FIU L. Rev. 1–11 the authors maintain that cultural clashes “are a function 
of tactics not tradition” (at 3) but then quickly concede that “clashes occur” (at 3). Although it is 
acknowledged that when two lawyers are trained in different systems they develop very different 
skills, Barkett and Paulsson argue that this does not necessarily have an effect on the way 
arbitration proceedings are conducted. An example is given with the practice of cross-
examination, which is not typical for civil-law-trained lawyers but is now routinely conducted in 
international commercial arbitration. In the authors’ opinion, however, cross-examination is not 
an example of a cultural clash, but an issue of simple procedural fairness: “In establishing 
procedures, arbitrators must understand their impact on the disputants and insure that due 
process is not compromised” (at 4). It is true that as a procedural tool, the practice of cross-
examination has an effect on the fairness of the process, however, the authors have failed to 
appreciate the fact that the admissibility and necessity of conducting cross-examination will 
ultimately be decided by the arbitrators, who will rely on their legal training and experience in 
ruling on this issue. Thus, the cultural clash does not necessarily involve only legal counsel; it 
may rather be a clash between one of the counsel and the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal.  
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arbitration, i.e. informality, speediness, flexibility, time- and cost-efficiency, by 
features usually associated with national litigation, such as procedural formality, 
legalism, cumbersomeness, excessive costs, rigidity and even inefficiency. 
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CHAPTER 2  THE PROCESS OF JUDICIALISATION 
AND THE CONCEPT OF SOURCES OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
 
Objectives 
 
This chapter explores the concept of “source of law”59 in international commercial 
arbitration. Its main objective is to examine whether the recognition of certain rules 
and norms as sources of law reveals an ongoing process of judicialisation. The 
existence and classification of sources of law manifest formality and legalism. As 
one of the implications of judicialisation is considered to be the increasing formality 
and legalisation of international commercial arbitration, it is important to consider 
the role sources of law play in that area of law.  
 
Particular attention is to be given to the classification of the sources of law for two 
reasons. Firstly, if the categorisation of sources of law in international commercial 
arbitration is identical to the one in national jurisdictions, this congruence may foster 
the process of judicialisation by prompting arbitrators to interpret and apply the 
sources of law in a way very similar to the approach adopted by national judges. 
Secondly, the categorisation of the sources of law is of importance to examining 
whether there is an evolving hierarchical system of international arbitral law. Should 
evidence for such a developing system be found, this will imply that there is an 
ongoing legalisation and institutionalisation of international commercial arbitration, 
which are considered to be some of the implications of the process of judicialisation. 
 
The analysis commences with an overview of the major theories for source of law 
and it will proceed with a review of the classifications of sources of law suggested in 
                                                 
59
  Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage, ‘Sources of International Commercial Arbitration’ in 
Emmanuel Gailard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 1999) suggest that the main sources 
of international arbitration law consist of rules enacted by competent national authorities acting 
in a national or international context. This definition, however, is too narrow and does not reflect 
important characteristics attributed to international commercial arbitration, such as the tendency 
towards self-regulation. 
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the literature. In view of the theoretical foundations of the concept of source of law 
and taking into account the particularities of international commercial arbitration, a 
working classification of the sources of international commercial arbitration will be 
suggested. Such categorisation will contribute to the analysis on the evolution of 
sources of law and assist with establishing whether the latter benefits the 
judicialisation agenda.  
 
This chapter does not aim to construct a definition for “source of law” in the context 
of international commercial arbitration, since this will not add much to the study of 
the process of judicialisation. To define “source of law” will require an extensive 
research in the field of legal theory and legal philosophy, which is beyond the 
objectives of this thesis. The aim of this chapter is to set the theoretical foundation 
for assessing arbitrator’s approach to the sources of law, meaning the way they 
interpret, apply and weigh the sources of law. The mechanics of arbitrator’s 
decision-making, including the use and application of the sources of law will be 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 5.   
 
 
2.1 The Importance of Classification of the Sources of Law in the 
Context of International Commercial Arbitration 
 
Although little attention is paid to the classification of the sources of law
60
 in 
international commercial arbitration, this matter is of general importance and it is of 
particular significance when discussion the implications of the process of 
judicialisation. It goes back to the theoretical foundations and nature of international 
commercial arbitration and the legal order(s) from which the latter derives its 
legitimacy
61
. The classification of sources of international commercial arbitration is 
                                                 
60
  In this and the following chapters the term “source of law” is understood to be a reference to 
sources of law governing both the arbitration proceedings and the merits of the dispute. When 
the analysis requires a differentiation between these sets of rules, this would be made clear. 
61
  See generally Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration in Three Dimensions’ (2011) 60 ICLQ 291–323. Also 
Giuditta Cordero-Moss, ‘International Arbitration is Not Only International’ in Giuditta 
Cordero-Moss (ed), International Commercial Arbitration: Different Forms and Their Features 
(1st edn, OUP 2013) 8 stating: “(…) not only the law of the place of arbitration, but also other 
national laws may have an impact on arbitration, and that this is quite irrespective of whether the 
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necessary in order to understand and appreciate the complexity of modern 
arbitration, and to identify the variety of norms, which may be found applicable in 
arbitration proceedings.  
 
The issues of defining and classifying the sources of law in arbitration are of 
importance when addressing questions related to the tension between the various 
legal orders that bring international commercial arbitration to existence. Is arbitration 
legally connected to a particular jurisdiction or is it truly autonomous? Where do 
arbitrators derive their powers from and what is the scope of their authority? Can 
arbitration function or continue to function without the support of the law of a 
particular state? What is the limit of party autonomy? Can parties alter the 
institutional arbitration rules applicable to the arbitration proceedings and to what 
extent? All these questions, although not directly bringing up the problem of 
classification of the sources of law in international commercial arbitration, are linked 
to legal norms that govern arbitration proceedings, their interpretation, application 
and binding/persuasive effect.  
 
Apart from identifying those legal norms, a classification of the sources of law in 
international commercial arbitration has the purpose of examining the process of 
regulation and harmonisation in the field. A tendency of bringing rules to the system 
and developing stricter legal framework within which arbitration users can operate 
will be evidence of the on-going judicialisation process. Further regulation of the 
conduct and administration of arbitration proceedings will benefit and facilitate the 
judicialisation agenda, as it ensures greater certainty and predictability of the 
outcome of arbitral process. Besides, by developing a more advanced legal 
framework to govern the exertion of parties’, counsel’s and arbitrators’ rights and 
obligations, arbitration consumers highlight the importance of the way procedural 
and substantive justice is achieved.  
 
The classification of the sources of law in international commercial arbitration can 
also be of significance to analyse some emerging trends in this field. Although it is 
                                                                                                                                          
parties have chosen them to apply or have even decided that they shall not apply: the law of the 
place of enforcement (…) and, to a certain extent, the law applicable to the substance of the 
dispute (…)”. 
 
Page 35 
widely accepted that there is no hierarchy of norms in international commercial 
arbitration, it cannot be denied that there is increasing differentiation between the 
sources of arbitration in terms of their binding and persuasive effect.
62
 Arbitral 
tribunals necessarily apply certain principles and considerations in order to weigh in 
the legal force and binding effect of the sources of law. It can be argued that the 
growing importance of questions related to the scope of party autonomy and public 
policy, the relevance of the law at the seat of arbitration, the applicability of general 
rules of law, the essence of arbitrators adjudicative function, and considerations as to 
procedural flexibility, legal certainty, and natural justice can be linked to an 
emerging hierarchical system of rules of law in international commercial arbitration. 
Such a development will complement the attempts to bring more certainty and 
predictability of the outcome of commercial disputes and more transparency in the 
decision-making process of arbitrators – evolution that can be associated with the 
judicialisation process of arbitration.  
 
Finally and following the foregoing, a classification of the sources of law in 
international commercial arbitration sets the theoretical foundation for analysing the 
arbitrator’s decision-making process. A look in the “black box”63 is of importance in 
order to examine whether the judicialisation process can be traced to the decision-
making process of arbitrators, making it similar or identical to the one applied by 
national judges. The increased regulation of arbitral process, the complexity of 
transnational commercial disputes and the higher expectations of commercial parties 
have allegedly transformed international commercial arbitration. As put by Catherine 
Rogers:  
 
The modern international business environment has forced international arbitration to 
become a more formalised and legalized dispute resolution process. In its final 
incarnation, international arbitration is less recognizable as a form of ‘alternative 
                                                 
62
  See generally Moritz Renner, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Norms in Transnational Law?’ (2009) 26 
Journal of International Arbitration 533–555. 
63 
 A reference to the Bernhard Berger and Michael E. Schneider (eds), ‘Inside the Black Box: How 
Arbitral Tribunals Operate and Reach Their Decisions - ASA Special Series No. 42’ in (1st edn, 
Juris Net 2014). 
 
Page 36 
dispute resolution’ than as a type of ‘offshore litigation.’ This transformation has been 
both celebrated and decried as the “judicialization” of arbitration.
64
 
 
In order to analyse this transformation and to find out what the implications of the 
judicialisation process are, it will be necessary to correctly identify the legal 
framework, within which arbitration users exert their rights and obligations and 
which governs the conduct of arbitral process from its start to the enforcement stage.  
 
 
2.2 The Concept of Source of Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration Context 
 
The classification of sources of law in international commercial arbitration 
necessarily goes through analysing the concept of source of law from jurisprudential 
standpoint. General presentation of the doctrinal concepts of source of law is of 
importance for two reasons. Firstly, it will introduce the theoretical framework 
necessary to understand the nature of legal norms, the validity of the legal system 
and the authoritativeness of the sources of law. Simply put, it will provide an 
overview of possible answers to the question ‘What makes a norm a legal rule?’ 
Secondly, a brief introduction to the theoretical foundations of the concept of source 
of law will facilitate the presentation of the thesis that international commercial 
arbitration derives its legitimacy and sources of law from a number of potentially 
relevant legal orders.
65
 Hence, when categorising the sources of law in international 
commercial arbitration context, the analysis will take into account concepts of 
“source of law” found in jurisprudence and compare them to arbitration reality.  
 
2.2.1 Doctrinal Concepts of Source of Law 
 
The main theories of law that determine the understanding of the term “source of 
law” are five, namely the naturalism, positivism, formalism, realism and legal 
                                                 
64
  Catherine A. Rogers, ‘Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for 
International Arbitration’ (2002) 23 Mich. J. Int’l L. 341–423, 352-353. 
65
  See generally Paulsson, ‘Arbitration in Three Dimensions’ (n 61).  
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pluralism. The first two take completely opposite stances as to the foundations of the 
law, the validity of the legal system and the authoritativeness of the sources of law. 
The natural law theories proclaim that “unjust laws are not laws” and accept that law 
have a dual nature – it can be considered both as a social fact of power and practice, 
and as a set of reasons for actions that are sound and just, and therefore normative. 
As explained in McCoubrey & White's Textbook on Jurisprudence, “[n]atural law 
(…) was principally a theory of the nature of morality in which the law was used as a 
model for understanding it”.66 Thus, according to the natural law theories the moral 
rules not only fall under the category of sources of law, but they are at the top of the 
hierarchy of norms, as they are rules of “higher law” and always apply to supplement 
the “social-fact” sources, especially when the latter are injustice, inadequate and 
insufficient behavioural guides. In normal adjudication and judicial reasoning two 
set of rules are used to rule on a case and justify the correctness of a decision – on 
one hand, the social-fact sources or “legal materials”67 (statutes, precedents, practice, 
etc.), and, on the other hand, moral standards, which function as a direct source of 
law.  
 
The opponents of the idea that law depends on its merits and goes hand in hand with 
morality form the legal positivism school of thought. As formulated by John Austin, 
“the existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be 
not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a 
different enquiry”.68 The positivist thesis does not state that the idea of justice, moral 
standards, and law are incompatible; it only asserts that the existence of a legal 
system and enforcement of laws is dependent on the presence of certain structures of 
governance. Whether and what laws are going to be enacted is subject to the 
officials’ power to recognise social guides and standards as authoritative, and not to 
the extent social norms satisfy ideals of justice or morality. Thus, according to one of 
the main architects of the legal positivism theory, Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, 
laws are de facto the sovereign’s commands backed up by threat of force or sanction. 
                                                 
66
  James Penner and Emmanuel Melissaris, McCoubrey & White’s Textbook on Jurisprudence (5th 
edn, OUP 2012) 12. 
67
  See Stephen Guest, Ronald Dworkin (3rd edn, Stanford University Press 2012). 
68
  John Austin, Austin: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Wilfrid Rumble (ed), 
Cambridge University Press 1995) 157. 
 
Page 38 
Hans Kelsen further develops the positivist idea of the coercive nature of law; 
however, he substantiates the validity and authoritativeness of the sources of law not 
on the ground of the sovereign’s commands, but through the “basic norm”.69 In 
Kelsen’s view “[l]aw is not, as it is sometimes said, a rule. It is a set of rules having 
the kind of unity we understand by a system.”70 The unity of the system is what 
validates the biding force of the norms, and not the fact that the laws are commanded 
by one sovereign. Thus, a by-law is legally valid, as it is a result of a corporation 
exercising powers conferred on it by the legislature. The latter grants power in 
accordance with the constitution, which was itself created as per an earlier 
constitution.
71
 Kelsen asserts that at the very end of the chain of norms is the so 
called “basic norm” which is neither a legal rule, nor a social norm, but is biding. 
Hence, the authoritative sources of law should be those legal norms that are part of 
the unity of the normative system.  
 
H.L.A. Hart accepts Kelsian’s view on the normative foundations of legal systems; 
however, he argues that the authority of law is not grounded in force (sovereign 
commands), or in a presupposed norm (basic rule), but in a social rule, practice, and 
custom. Hart divides the rules into primary and secondary rules, as the latter 
represents rules “for conclusive identification of the primary rules of obligation”72. 
Thus, three categories might be distinguished within the group of the secondary rules 
– “rules of recognition” which specify the criteria of validity in the legal system, 
“rules of change” which identify the individual or body of persons who will be 
entitled to change or introduce new primary rules, and rules bestowing powers on 
individuals to judge whether a primary rule has been violated. Hence, Hart places the 
social customs at the very top of the legal system as they provide guidance and 
standards for behaviour. These social customs, however, are official, i.e. in order for 
the rules of behaviour to be valid they “must be generally obeyed, and (...) must be 
                                                 
69
  See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (3rd edn, The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 
2009). 
70
  Ibid 3. 
71
  The example is illustrated in the online version of Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/>  
72
  H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A. Bulloch (eds), 3rd edn, OUP 
2012) 95. 
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effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its 
officials”73.  
 
International commercial arbitration is considered a part of the normative system and 
its recognition is dependant on the existence of a certain structures of governance. 
Arbitration is conducted within national legal regimes, the validity of the arbitration 
proceedings and arbitration agreements is subject to mandatory rules and public 
policy of national laws, but most importantly arbitration lacks the coercive powers of 
national courts and relies on the public system of justice to compel compliance. The 
interrelationship between national courts and international commercial arbitration is 
highlighted by Hon Mr Justice Blair in his speech at the 2016 Commercial Litigation 
and Arbitration Forum.
74
 Hon Mr Justice Blair cited statistics according to which in 
2015 25.7% of cases commenced in the Commercial Court were arbitration claims 
and this trend is allegedly rising. These cases include wide range of issues – from 
injunctions, interim measures and appointment of arbitrators, to registration of 
awards and enforcement, appeals on points of law and challenges on the grounds of 
serious irregularity. Hon Mr Justice Blair pointed out that this not only gives some 
perspective on the scope of the court’s work in support of arbitration, but it also 
emphasises the interrelationship between international commercial arbitration and 
national legal systems. In the words of Hon Mr Justice Blair: “(…) [w]e do not think 
it is accurate or sensible to see arbitration and litigation as in some kind of arms race. 
Both should be seen as mutually supportive parts of what is a developing system of 
international commercial dispute resolution.”75  
 
It is to be noted that in contrast with international commercial arbitration some ADR 
mechanisms may appear to operate within the normative system more independently. 
For example, eBay dispute resolution is conducted on the basis of well-developed 
and formalised set of rules of conduct. EBay regulatory workings appear “to be 
                                                 
73
  Ibid 116. 
74
  See Remarks by The Hon Mr Justice Blair: Commercial Dispute Resolution – Current 
Developments in the Commercial Court, available at: <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/blair-j-legal-week-20161103.pdf> 
75
  Ibid 7. 
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closer to a legal system than to a contractual framework”.76 The efficiency of the 
eBay dispute resolution mechanism rests on its detailed policies, which have a high 
level of recognition among eBay users. This recognition stems from the constraining 
power of eBay’s user policies by virtue of the instrumentalisation of the reputation of 
eBay members.
77
 EBay users are sanctioned if they refuse to participate in the 
dispute resolution process or fail to comply with its outcome. 
 
Hart’s theory of primary and secondary rules is seriously questioned by the leading 
theoretical spokesman for legal formalism Ronald Dworkin, Dworkin rejects the 
differentiation between the rules of law into rules of obligation and rules of 
recognition/change. In his opinion “when lawyers reason or dispute about legal 
rights and obligations, […] they make use of standards that do not function as rules, 
but operate differently as principles, policies, and other sorts of standards”78. In line 
with formalist theory, Dworkin argues that the difference between legal principles 
and legal rules is just a logical distinction and both sets of standards directs to a 
particular decision about legal obligations under certain circumstances. The 
difference lies in the character of the direction they give: 
 
The standards […] are not the sort we think of as legal rules. […] They are different 
because they are legal principles rather than legal rules. […] Rules are applicable in all-
or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in 
which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it 
contributes nothing to the decision. […] But this is not the way sample principles […] 
operate. Even those which look most like rules do not set out legal consequences that 
follow automatically when the conditions provided are met.
79
 
 
The assertion that legal rules are complimented by and interpreted in view of a set of 
standards supports formalists’ argument for an autonomous adjudication, i.e. “judges 
can reach the required decision without recourse to non-legal normative 
                                                 
76
  Arnold Ingen-Housz, ADR in Business. Practice and Issues across Countries and Cultures: 2 
(1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2010) 139. 
77
  Ibid. 
78
  Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules I’ in Larry May and Jeff Brown (eds), Philosophy of 
Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings (1st edn, Wiley-Blackwell 2009) 99. 
79
  Ibid 100, 101.  
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considerations of morality and political philosophy”80. The way formalists ascertain 
the rules of law is what distinguish them from the adherents of other schools of 
thought. Jean d'Aspremont explains the rationale of formalism in international law as 
follows: 
 
Formalism […] refers to the use of formal yardsticks to distinguish law from non-law. 
According to a formal conception of law-identification, any norm that meets such 
predefined formal standards is a rule of law. This formal standardization will 
materialize itself in predefined formal indicators. These predefined indicators can be 
linguistic or material. This means that formal ascertainment of legal rules does not 
automatically necessitate the existence of a written instrument where the rule concerned 
is enshrined.
81
 
 
Indeed in contrast with Hart, Kelsen, and their supporters who reduce the functional 
legal norms to one variety, namely rules (although of various types), formalists look 
at other important aspects of law in order to ascertain the rules, such as legal 
principles, judicial decision-making
82
, and the form of functional legal units
83
. 
Robert Summers, a formalist adherent, attempts to understand the nature of a legal 
system by dividing it into functional units, namely legislatures and courts, legal 
precepts, such as rules and principles, nonpreceptual species of law, such as 
contracts and property interests, interpretive and other legal methodologies, 
sanctions and remedies, and analysing the dynamics between them. In Summers’ 
words:  
 
(…) to grasp the nature of a legal system and the purposes it can serve, it is not enough 
to understand the functional units of the system. (…) These units must also be combines 
and integrated within an operational system to be duly functional. Various 
                                                 
80
  Brian Leiter, ‘Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?’ (2010) 16 Legal Theory 
111–133, 111. 
81
  Jean D’Aspremont, ‘The Concept and the Rationale of Formalism in International Law’ in 
Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules 
(1st edn, OUP 2011) 13. 
82
  Ronald Dworkin is often criticised for focusing too closely on judicial decision-making. See 
Brian Bix, ‘Form and Formalism: The View from Legal Theory’ (2007) 20 Ratio Juris 45–55, 
47. 
83
  Robert S. Summers, Form and Function in a Legal System: A General Study (1st edn, OUP 
2005). 
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systematizing devices are required for this. Some of these devices centralise and 
hierarchically order the relations between legal institutions as, for example, with the 
general prioritization of a legislature over a court in the making of law. Other such 
devices specify and order system-wide criteria for identifying valid rules and other 
species of law of the system in the first place. (…) Other devices consist of basic 
operational techniques that integrate and coordinate institutions, precepts, 
methodologies, sanctions, and other functional units. (…) From systematic study of the 
nature and roles of legal form, form itself can be clarified, functional legal units and the 
legal system as a whole can be better understood (…).
84
  
 
Summers’ point that the focus on rules cannot give us adequate and full 
understanding of many aspects of law is particularly relevant when trying to 
decipher the concept of source of law in the context of international commercial 
arbitration. Full appreciation of the variety of rules and their functions in the area of 
arbitration can be achieved by acknowledging the importance of the rules of 
procedure, the role of arbitration institutions, the forms of arbitration agreements, the 
role of arbitrators, etc.  
 
Less formalised approach to the sources of law is adopted by the legal realism school 
of thought. The legal realist movement has been triggered by the works of John 
Chipman Gray and Oliver Wendall Holmes, and it is further developed by Karl 
Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and Felix Cohen. The realists aim to show how the cases 
are being decided de facto, so they abandoned the conceptual approach of the 
positivists and naturalists in favour of an empirical analysis. In the core of legal 
realism stand the idea that the available law is usually insufficient for the judges to 
decide on cases, so the latter create new law by exercising law-making discretion. 
Indeed, realists, such as John Chipman Gray, draw a difference between the concepts 
of “law” and “sources of law”. The former consists of “the rules authoritatively laid 
down by the courts in their decisions”85, while the latter represents “certain legal and 
non-legal materials relied upon by the judges in shaping rules which make up the 
laws, namely i) Acts of legislative organs; ii) Precedents; iii) Customs: iv) Principles 
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85
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of morality”86. Thus the legal realism school of thought takes into account that legal 
reasoning may be indeterminate in some cases and judges may resort to practices and 
customs as a normative benchmark in order to reach a predicable and right outcome. 
Contrary to formalist theories, which claim that law is rationally determinate and 
there is no need for recourse to non-legal normative considerations of morality or 
political philosophy, the proponents of legal realism recognise the positivist 
approach to sources of law, however they apply social sciences into the domain of 
jurisprudence for predictive purposes.  
 
The commercialisation of national Commercial Courts and the judicialisation of 
international commercial arbitration could be viewed as legal realism at play. These 
processes indicate that both courts and arbitration users are interested in seeing that 
the rule of law is upheld, while commercial justice that meets the needs of the very 
rapidly changing world of international markets, trade and commerce is delivered. 
On the one hand, there are aspirations to bring Commercial Courts up to speed with 
the developments in the international markets. The Right Hon The Lord Thomas of 
Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales has recently announced the 
formation of a forum of Commercial Courts which objective is “to build on and 
develop a more systematic approach to providing a common approach to the 
resolution of disputes and (…) to developing the law to keep pace with the way our 
global village is developing”.87  In The Lord Chief Justice’s opinion commercial 
courts will realise better their potential to ensure “the prosperity and good order of 
the digital village” if they are able to start developing more structured links, sharing 
best practices, considering problematic areas and novel developments and building 
mutual confidence.
88
 On the other hand, there are calls to increase and equalise 
access to information about arbitrators and their decision making, which aims to 
promote greater transparency, fairness and accountability in the selection of 
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international arbitrators.
89
 Thus, both developments aim at improving the access to 
best practices, customs and know-how in order to enhance the decision making of 
judges and arbitrators.    
 
It has been argued that the best – and perhaps only – manner to justify in theory the 
multiplicity of legal and social norms that apply in international commercial 
arbitration is legal pluralism
90
. Following the theory of legal pluralism all social 
bodies may be the source of a legal order and not only the State. In a pluralist 
approach the recognition of such orders by the State is not a condition of their 
existence.
 91
 According to the legal pluralism school of thought there are multiple not 
just one legal system that exist within a state or a geographic state. This presupposes 
a re-conceptualisation of the traditional State-centric paradigm of law-making and a 
shift towards a paradigm of spontaneous creation of rules of law and social norms by 
the international business community. In an era of globalisation, rapidly changing 
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international markets and evolving complex society the school of legal pluralism 
offers a way to reconcile the coexistence and competition between hard and soft law, 
official and unofficial law, public and private norms, rules of law and social norms. 
This makes legal pluralism the legal realism of 21
st
 century.  
 
Legal pluralism has even been suggested as one of the theoretical foundations for the 
new lex mercatoria.
92
 On the basis of the latter Teubner argues that the law-making 
function has moved away from the State into various transnational actors.
93
 Ralf 
Michaels, however, correctly points out that although legal pluralism helpfully 
explains the existence of law beyond the State, in maintaining that legal orders are 
completely autonomous one runs the risk of overstating the internal coherence and 
external autonomy of the transnational legal orders that are depicted.
94
 This may 
appear be particularly true for international commercial arbitration, which reliance 
on the cooperation and supervisory powers of national courts is not to be 
underestimated. In fact the process of judicialisation in international commercial 
arbitration may be indicative of the weaknesses of the legal pluralism theory as it 
suggest an urge for greater certainty, predictability and coherence in transnational 
arbitration. 
 
The above overview of the schools of thought gives an understanding of the 
complexity that permeates the notion “source of law” and the difficulties associated 
with the categorisation of the sources of law. If just looking at custom as a source of 
law, one will see that different schools of thoughts adopt different understanding. 
Whether custom will be considered to be a species of natural law or positive law is 
of importance to questions as “whether a practice can displace a contrary statute (or 
other form of positive law-making authority) or can be in conflict with right 
reason.”95 There is no uniformly accepted concept of source of law and this is of 
particular importance to international commercial arbitration, which not only may 
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derive its legitimacy from several conceivable jurisdictions, but also by its very 
nature is an intersection of sources of national and international, private and public 
origin to which different doctrinal theories may apply. Hence, for the purposes of 
classifying the sources of law in the context of international commercial arbitration it 
is essential to adhere to a broad understanding of the concept “source of law”. Such 
an understanding may necessarily be adjusted in view of the particularities of a 
specific case at hand. A. Roger provides a useful example of what may go wrong if 
trying to generalise what the sources of law are: 
 
[t]he issues are complicated. […] The sources of English law are said to be Custom, 
Precedent, Equity, Legislation, and Subordinate Legislation. But already that would not 
apply to Canadian law, whose sources include the Chater of Rights and Freedoms, and 
embody both provincial and federal jurisdiction. Nor would it apply to European 
Community Law […], or to the United States […]. Under the civil law, doctrinal 
treatises – legal dogmatics – have some role as a source as well as the code.
96
 
 
Further analysis on the theoretical foundations of the notion “source of law” will not 
add much to the classification of sources of law, as it is not among the objectives of 
this chapter to construct a working definition of “source of law” in international 
commercial arbitration context. As for the concept of source of law from 
international law perspective, it has caused as much misunderstanding as in national 
jurisprudence. For example, Herbert Briggs points out that the term “source of law” 
leads to confusion with: (i) basis of international law, i.e. the basis of obligation of 
this law, (ii) causes, i.e. factors influencing its development, or (iii) its evidences, 
where the substantive rules find expression, and suggests that for the sake of clarity 
the term is used in a formal sense, as indicating the methods or procedures by which 
international law is created.
97
 Herbert Briggs’s opinion was shared and developed by 
Georg Schwarzenberger, who proposed the terms law-creating processes for treaties, 
custom and general principles, and law-determining agencies for “subsidiary means 
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for determination of law, this is judicial practice and doctrine”.98 It is also to be 
noted that although a definition of source of law is provided in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, this concept is of relevance to the field 
of public international law and not necessarily to private international law.  
 
Given that international commercial arbitration is a forum where different legal 
traditions and cultures meet it might be of benefit to consider the concept of source 
of law and the issues concerning the classification of sources of law from a 
comparative law perspective. As Stefan Vogenauer points out the concept of source 
of law is always followed by terminological difficulties as it is used to designate 
related, but ultimately different objects.
99
  
 
Stefan Vogenauer distinguishes between five concepts of “source of law”: the first 
one is used to denote “institutions or groups of persons which create law” (e.g. the 
legislature, the courts, the merchants); the second one refers to “various forms of 
conduct which these institutions or persons engage in and which are generally 
accepted in a legal system as validly generating law” (such as the passing of 
legislation, rendering a decision, or customary behaviour); the third concept 
designates “the wide variety of factors influencing these institutions and persons 
when they are creating law” (e.g. certain customary behaviour can be treated as a 
source of a passage in a treatise); the fourth one denotes “the body of law resulting 
from one of the forms of conduct that are generally accepted as validly generating 
law” (e.g. statute law, case law, or customary law); and the fifth one refers to “the 
instruments or documents from which lawyers obtain their knowledge of such law 
and which provide evidence for its existence” (such as statutory materials, case 
reports, records of customs, or legal treatises).
100
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Although all five notions presented by Vogenauer are interrelated, the notion of 
source of law in this thesis will be understood to denote the body of law that is a 
result of a law-making or law-applying function, and the instruments or documents, 
which contain the rules of law. Such a general understanding of the concept of 
source of law serves the purposes of this Chapter and Chapter 3. The objective of the 
analysis hereto is not to construct a definition of source of law or to explore how the 
sources of law are created. Instead the aim is to consider whether the approach to the 
sources of law could be linked to the process of judicialisation. As the issues of 
classification could indicate a preference for a judicialised or flexible approach to the 
sources of law in international commercial arbitration, these matters will be 
discussed further. 
 
Indeed the question to be asked here is not “What makes the legal norms in 
international commercial arbitration what they are?” but rather “Does the recognition 
of certain norms as sources of law in international commercial arbitration 
demonstrate an aspiration for judicialisation?” In other words, regardless of the 
precise definition of sources of law, if the categorisation, emerging hierarchical 
order
101
 and authoritativeness of the sources of law in international commercial 
arbitration show similarities to those applicable in national jurisdictions, such 
resemblance will demonstrate a tendency towards judicialisation, i.e. international 
commercial arbitration becoming more alike national litigation. Other related 
questions to be considered are: How does the recognition of certain resources, 
materials or norms as sources of law contribute to the judicialisation agenda or not? 
Does this recognition make them more influential and authoritative sources of law 
and is this linked to the pursuit of greater predictability, certainty and foreseeability 
in international commercial arbitration? 
 
In order to address those questions issues of general jurisprudence and legal theory 
are to be considered in view of the special attributes of international commercial 
arbitration and current developments in the field. It is important to take into account 
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the transnationality of arbitration – it is a forum for resolving international trade 
disputes where rules of national and international law, norms drafted by professional 
bodies and intergovernmental organisations, and trade practices and customs meet. 
Due to its transnational character some authors consider international commercial 
arbitration as an entirely autonomous legal order separated from the national legal 
systems. For example, according to Jan Paulsson the suggestion that arbitration can 
have no foundation other than that of the legal order of the particular state in which 
the arbitration takes place is out-dated; “[a] critical look at the competing 
conceptions leads to the insight that arbitration derives its legitimacy and 
effectiveness from an indefinite number of potentially relevant legal orders.” 102 
Giuditta Cordero-Moss also shares the view that international commercial arbitration 
is not affiliated only with the law of the seat of arbitration: 
 
(…) not only the law of the place of arbitration, but also other national laws may have 
an impact on arbitration, and that this is quite irrespective of whether the parties have 
chosen them to apply or have even decided that they shall not apply: the law of the 
place of enforcement (…) and, to a certain extent, the law applicable to the substance of 
the dispute (…).
103
 
 
An overview of the special attributes of international commercial arbitration will 
provide the context in which to consider issues of categorisation of the sources of 
law.  
 
2.2.2 Special Attributes of International Commercial Arbitration  
 
This sections aims at providing an overview of the inherent features of international 
commercial arbitration before embarking on a discussion about the categorisation of 
the sources of law. It is necessary to approach the latter with an understanding of the 
characteristics of international commercial arbitration in order to examine whether a 
traditional, formalistic approach to the sources of law and their classification is 
appropriate in a forum, which is valued for being an alternative to court litigation.    
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International commercial arbitration is an alternative method for resolution of 
international private disputes. It is conceived to be an a-nation neutral forum, which 
does not subject the disputing parties to the caprices of local courts. As explained by 
Julian Lew: 
 
The ideal and expectation is for international arbitration to be established and 
conducted according to internationally accepted practices, free from the controls of 
parochial national laws, and without the interference or review of national courts. 
Arbitration agreements and awards should be recognised and given effect, with little or 
no complication or review, by national courts.
104
 
 
Although the autonomy of commercial parties to agree their dispute to be resolved 
by independent experts has remained a pivotal principle in international commercial 
arbitration, the battle for supremacy between national laws and national courts, on 
the one hand, and party autonomy and the independence of international arbitration 
system, on the other hand, has not ceased yet. Throughout the years national laws 
variously sought to control, administer, interfere or support international commercial 
arbitration. To oppose the attempts to “localise” international commercial 
arbitration
105
 and to promote uniformity in the field, professional private institutions 
and international and intergovernmental organisations have produced a considerable 
body of rules of law, which aims to ensure the self-management and self-governance 
of the system. 
 
Despite, or maybe because of, paradoxically seeking “the cooperation of the very 
public authorities from which it wants free itself” 106 , international commercial 
arbitration cannot exist independently from national jurisdictions. In today’s 
international arbitration the relevance and influence of national arbitration laws and 
of national court supervision is greatly reduced, however lex fori still plays an 
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important role in arbitration proceedings. Although Francis Mann’s position that 
“every arbitration is a national arbitration” 107  is no longer endorsed, as it is 
considered inflexible and incorrect,
108
 it is aimed to suggest that international 
arbitration does not exist in a “legal vacuum”109  – it derives its legitimacy and 
authoritativeness from certain legal orders. Mann’s legacy was seeking to defend the 
legitimacy of international arbitration and to protect some arbitrators from the 
temptation to exceed their powers and use arbitration as a tool for law-voidance.
110
 
 
However, as Jan Paulsson observes, in his article Mann does not make distinction 
between identifying the law followed in making an award, on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, the law that gives effect to the undertaking to arbitrate, to the arbitral 
process, and to the final award. The result is that Mann unnecessarily restricts the 
number of legal orders that can validate arbitration proceedings to just one – the law 
of the seat of arbitration. In contrast to Mann’s theory Paulsson observes that “it is 
curious to insist on the authority of a preordained lex arbitri all the while observing 
that it is not preordained at all, since the parties may choose their legal order.”111 For 
example, there may be several conceivable enforcement fori
112
, parallel court and 
arbitration proceedings, national courts asked to grant provisional measures in aid of 
arbitration – international arbitration is not confined to the rules of law of a single 
legal system. Hence, when categorising the sources of law in international 
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commercial arbitration it is necessary to keep in mind that several legal orders may 
give effect to arbitration and thus various rules of law may be applicable to it. 
 
The above helpfully illustrates the plurality of sources of international commercial 
arbitration and the complexities associated with identifying the laws that give effect 
to the undertaking of arbitration, the conduct of arbitration proceedings and the 
making and enforcement of the arbitral award, on one hand, and, the laws that are 
found applicable to parties’ commercial relationships and are followed in making the 
award, on the other. The privatisation of adjudication authority and the development 
of private law-making, however, give rise to arguments that international 
commercial arbitration is part of a transnational legal order
113
, which has to be 
distinguished and kept intact from national legal systems. Such assertions have been 
extended to judicial pronouncements, but are not embedded in legislation. The 
proponents of the thesis of an autonomous arbitral legal order maintain that when 
faced with a matter which is not expressly settled by the parties, respectively the law 
chosen by the latter, arbitrators can and should reach a decision by interpretation and 
application of general principles of law and lex mercatoria, which are more 
appropriate and commercially-fit for resolving disputes by means of arbitration than 
the legal rules of a different legal system. Julian Lew explains this vision idea, which 
has been gaining popularity for half century now, as follows: 
 
[t]oday, there is increasingly, I suggest, a new regime. International arbitration is a sui 
juris or autonomous dispute resolution process, governed primarily by non-national 
rules and accepted international commercial rules and practices. […] [I]nternational 
arbitration is, and should be recognised to be, an autonomous process for the 
determination of all types of international business disputes. It exists in its own space – 
a non-national or transnational or, if you prefer, an international domain. It has its own 
space independent of all national jurisdictions. This has implications for the approach of 
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national courts and law when their involvement with a particular arbitration is 
sought.
114
 
 
The well-known author and arbitrator further adds that there is no doubt that 
international arbitration coexists with national laws, however, “national courts will 
not interfere in the arbitration process (…) and will not seek to review or know better 
than the arbitrators in any particular case.”115 The theory of an autonomous arbitral 
legal order have important implications with regard to the sources of international 
commercial arbitration and particularly as to their authoritativeness. The proponents 
of this thesis support the view that transnational norms and trade practices are often 
better suited to provide answers to issues arising out of international commercial 
relations than national positive law. Although the theory of an autonomous arbitral 
legal order is mainly endorsed by French courts
116
, it once again demonstrates the 
multiple legal orders, hence rules of law, that may give effect to arbitration. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that when commenting on the sources of international 
commercial arbitration, it is important to bear in mind that there is not a unanimous 
view as to the legal order(s) that legitimise international arbitration. Whether one 
will follow the plurality thesis or the autonomous arbitral legal order theory makes 
no significant difference as to the numbers of conceivable legal orders that may be 
applicable to arbitration.
117
 The conflict in the views lies in the acknowledgement or 
the dismissal that one of those legal orders has primacy over the others.  
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In light of the abovesaid and in view of the forthcoming classification of the sources 
of international commercial arbitration, it is important to note the difference that Jan 
Paulsson draws between the law applicable to arbitration and the law applicable in 
arbitration.
118
 As further explained by the eminent author, the distinction between the 
two is that the latter determines arbitrators’ decisions, while the former refers to the 
source of their authority and the legal order that governs arbitration.
119
 In a less 
unequivocal way, Julian D. M. Lew also comments on the contrast between the rules 
of law applicable to the merits of disputes between commercial parties, and the rules 
of law governing the undertaking of arbitration, parties’ and arbitrators’ conduct, 
scope of arbitrators’ power, enforcing and setting aside arbitral awards: 
 
There are rules of private international law that regulate the interaction of different or 
conflicting national laws. There are also rules to regulate the relations between national 
laws and international arbitration. These rules have their origin in public international 
law, private international law and intergovernmental and non-government instruments 
which have developed procedures and practices that have wide international 
acceptance.
120
 
  
Hence, although the primary sources of international commercial arbitration that are 
applicable to parties’ disputes are of private international law origin, there might be 
instances where sources of international public law can be taken into account 
because they are relevant to determining the legitimacy of international commercial 
arbitration.
121
 With that in mind, it will be pertinent to note here that the Statute of 
the ICJ has a specific provision devoted on sources of law.  
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According to Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ the main sources of international 
law are international conventions, international custom and the general principles of 
law recognised by civilised nations. The latter are also recognised as a 
supplementary source of law under instruments of private international law.
122
 The 
Statute of the ICJ also endorses the judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations as a supplementary source of 
international law (or in the words of the Statute “a subsidiary means for 
determination of rules of law”). Though these have no binding force except between 
the parties and in respect of that particular case
123
, their role is of great importance. 
This approach to the supplementary sources provides for both legal certainty in 
application of the rules of law and flexibility in considering application of new legal 
reasoning to the matters. On one hand, the Court is free to follow the legal reasoning 
of its decisions established in previous cases, which benefits the creation of a stable 
and consistent jurisprudence; while on the other hand, the Court is not bound by this 
legal reasoning and can adopt a new one if it appears to be more appropriate. This 
ensures the flexibility and adjustment of the existing law to new life situations, for 
example in relation to technological developments, or acquiring new data or 
knowledge.
124
 The approach to court decisions adopted by the International Court of 
                                                 
122
  For example, according to CISG, Art. 7(2) “[q]uestions concerning matters governed by this 
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general 
principles on which it is based (…)”. Similar reasoning is found in UNCITRAL ML, Art. 2A(2) 
on which many national arbitration laws are based. 
123
  Statute of the ICJ, Art. 59. 
124
  An example of the Courts’ practice of incorporation of new legal reasoning as to the 
interpretation of international rules, and in particular those related to the law of maritime 
delimitation, is provided by Gilbert Guillaume, ‘The Use of Precedent by International Judges 
and Arbitrators’ (2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 5–23, 11-12. So, the Court 
has applied for years contradictory methods to maritime delimitation, i.e. “equidistance method” 
and “equitable principles and standards”. Refusing to grant binding effect to its previous 
decisions and looking relentlessly for the best solution for each particular case, the Court has 
managed to unify and stabilise its position on the matter – “in all cases it was necessary to first 
draw the line of equidistance, then adjust it to take account of relevant factors related mainly to 
the coastline”. As Guillaume correctly observes “[t]his dual analysis clarifies a lesson: the 
International Court of Justice does not recognize any binding value to its own precedent. 
However, it takes it into great consideration. It is nonetheless prepared to reconsider 
jurisprudence on the request of the parties or ex officio” (Guillaume, ‘The Use of Precedent by 
International Judges and Arbitrators’ 12). Furthermore, the above also speaks for the fact that 
ICJ takes into account the legal reasoning in previous decisions, rather than following 
established precedents. Such an approach is rigid enough in order to provide the necessary legal 
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Justice might be considered as an example of good practice when analysing the 
status of arbitral awards as a source of law in international commercial arbitration.
125
 
 
It is also worth noting that the role the sources of law play in international 
commercial arbitration could be influenced by the endorsement of one or another 
theory about the foundations of international commercial arbitration. Thus, for 
example, the jurisdictional theory favours arbitrators’ strict application of the law, 
including adherence to court decisions as far as they are considered to have a binding 
effect according to the law applicable to the merits of the dispute. Such an approach 
upholds the rule of law, promotes greater certainty and predictability in international 
commercial arbitration, and arguably enhances the authoritativeness of the system
126
. 
It also serves the agenda of the judicialisation process and meets its objectives
127
. 
 
Having presented the theoretical foundations of the concept of source of law and 
highlighted some intrinsic features of international commercial arbitration that have 
to be considered when classifying the sources of international arbitration, the 
following section will examine categorisations suggested in the literature. The 
proposed classifications will be analysed in view of their adequacy and sufficiency. 
It is to be questioned whether a traditional, formalised classification of the sources of 
                                                                                                                                          
certainty in ICJ’s practice, and at the same time, flexible enough in order not to prevent ICJ’s 
jurisprudence from developing. As the court puts it: “[i]t is not a question of holding [the parties 
in the instant case] to decisions reached by the court in previous cases. The real question is 
whether in this case, there is cause not to follow the reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases.” 
(citation from Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Preliminary 
Objections Judgment) [1998] ICJ Rep. 275, para. 28). 
125
  See Section 2.3.4.  
126
  The contention that arbitrator’s status and function resembles the one of a judge demonstrates 
not only endorsement of the jurisdictional theory but also the state and courts’ pro-arbitration 
position. According to Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis and Stefan Kröll (Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas 
A. Mistelis, and Stefan Michael Kröll, ‘Juridical Nature of Arbitration’ in Julian D. M. Lew and 
others (eds), Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 
2003) 75) such an approach is adopted by the English Court of Appeal and is illustrated in its 
discussion about the neutrality and impartiality of arbitrators. In AT & T Corporation and 
another v Saudi Cable Company [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 127 the Court of Appeal held that “(…) 
the test under English Law for apparent or unconscious bias in an arbitrator is the same as that 
for all those who make judicial decisions and is that to be found in the opinion of Lord Goff of 
Chieveley in R v Gough [1993] AC 646.”  
127
  See Lew, Mistelis, and Kröll, ‘Juridical Nature of Arbitration’ (n 126) 74 addressing the issue of 
the increasing judicialisation of international commercial arbitration in the presentation of the 
jurisdictional theory. 
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law is appropriate in an alternative forum for dispute resolution and whether this 
approach could be linked to the emerging system of norms and the process of 
judicialisation in international commercial arbitration. Attention will be paid as to 
whether the suggested categorisations take into account the plurality of legal orders 
that apply in and to international commercial arbitration, the multiplicity of rules of 
law and social norms followed in arbitrators’ decision-making process128 and the 
increasing self-regulation in the field carried out through soft-law instruments 
created by professional bodies, international and intergovernmental organisations
129
. 
 
 
2.2.3 Suggested Classifications of Sources of Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration  
 
It is to be noted from the outset that the issues of categorisation in the context of 
international commercial arbitration require further research. The literature on the 
matter is scarce, despite the importance of those issues with regard to questions of 
applicable law. In addition, there is insufficient research on the concept of “source of 
law” in international commercial arbitration and a lack of a consensus as to the 
classification of the sources of law. Answers to questions, such as “Is Lex 
Mercatoria a source of law?”; “Should arbitrators adhere to national court 
decisions?”; “Should arbitrators adopt a legalistic or flexible approach to issues of 
classification, i.e. should arbitrators follow the method of categorisation as 
prescribed by a particular legal system or should they engage in a comparative legal 
analysis?” have effect on arbitral decision making130. 
 
Despite the lack of consistency in the categorisation of the sources of law, however, 
it can be inferred from the available literature that scholars and practitioners adopt a 
less formalistic approach to the matter. They often take into consideration the special 
attributes of international commercial arbitration and support an understanding of the 
sources of international commercial arbitration that is not parochial to concepts 
embedded in their home jurisdictions. 
                                                 
128
  See p 59. 
129
  See also Section 3.2.1. 
130
  See Chapter 3 and Section 5.3. 
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Thus, SI Strong distinguishes among eight categories of legal authorities, namely 
conventions and treaties, national laws, arbitral rules, law of the dispute (procedural 
orders and agreements between the parties), arbitral awards, case law, treatises and 
monographs, and legal articles.
131
 Apart from stating that the “authorities in this field 
can be generated by both public sources (states) and private sources (ranging from 
international arbitral institutions to the parties themselves)” 132 Prof Strong does not 
provide a theoretical framework for this classification. The interchangeable use of 
the terms “sources of law”, “legal sources”, “legal authorities” and “forms of legal 
authorities” creates some confusion as to the criteria used to distinguish between the 
sources of law in arbitration.  
 
Unfortunately, Prof Strong does not focus on the role of widely recognised rules of 
law, such as lex mercatoria, trade usages and customs, as well as general principles 
of international law
133
. Although lex mercatoria and general principles under Article 
38 of the Statute of ICJ are briefly mentioned with regard to possible laws governing 
the merits of a dispute, their inclusion in Section “Sources of Law – National Laws” 
raises salient questions
134
. It is interesting to note that procedural orders and 
agreements between parties are categorised by the author as sources of law, on the 
basis of their binding effect upon parties. Thus, it may be assumed that the 
underlying sale/commercial contract between parties should be considered as a 
source of law (according to this categorisation) as well. Such conclusion, however, 
will delude the difference between sources of law and sources of (contractual) 
obligations and may be deceptive. Although sale contracts and arbitration 
agreements are binding upon parties, this effect is derived from the principles of 
pacta sunt servanda and good faith (part of states’ public policy)135. 
                                                 
131
  SI Strong, Research and Practice in International Commercial Arbitration: Sources and 
Strategies (1st edn, OUP 2009) para 2.09, 12. 
132
  Ibid paras 2.11, 2.12. 
133
  For the role of lex mercatoria see Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, and Hunter (n 24); Gary B. 
Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2014); Michael 
Pryles, ‘Application of Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 31 
U.N.S.W.L.J. 319–329. 
134
  Ibid (n 131) paras 2.31, 2.33. 
135
  See Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision No 4A_488/2009 rendered on 15 February 2010; English 
translation available at: <http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/claim-of-violation-of-
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As such, the comparative analysis conducted by Prof Strong between the sources of 
law in national legal systems and those in international commercial arbitration shows 
some omissions and limitations. The author, however, correctly highlights the 
importance of the sources of law in arbitration, countering criticisms against the 
private nature of this dispute resolution method, as well as allegations equating 
international arbitration to a “lawless” decision-making process136 because of the 
informality of the proceedings and the alleged lack of adherence to the substantive 
rules of law. 
 
Another classification of the sources of law in international arbitration is suggested 
by Loeff C. Verbeke, who distinguishes between six categories, namely treaties, 
national legislation, arbitration rules, arbitral awards, court decisions and 
literature.
137
 Verbeke does not recognise either lex mercatoria or trade usages and 
general principles of law as sources of law in international commercial arbitration. 
However, it is undoubted that lex mercatoria, trade usages and customs have a wide 
recognition as sources of law and a major role in the decision-making process.
138
  
                                                                                                                                          
public-policy-pacta-sunt-servanda-and-the->; Original text available at: 
<http://relevancy.bger.ch/php/aza/http/index.php?lang=fr&type=highlight_simple_query&page=
1&from_date=&to_date=&sort=relevance&insertion_date=&top_subcollection_aza=all&query_
words=4A_488/2009&rank=1&azaclir=aza&highlight_docid=aza%3A//15-02-2010-4A_488-
2009&number_of_ranks=1>. A dispute arose with regard to a terminated contract for sale of 
metal bars between a Turkish company and a Romanian company. The former initiated 
arbitration proceedings in Geneva in front of a sole arbitrator, who upheld the claim. The 
Romanian company appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal seeking annulment of arbitrator’s 
award on the grounds of violation of public policy, in particular violation of the rule of pacta 
sunt servanda. The Tribunal rejected the claim stating that inaccurate interpretation of a contract 
did not constitute violation of the rule of pacta sunt servanda. The latter would be infringed only 
in the (most unlikely) event that an arbitral tribunal would find that a contract is binding and 
then dispense a party from complying with it. 
136
  See for example Christopher R. Drahozal, ‘Is Arbitration Lawless?’ (2007) 40 Loy. L. A. L. 
Rev. 187–216; Philip J. McConnaughay, ‘The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: a “Second 
Look” at International Commercial Arbitration’ (1999) 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 453–523. 
137
  Loeff C. Verbeke, ‘Sources of International Commercial Arbitration’ (1995) 23 Int’l J Legal 
Info 293–294. 
138
  See CISG, Art. 7(2) “Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not 
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is 
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the 
rules of private international law.” CISG, Art. 9 “(1) The parties are bound by any usage to 
which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established between themselves. 
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to 
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Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage try to introduce a more systematic approach in 
determining the types of sources of law in international commercial arbitration.
139
 
They distinguish between two main categories, i.e. sources of public and private 
origin. Among the sources of public origin the authors place those found within the 
legal systems of each country
140
, as well as international sources
141
. The latter 
consist of “international conventions, but also include international custom, general 
principles of law and judicial decisions, as listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice”142. Furthermore, according to Gaillard and Savage, 
the “soft law” can also be attributed to the category of international sources of law, 
as it consists of “instruments drawn up by international organizations, but which are 
simply recommended to, rather than imposed upon, potential users”.143 Such optional 
instruments are arbitration rules drafted by international institutions, e.g. the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the UNCITRAL ML, and bilateral agreements 
concerning judicial assistance. Gaillard and Savage argue that the second main 
category, namely the sources of private origin, is comprised of model arbitration 
agreements, arbitration rules and arbitral awards.
144
  
 
The approach adopted by Gaillard and Savage in categorisation of the sources of law 
in international commercial arbitration has the benefit of providing a better-
structured classification, as it is based on differentiation on the grounds of certain 
criteria, i.e. origin and territorial validity. Despite employing a formal law-
                                                                                                                                          
their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known and 
which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts 
of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.” See also William W. Park, ‘The 
Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration: Non-Governmental Instruments’ in Julian 
D.M. Lew and Loukas Mistelis (eds), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (1st edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2006); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Soft Law in International 
Arbitration: Codification and Normativity’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 
283–299; Joshua D. H. Karton, ‘Norms Arising from the Values Shared by International 
Commercial Arbitrators’ in Joshua D. H. Karton (ed), The Culture of International Arbitration 
and The Evolution of Contract Law (1st edn, OUP 2013). 
139
  Gaillard and Savage, ‘Sources of International Commercial Arbitration’ (n 59). 
140
  Ibid 63. 
141
  Ibid 102. 
142
  Ibid. 
143
  Ibid.  
144
  Ibid 151. 
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ascertainment method, the approach is not entirely comprehensive because there is 
no explanation as to the rationale behind categorising the sources of law on the basis 
of public-private origin differentiation. Such classification adds little to 
understanding why the designated rules of law are recognised as sources of law in 
international commercial arbitration. Thus, for example the so-called soft law can be 
present both in the categories of sources of public and private origin. UNCITRAL 
ML is drafted by the UN Commission on International Trade Law and is designed to 
assist states in reforming, modernising and harmonising their laws on arbitral 
procedure. It is does not have a binding effect, unless implemented in the national 
legislation following the relevant procedure for that. An example for a piece of soft 
law from private origin can be given with the IBA Guidelines on Party 
Representation in International Arbitration. The latter are created by International 
Bar Association, which is professional organisation of legal practitioners, bar 
associations and law societies devoted to the development of international law. 
Similarly, corresponding illustrations can be provided with regard to the 
international custom as a source of law of public origin and trade practices and lex 
mercatoria as sources of law of private origin.  
 
Although Gaillard and Savage admit that international commercial arbitration is of 
peculiar nature, they do not endeavour to examine whether and how its 
characteristics and objectives might have an effect on the sources of law applicable 
to and in it. Thus, for example, the main advantages of arbitration, which 
distinguishes it from state litigation, is its consideration for individual interests and 
the promotion of the principle of party autonomy. However, arbitrators always face a 
predicament when they have to rule on the limitations of the principle of party 
autonomy – both when the principle collides with sources of law of public and 
private origin. While party autonomy is limited only to the extent it is contrary to 
mandatory rules in national legislations, institutional arbitration rules are becoming 
more comprehensive and intolerant to parties’ interference. It is becoming more and 
more questionable whether the origin of the rules of law is what makes them sources 
of law and entirely determines their authoritativeness.  
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Another interesting aspect that deserves attention is the recognition of model 
arbitration clauses as sources of law.
145
 Gaillard and Savage argue that model 
arbitration agreements can be considered as sources of law, because:  
 
from a theoretical standpoint, a degree of repetition and generality is required for a rule 
of contractual origin to govern situations for which it was not expressly intended and 
thus contribute to the creation of a non-national body of legal rules.
146
  
 
However, the arbitration agreements negotiated on case-by-case basis cannot be 
considered “a source of international arbitration law” because: 
 
from a more practical point of view, ad hoc clauses agreed between parties to a contract 
clearly do not have the same authority and relevance as instruments intended for use in 
– and actually used in – an indefinite number of cases.
147
  
 
The above statements are equivocal for several reasons. Firstly, it is difficult to 
understand how a model arbitration clause can “govern any situations for which it 
was not expressly intended”. Any arbitration agreement, whether a model or an ad 
hoc one, is applicable to parties’ dispute only in case it is valid and operational, i.e. 
the parties have explicitly decided their dispute to be resolved by arbitration and the 
necessary requirements for formal and substantive validity of the arbitration 
agreement are met. 
 
Secondly, the foregoing approach fails to take into account that professional 
organisations and private entities are delegated law-making functions in international 
commercial arbitration. This function is derived not from any degree of repetition 
and generality of the rules but from statutory provisions in national legislations that 
mirror Article 19(1) UNCITRAL ML, stating: “Subject to the provisions of this 
Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral 
tribunal in conducting the proceedings.” In absence of such agreement arbitral 
                                                 
145
  Ibid. 
146
  Ibid. 
147
  Ibid. 
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tribunal may conduct the arbitration and follow rules of law in such a manner, as it 
considers appropriate.
148
 
 
Thirdly, the proposition that model arbitration clauses can be considered as sources 
of law fails to differentiate between sources of law applicable in international 
commercial arbitration and sources of obligation. Any arbitration agreement (source 
of obligation) has to be followed by the parties due to the principle of pacta sunt 
servanta (source of law).
149
 An opposite approach will call for commercial contracts 
or at least boilerplate clauses and agreements being recognised as sources of law. 
Although it is acknowledged that soft law
150
 is one of the sources of law in 
international commercial arbitration, model arbitration clauses cannot be considered 
as a source of law as they are neither acts of rules of law, nor they have any binding 
or persuasive authority to disputes where parties have not validly agreed on them. 
 
All foregoing classifications adopt a formalised approach to ascertain the sources of 
international commercial arbitration. They follow the so-called source thesis 
“whereby law is identified in accordance with its formal pedigree”.151 Joshua Karton 
argues for a less legalistic understanding of the concept of norms in international 
commercial arbitration. His proposition is conforming to the social thesis, which 
infers the law-ascertaining criteria from the practice of law-applying officials.
152
 
According to Joshua Karton some intrinsic characteristics of arbitration are a result 
of shared culture and values, of shared social norms: 
 
                                                 
148
  UNCITRAL ML, Art. 19(2). 
149
  Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’ 
[1958] Symbolae Verzijl (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague) 153–176, 157, 158. 
150
  See D’Aspremont, ‘The Emergence of Formal Law-Ascertainment in the Theory of the Sources 
of International Law’ (n 38) 72 stating: “In the second half of the 20th century, another form of 
deformalisation gained currency through the concept of soft law, i.e. the idea that international 
law can originate in acts that are not formally identified as legal acts. These non-formal law-
ascertainment mechanisms enjoyed a wide acceptance as they provided room to reconnect 
international law with pluralized norm-making at the international level.” 
151
  Jean D’Aspremont, ‘The Critiques of Formal Law-Ascertainment in the Theory of the Sources 
of International Law’ in Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the 
Ascertainment of Legal Rules (1st edn, OUP 2011) 83. 
152
  Ibid. 
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In a system with few constraints on arbitrators’ power to adjudicate the merits of 
disputes, social norms are particularly important in guiding and legitimizing 
international arbitral justice. Shared norms promote harmonization of decision-making 
in a system that otherwise has little to encourage internal consistency.
153
 
 
The author identifies four social norms that constitute elements of an incipient 
international commercial arbitration culture. Those are party autonomy, the service 
of business, neutrality, and internationalism. Joshua Karton further elaborates on 
each of the four social norms. Thus, for example, he acknowledges that party 
autonomy is a core principle in international commercial arbitration
154
 and has 
become a widely entrenched norm, which relevance is discerned through all stages 
of arbitration proceedings.
155
 It is asserted that as a social norm party autonomy acts 
as a constraint on arbitrators’ powers and as a guarantee that individual interests will 
take primacy over systemic ones.
156
  
 
The contribution of Karton’s analysis to the development of a concept of source of 
law in international commercial arbitration is the suggested shift to a less formal 
approach, which takes into account the peculiar nature of arbitration and has regard 
not only to the law-making function of states, organisations and professional bodies, 
but also to the law-applying function of arbitrators. Such an approach is undoubtedly 
more appropriate when identifying the rules of law being recognised as sources of 
law in the context of international commercial arbitration. It gives credit to the 
multiplicity of norms that govern arbitration and the complex dynamics of the 
system. A formalistic construction is not adequate as it cannot explain why 
arbitrators can decide the dispute at hand in a manner which is very different from 
national courts. The categorisation of sources of international commercial arbitration 
has to be fitted to convey these intrinsic characteristics of the system.  
 
                                                 
153
  Karton, ‘Norms Arising from the Values Shared by International Commercial Arbitrators’ (n 
138) 78. 
154
  Ibid 78, 79. 
155
  Ibid 79. 
156
  Ibid et seq. The primacy of individual interests over system ones even gives rise to the thesis of 
“lawlessness” of international commercial arbitration. This phenomenon is explained by 
arbitrators’ focus on the equities of a dispute or the particularities of a contract than to the 
applicable law (at 91). 
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Conclusion 
 
It appears that the majority of suggested classifications do not take into account the 
sue generis nature of international commercial arbitration and favour a formalistic 
approach to ascertaining the sources of law. Such an approach creates a favourable 
environment for the evolution of the process of judicialisation. By applying a 
formalistic approach to the classification of sources of law arbitrators are encouraged 
to apply the law strictly and disregard the application of other norms that may 
otherwise influence their decision-making.  
 
Although it is true that arbitration “does not exist in a legal vacuum”157 and its 
legitimacy is derived from one or more national legal orders
158
, it is argued that 
arbitral practice in the form of shared social norms plays a significant role in the 
organisation and conduct of arbitration proceedings and arbitrator’s decision-
making. This is why the significance of such practices and norms should be 
appreciated by acknowledging the latter as legitimate sources of law. It is, therefore, 
suggested that the categorisation of the sources of law has to have regard to the 
plurality legal orders applying to and in arbitration
159
, on the one hand, and the 
shared social norms forming a rising arbitration culture, on the other hand.  
 
The concept of “source of law” is to be understood in its broadest meaning in order 
to be inclusive of different rules of law and social norms influencing arbitrator’s 
decision-making process. Adopting a flexible approach to the classification of the 
sources of law in international commercial arbitration has the implication of 
encouraging arbitrators to conduct a comparative legal analysis when taking 
decisions, rather than following a formalistic approach to the sources of law, the 
latter being organised in a hierarchical system. Such a formalistic approach serves 
the judicialisation agenda and contributes to the formalisation of international 
commercial arbitration.  
                                                 
157
  Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, and Hunter (n 24) para 3.04, 164. 
158
  See n 61. 
159
  See generally Paulsson, ‘Arbitration in Three Dimensions’ (n 61).  
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CHAPTER 3  THE JUDICIALISED AND FLEXIBLE 
APPROACHES TO THE SOURCES OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
 
Objectives 
 
It was discussed in the previous chapter that the way the sources of law are classified 
in international commercial arbitration might influence the very concept of “source 
of law”. A formalistic approach to the categorisation of the sources of law will serve 
the judicialisation agenda and will encourage arbitrators to adopt a judicialised 
approach to the sources of law, meaning that arbitrators will be expected to interpret 
and apply the sources of law in a way very similar to the one adopted by national 
judges. In contrast, a classification of the sources of law that takes into account the 
particularities of the latter and the incipient arbitral culture will endorse a flexible or 
autonomous approach to the sources of law.  
 
In view of the above this chapters aims to examine how a judicialised approach to 
the sources of law in international commercial arbitration differs from a flexible 
approach. Of particular interest are three categories of sources of law, namely 
national court decisions, arbitral awards and trade practices, the latter often referred 
to as lex mercatoria. Although these are generally acknowledged as sources of law 
in the context of international commercial arbitration, there are debates in the 
literature and inconsistent practices as to their authoritativeness and binding force. 
  
The question whether and to what extent national case law
160
 is binding on 
arbitrators in international arbitration proceedings has not been answered 
                                                 
160
  For the purposes of this part the term “case law” will be used as a synonym of the term “judicial 
precedent”, the describing the binding force of precedents under the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Despite the fact that there are authors, such as Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Arbitral Precedent: 
Dream, Necessity or Excuse?’ (2007) 23 Arbitration International 357–378, who use the term 
“precedent” broadly, namely to cover the notion of both binding and persuasive precedents, this 
thesis will aim to distinguish between the two. The concept of “precedent” is a disputable one in 
the area of international commercial arbitration and its scope has not been strictly defined yet. 
As such, it is believed that (where possible) differentiating between binding and persuasive 
precedents will be of benefit to the analysis in this thesis.  
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unequivocally in the literature. This issue is of relevance to the discussion about the 
process of judicialisation because the subscription to a particular position with regard 
to the authoritativeness of national court decisions could suggest an endorsement of 
either a flexible or judicialised approach to the sources of law in international 
commercial arbitration. Similarly, two approaches could also be applied to arbitral 
awards and their authoritativeness. As for lex mercatoria, the analysis will focus on 
the use of lex mercatoria and the general principles of law in international 
commercial arbitration. The extent to which arbitration users rely on lex mercatoria 
is used as an indication of proliferation of a judicialised approach to the sources of 
law. It is expected that if trade customs and general principles of law are considered 
applicable predominantly when an arbitrator is granted the power to decide a dispute 
as amiable compositeur
161
, a judicialised approach to lex mercatoria will be adopted. 
In contrast if lex mercatoria is considered to form a body of rules, i.e. transnational 
rules of law
162
, that is commonly applied in absence of a specific choice of law 
agreement, then a flexible approach that nourishes the developing arbitration culture 
will be observed. 
 
 
3.1 National Court Decisions as a Source of Law – The Judicialised 
Approach 
 
The main question regarding court decisions as sources of law in international 
commercial arbitration is whether in case of a presence of a choice of law clause 
arbitrators are obliged to follow the reasoning of national courts. Other related 
                                                 
161
  See Berthold Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - the Lex Mercatoria’ 
in Julian D. M. Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (1st edn, 
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. 1987) 117 stating that “(…) certain contractual clauses 
may be construed as implying a reference to the lex mercatoria, for example, the amiable 
composition clause, which empowers the arbitrator to decide ex aequo et bono.” 
162
  See Clive M. Schmitthoff, Select Essays on International Trade Law (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 1988) 221 arguing that “[m]odern trade demands an autonomous international trade 
law, founded on uniform rules accepted in all countries. Such a regulation would make the 
localisation of a transaction in a national jurisdiction superfluous”; and at 222 “[…]the modern 
lex mercatoria is the deliberate creation of formulating agencies and is expressed in international 
conventions or model laws or in documents published by such bodies as the International 
Chamber of Commerce”.  
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questions are whether arbitrators have to abide by the conflict of laws approach 
applied by national judges, whether in cases where arbitrators are confronted with 
long-standing case law of the highest court of the country whose law has been 
chosen by the parties to govern the substantive issues of case, but which case law 
arbitrators consider to be unacceptable or unfavourable in an international 
commercial context, the tribunal can disregard the case law in favour of a more 
commercially sensible approach, and finally what is the preclusive effect of 
jurisdictional decisions by national courts, i.e. whether arbitrators in international 
arbitration proceedings are bound by national courts’ judgment dealing with 
questions of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
 
Opinions that support the view that arbitrators are not obliged to follow courts’ 
interpretation and application of national laws, and are not bound by national court 
judgments dealing with questions of tribunal’s jurisdiction can be considered to 
favour a more flexible and autonomous approach to international commercial 
arbitration, while those advocating for more rigid application of national laws, 
including adherence to court decisions and acknowledgement of the preclusive effect 
of court jurisdictional decisions, advance the judicialisation process in international 
commercial arbitration. 
 
What seems to be the widely accepted position is that when parties’ choice of law 
clause designates a particular national law it will “ordinarily include the constitution, 
legislation, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of the state in 
question”163. As Gary Born explains, save where parties have agreed to arbitration ex 
aequo et bono or amiable compositeur, the arbitrators’ mandate is to resolve the 
parties’ dispute in an adjudicative manner, in accordance with the applicable law. If 
a national (or international) legal system accords, binding, precedential weight to 
judicial decisions, then arbitral tribunals should give those decisions no less legal 
effect than would a court in that system: this conclusion follows inevitably from the 
arbitrators’ adjudicative function of applying the law to the evidence.164 
 
                                                 
163
  Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 2723. 
164
  Ibid 3821. 
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Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage share a similar view: 
 
In international arbitration, as in private international law, the word ‘law’ encompasses 
all rules belonging to the legal system in question, with each source (including statute, 
case law and custom) having the authority attributed to it by that legal system. Thus, for 
example, by referring to ‘Venezuelan law’, the parties include all of the sources 
recognized by the Venezuelan legal system, following the hierarchy established 
therein.
165
 
 
Such an approach, where arbitral tribunals accord with the effect of national court 
decisions, can be viewed as judicialised because it is more rigid, inflexible and does 
not leave arbitral tribunal with much room for interpretation and/or law making. It 
can be argued that this position has both its advantages and disadvantages. On the 
positive side, adherence to judicial decisions upholds the principle of legal certainty 
and predictability in law and avoids a scenario where parties are returned to the 
“legal no-man’s land”. Ascertaining principles like stare decisis and binding 
precedential authority undoubtedly serves the judicialisation agenda. The CISG 
database, a free platform for publishing national court decisions and arbitral awards 
rendered on cases where CISG is found to be the applicable law, suggests that 
arbitrators and foreign national course are not averse to following judicial 
precedents.
166
  
 
Furthermore, arbitrators’ adherence to the applicable law, including court decisions 
that have been recognised as primary authority in the relevant national legal systems, 
can be viewed as a due performance of arbitrators’ mandate: “It is sometimes posited 
that an arbitrator would violate his mandate if he expressly refused to apply the law 
                                                 
165
  Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage, ‘Part 5: Chapter I - The Law Applicable to the Merits of 
the Dispute’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999) 790. 
166
  CISG database: “The U.S. federal court regards a foreign court decision as precedent, or at least 
as ‘authority’” Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary on Medical Marketing v. Internationale Medico 
Scientifica [translated text of commentary], Praxis des International Privat- und 
Verfahrensrechts (1999) 791; “The European Court of Justice witnessed a reference to our 
database by an agent for the European Commission. The case of MCC-Marble v. Ceramica 
Nuova that we cite refers to our database as a ‘promising source’ for ‘persuasive authority from 
courts of other States party to the CISG’.” 
 
Page 70 
stipulated by the parties.”167 A frequently cited suggestion by Lord Denning states 
that “whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred 
on it and its decision is void”.168 Although not going to the extreme to argue that any 
mistake in law by the arbitral tribunal is excess of authority, William Park also 
contends that one of four arbitrators’ obligations, apart from observing procedural 
fairness, striving for efficiency and exercising vigilance in promoting an enforceable 
award, is rendering an accurate award:  
 
The first duty of an arbitrator lies in rendering an accurate award, in the sense of fidelity 
to the text and the context of the relevant bargain, whether memorialized in a private 
contract or the terms of a public investment treaty. The arbitrator should aim to get as 
near as reasonably possible to understanding what actually happened between the 
litigants, and how the pertinent legal norms apply to the controverted events. (…) 
Arbitration would provide for poor justice if arbitrators aspired to nothing higher than 
to meet the minimum grounds for annulment.
169
 
 
In contrast with the above position, what may be considered a disadvantage of the 
judicialised approach is its inflexibility – in presence of a choice of law clause an 
arbitrator has to abide by the particularities of the designated national legal system 
and to follow court decisions without questioning the appropriateness of the latter in 
international commercial context. Furthermore, it could be argued that the relevance 
and weight of judicial decisions may vary depending on whether there is an express 
or implied choice of law provision, or the particular national law has been applied as 
most closely connected to the dispute. Finally, regarding courts’ jurisdictional 
decisions, arbitrators should be free to determine whether they have jurisdiction to 
decide the dispute and what the scope of their jurisdiction is, which is in accordance 
with the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine
170
 (also referred to as competence-
                                                 
167
  Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (1st edn, OUP 2013) 93. 
168
  Lord Alfred Denning, Lord Denning: The Discipline of Law (1st edn, OUP 1979) 74. 
169
  William W. Park, ‘International Arbitration (Sokol Colloquium)’ in John Norton Moore (ed), 
International Arbitration (Sokol Colloquium) (1st edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 7. 
170
  Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (n 167) 54: “In the context of private arbitrations subject to the 
supervision of national courts, which could if needed enforce the arbitral agreement, it has also 
long been understood that a fundamental advantage of arbitration would be lost if the process 
instantly came to a halt as soon as one of the parties protested. (…) Here is how Lord Devlin, a 
prominent English judge, put it in 1954: (…) They [arbitrators] are entitled to inquire into the 
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competence in England and compétence de la competence in France). Such arbitral 
decisions are subject to judicial control, once the award is rendered, and any 
adherence to jurisdictional court decisions may be premature and incorrect. As 
argued by Jan Paulsson, when deciding challenges to arbitral authority, the most 
essential question is what the parties’ intention is, rather than following blindly the 
reasoning of certain sources of law.
171
  
 
The justification for the judicialised approach to nation court decisions lies on the 
premise that arbitrators are obliged to apply the law, and since case law is either a 
primary or secondary source of law in national legal orders, arbitral tribunals have to 
abide by its authoritativeness. In common law jurisdictions judicial decisions are 
recognised as primary sources of law, which have precedential effect in accordance 
with the principle of stare decisis, while in civil law jurisdictions, court decisions are 
secondary sources of law that provide interpretation of the primary authority. This 
means that in civil legal systems the Parliament or other legislature have law-making 
functions and courts’ adjudicative role covers mere interpretation and application of 
the law.  
 
The doctrine of precedent in the common law system is a result of certain evolution, 
i.e. that “historically much of the law was a product of the common law rather than 
statutes”172. For common law systems the concept of precedent is a centric one as 
judges are not allowed to deviate from established judicial principle unless they can 
reason the inapplicability of the latter to the case in hand. Despite securing a 
predictable outcomes, the doctrine of stare decisis, has been criticised for its 
inflexibility to accommodate new developments. The main proposition in support of 
such a criticism is that in order to justify a decision that embraces new solutions, a 
judge or an arbitrator has to distinguish their case from judicial precedents, i.e. 
decisions rendered on similar facts. This may prove to be of particular difficulty to 
                                                                                                                                          
merits of the issue as to whether they have jurisdiction or not, not for the purposes of reaching 
any conclusion which will be binding on the parties—because that they cannot do—but for the 
purpose of satisfying themselves as a preliminary matter about whether they ought to go on with 
the arbitration or not. (Christopher Brown Ltd v. Genossenschaft Osterreichischer Waldbestizer 
GmbH [1954] 1 QB 8, at 12–13).” 
171
  Ibid 89. 
172
  Alisdair A. Gillespie, The English Legal System (1st edn, OUP 2007) 61. 
 
Page 72 
arbitrators who have their legal training in countries pertaining to the civil legal 
system, where legal rules are characterised with their generality and it is the art of 
the jurist to ascertain the specific legal rule that applies to the particular factual 
situation:  
 
The generality of the [Romano-Germanic] legal rule explains why the task of lawyers in 
these countries is conceived as essentially one of interpreting legislative provisions and 
is thus unlike that of Common law countries where the legal technique is characterized 
by the process of distinguishing judicial decisions. The ‘right’ legal rule itself is not 
thought of in the same manner: in Common law countries the judge is expected to 
formulate, as precisely as possible, the rule which provides a solution to the dispute; in 
Romano-Germanic countries on the contrary, because its function is simply to establish 
the framework of the law and to furnish the judge with guidelines for decision-making, 
it is considered desirable that the legal rule leave him a certain margin of discretion.
173
  
 
The advantages of stare decisis in providing legal certainty and predictability, 
however, seem to overrun the concerns about its potential for development and 
progress. In Davis v Johnson
174
 Cumming-Bruce L.J. gave an opinion on the balance 
that is to be achieved between legal certainty and justice in a legal system. In his 
view “in any system of law the undoubted public advantages of certainty in civil 
proceedings must be purchased at the price of the risk of injustice in difficult 
individual situations”175. Such a position is justified in national court proceedings 
where among judges’ adjudicative functions also rests the obligation to preserve the 
public interest and to ensure the stability and unity of the legal system. In 
international commercial arbitration, where the applicable standard is commercial 
reasonableness and the limits to party autonomy is international public policy and 
national mandatory rules, arbitrators do not have such duties. Save where parties 
have explicitly designated a national law to govern the dispute between them, it is 
                                                 
173
  Rene David, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative 
Study of Law (2nd edn, The Free Press 1979) 90. 
174
  Davis v Johnson [1979] AC 264. 
175
  Ibid at [311]. 
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arguable whether arbitrators’ mandate is to render a correct decision176 or “merely” 
settle
177
 the dispute between the parties. 
 
In contrast with common law jurisdictions in civil law jurisdictions, court decisions 
are secondary sources of law that provide interpretation of the primary authority. 
This means that in civil legal systems the Parliament or other legislature have law-
making functions and courts’ adjudicative role covers mere interpretation and 
application of the law. This is the reason for some author to claim that while in 
common law system judicial precedent forms a principle source of law, it is 
debatable whether in civil law jurisdictions court decisions are “at most a source of 
definition of subjective rights, or also a source for creation of objective rights”178.  
 
The role of court decisions in civil law jurisdictions can be historically explained by 
way the Continental system evolved, i.e. the need for legal consistency, certainty and 
stability was ensured through codification of the law, rather than judge-made law. In 
civil law jurisdictions legal provisions are, in principle, abstract and general enough 
to encompass all and every factual case that may arise, so that all judges have to do 
is to subsume the factual case under the general rule. Thus, the adjudicative function 
of judges includes interpretation and application of the legal rules enacted by the 
Parliament or other legislature. The case law has a persuasive effect, as it is not 
governed by the stare decisis doctrine.  
 
Although in civil law jurisdictions codified legislation has primary authority, while 
court decisions have secondary, previous judicial decisions, especially decisions of 
                                                 
176
  This does not mean that arbitration is not concerned with settling the dispute between the parties 
by means of fair and just arbitral award (see e.g. Jeffrey Waincymer, ‘Promoting Fairness and 
Efficiency of Procedures in International Commercial Arbitration - Identifying Uniform Model 
Norms’ (2010) 2 Contemp Asia Arb J 25–64; E. D. D. Tavender, ‘Considerations of Fairness in 
the Context of International Commercial Arbitration’ (1995) 34 Alta L Rev 509–556; Henry 
Gabriel and Anjanette H. Raymond, ‘Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic Principles and 
Emerging Standards’ (2005) 5 Wyo. L. Rev. 453–470), rather that the pursuit for fairness, 
justice together with preservation of public interest are major characteristics of national state 
litigation.  
177
  See, for example, A. M. Stuyt, Survey of International Arbitrations, 1794-1989 (3rd edn, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 1990) where it is stated that “arbitration is the oldest method for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes”. 
178
  María José Falcón y Tella, Case Law in Roman, Anglosaxon and Continental Law (1st edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/ Brill Academic 2011) 1. 
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the supreme courts, are respected in a way that is very similar in substance to the 
doctrine of precedent in the common law jurisdictions. As Gary Born explains: 
 
it is unclear whether orthodox characterizations of the role of precedent and stare 
decisis in civil and common law jurisdictions are sufficiently nuanced. In reality, the 
role of precedent in different legal systems is more complex, with most developed legal 
systems – both common law and civil law – according varying degrees of binding effect 
to prior judicial decisions, depending on the nature of those decisions and the relevant 
decision-makers, the subject matter the decisions deal with, the means available to alter 
the assertedly precedential rule, and other factors.
179
 
 
Indeed, despite the discrepancy in the degree of binding force, a concept alike stare 
decisis does exist in civil law jurisdictions: “there are jurisdictions where a quasi 
stare decisis effect is implemented by the law itself”180. An example can be given, as 
pointed out by Professor Berger, with the Spanish Tribunal Supremo, which case law 
constitutes doctrina legal or binding law, in case there are no less than two Supreme 
Court decision supporting a particular legal doctrine. Similar example can be 
provided with the Bulgarian Court of Appeal whose decisions are subject to a 
cassation appeal where the decisions are rendered in controversy with case law of the 
Supreme Cassation Court (i.e. “съдебна практика”) and they concern substantial 
issues of procedural or substantive law.
181
 In France, Switzerland and Germany 
courts also follow previous judicial decisions on the grounds of principles referred to 
as “jurisprudence constant” and “ständige Rechtsprechung”.182 Although civil law 
jurisdictions use various formulations when referring to the binding precedential 
authority of prior judicial decisions and the concept of precedential authority is very 
flexible, it is well-established view
183
 that the courts take into account previous 
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  Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 3810. 
180
  Klaus Peter Berger, ‘The International Arbitrators’ Application of Precedents’ (1992) 9 
International Arbitration 5–228. 
181
  See Bulgarian Code of Civil Procedure (Promulgated State Gazette No. 59/20.07.2007, effective 
as of 1.03.2008), Art. 280 (1). 
182
  See generally Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 3815. 
183
  See generally ibid 3815, 3816, 3817; Berger, ‘The International Arbitrators’ Application of 
Precedents’ (n 180); Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Arbitral Precedent’ (n 160) 358, 359: “The degree of 
deference to earlier cases and the level of freedom to depart from prior rulings may vary from 
one jurisdiction to another, and even within one jurisdiction, depending on the court and the 
issue involves. In civil law countries, the precedential value of cases may be weaker than in 
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judicial decisions in deliberation of the case, and as such pursuing the need for 
consistency, foreseeability and stability in law. The role of the case law in civil law 
systems should not be belittled because a de facto doctrine of precedent can be as 
important as de jure one. Or as Prof Berger cites Larenz and Canaris’ Methodenlehre 
der Rechtswissenschaft: 
 
even if case-law is considered not to be a source of law but a mere ‘source for the 
cognition of the law’ a binding effect of case-law of the highest court is acknowledged 
if the court, in deciding an individual case before it, has developed a general rule which 
comes close to a statutory rule of law that can easily be applied to all future cases of 
this kind.
184
 
 
As theory and practice in civil law jurisdictions is constantly improving, adherence 
to previous court decisions is being favoured because it provides legal certainty and 
predictability. Moreover, in line with the global trends of harmonisation
185
 and 
unification of international law
186
, national laws also incorporate practices and 
doctrines that bring more stability for the legal systems. Thus, although case law has 
secondary to legislation authority in civil law jurisdictions, decisions of higher courts 
have de facto binding effect similar to the doctrine of stare decisis in common law 
jurisdictions.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
common law countries, though it is nonetheless well established there. Indeed, civil law 
countries such notions as arret de principe and jurisprudence constante, which are similar to 
stare decisis except that they do not require adherence to a legal principle that has been applied 
only once before.” 
184
  Berger, ‘The International Arbitrators’ Application of Precedents’ (n 180) 9, citing Claus-
Wilhelm Canaris, Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (4th edn, Springer, 2009). 
185
  The UNCITRAL, the UNIDROIT, and the Hague Conference on Private International Law have 
played central roles in the process of harmonisation of private commercial and arbitration laws. 
UNCITRAL has been responsible for a variety of conventions, model laws and rules, including 
the CISG, UNCITRAL ML and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. UNIDROIT has also played 
a prominent role in the preparatory work for the CISG, but what is considered to be a highly 
successful international restatement is the UNIDROIT Principles. 
186
  In this thesis the processes of harmonisation and uniformity in international laws are viewed as 
two inherently different developments. See generally Camilla Baasch Andersen, ‘Defining 
Uniformity in Law’ (2007) 12 Unif. L. Rev. 5–55, in which article Prof Andersen distinguishes 
between shared, harmonised and uniform laws, as well as between textual and applied 
uniformity. 
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To conclude the overview of the authoritativeness of judicial decisions, it is 
important to highlight that from a comparative law perspective: 
 
there is widespread agreement that, as with statute law, the perceived differences [with 
regard to the case law as a source of law] are rather due to diverging theories of sources 
and that there are, at least in this respect, no major differences of practical relevance 
between the legal families.
187
 
 
In spite of the “difference between the literary, discursive, and closely fact-related 
judicial style of the Anglo-American courts and the formal, austere, and abstract 
mode of writing judgements in the Continent”188  no legal system has remained 
indifferent to the doctrine of judicial precedent. The latter fosters the 
accomplishment of fairness, justice, certainty and consistency in the making and 
application of legal provisions, while ensuring that public interest is preserved and 
individual rights are honoured. Although it is argued by some that the doctrine of 
precedent hinders the evolution of law and makes the legal system inflexible and 
impermeable to new developments, all common law, civil law and mixed legal 
systems
189
 resort to the doctrines of stare decisis, res judicata, jurisprudence 
constante, arrêt de principe, ständige Rechtsprechung, съдебна практика, doctrina 
legal or similar concepts of judicial precedent in pursuit of legal stability and 
certainty.  
 
In the light of the above, it is questionable why the approach to national court 
decisions should be different in international commercial arbitration. The latter is an 
adjudication system having its roots in national legislation and reinforced by 
international instruments and uniform rules of law. It not only “does not exist in a 
legal vacuum”190, but is in fact evolving as a system of rules of law and some even 
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edn, OUP 2008) 895. 
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Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 
(1st edn, OUP 2008) 480-486. 
190
  Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, and Hunter (n 24) para 3.04, 164. 
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claim that it as a separate legal order
191
. As such, it is argued that principles and 
doctrines that foster legal certainty and predictability in national legal system should 
also be followed in international commercial arbitration, as this would benefit the 
development of international law and the evolution of international commercial 
community. As explained by Gary Born: 
 
[i]n a system with only limited codification, heavily reliant on developing norms of 
customary law, the alternatives to precedent would be an invitation to discretionary 
whim and a lack of law. Equally, the reasons that gave rise to rules of stare decisis and 
jurisprudence constante in national courts – parties’ expectations, the need for 
predictable rules, enhancing judicial integrity and efficiency – all apply with at least 
equal force in international settings.
192
  
 
Considerations of legal certainty, stability and judicial integrity are put forward by 
the supporters of a judicialised approach to national court decisions to argue that the 
authoritativeness and binding force of national case law should be upheld in 
international commercial arbitration. According to them, arbitral tribunals should 
respect the precedential effect of national case law and apply it in the same manner 
as national judges do. This obligation derives from the judicial function that they 
exercise. Legal stability and certainty could only be achieved when arbitrators 
recognise that their adjudicative function entails a mandate
193
 to decide a dispute by 
following the letter of the law, i.e. by construing and applying the law in accordance 
with longstanding case law. In the opinion of Professor Berger:  
 
the international arbitrator would be held to construe and apply the law along the case-
law of the highest courts of that country. (...) This does not only conform with the 
parties’ legitimate interest in legal certainty and predictability of the arbitrators’ 
decision-making and the “judicial” function of the international arbitrator, it also 
prevents international arbitrators from assuming the function of appellate courts, 
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Kluwer Law International 2012). 
192
  Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 380. 
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capable of developing the law and, more importantly, of reviewing the merits of 
decisions which are regarded as authoritative in the country in question.
194
  
 
Gary Born shares similar opinion and argues that arbitrators are compelled to strictly 
apply the law not only because they exercise an adjudicative function but because 
they must meet parties’ legitimate expectations:  
 
[i]f national (or international) legal system accords, binding, precedential weight to 
judicial decisions, then arbitral tribunals should give those decisions no less legal effect 
than would a court in that system: this conclusion follows inevitably from the 
arbitrators’ adjudicative function of applying the law to the evidence. (…) [P]arties 
select arbitrators to decide a single case in order to obtain the most expert, best-suited 
and most attentive decision-maker, to resolve their dispute in accordance with the law, 
including the law as expressed in decided judicial authorities.
195
 
 
By following national judicial precedents arbitrators also enhance the legitimacy of 
international commercial arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. It will be 
contrary to international public policy
196
 to see in parties’ arbitration agreement 
willingness to avoid or circumvent the application of relevant legal provisions and 
judicial precedents. The arbitration clause conveys the express consent of the parties 
to adjudicate their dispute according to the letter of the law, as formulated by the 
legislature and applied by the national courts. The views that arbitrators should be 
allowed to disregard long-standing case law: 
 
are incompatible with the adjudicative function and mandate of international arbitrators. 
It is not acceptable that arbitrators view their mandate as coming close to applying the 
law or as being able to disregard settled authority if there is “sufficient support” for 
doing so. These formulations are incompatible with both the arbitrators' obligation to 
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  Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 3821, 3822. 
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apply the law and the parties’ desire for predictability and certainty – evinced through 
their choice-of-law agreement and their decision not to arbitrate ex aequo et bono. Nor 
does it even arguably matter that the arbitrators become functus officio after deciding a 
single case (…).
197
  
 
It is to be noted that the understanding of the nature of arbitrator’s adjudicative 
function could be influenced by the adherence to one or another theory of the 
foundations of international commercial arbitration. The endorsement of the 
jurisdictional theory indicates preference for a more judicialised approach to 
international commercial arbitration. The proponents of the jurisdictional theory 
contend that arbitrator’s adjudicative function incorporates strict application of the 
rules of law, including application of national and international laws, and adherence 
to national judicial precedents to the extent that those decisions are given binding 
effect in state jurisdictions. Some argue that: 
 
arbitrators resemble judges of national courts because the arbitrators' powers are drawn 
from the states by means of the rules of law. As with judges, arbitrators are required to 
apply the rules of law of a specific state to settle the disputes submitted to them.
198
 
 
According to the judicialised position towards the sources of law in international 
commercial arbitration, arbitrator’s mandate also includes an obligation to honour 
parties’ express choice of law and in absence of explicit provisions to resort to the 
conflicts of law principles to determine the relevant rules of law. Only in cases 
where parties explicitly state that they opt for amiable compositeur arbitration, an 
arbitral tribunal is free to disregard judicial decisions and adjust the outcome by 
taking into account equitable principles.
199
 
 
A word of caution should be given here, as the meaning and significance of legal 
certainty in national legal systems may be different from the ones in international 
commercial arbitration. This is because policy considerations that are advanced by 
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the concepts of legal certainty and predictability in national legal systems may not be 
at all or entirely applicable in international commercial arbitration settings. It is 
widely acknowledged that policy issues do not play a significant role in international 
commercial arbitration proceedings, where often protection for private interests as 
opposed to the public interest is sought. Thus, although it is true that business parties 
appreciate legal certainty and predictability, it is necessary to ask the question “legal 
certainty with respect to what?”. Do parties expect legal certainty with respect to the 
dispute resolution procedure or do they seek predictability in arbitrator’s decision-
making? What is the meaning of legal certainty in international commercial 
arbitration? The significance of parties’ expectations and how they influence the 
judicialisation process will be considered in the following Chapters 3 and 5.   
 
To conclude it is worth mentioning that the judicialised approach to court decisions 
resonates with the position adopted in other areas of international law. Thus, for 
example, the important role of court decisions as a source of law is emphasised in 
Art. 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, according to which judicial decisions, as well as the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, are 
recognised as international sources of law, or in the words of the Statute – they are 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”. In ICSID arbitrations, 
which arise out of bilateral or other investment treaties as opposed to arbitration 
agreements, which is the case with international commercial arbitration, the 
reference to judicial decisions by arbitral tribunals is characterised as 
“remarkable” 200 : “The relatively high number of references to domestic court 
decisions as compared to the other categories of unilateral practice is remarkable. It 
may indicate a trend in ICSID tribunals to be more case law oriented than legislation 
oriented.”201 
 
Judicial decisions, viewed as authoritative legal reasoning, have effects beyond the 
particular case. Apart from providing standards for the correctness and fairness of 
the decisions, case law also has a bearing on the process of harmonisation and 
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unification of law. As highlighted by Professor Camilla Baasch Andersen
202
, the 
jurisconsultorium, or “the sharing of scholarly and case-law-based sources of legal 
understanding and interpretation” 203 , is the means to ensure not mere textual 
uniformity, but also applied uniformity in law, as “any drafted text purporting to be a 
uniform law is nothing until it is applied uniformly as law”204. It is considered that 
for the international business community consistency in resolving similar legal 
disputes is of great importance. 
 
 
3.1.1 Case Study with a Collection of Arbitral Awards by the Society of Maritime 
Arbitrators and ICC Arbitral Awards  
 
The judicialised approach to sources of law can be illustrated by examination of 
arbitral awards rendered in commercial and maritime cases, where legal certainty 
and predictability are highly valued.
205
 A comprehensive search in the collection of 
awards rendered by the Society of Maritime Arbitrators reveals that maritime law 
arbitrators very often refer to national court decisions and other arbitral awards in 
order to promote the principles of legal certainty, predictability and commercial 
justice.
206
 Thus, in Agrowest, S.A., Dos Valles S.A. and Comexa S.A. and Maersk 
Sealand
207
 the sole arbitrator analysed various court decisions and arbitral awards in 
consideration of arbitrator’s obligation to bring arbitration proceedings to a 
conclusion as soon as reasonably possible, and arbitrator’s power to dismiss cases 
with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Similar approach to court decisions is 
                                                 
202
  See Camilla Baasch Andersen, The Uniformity of the CISG and Its Jurisconsultorium: An 
Analysis of the Terms and a Closer Look at Examiation and Notification (1st edn, 
Handelshøjskolen i Aarhus 2006); Andersen, ‘Defining Uniformity in Law’ (n 184).  
203
  Andersen, ‘Defining Uniformity in Law’ (n 186) 6. 
204
  Andersen, The Uniformity of the CISG and Its Jurisconsultorium (n 200) 57. 
205
  Regarding the importance of legal certainty and predictability in commercial and maritime 
cases, see Zerkos Georgios I. Zerkos, International Commercial and Marine Arbitration (1st 
edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2008) 491 stating: “In practice, parties’ perceived fairness in 
arbitration process and the predictability and certainty of the result is why arbitration is 
becoming more and more the preferred dispute mechanism for specific kind of disputes such as 
commercial, maritime, employment and consumer protection issues”. 
206
  Similar search in the CISG database, available at: <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/search-
cases.html>, using the keyword “precedent” rendered no result. 
207
  SMA 4050 (2009). 
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demonstrated in the cases of Transammonia, Inc. and Bergesen d.y. ASA as agents 
for the Norwegian flag LPG/C HUGO N, and General Gas Carrier Corp., Ltd.
208
, 
Sangamon Transportation Group, as Disponent Owner of the Genco Carrier and 
OSL Steamship Corp.
209
, Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, Time Charterers, 
and Ina Tankers Corp., Owners of the M.T. Noto
210
. In all of the cited awards the 
arbitrators’ decisions are introduced with variations of the following wording: “The 
Panel has carefully considered the facts, arguments and legal precedents, and reaches 
the following decision (…)”211.  
 
Several ICC arbitral awards also follow a formalistic and judicialised approach to the 
sources of law and national court decisions in particular. The dispute in ICC Case 
13258
212
 arose between a Claimant, a UK join venture company and a Respondent, 
an African State-owned entity, which awarded a construction contract for part of a 
hydroelectricity project to the Claimant. Claimant alleged that the issuance of a 
variation order by the employer amounted to a breach of contract, while Respondent 
argued that such an order allows an employer to make changes to the works without 
thereby committing a breach of contract. The contract was based on the FIDIC 
Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering Construction, 4
th
 edition, 
1987, as amended and completed by conditions of particular application. The law 
governing the substantive matters of the dispute was the law of the African state [F] 
from which the Respondent originated. That law was based on English common law. 
The arbitral tribunal reasoned that “[t]he crux of the issues in the present case is 
whether the facts come within the proviso expressly stipulated in FIDIC/GC 
51.1(b).”213 Despite the lack of judicial decisions on the matter and the fact that 
“[t]he parties did not refer the Arbitral Tribunal to any [State F] legal authorities 
                                                 
208
  SMA 4115 (2011). 
209
  SMA 4167 (2012).  
210
  SMA 1032 (1976). 
211
  Sangamon Transportation Group (n 209). Also see Agrowest, S.A. (n 207): “(…)[A]fter having 
taken into account the totality of facts and circumstances, the contract terms, the conduct by 
AgroWest and its counsel, the legal and arbitral precedents as well as the principles of fairness 
and equity, I conclude (…).” 
212
  ICC Case 12358, partial award rendered in 2005 in (2012) 23(2) ‘ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin’ 83. 
213
  Ibid. 
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concerning the interpretation of variations clauses for building contracts” 214, the 
arbitrators based their construction of FIDIC/GC 51.1(b) on a number of English, 
Commonwealth and other common law judicial decisions instead of practices and 
usages in the construction industry for example.  
 
In another ICC case the law governing to the contractual relationship between the 
parties was Brazilian law.
215
 The arbitral tribunal gave consideration to a number of 
judicial decisions to support its interpretation of the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916. It 
also engaged in a surprisingly long discussion on the evolution of the governing law 
only to conclude that the parties were free to agree otherwise and had indeed done 
so. With respect to the binding authority of the court decisions, the tribunal explicitly 
stated that in addition to the applicable legal provisions: 
 
the Arbitral Tribunal will also look at secondary sources of Brazilian law, such as 
writings by legal scholars and decisions taken by Brazilian courts. It will take into 
account the opinions written by the distinguished legal experts brought by the parties to 
these proceedings. Furthermore, to enlighten this review [the] Arbitral Tribunal will 
also take into account sources of comparative law, particularly of countries of the civil 
law tradition that have similar regulations (…). The tribunal holds that these secondary 
sources of law do not serve as precedents and they are not imperative or binding, but 
they are useful to attain a duly justified and fair decision.
216
 
 
In ICC Cases 11876
217
 and 12048
218
 the arbitral tribunals relied on a number of court 
decisions before confirming that they have powers to rule upon a dispute involving a 
party against which insolvency proceedings are brought and award pre-judgment 
interest respectively. In the second ICC Case, ICC Case 12048
219
, the tribunal 
pointed out that it could find no impediment in the applicable law to the award of 
                                                 
214
  Ibid. 
215
  ICC Case 14424, award rendered in 2008 in (2012) 23(1) ‘ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin’. 
216
  Ibid. 
217
  ICC Case 11876, award rendered in 2003 in (2009) 20(1) ‘ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin’ 86. 
218
  ICC Case 12048, award rendered in 2006 in (2012) 23(2) ‘ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin’ 70. 
219
  Ibid. 
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pre-judgment interest and reasoned that it should have as much authority to award 
such interest as a state court indisputably would have under the applicable law.  
 
In ICC Case 10346
220
 the arbitral tribunal expressly relied on judicial precedents to 
decide against Claimant’s proposed remedy. The dispute concerned the performance 
of a contract for construction of an industrial facility in a South Asian country. The 
law governing the contract was the law of New York.  In the course of the arbitration 
proceedings Respondent raised a threshold issue, alleging that Claimant was barred 
from obtaining relief as it had won the contract by bribing Respondent’s advisers and 
had failed to disclose information on the bribes paid to them. In a partial award the 
arbitral tribunal found that the existence of bribery did not make the contract 
unforeseeable or prevent Claimant from pursuing its claims. In the second phase of 
the arbitration proceedings the arbitral tribunal considered whether to allow 
Claimant to recover its out-of-pocket expenses and profit (Claimant’s proposed 
remedy) or to deprive Claimant of any profit and allow it only to recover its out-of-
pocket expenses (Respondent’s proposed remedy). The tribunal found that 
“[Claimant]’s proposed remedy, which would allow [Claimant] to recover costs plus 
profit minus the bribe, is inconsistent with the New York precedent”.221 In addition it 
relied on policy considerations to conclude that the remedy must deprive Claimant 
from any incentive to participate in bribery: “the remedy that the Tribunal adopts, 
one that allows no profit to the briber, is surely a powerful disincentive. Corporations 
do not thrive on costs plus zero contracts.” 222 
 
It could be inferred from the above that in arbitrations where parties have explicitly 
agreed on a choice of law provision legal certainty and precision are highly valued. It 
appears that such a clause restricts to some extent arbitrators’ discretion to judge on 
the authoritativeness and persuasiveness of the applicable sources of law and compel 
arbitral tribunals tend to follow established judicial precedents. Adherence to well-
established legal reasoning serves the need for consistency, certainty and 
predictability in law. 
                                                 
220
  ICC Case 10346, award rendered in 2000 in (2001) 12(2) ‘ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin’ 106. 
221
  Ibid. 
222
  Ibid. 
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3.2 National Court Decisions as a Source of Law - A Flexible 
Approach 
 
The downsides of the judicialised approach to national court decisions as a source of 
law in international commercial arbitration give rise to arguments in favour of a 
more flexible position. The proponents of the latter argue that arbitrators should have 
authority to decide whether to adhere to the rigidity of national legal systems or not. 
The approach to precedents is to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Thus, for 
example, arbitrators may sometimes be faced with situations, where the reasoning of 
national court decisions is out-dated, rigid or inapplicable to the realities of 
international commerce and trade. If a national law does not provide for a particular 
set of rules designated specifically for transactions in international commercial 
context, the case law on those provisions may lead to an inacceptable, nonsensical or 
unjust outcome of the dispute. A flexible position would be to grant arbitrators with 
discretion to decide whether to follow national court decisions in view of the 
particular facts of the case. Prosper Weil deftly explains the sociological imperatives 
in play:  
 
The question whether and to what extent judicial decisions constitute a source of law 
and, therefore, a binding authority upon tribunals, is, as we all know, a difficult and 
controversial one. There are competing sociological imperatives at play: the need for 
continuity of jurisprudence, which is to say stability in the rules of law, without which 
there can be no predictability, weighs against the need for the evolution of such rules of 
law, responsive to an ever changing political, sociological, and economic climate. 
Permanence and stability serve certain purposes; flexibility and evolution serve 
others.
223
 
 
Indeed, the flexible approach to the sources of law in international commercial 
arbitration prioritises considerations of flexibility, commercial sense and private 
                                                 
223
  Prosper Weil, ‘Introductory Remarks’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi (eds), IAI 
Series on International Arbitration No. 5: Precedent in International Arbitration (1st edn, Juris 
Publishing, Inc. 2008) 95. 
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interests over those of certainty and the public interest. While the latter generally 
applies to both the arbitration proceedings and arbitrator’s decision-making, it will 
be discussed in the following chapters what parties’ expectations as to the arbitral 
process and arbitrator’s functions are and whether they differ. It is, however, 
important to note that the proponents of the flexible approach maintain that business 
needs will best be met if arbitrators decide disputes on a case-by-case basis with 
minimum reference to established case law. On the occasions that national court 
decisions are cited, arbitral tribunals should consider whether the application of 
judicial precedents is appropriate. Advocates for a more flexible approach to the 
sources of law contend that instead of blindly following the letter of the law, 
arbitrators should strive to resolve disputes in view of the particularities of the 
specific case, i.e. by closely examining the facts of the case and applying 
commercial sense. In Redfern’s view: 
 
[b]y its whole nature and constitution, an arbitral tribunal is far more ready, and far 
freer than a conventional judicial tribunal to deal with the actual case in front of it. An 
arbitral tribunal is usually established to deal with a particular case. Once it has 
pronounced its decision, its function is over. In such cases, there is less need to be 
concerned with consistency of decisions. There is more scope for tailoring the award to 
the particular merits of the dispute.
224
 
 
Klaus Peter Berger also asserts that arbitrators are not obliged to comply with the 
rigidity of the national legal systems. While arbitral tribunals are forbidden to act 
contra legem
225
, they may apply the law in a more flexible way, developing a law 
“secundum or praetor legem”. Professor Berger further notes that arbitrators should 
assess the authoritativeness of national court decisions in view of the specifics of the 
particular legal system to which the applicable national law belongs. For example, 
judicial precedents play a significant role in common law systems, which is not 
always the case with the function that court decisions have in civil law 
jurisdictions
226
.  
                                                 
224
  Alan Redfern, ‘International Commercial Arbitration: Winning the Battle’ in The Southwestern 
Legal Foundation (ed), Private Investors Abroad (1st edn, Dallas 1989) 11-1, 11-12. 
225
  See  Berger, ‘The International Arbitrators’ Application of Precedents’ (n 178) 15. 
226
  It is worth mentioning that in Falcón y Tella (n 176) , the author distinguishes between the terms 
“legal system”, and “legal tradition” or “legal family”. In particular it is argued that the terms 
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Contrary to the judicialised approach to the sources of law in arbitration, proponents 
of the flexible position, such as Professor Klaus P. Berger
227
 and Alan Redfern
228
 do 
not fully equate the arbitrator’s adjudicative function to the judicial one and, as such, 
do not transpose on arbitrators policy consideration associated with the role of a 
national judge. Arbitrators’ mandate is seen as a case-specific one rather than as a 
system-contributive mandate
229
. According to Professor Berger: 
                                                                                                                                          
“civil legal system” and “common legal system” are not correct, and one has to refer to 
Continental, Anglo-Saxon and Roman systems. However, Prof Berger uses the expressions 
“civil/common law system”, “civil/common law”, “civil/common law tradition”, and 
“civil/common law jurisdictions” interchangeably, without making a distinction between the 
terms. As such any references made to Berger, ‘The International Arbitrators’ Application of 
Precedents’ (n 180) should not contain connotations regarding any differences that may have 
between the terms “common/civil legal system” and “Continental/Anglo-Saxon systems”. In 
fact, the terms “common/civil legal system” will be used throughout the research paper without 
going into detail to deliberate on their accuracy, as those terms are widely recognisable.  
227
  See n 225.  
228
  See n 224. 
229
  The viability of the doctrine of stare decisis and the applicability of the concept of precedent are 
disputable issues in the area of international investment arbitration as well. In Michael W. 
Reisman, ‘“Case Specific Mandates” versus “Systemic Implications”: How Should Investment 
Tribunals Decide? The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture’ (2013) 29 Arbitration International 131–
153, the author analyses two approaches to arbitrators’ legal function, namely “case-specific” 
and “systematic-application”, as the latter is taking account of the “systematic implications” of 
arbitral decisions. Contrary to the assertions of Sir Robert Jennings and Prof Mc Edward 
Whinney, cited by Reisman, the latter concludes that application of international investment law 
“based on ‘a modicum of awareness of the system as a whole’ and ‘greater contextual 
awareness’ actually have negative implications for the public system of private investment 
protection” (at 151). In support of his arguments, the author refers to the legal reasoning in the 
case of Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara, 
UNCITRAL Ad-Hoc Award, 4 May (1999), where the tribunal made a remark on the “inherent 
limitations of its role”. Needless to say that international investment arbitration differs greatly 
from international commercial arbitration. The former is part of public international law as a 
system for investor-state disputes settlement, while the latter is part of private international law 
realm. However, it is interesting to note that in both areas the function of arbitrators is 
disputable, namely whether arbitral tribunals should confine to the case-specific and rule-and-
text-based analysis or they also need to pay regard to policy-and-context-based considerations 
and to the systemic implications of their decisions. Although Reisman objects the idea of limited 
law-making function for private international tribunals, stating that “a policy or law-making 
function for the international commercial arbitrator would seem anomalous (...): private law-
making, conducted under private circumstances and not published simply would not serve as law 
for an entire national community” (at 135), the latter is not entirely unsupported in the literature. 
According to CISG, Art. 7(2) where questions concerning matters governed by the Convention 
are not expressly settled in it, arbitral tribunals are entitled to fill the gap by resorting to the 
general principles on which the CISG is based or, in the absence of such principles, in 
conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law. The 
promotion of autonomous interpretation of the Convention under Art. 7(1) and the provision of 
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in view of the specificity of international arbitration, the arbitrators should be entitled to 
go a step further than the foreign judge and disregard even long-standing case-law of 
the highest court if the result does not conform with the needs of international trade and 
commerce, provided there is sufficient support in foreign doctrine for the result he 
endeavours to achieve in the case before him.
230
 
 
At first thought such an approach does not seem to be in favour of the international 
commercial community, as it does not guarantee certainty and predictability in the 
application of the law. If a long-standing case law can easily be disregarded by 
arbitrators, then businesses will be brought back to a “legal no-man’s land”231. Some 
will even argue that if parties want their disputes to be decided on the grounds of 
general norms and equity principles, they will opt for ex aequo et bono arbitration 
instead of including a choice of law provision.  
 
The position of the proponents of the flexible approach to national case law is not 
that arbitrators are entitled to completely disregard national court decisions. The 
argument goes differently. It is argued that arbitrators have the discretion to follow 
or not established case law as long as their decision is not contra legem. This is 
because by its nature international commercial arbitration is an alternative to 
                                                                                                                                          
gap-filling mechanism under Art. 7(2) serve for grounds for some scholars to advocate for a 
biding effect of arbitral awards on the CISG and “supranational stare decisis” (in Larry 
DiMatteo, ‘The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended Contractual Liability 
in International Business Dealings’ (1997) 22 Yale Journal of International Law 111–170, 111), 
“ipso facto stare decisis” (in René Franz Henschel, ‘Conformity of Goods in International Sales 
Governed by CISG Article 35: Caveat Venditor, Caveat Emptor and Contract Law as 
Background Law and as a Competing Set of Rules’ (2004) 1 Nordic Journal of Commercial 
Law) or “inspirational precedent” (in Andersen, The Uniformity of the CISG and Its 
Jurisconsultorium (n 202) 117). Furthermore, in Franҫois Perret, ‘Is There a Need for 
Consistency in International Commercial Arbitration?’ in Yas Banifatemi and Emmanuel 
Gaillard (eds), IAI Series on International Commercial Arbitration No. 5, Precedent in 
International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Juris Net, International Arbitration Institute 
(IAI) 2008), 26 it is argued that “[w]hile it is true that arbitrators must not loose sight of the 
main objective assigned to them, namely settling the dispute pending before them, it is equally 
true that in many cases the reasons for the decision are not limited to the application of a given 
legal rule on the circumstances at hand. Like an arrêt de principe, an arbitral award may give a 
solution to the legal issue at state going beyond the contingency of the specific case and thus 
may be called upon to rule on disputes of the same kind.”                                                                                  
230
  Berger, ‘The International Arbitrators’ Application of Precedents’ (n 180) 15. 
231
  See Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 3821; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (U.S. S. Ct. 1974). 
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litigation dispute resolution mechanism, which cares more for the needs of 
commercial parties than for the public interest. As such, arbitrator’s function is to 
render a decision that meets businesses’ needs and if, in light of the particular facts 
of the case and international trade practices, this means deviating from the strict 
application of judicial precedents, arbitrators should be allowed to do so.  
 
The alternative nature of arbitration and the secondary role of court decisions as 
sources of law are attested by the increasing significance of the so-called “soft law” 
in international commercial arbitration
232
. The importance of self-regulation in 
arbitration can be interpreted as willingness on the side of international commercial 
community to grant normativity to such sources of law that are perceived with 
greater respect for the authority of the lawmaker and are associated with 
harmonisation and globalisation trends and commercial realities. Hence, references 
to national court decisions may be expected only when parties’ contract, mandatory 
rules, trade practices and soft law do not provide unequivocal answer to the matters 
of dispute. 
 
ICC Case 14208/14236
233
 provides an excellent example of a flexible approach to 
the sources of law and court decisions in particular. The parties to the contract had 
specified that the contract should be governed and construed in accordance with the 
laws of [State X]. The arbitral tribunal had not been granted powers to act as amiable 
compositeur or to decide matters ex aequo et bono. Among the issues to be decided 
by the arbitrators was the question whether a third party should/could be joined to 
the arbitration agreement.  
 
The arbitral tribunal held that “[t]he fact that [State X] law governs the merits of the 
dispute does not mean that it necessarily also governs the issues of joining a non-
signatory, or, in other words, the issue of whether the arbitration clause should be 
extended to [the Parent Company]”.234 Claimant’s position was that reference to any 
particular law was unnecessary and the arbitral tribunal should instead refer the lex 
                                                 
232
  See generally Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Soft Law in International Arbitration’ (n 136).  
233
  ICC Case 14208/14236, partial award rendered in 2008 in (2013) 24(2) ICC ‘International Court 
of Arbitration Bulletin’. 
234
  Ibid. 
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mercatoria. According to the Respondent, the arbitral tribunal was to consider the 
law of the state where the parent company was incorporated as a starting point in the 
veil-piercing exercise because “the Arbitral Tribunal’s determination concerns an 
issue of legal personality”.235 The tribunal disagreed with the Respondent on the 
basis that: 
 
While in national legal systems, piercing the corporate veil is in most cases a 
substitution mechanism, and therefore an issue of corporate legal personality, it is not 
generally considered as such in transnational arbitration, but rather as another method 
of extending the arbitration clause to a non-signatory in case of abusive or fraudulent 
behaviour by the parent company or the owner of the group.
 236
 
By distinguishing between issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation, i.e. 
issues of corporate legal personality governed by the law of the state of 
incorporation, and issues relating to the rights of third parties external to the 
corporation, the tribunal concluded that it was not bound to consider the law of the 
state of incorporation and allowed the corporate veil to be pierced in consideration of 
the individual circumstances of the case at hand. 
 
The reasoning in ICC Case 14208/14236
237
 demonstrates a flexible approach to the 
sources of law and the appropriateness of referring to lex mercatoria in view of the 
particular circumstances of the dispute. The appeal of applying transnational 
principles to international commercial disputes has been explained in ICC Case 
8385: 
 
Application of international standards offer many advantages. They apply uniformly 
and are not dependent on the peculiarities of any particular national law. They take due 
account of the needs of international intercourse and permit cross-fertilization between 
systems that may be unduly wedded to conceptual distinctions and those that look for a 
pragmatic and fair resolution in the individual case.
238
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238
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Section 2.4 of this thesis considers the recognition and application of lex mercatoria 
as a source of law in international commercial arbitration proceedings and two 
approaches to the New Law Merchant.
239
 
 
 
3.3 Arbitral Awards as a Source of Law 
 
A question that causes as much difficulty to answer as the one concerning the 
binding force of national court decisions in international commercial arbitration, 
refers to the nature of arbitral awards in arbitration and their role, if any, as sources 
of law. If it may be hard to justify judicial decisions’ strict application in 
international arbitration, it is even harder to argue that arbitral decisions decided in 
an ad hoc manner, and as a rule protected by confidentiality clauses, can be regarded 
as a source of law.  
 
Similar to the approach to national court decisions, there are two general points of 
view that are of importance for the process of judicialisation in international 
commercial arbitration. The first position is associated with the judicialised approach 
to sources of law and perceives arbitral awards as a source of law for considerations 
of legal certainty, predictability of dispute’s outcome, and procedural and 
substantive justice. This position is necessarily linked to some new developments in 
international commercial arbitration, such as the rise of transparency in 
arbitration
240
, the emergence of the theory of arbitral precedent
241
, and transmission 
                                                 
239
  See Section 2.4. 
240
  Alberto Malatesta and Rinaldo Sali, The Rise of Transparency in International Arbitration: The 
Case for the Anonymous Publication of Arbitral Awards (Alberto Malatesta and Rinaldo Sali 
(eds), 1st edn, Juris Net 2013). Also see the new initiative for publicising arbitral awards called 
Arbitrator Intelligence, web page available at: <http://www.arbitratorintelligence.org/>; 
Catherine A. Rogers, ‘Arbitrator Intelligence: the Pilot Project and Beyond’, Kluwer Arbitration 
Blog, post available at: <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2015/01/20/arbitrator-
intelligence-the-pilot-project-and-beyond/> 
241
  See generally Guillaume (n 124); Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Arbitral Precedent’ (n 158); Weidemaier, 
‘Judging-Lite’ (n 33); Yas Banifatemi and Emmanuel Gaillard (eds), IAI Series on International 
Arbitration No. 5, Precedent in International Arbitration (1st edn, Juris Net, International 
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(2010) 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1895–1958; Walter E. Baer, ‘Precedent Value of Arbitration 
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of the principle of Jura Novit Curia from Continental jurisdictions to international 
commercial arbitration
242
.  
 
The second approach seeks more flexibility, greater freedom in arbitrator’s decision-
making process and re-affirmation of the principle of confidentiality. The supporters 
of this position daydream about the bygone golden age of cheap, fast, efficient and 
less regulated international commercial arbitration. They argue that international 
commercial arbitration should remain free of litigation concepts, such as lis pendens, 
and rigid doctrines, such as stare decisis. 
 
The significance of these two approaches to the sources of law in arbitration, in 
particular with regard to arbitral awards, comes into play when issues of res judicata, 
lis pendens and precedential/persuasive effect of arbitral awards arise in international 
arbitration proceedings. Thus, arbitration users, who favour the process of 
judicialisation in international commercial arbitration and, as such, encourage further 
regulation in the field, and strive for greater certainty and predictability in arbitration 
proceedings, apply the concept of res judicata more strictly, adopt litigation-like 
                                                                                                                                          
Awards’ (1966) 45 Personnel Journal 484–488; Rolf A. Schütze, ‘The Precedential Effect of 
Arbitration Decisions’ (1994) 11 J. Int’l Arb. 69–75; Perret, ‘Is There a Need for Consistency in 
International Commercial Arbitration?’ (n 227); William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, ‘The 
Binding Force of International Arbitral Awards’ (1983) 23 Va. J. Int’l L. 253–285. 
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practices to combat parallel proceedings, and acknowledge, if not the binding, at 
least the persuasive effect of arbitral awards. In contrast to the judicialised approach, 
those who oppose the applicability of litigation concepts to arbitration, seek an 
autonomous and flexible understanding of the concept of res judicata, and dispute 
the role of arbitral awards as a source of law in arbitration.  
 
Since the concepts of res judicata, lis pendens, and arbitral precedent require an 
extensive analysis
243
, the latter not being the purpose of this study, it is necessary to 
                                                 
243
  For profound analysis on the concepts of res judicata and lis pendens in international arbitration 
see: Audley Sheppard, ‘Res Judicata and Estoppel’ in Bernardo M. Cremades and Julian D. M. 
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Review 623–675; Christer Söderlund, ‘Lis Pendens, Res Judicata and the Issue of Parallel 
Judicial Proceedings’ in Lars Heuman and Sigvard Jarvin (eds), The Swedish Arbitration Act of 
1999, Five Years on: a Critical Review of Strenghts and Weaknesses (1st edn, Juris Net 2006); 
Randy D. Gordon, ‘Only One Kick at the Cat: A Contextual Rubric for Evaluating Res Judicata 
and Collateral Estoppel in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2006) 18 Florida Journal of 
International Law 549–595; Mark Beeley and Hakeem Seriki, ‘Res Judicata: Recent 
developments in Arbitration’ (2005) 8 International Arbitration Law Review 111–116; Florian 
Kremslehner, ‘The Arbitration Procedure - Lis pendens and res judicata in International 
Commercial Arbitration’ in Christian Klausegger and others (eds), Austrian Arbitration 
Yearbook 2007 (1st edn, C.H.Beck, Stämpfli & Manz 2007); Christer Söderlund, ‘Lis Pendens, 
Res Judicata and the Issue of Parallel Judicial Proceedings’ (2005) 22 Journal of International 
Arbitration 301–322; Gretta L. Walters, ‘Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole: Do Res 
Judicata Challenges in International Arbitration Constitute Jurisdictional or Admissibility 
Problems?’ (2012) 29 Journal of International Arbitration 651–680; AnneCatherine Hahn, ‘The 
Award and the Courts, Res Judicata as a Challenge for Arbitral Tribunals’ in Christian 
Klausegger and Peter Klein (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2014 (1st edn, 
Manz’sche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung; Manz’sche Verlagsund 
Universitätsbuchhandlung 2004); Filip de Ly and Audley Sheppard, ‘ILA Final Report on Res 
Judicata and Arbitration’ (2009) 25 Arbitration International 67–82; Vaughan Lowe, ‘Res 
Judicata and the Rule of Law in International Arbitration’ (1996) 8 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 38–
50; Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Res Judicata and International Arbitral Awards’ [2012] ASA 
Special Series No. 38; August Reinisch, ‘The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as 
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Int’l Cts. & Tribunals 37–77; Kaj Hobér, ‘International Arbitration, Res Judicata and Lis 
Pendens’ in Recueil Des Courts, Volume 366 (1st edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
Leiden/Boston 2013); Norah Gallagher, ‘Parallel Proceelings, Res Judicata and Lis Pendens: 
Problems and Possible Solutions’ in Loukas A. Mistelis (ed), Pervasive Problems in 
International Arbitration (International Arbitration Law Library Series) (1st edn, Kluwer Law 
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Publishing 2003); Christa Roodt, ‘Reflections on Finality in Arbitration’ [2012] De Jure 485–
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set some preliminary limitations. The objective of this chapter is to explore whether 
(the approaches to) the sources of law in international commercial arbitration 
demonstrate an on-going process of judicialisation in the field. As such, the 
following section will explore only developments that can be linked to the 
judicialisation process, rather than conducting an in-depth examination of the above-
mentioned notions. 
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Proceedings in International Arbitration: A Comparative European Perspective, International 
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The applicability of doctrines like res judicata and lis pendens to international 
commercial arbitration, as well as the implementation of litigation practices, such as 
consolidation of arbitration proceedings, joinder of additional parties, and claims 
between multiple parties
244
, raises salient questions as to the increased complexity of 
arbitration proceedings, including post-award issues. Having taken on the litigation 
toolkit to handle parallel proceedings in international arbitration, arbitrators are even 
“required to proceed judicially”245 and adopt solutions that promote the principles of 
res judicata and lis pendens – doctrines intrinsically associated with national legal 
systems. These new developments in international commercial arbitration sparkle the 
debate about its judicialisation, as they are perceived as a move towards a litigation-
like adjudication process.  
 
Due to the expansion of international arbitration as a dispute resolution method, 
however, the harmonisation of courts’ and tribunals’ approaches to parallel 
proceedings and post-award issues related to the res judicata effect of arbitral 
awards has become increasingly important. Thus, although the doctrines of res 
judicata and lis pendens are innate to national legal systems, they found their way to 
the field of international commercial arbitration as well.  
 
 
3.3.1 Lis Alibi Pendens and International Commercial Arbitration 
 
National courts apply lis alibi pendens to tackle parallel proceedings involving the 
same parties and the case cause of action. It entitles courts to refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction, i.e. to stay or suspend legal proceedings, when there is parallel litigation 
pending in another jurisdiction. The lis pendens doctrine is relied upon both in civil 
law and common law jurisdictions
246
, and is considered by some authors to be also a 
rule of customary international law or a general principle of law
247
. The applicability 
                                                 
244
  The incorporation of litigation practices in the arbitration process and its implications are 
considered in Chapter 4. 
245
  Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, and Hunter (n 24) 41. 
246
  Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 3792.  
247
  See for example Reinisch (n 241) 48: “Still, it can hardly be disputed that lis pendens is also a 
rule of international law applicable in international proceedings. The widespread use and 
similarity of the concept of lis pendens in the national procedural laws of States of all legal 
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of the principle of lis alibi pendens in international arbitration is not just unclear but 
highly questionable. Opinions on the matter range from complete dismissal of the 
relevance of lis pendens doctrine to international arbitration, to acknowledgment of 
its sui generis application. Thus, according to Julian D.M. Lew QC: 
 
There is no place for the concept of lis pendens in international arbitration. It will not 
and cannot resolve the problem of parallel and simultaneous forums. (…) Tribunals 
should not look over their shoulder at what other tribunals may or may not be doing. 
Each tribunal has a duty to carry out its authority and responsibility in accordance with 
the appropriate jurisdiction clause and the agreements of the parties. There may be 
instances where a stay or slowdown of proceedings might be appropriate, provided this 
does not cause undue delay and will not prejudice the interests of the parties.
248
 
 
Furthermore, it is commonly acknowledged that “the very concept of lis alibi 
pendens is considered as a logical impossibility in international commercial 
arbitration”: 
 
(…) there can be no question of two equally competent bodies: the jurisdiction of an 
arbitral tribunal requires a valid arbitration agreement, and one of the main legal 
consequences of such an agreement is precisely that it evicts the jurisdiction of national 
courts. Moreover, it is commonly held that whenever the validity or the scope of an 
agreement to arbitrate is in dispute, national courts should defer initially to the arbitral 
tribunal, whose jurisdiction to decide the issue is said to have priority (…).
249
 
 
In spite of the suggestion that lis pendens may be an oxymoron in the field of 
international arbitration, issues considering the extent to which court proceedings 
                                                                                                                                          
traditions as well as its inclusion in a number of bi- and multilateral agreements is evidence that 
lis pendens can be regarded as a general principle of law in the sense of Art. 38 of the ICJ 
Statute. Further, the existence or application of such a rule was generally acknowledged in the 
few cases where lis pendens claims were made before international courts or tribunals.” (citing  
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) 
No. 6; Caire Claim (France v. Mexico), 5 R.I.A.A. 516 (1929).  
248
  Cremades and Lew (n 243) 311. 
249
  Geisinger and Lévy (n 241) 53, also citing the reasoning of the Italian Corte di cassazione in the 
decision Società Montedison e altre v. Società Enichem, 8 July 1996, [2000] ASA Bulletin 38, 
388, ICC Case 5103, award rendered in 1988 in S. Jarvin, Y. Derains and J. J. Arnaldez, 
Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards (1986-1990) (1st (ed), ICC Publishing/Kluwer 1994) 361, 
365. 
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should interfere with or affect arbitral proceedings prove to be of significant 
importance. An example of these issues is demonstrated by the Fomento case
250
, in 
which Swiss courts had to deal with questions arising out of pending proceedings. 
Before an arbitral tribunal was instituted, Fomento initiated court proceedings in 
Panama against Colón Container Terminal (CCT), a Panamanian company. CCT 
objected to the jurisdiction of the Panamanian court by virtue of the valid arbitration 
agreement. The court of first instance rejected the jurisdictional objection and did not 
grant stay of the proceedins. CCT subsequently brought arbitration proceedings 
under the ICC Arbitration Rules, however Fomento maintained before the 
Panamanian courts that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the Claimant 
had waived its right to arbitration by not challenging the court’s jurisdition in time. 
The case went to the Supreme Court of Panama, which ruled that the jurisdictional 
objection had been raised too late. Fomento then challenged the jurisdictional 
decision of the arbitral tribunal before the Swiss Federal Tribunal on the grounds of 
tribunal’s violation of lis pendens principle. The Swiss Federal Tribunal set aside the 
jurisdictional award of the arbitral tribunal. The Tribunal saw no reason to 
distinguish arbitral awards from court decisions when it came to the principles of res 
judicata  and lis pendens, and, as such, since the foreign court judgement was 
susceptible to enforcement in Switzerland, the issue of priority had to be applied also 
with respect to the court first seised. Thus, the Swiss Federal Tribunal maintained 
that both the arbitral tribunal and the court are entitled to rule on their jurisdiction 
and there was no reason to grant any priority with regard to the principle of 
compétence de la compétence to the arbitral tribunal. 
 
The decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal on Fomento case was heavily criticised 
because it opened the possibility of arbitral proceedings being circumvented by a 
party by bringing an action before a foreign court prior to the institution of an 
arbitral tribunal. This position of the Tribunal was rectified by amendment to the 
Swiss PILA, which Art. 186 (1bis) now reads: “It [the arbitral Tribunal] shall decide 
on its jurisdiction notwithstanding an action on the same matter between the same 
parties already pending before a State Court or another arbitral tribunal, unless there 
                                                 
250
  Fomento de Constructiones y Contratas SA v. Colón Container Terminal SA, BGE 127 III 279 
(2001), English translation in 19 ASA Bulletin (2001) 555. 
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are serious reasons to stay the proceedings” 251 . In 2008, in the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal decision 4A_210/2008, the Tribunal applied Art. 186 (1bis) Swiss PILA to 
a case involving parallel proceedings before two aribtral tribunals, thus following the 
Swill legislator’s position that the arbitral tribunal first seised of the same issue is 
entitled to rule on its jurisdiction.
252
 
 
There are several rules and tools that an arbitral tribunal can use or resort to when 
faced with parallel proceedings in international arbitration. The general provisions 
that regulate the issue of priority in international arbitration are Art. II(3) NYC and 
Art. 8(1) UNCITRAL ML, according to which a national court, before which an 
action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, should 
refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed. The application of these provisions is 
supported by the doctrine of competence-competence under national arbitration laws, 
according to which arbitrators are entitled to decide on their own jurisdiction. As 
such, even in case of parallel pending proceedings, arbitrators are allowed to proceed 
with the arbitration (this is the so-called positive effect of competence-competence 
doctrine). Some jurisdictions, among which France is the leading example, recognise 
a negative effect of the doctrine of competence-competence as well. The latter grants 
priority to arbitral tribunals to rule on their jurisdiction and prohibits courts from 
making determination of arbitrators’ jurisdiction before tribunals have decided on 
the matter. Finally, the most controversial tool that can be used to handle parallel 
proceedings in international arbitration is anti-suit injunctions
253
. They are 
                                                 
251
  Art. 186 (1bis) reads: ‘Il statue sur sa compétence sans égard à une action ayant le même objet 
déjà pendant entre les mêmes parties devant un autre tribunal étatique ou arbitral, sauf si des 
motifs sérieux commandent de suspendre la procédure’. The English translation is cited as in 
Thomas H. Webster and Michael W. Bühler, Handbook of ICC Arbitration: Commentary, 
Precedents, Materials (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) 329 at para 22-26. 
252
  For analysis on the Swiss Federal Tribunal decision 4A_210/2008 dated 29 October 2008 see 
von Segesser, ‘Swiss Federal Tribunal applies Article 186 (1bis) of the Swiss Private 
International Law Act in a case involving parallel proceedings before two arbitral tribunals | 
Kluwer Arbitration Blog’, available at: 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/03/12/swiss-federal-tribunal-applies-article-186-
1bis-of-the-swiss-private-international-law-act-in-a-case-involving-parallel-proceedings-before-
two-arbitral-tribunals/>  
253
  Anti-suit injunctions are well established in some jurisdictions (traditionally common-law ones) 
and absent in others. National courts are called upon to intervene in arbitration by means of anti-
suit injunctions in extreme, pathological situations occurring during the course of arbitration 
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traditionally associated with common law jurisdictions, since civil law jurisdictions 
invoke the concept of lis pendens to tackle problems arising of parallel pending 
proceedings. Anti-suit injunctions can be issued both by courts in support of or 
against arbitration, and by arbitral tribunals against court litigation.  
 
The above rules and tools provide a regulatory framework, within which the arbitral 
tribunals and courts can function when dealing with parallel proceedings in 
international commercial arbitration. This framework, however, proves to be 
incomplete and not entirely efficient, as it leaves many unanswered questions.  Thus, 
for example, there is no general principle as to the priority and coordination between 
arbitration and court litigation. It is true that an arbitral tribunal has power to rule on 
its jurisdiction and is entitled to carry on with the arbitration even when faced with 
parallel court proceedings. However it is equally true that both parties and arbitrators 
“shall make every effort to conduct the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-
effective manner”254, and, as such, the arbitral tribunal should take into account the 
fact that the final decision regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement belongs 
to the national courts, which can set aside the jurisdictional or final award in 
accordance with Art. 34(2)(a)(i) UNCITRAL ML.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
proceedings. Still, anti-suit injunctions are considered a controversial tool and have been 
criticised for being in breach of public international law and general principles of international 
arbitration. For in-depth analysis on anti-suit injunctions in international arbitration, see: 
Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘How to Handle Parallel Proceedings’ (n 241); Emmanuel Gaillard, IAI 
Series on International Arbitration No2: Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration 
(Emmanuel Gaillard (ed), 1st edn, Juris Net Llc 2005); Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Reflections on the 
Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration’ in Loukas A. Mistelis (ed), Pervasive 
Problems in International Arbitration (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2008); Olivier Luc 
Mosimann, Anti-suit Injunctions in International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Eleven 
International Publishing 2010); Thomas Raphael, ‘Anti-Suit Injunctions to Restrain Arbitration 
Proceedings’ in The Anti-Suit Injunction (1st edn, OUP 2008); Georgios Petrochilos, Procedural 
Law in International Arbitration (OUP 2004) 105-107. 
254
  See ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, Art. 22(1). Similar provisions are found in LCIA Arbitration 
Rules 2014, Art. 14.4(ii) stating: “Under the Arbitration Agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal’s 
general duties at all times during the arbitration shall include a duty to adopt procedures suitable 
to the circumstances of the arbitration, avoiding unnecessary delay and expense, so as to provide 
a fair, efficient and expeditious means for the final resolution of the parties' dispute”; SIAC 
Arbitration Rules 2013, Art. 16.1 stating: “The Tribunal shall conduct the arbitration in such 
manner as it considers appropriate, after consulting with the parties, to ensure the fair, 
expeditious, economical and final determination of the dispute”.  
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Apart from being the perfect example for illustration of the problems that can arise 
with regard to parallel proceedings in international commercial arbitration, Fomento 
case demonstrates a downside of a judicialised approach to international commercial 
arbitration. As pointed out by Elliott Geisinger and Laurent Lévy: 
 
[t]here can be little doubt that the belief that arbitral tribunals and national courts rank 
equally with each other laid the foundations for Fomento. (…) If arbitration is the 
ordinary dispute resolution method in international commercial contracts and arbitral 
tribunals rank equally with national courts, is it not natural to treat instances of 
competing jurisdiction alike, whether they involve an arbitral tribunal and a national 
court or two national courts?
 255
 
 
Indeed, an implication of the judicialisation process in international commercial 
arbitration, particularly with regard to the approach to the sources of international 
commercial arbitration and the principles that govern it, would be putting 
international commercial arbitration on an equal footing with national litigation 
when it comes to competing jurisdictions. This would mean accommodating the 
principle of lis pendens in international commercial arbitration and adopting 
litigation tools to handle parallel proceedings, so as to avoid situations, in which two 
equally final, binding and enforceable decisions exist within the same legal system. 
This would also suggest that in case of pending proceedings before a national court, 
on the one hand, and an arbitral tribunal, on the other hand, where the national court 
renders a decision regarding the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, the latter should be binding 
upon the arbitral tribunal. In fact, such is the conclusion reached by the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal in Westland Helicopters case
256
, where the latter stated in obiter 
dictum that: 
 
(…) if a national court decides that it has jurisdiction notwithstanding an agreement to 
arbitrate and despite a jurisdictional defence based on that agreement, its ruling on 
jurisdiction is binding upon an arbitral tribunal before which proceedings are brought 
                                                 
255
  Geisinger and Lévy (n 241) 55. 
256
  Les Emirates Arabes Unis v Westland Helicopters, (1994) ASA Bulletin 404. 
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subsequent to the commencement of judicial proceedings, provided that the parties and 
the subject matter in both proceedings are the same
257
. 
 
As demonstrated by both Westland Helicopters and Fomento, applying the principle 
of lis pendens to international commercial arbitration proceedings may lead to more 
complications than the one that the doctrine aims to eradicate
258
. Although it may 
seem reasonable to give priority to the court at the seat of arbitration in situation of 
parallel proceedings, since the court is the one that has the last word on arbitrators’ 
jurisdiction, this solution vitiates party autonomy, in particular the arbitration 
agreement granting explicit jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal, as well as the 
doctrine of competence-competence.  
 
This is why both Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I Regulation) and Regulation 
(EU) 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (Recast Brussels I Regulation) left arbitration out of its 
scope of application. Art. 1(2)(d) Brussels I Regulation is simply drafted, as the aim 
is to ensure that member state courts act in support of arbitration in compliance with 
their national law. Thus, in Marc Rich
259
 the European Court of Justice held that the 
issue of the scope or validity of an arbitration agreement is covered by the exception 
                                                 
257
  Geisinger and Lévy (n 241) 55, commenting on Les Emirates Arabes Unis v Westland 
Helicopters, (1994) ASA Bulletin 404, 411. Original text in French: ‘En droit suisse, la question 
de la compétence - la “compétence de la compétence” (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) - est tranchée 
en dernier ressort par le juge étatique (art. 36 let. b CIA; art. 190 al. 2 let. b LDIP). Cependant, il 
appartient dans la régie au tribunal arbitral de la traiter en priorité (art. 8 CIA; art. 186 LDIP). Il 
n'en va autrement - sous réserve de l'admissibilité, sujette à caution, d'une action en constatation 
de l'existence, de la validité ou des effets d'une convention d'arbitrage (Poudret, FS Walder, loc. 
cit.) - que lorsque la juridiction ordinaire est saisie en premier d'une action au fond et qu'une 
exception d'arbitrage est soulevée devant elle. Si elle décline sa compétence, sa décision ne lie 
pas le tribunal arbitral saisi en second lieu; en revanche, si elle l'admet, elle le lie en raison de 
l'autorité de la chose jugée attachée à sa décision (Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, op. cit., n. 1 ad art. 
8 CIA). 
258
  As noted by Geisinger and Lévy (n 241) citing Perret, ‘Parallel Actions Pending before an 
Arbitral Tribunal and a State Court’ (n 243), 65, 68, 76-78; “Whilst disagreeing with (…) (the) 
reasoning (in Westland Helicopters case), Professor François Perret observes that it is a key link 
in the chain of thought leading to the recognition of lis alibi pendens in international arbitration: 
if arbitrators were not bound by a court judgement denying the validity of an agreement to 
arbitrate, they would be free to proceed without regard to any judgement that a national court 
seized of the same matter might render.” 
259
  ECJ C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co AG v. Societá Italiana Impianti SpA [1991] ECR 1-3855. 
 
Page 102 
in Art. 1(2)(d), provided that this issue only constitutes a preliminary one. 
Unfortunately, the now infamous West Tankers
260
 decision undermined the 
arbitration exclusion under the Brussels I Regulation. It gave parties to arbitration 
agreement green light to act in violation of the latter by allowing them to bring 
substantive proceedings falling within the scope of the Regulation in a member state 
court most likely to find the arbitration clause invalid. Although, on the face of it, 
West Tankers dealt with the issue of the availability of anti-suit injunctions as 
recourse in support of an arbitration agreement
261
, the effect of the decision was de 
jure and de facto paralyzing the courts of the seat of arbitration, as well as the party 
willing to uphold the arbitration agreement, and rendering the latter powerless to 
prevent the violation of the arbitration clause. The decision in West Tankers was 
heavily criticised by arbitration users, who saw it as a step in the wrong direction. 
The ECJ’s decision created the possibility for a party to arbitration agreements to 
exploit the principle of lis pendens and drag the innocent party into costly and time-
consuming proceedings before an unfavourable national court, running a real risk of 
inconsistent decisions
262
. 
 
Various proposals for clarification of the scope of the arbitration exclusion were put 
forward during the wide consultation led by the European Commission on the 
                                                 
260
  ECJ C-185/07, Allianz SpA v West Tankers Inc. [2009] 1 AC 1138. 
261
  Ibid [31] “(…) [I]f, by means of an anti-suit injunction, the Tribunale di Siracusa were prevented 
from examining itself the preliminary issue of the validity or the applicability of the arbitration 
agreement, a party could avoid the proceedings merely by relying on that agreement and the 
applicant, which considers that the agreement is void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed, would thus be barred from access to the court before which it brought proceedings 
under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 and would therefore be deprived of a form of 
judicial protection to which it is entitled.” 
262
  Nick Archer, Slaughter and May, ‘The Practical Implications of the West Tankers Decision, 
April 2009,’ 2009, available online at: 
<http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/822289/the_practical_implications_of_the_west_tank
ers_decision.pdf>. When commenting on the implications of the West Tankers decision, the 
author maintains that: “It is not difficult to envisage a situation where an opportunistic potential 
defendant could exploit the position created by the ECJ’s decision by commencing tactical 
proceedings which have the effect of delaying the resolution of the substantive dispute. Such 
delay might well be significant depending on, for example, the availability of summary 
procedures and the rights of appeal in the relevant jurisdiction’s court system. Further, such 
collateral proceedings will inevitably cause expense – potentially both significant and 
irrecoverable – for the innocent party. Finally, there is a real risk of inconsistent decisions by the 
national court on the one hand and the arbitral tribunal on the other both as to the validity and 
applicability of the arbitration agreement and even on the substantive dispute itself.” 
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revision of Brussels I Regulation. The new Recital 12 of the Recast Brussels I 
Regulation restates the exclusion of arbitration-related actions from its scope, in 
particular: (i) actions relating to the validity of the arbitration agreement or its scope; 
(ii) actions ancillary to arbitration including actions concerning the establishment of 
an arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration procedure 
or any other aspects of such a procedure; (iii) actions relating to the annulment, 
review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award; and (iv) actions 
relating to the enforcement of a court judgment recognising the validity of an 
arbitration agreement. The second paragraph of Recital 12 goes on to provide that a 
ruling given by a court of a member state as to whether or not an arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should not 
be subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in the Recast 
Brussels I Regulation, regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal 
issue or as an incidental question. Hopefully, this means that parties now have less 
incentive to initiate court proceedings in a member state simply with the purpose of 
obtaining an order that their arbitration agreement is invalid (because such an order 
will not be susceptible to recognition in other member states).  
 
The above demonstrates the problems that can arise with regard to the principle of lis 
pendens, particularly in proceedings between international arbitral tribunals, on the 
one hand, and national courts, on the other hand
263
. Questions of competing 
                                                 
263
  Lis pendens can also be invoked in situations where two different tribunals are instituted to 
decided on the same or related claims between the same parties, particularly in related 
international commercial arbitral proceedings (see Hobér (n 241) 245-247, where it is 
maintained that horizontal or vertical parallel disputes can often arise with regard to complex 
projects, such as gas and oil drilling projects or construction projects), or in investment 
arbitrations, if the underlying dispute between an investor and its host state may give rise to 
multiple claims (see McLachlan (n 241) 197, explaining that parallel proceedings in investment 
arbitration regarding the same underlying factual dispute may be initiated on the grounds of 
different investment treaties, or on the basis of a contract concluded between the investor an the 
state, or with regard to investor’s property rights, etc.). For related arbitrations in investment 
arbitration, see Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Lauder v. Czech Republic), 
Final Award 3 September 2001 and CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL 
(CME v. Czech Republic), Partial Award 13 September 2001, Final Award 14 March 2003. In 
both cases the submissions based on lis pendens were rejected because it was held by the 
tribunal that claims involved different parties and different causes of action (under different 
BITs). See also A v AC Court of First Instance of Geneva, September 30, 1998, ((1999) 9 Revue 
suisse de droit international et droit européen, 628), 629. Quotations translated from French 
original by Geisinger & Lévy, (n 243) 66. 
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jurisdictions are most acute in cases of parallel arbitral and court proceedings 
because international arbitration can exist and subsist to the extent it is allowed by 
national laws and supported by national courts. As maintained by Campbell 
McLachlan “[t]he jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is, of its nature, limited by the 
extent, and validity, of the arbitration agreement. It relies on the intervention of 
national courts to secure its application.”264 Depending on whether the courts of the 
seat of arbitration or other courts are deciding on arbitral jurisdiction, questions of 
priority as between courts and arbitral tribunals are decided differently. Thus, in case 
of parallel proceedings between an arbitral tribunal and the court of the seat of 
arbitration, there are three are the possible solutions: (i) sequencing determination of 
competence
265
; (ii) parallel consideration of competence
266
; (iii) priority to 
arbitrators’ determination of jurisdiction267. Where the court sought to decide on 
arbitral jurisdiction is in a different state to that of the arbitral seat, as in Fomento 
case and Weissfisch v Julius
268
, solutions may vary. In the latter case the English 
Court of Appeal rejected an application for an injunction to restrain Mr. Julius 
personally from acting as an arbitrator. The Court held that, since the seat of 
arbitration was in Switzerland and Swiss law was governing the arbitration, Swiss 
courts had supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration there and any conduct 
associated with it. In the absence of any “special circumstances” that could have 
                                                 
264
  McLachlan (n 241) 194.  
265
  This is approach adopted by the ECICA, which states in Art. VI Jurisdiction of Courts of Law 
that where the court is seised first, the court will proceed to determine the validity, however, if 
arbitral tribunal is commenced first, the court will stay its ruling until an award is rendered: “(1) 
A plea as to the jurisdiction of the court made before the court seized by either party to the 
arbitration agreement, on the basis of the fact that an arbitration agreement exists shall, under 
penalty of estoppel, be presented by the respondent before or at the same time as the 
presentation of his substantial defence, depending upon whether the law of the court seized 
regards this plea as one of procedure or of substance. (…) (3) Where either party to an 
arbitration agreement has initiated arbitration proceedings before any resort is had to a court, 
courts of Contracting States subsequently asked to deal with the same subject-matter between 
the same parties or with the question whether the arbitration agreement was non-existent or null 
and void or had lapsed, shall stay their ruling on the arbitrator’s jurisdiction until the arbitral 
award is made, unless they have good and substantial reasons to the contrary.” 
266
  UNCITRAL ML (Art. 8), NYC (Art. II.3), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 (Art. 23), ICC 
Rules 2012 (Art. 6.3), SIAC Arbitration Rules 2013 (Art. 25.1) – all tolerate parallel 
consideration of arbitrators’ jurisdiction. In contrast SCC Arbitration Rules 2010 do not contain 
any provisions on the issues of competence as between courts and arbitral tribunals. 
267
  LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014.  
268
  [2006] EWCA Civ 218 (08 March 2006), available at: 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/218.html>  
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justified English courts having taken an action, the application for injunction was 
denied
269
.  
 
It can be argued that this dependence of arbitrators’ jurisdiction on national courts’ 
recognition and enforcement will never decide once and for all the questions of 
priority in international arbitration. The reliance of arbitrator’s mandate and the 
subsistence of arbitration on national laws and state courts necessarily grounds 
international commercial arbitration to a national forum
270
 and maintains the 
umbilical cord connecting international commercial arbitration to one or several 
national legal orders. As such arbitrators should be cautious if annulment or setting 
aside proceedings are brought before municipal courts. Although arbitrators are 
entitled to continue the arbitration, even where a court at the seat of arbitration has 
determined that there is no valid arbitration agreement, few are the examples of 
enforcement of arbitral awards annulled in the place of their origin
271
. 
 
In order to conclude on the applicability and scope of lis pendens doctrine in 
international commercial arbitration, it is worth noting (at the risk of generalisation) 
that in situations where an arbitral tribunal is sitting in a common law jurisdiction, it 
is quite possible that arbitrators will adopt a flexible approach to issues concerning 
parallel proceedings, i.e. invoking concepts, such as forum non conveniens, lis alibi 
pendens, abuse of process, forum shopping, and will exercise their discretion to 
                                                 
269
  Also see the court’s decision on the subsequent proceedings in A v. B [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 237 
(QB), where Colman J decided to stay both the arbitration and personal claims against Julius 
until he had rendered the final awards. It was stated that the court was not obliged to grant a stay 
under NYC, Art. II(3) and that: ‘the court retains an inherent jurisdiction to stay English 
proceedings in favour of arbitration in a case where there is an issue whether the parties entered 
into a binding agreement to arbitrate or whether the subject matter of the action was within the 
scope of the arbitration’ (at 107). See also Solvarex SA v Romero Alvarez SA [2011] EWHC 
1661 (Comm) and Union de Remorquage et de Sauvetage SA v. Lake Avery Inc (The Lake 
Avery) [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
270
  For competing views on the legal foundations of arbitration see:  Mann, ‘The UNCITRAL 
Model Law' (n 107); Paulsson, ‘Arbitration in Three Dimensions’ (n 61); Yu (n 241); Adam 
Samuel, ‘The Nature of Arbitration’ in Jurisdictional Problems in International Commercial 
Arbitration: A Study of Belgian, Dutch, English, French, Swedish, Swiss, U.S. and West German 
Law (1st edn, Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag 1989). 
271
  Koch (n 112); Claudia T. Salomon, Lilia B. Vazova ‘Arbitral award enforced in the United 
States although annulled abroad’ (2013) Lexology, available online at: 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2ce0058a-826e-4302-a14d-293fa8b2fde4>; 
Hilmarton (n 116). 
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proceed with arbitration with greater independence. In contrast, civil law 
jurisdictions usually follow the first-seised rule and, as such, the timing factor is the 
one determining the decision to stay or proceed with arbitration.
272
  
 
In light of the foregoing, it is argued
273
 that the existing legal framework, including 
both national legislation and international legal instruments
274
, as well as the tools 
available to handle parallel proceedings, do not guarantee the primacy of party 
autonomy and the escape from multiple fora
275
. Currently the means available to 
courts and arbitral tribunals to avoid divergent conflicting decisions are: (i) 
                                                 
272
  Until recently the fist-seised-rule also regulated lis pendens scenarios under the European 
Council Regulation 44/2001, i.e. adopting an approach to parallel proceedings very similar to the 
one existing in civil law jurisdictions. The Recast Brussels I Regulation, however, contains a 
new Art. 31(2), according to which: “(…) where a court of a Member State on which an 
agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is seised, any court of 
another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis 
of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement.” This is a positive 
development aimed at preventing parallel proceedings before member state courts and 
inconsistent judgments. It shows Commission’s determination to deal with the concerns 
expressed by commercial parties and practitioners during the consultation stages as to the so-
called torpedo tactics/proceedings.  
273
  See for example Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘How to Handle Parallel Proceedings' (n 241) 111 et seq.; 
Brengesjö (n 241).  
274
  See NYC, Art. II(3); UNCITRAL ML, Arts. 8, 16(1); Recast Brussels I Regulation, Recital 12; 
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Art. 27. 
275
  As maintained in McLachlan (n 241) 189-190, one of the perceived advantages of international 
arbitration over litigation is providing a single neutral forum, outside the parochial 
preoccupations of national courts, for resolution of trade disputes. This reasoning is to be applied 
to the construction of the arbitration agreement, as well as to tackling questions about courts’ 
attitude to arbitration. In the recent case of Premium Nafta Products Ltd. v Fili Shipping Co. Ltd. 
[2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 254, at 5-8 Lord Hoffman stated: “(…) Arbitration is consensual. It 
depends upon the intention of the parties as expressed in their agreement. Only the agreement 
can tell you what kind of disputes they intended to submit to arbitration. (…) The parties have 
entered into a relationship, an agreement or what is alleged to be an agreement or what appears 
on its face to be an agreement, which may give rise to disputes. They want those disputes 
decided by a tribunal which they have chosen, commonly on the grounds of such matters as its 
neutrality, expertise and privacy, the availability of legal services at the seat of the arbitration 
and the unobtrusive efficiency of its supervisory law. (…) If one accepts that this is the purpose 
of an arbitration clause, its construction must be influenced by whether the parties, as rational 
businessmen, were likely to have intended that only some of the questions arising out of their 
relationship were to be submitted to arbitration and others were to be decided by national courts. 
(…) If, as appears to be generally accepted, there is no rational basis upon which businessmen 
would be likely to wish to have questions of the validity or enforceability of the contract decided 
by one tribunal and questions about its performance decided by another, one would need to find 
very clear language before deciding that they must have had such an intention.” 
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recognising and exercising the negative form of competence-competence by granting 
arbitrators priority to rule over their jurisdiction and limiting courts’ control over the 
existence and validity of the arbitration agreement to a prima facie review
276
; (ii) 
anti-suit injunctions
277
; (iii) consolidation and joinder of proceedings, if possible and 
appropriate; and (iv) non-enforcement of a judgment or arbitral award as means of 
last resort. Apart from some encouraging developments in the realm of the 
competence-competence doctrine with regard to both its positive and negative 
effects, the other solutions engaged in the battle against parallel proceedings are 
typically associated with litigation practices. It is yet to be seen how the notion of lis 
alibi pendens will evolve in international commercial arbitration and whether a more 
flexible understanding of the doctrine together with an independent toolkit for 
handling parallel proceedings will emerge. According to Elliott Geisinger and 
Laurent Lévy, however, the recognition of lis alibi pendens in international 
arbitration is a “normal development, which merely highlights the maturity of that 
field of law”278. For others, the doctrine of lis pendens can be perceived as a step 
further towards a judicialised and overregulated arbitration, since “[t]here is no place 
for the concept of lis pendens in international arbitration”279. 
                                                 
276
  See Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘How to Handle Parallel Proceedings’ (n 241); Sandra Synková, ‘The 
Negative Effect of Competence-Competence’ in Courts’ Inquiry into Arbitral Jurisdiction at the 
Pre-Award Stage: A Comparative Analysis of the English, German and Swiss Legal Order (1st 
edn, Springer 2014); Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi, ‘Negative Effect of Competence-
Competence: The Rule of Priority in Favour of the Arbitrators’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and DD 
Pietro (eds), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards 
(Cameron May 2008); Jack M. Graves, ‘Court Litigation over Arbitration Agreements: Is It 
Time for a New Default Rule?’ (2012) 23 The American Review of International Arbitration, 
113; Jean Francois Poudret, Sebastien Besson, and Stephen Birti, ‘Control of the Arbitral 
Tribunal’s Jurisdiction’ in Comparative Law of International Arbitration (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2007); See also court decisions supporting arbitrators’ priority to determine the validity 
of the arbitration agreement to various extent: Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] 
UKHL 40, Fondation M v Banque X, BGE 122 III 139, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 29 April 
1996, Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd. v Aksh Optifibre Ltd., Supreme Court of India, 12 August 
2005, Dell Computer Corp v Union des consommateurs, Supreme Court of Canada, 13 July 
2007, Copropriété Maritime Jules Verne, et al. v. ABS – American Bureau of Shipping, Cour de 
Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 7 June 2006. 
277
  McLachlan (n 241) 219-253; Raphael (n 251); Gaillard, ‘Reflections on the Use of Anti-Suit 
Injunctions in International Arbitration’ (n 251); Mosimann (n 251); Hakeem Seriki, Injunctive 
Relief and International Arbitration (1st edn, Informa Law from Routledge 2015); AES Ust-
Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP v Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC [2013] 
UKSC 35; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1889.  
278
  Geisinger and Lévy (n 241) 68. 
279
  Cremades and Lew (n 243) 311. 
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3.3.2 Res Judicata and International Commercial Arbitration 
 
Issues of res judicata, cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel, claim preclusion, lis 
pendens, lis alibi pendens or similar variations of the concepts in national 
jurisdictions arise with regard to questions of fact and the legal effects of facts with 
the intention to avoid re-litigation of issues, conflicting decisions and judicial 
inefficiency. The principle of res judicata is commonly associated with the formal 
and substantive finality of court decisions. The former has to do with the 
impossibility to appeal a judgment within the normal procedural regime for review 
to a higher court, while the latter means that a judgment cannot be considered anew 
with respect to identical claims, i.e. identity of the parties, the subject matter and the 
legal grounds
280
. 
 
Apart from the application of the doctrine in national legal systems, res judicata has 
also been recognised as a general principle of international law
281
. In the area of 
international commercial arbitration the doctrine of res judicata is linked to the 
negative (preclusive) and the positive (conclusive) effects of arbitral awards, 
meaning that a final and binding arbitral award prevents further litigation on a matter 
that has formed the subject matter of a prior arbitral award, however, parties to 
subsequent arbitration proceedings can rely on findings in previous arbitration to 
develop their case. Such interpretation is endorsed by the International Law 
Association’s Final Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration, which recognises the 
inconsistency in the approach to res judicata effect of arbitral awards and the need 
for harmonisation in the area, particularly with regard to the effect of international 
commercial arbitration awards upon further or subsequent arbitration proceedings 
between the same parties
282
.  
                                                 
280
  Söderlund (n 241) 300, 301. 
281
  See Sheppard, ‘Res Judicata and Estoppel’ , 228; Reinisch (n 241); Bin Cheng, General 
Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Grotius Classic Reprint 
Series) (1st (ed), Cambridge University Press 2006) 336-372; Yuval Shany, The Competing 
Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (3rd edn, OUP 2003) 27-28, 164-173; 245-
255; Lowe (n 241).  
282
  de Ly and Sheppard, ‘ILA Final Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration’ (n 243).  
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Post-award issues and res judicata effect of arbitral awards in the same arbitration 
(with regard to the effect of partial or interim awards), in subsequent arbitration and 
in the proceedings before national courts (with regard to the effect of final awards) 
can raise various questions, which are well summarised by Luca Radicati di Brozolo 
in a list of open issues: 
(i) What is the scope of the doctrine, particularly as to the preclusive and 
conclusive effects of an arbitral award? 
(ii) Does the res judicata effect apply only to the dispositive part of the award or 
also to the reasoning? 
(iii) Does res judicata operate only in strict compliance with the triple identity test 
(same parties, cause of action and subject matter)?  
(iv) Does res judicata cover all matters that could or should (by the exercise of due 
diligence and good faith) have been raised before the court in support of the 
claims brought in the earlier proceedings (sometimes referred to as the 
obligation of concentration)? Is there any test for assessing, which matters 
ought to have been pleaded in support of such claims? 
(v) Do jurisdictional and interim awards have res judicata effect? 
(vi) Who is bound by the res judicata effect of an arbitral award, in particular does 
it apply to third parties to arbitration? 
(vii) As of when does an arbitral award have a res judicata effect? 
(viii) Is res judicata effect conditional on the award being enforced/enforceable? 
(ix) Are there exceptions to the res judicata principle? 
(x) Does res judicata operate across different legal orders (e.g. can a judgement 
rendered under public international law or in an investment arbitration be res 
judicata in a commercial arbitration or the vice versa)? 
(xi) What are the consequences of the failure to attribute the requisite res judicata 
effect to an arbitral award? 
(xii) Is an arbitrator obliged or entitled to raise a res judicata objection ex officio?283  
 
                                                 
283
  Those and other questions have been raised by Luca G.Radicati di Brozolo in Radicati di 
Brozolo (n 243) 3, 4. The author demonstrates the importance of the solutions to those questions 
by commenting on an unpublished ICC award on ICC case 13808/2008. The facts of the case are 
stated in Radicati di Brozolo (n 241) 2, 3. 
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Without going into in-depth analysis on the above-mentioned issues on res judicata 
(since this goes outside the objectives of this chapter), it is necessary to point out 
some general observations based on commentaries and ILA Final Report on Res 
Judicata in international arbitration
284
, which have regard to the debate about the 
process of judicialisation.  
 
Regarding the meaning and scope of res judicata, it is well recognised that 
international arbitration lacks autonomous interpretation of the principle of res 
judicata. At the present, res judicata effect is scarcely, if at all, regulated by national 
procedural rules. The existing regulations, however, are fragmented and inconsistent. 
Thus, for example, the res judicata effect of an award by consent, as well as the 
scope of the doctrine in general differs between jurisdictions. As observed in ILA 
Final Report on Res Judicata civil law jurisdictions recognise a more limited notion 
of res judicata, which covers only the dispositive part of an arbitral award
285
. Luca 
G. Radicati di Brozolo summarises national laws’ approaches as follows:  
 
(…) continental legal systems tend to adopt a more formalistic approach, which 
essentially limits res judicata to the dispositive part of the decision and sets 
considerable emphasis on the triple identity test. Common law systems, on the other 
hand, follow a more open and pragmatic approach which extends the res judicata to 
cover not only claim preclusion (or cause of action estoppel) but also issue preclusion 
(or issue estoppel).
 286
 
                                                 
284
  de Ly and Sheppard, ‘ILA Final Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration’ (n 243).  
285
  Ibid 67. 
286
  Radicati di Brozolo (n 241) 5; see also Söderlund (n 243) 301-302, who similarly maintains: “In 
the context of res judicata, it is important to underline a feature of continental civil law systems 
different to the common law systems – that they do not attach res judicata effect to the 
adjudicatory bodies’ conclusions in respect of specific issues or legal premises but only to the 
dispositive part of the judgment. In other words, if one and the same issue arises in another 
action, although between the same parties, the judge or arbitrator in the page subsequent 
litigation will be at liberty to revisit the issue and conceivably arrive at a different conclusion. 
This principle is opposed to the concepts of collateral estoppel (USA) or issue estoppel (English 
law), which attach the force of res judicata also to legal issues and legal premises. The thinking 
behind the continental law approach is that the importance of a legal action and a specific issue 
figuring in that action could differ widely in relation to another legal action, meaning that a party 
might not invest so much effort in one particular issue in the first litigation because of its relative 
insignificance while the situation could be radically different in a subsequent action.” See also 
Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 3734-3737: “In common law jurisdictions, 
rules of preclusion are generally not codified, but instead based largely or entirely upon judicial 
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Furthermore, as pointed out by Gary Born, the preclusive effects of an arbitral award 
also depend on whether res judicata has been invoked before the courts of the seat of 
arbitration (in which case “an award made in a locally seated arbitration does not 
require confirmation (or recognition) in order to have preclusive effects”) or before 
foreign courts (in which case “most jurisdictions require that the award first be 
recognized, before it will have preclusive effects in local courts”) 287 . The 
uncertainties derive from the fact that “recognition is a separate legal act, which may 
produce consequences under rules of preclusion, but which is not independently the 
source of preclusive effects and which does not ‘declare’ what the award’s 
preclusive effects are”288. 
 
The diverging approaches of national laws together with the lack of clarity as to the 
appropriate conflict of laws rules applicable to it lead to inconsistent application of 
the res judicata doctrine in international commercial arbitration. In fact, there are not 
generally accepted conflict of laws rules on the matter. The laws that can be 
considered relevant to determining the res judicata effect of an arbitral award are (i) 
the law governing the substantive rights (i.e. the law of the contract); (ii) the law of 
the place of arbitration of the proceedings leading to the prior award (i.e. the lex 
arbitri of the award whose effects are questioned); and (iii) the law of the place of 
arbitration of the proceedings where res judicata is invoked (i.e. the lex arbitri of the 
second arbitration or the lex fori of the state court called upon to rule on the matter).  
                                                                                                                                          
authority. Most common law page jurisdictions recognise two basic types of preclusion: claim 
preclusion (also termed “res judicata”) and issue preclusion (also termed “collateral estoppel” or 
“issue estoppel”). (…) Importantly, the notion of a “claim” or “cause of action,” which is subject 
to preclusion, is generally defined to include all claims or rights of legal action that arise out of a 
single set of facts or a single transaction. This expansive conception of “claims” has the effect of 
extending the preclusive effects of a res judicata well beyond those claims that were actually 
litigated concerning a particular transaction in a prior litigation, to also reach claims that might 
have been litigated (but were not). Distinct from the doctrine of claim preclusion (res judicata) 
in common law jurisdictions is that of issue preclusion (also termed issue estoppel or collateral 
estoppel). Issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating, against a counter-party, an issue of 
fact or law that was previously contested and decided in a litigation between the same parties. 
(…) Some common law jurisdictions also recognize other grounds of preclusion, including 
“abuse of process.” (…) Principles of preclusion are generally formulated in less expansive ways 
in civil law jurisdictions, as compared to common law systems. (…) The basic principle of 
preclusion in civil law jurisdictions is that of res judicata (or claim preclusion).” 
287
  Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 2908, 2909. 
288
  Ibid 2909. 
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There is no prevailing solution as to the conflict of laws rules governing res judicata 
issues, nor is there commonly accepted practices, which avoid yielding unpredictable 
results
289
. In general, national courts assess the res judicata effect of an arbitral 
award applying principles and rules applicable to domestic judicial decisions in their 
own legal systems
290
. Because of the different regulatory approaches, however, the 
solutions to the res judicata conundrum vary and they are not always in compliance 
with Arts. III and II NYC. The latter impose an obligation on the states to “recognize 
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them”, and to give effect to the arbitration 
agreements concluded by parties. 
 
In order to overcome those discrepancies in the approach to res judicata, it has been 
suggested that state courts should restrain from applying a domestic interpretation of 
res judicata to international arbitral awards, rather courts should develop a sui 
generis transnational approach to the preclusive and conclusive effects of arbitral 
awards
291
. The starting point in the application of Arts. II and III NYC is applying 
the correct principles of construction to them. Since the NYC is a treaty within the 
meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, regard must be had 
in its application to the rules of interpretation provided by the Vienna Convention. 
This suggests that the states (signatories to the NYC and the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties) have to interpret and apply their obligations to recognise arbitral 
awards as binding and enforce them, and to give effect to the arbitration agreements, 
in light of the object and purpose of the NYC, having regard to relevant general 
principles of international law, but most importantly to the underlying assumptions 
of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. It is claimed that a broader understanding of 
res judicata will give better effect to the terms and objectives of the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate: 
                                                 
289
  Ibid 3740, 3741: “Despite widespread acceptance of (…) (the) general principle (of res 
judicata), however, there is limited agreement on the precise preclusion rules that apply to 
international awards. (…) [T]here are no provisions in the New York Convention, or other 
contemporary arbitration conventions, that expressly address the preclusive effects of arbitral 
awards. Equally, there is limited arbitral authority formulating particular rules of preclusion.” 
290
  See Radicati di Brozolo (n 241) 8; Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 3741. 
291
  See de Ly and Sheppard, ‘ILA Final Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration’ (n 243) 71; 
Radicati di Brozolo (n 241) 9;  Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 3744, 3745. 
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[t]he better view of the Convention is that it should permit parties only “one bite at the 
cherry” (or apple), as required in developed common law preclusion systems. This 
analysis would entail a broader view of res judicata principles than ordinarily taken in 
some civil law jurisdictions, but that is appropriate in light of the New York 
Convention’s requirements and the objectives of the arbitral process. 
292
 
 
This reasoning is also in line with ILA’s recommendations on res judicata effect of 
arbitral awards. According to the ILA’s Committee the recommendations should 
apply only in international commercial arbitration context, to partial final awards, 
final awards (including awards on agreed terms), and awards on jurisdiction
293
. 
Moreover, international arbitral awards should be treated differently than national 
court judgments, namely by having regard to the international character of 
arbitration rather than applying the unnecessary restrictive notion of res judicata that 
some national legal systems recognise. Thus, among the most important suggestions 
in the ILA report is the proposal for extending the notion of res judicata in 
international arbitration, so that the latter (i) covers issue preclusion
294
, (ii) 
incorporates narrow understanding of procedural unfairness or abuse of process
295
, 
                                                 
292
  See Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 3746. 
293
  de Ly and Sheppard, ‘ILA Final Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration’ (n 243) 69. 
294
  Ibid 76, 77. 
295
  See ibid 78, 79 where the Committee weights competing interests and objectives – on one hand 
claimant’s right to have access to justice and, on the other hand, respondent’s right to have a fair 
trial in conformity with internationally regognised principles and human right standards: “In 
arbitration, party autonomy to a large extent reigns and parties and their counsel should be given 
wide discretion in determining their strategies. Costs, psychological influences, relational 
elements, cross-cultural considerations, persuasiveness, political constraints and other aspects 
may be responsible for not instituting certain claims or for not raising certain causes of action or 
issues of fact or law, and caution is in order to avoid res judicata amounting to a patronizing 
review of what parties and counsel ought to have done in managing their case. On the other 
hand, policy objectives of efficiency and finality can also be taken into account to protect 
respondents from being exposed to further arbitration if a claimant fails to raise claims, causes of 
action or issues of fact or law in prior proceedings. Also, there is a legitimate public interest in 
having an end to arbitration as well as an end to the supportive and corrective powers of 
domestic courts supervising and reviewing the arbitral process and assisting at the recognition 
and enforcement stage. The doctrines of procedural fairness and abuse, in the view of the 
Committee, provide an acceptable compromise regarding the private and public interests at 
stake.” 
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and (iii) includes not only the dispositive part of an arbitral award, but also the 
underlying reasoning
296
.   
 
The Committee’s approach to res judicata and its related notions reveals preference 
to general considerations of legal certainty and stability, procedural efficiency, 
finality of arbitral awards and public interest “in having an end to arbitration as well 
as an end to supportive and corrective powers of domestic courts supervising and 
reviewing the arbitral process and assisting at the recognition and enforcement 
stage”297. The position of ILA, based on a four-year study of res judicata298 and 
incorporating observations and comments from both scholars and practitioners, is a 
manifest of a new approach to international commercial arbitration and its sources of 
law. The latter shares many common to international arbitration and national court 
proceedings objectives, namely considerations of legal certainty and predictability, 
procedural efficiency and public interest.  
 
Thus, although ILA recommendations concern the effect of an international 
commercial award upon further or subsequent arbitration proceedings between the 
same parties, and as such they are not addressed to state courts faced with res 
judicata effects of arbitral awards in relation to jurisdiction, setting aside or 
enforcement questions, they “may constitute persuasive authority for domestic courts 
when considering res judicata effects of international commercial arbitral 
awards” 299 . By endorsing a broader notion of res judicata in international 
commercial arbitration, one that covers not only the dispositive part of an arbitral 
award but also the underlying reasoning, and by advocating for its adherence by 
national courts, ILA elevates the legitimacy and reputation of arbitral awards to the 
those of national court decisions. Furthermore, granting arbitral reasoning a res 
judicata effect is another step towards developing arbitral jurisprudence and 
acknowledging the existence of an arbitral precedent
300
.  
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3.3.3 The Two Approaches to Lis Alibi Pendens and Res Judicata in International 
Commercial Arbitration 
 
The judicialised approach to the role of arbitral awards in international arbitration is 
justified by the necessity for more legal certainty and procedural justice in a time of 
difficulties for international arbitration. Due to the increased use of international 
arbitration and the great amount of high-stake disputes brought to arbitration, the 
latter faces some unprecedented challenges. Since both principles of res judicata and 
lis pendens serve the purpose of legal security by precluding the possibility of re-
litigating identical cases (res judicata situation) or avoiding the potential of 
divergent and conflicting decisions in identical cases (lis pendens situation), the 
proponents of judicialisation heartedly welcome those concepts to international 
commercial arbitration proceedings. It is argued that, despite the great divergence in 
national jurisdictions, the notions of res judicata and lis pendens can assist arbitral 
tribunals with situations where the conclusive and preclusive effect of arbitral 
awards has been challenged, i.e. when: (i) one of the parties is trying to commence 
court proceedings with respect to the subject matter covered by the arbitration 
agreement, or (ii) a national court has already been seized to rule upon a dispute, 
which addresses issues of essence to the outcome of the arbitration, or (iii) the 
defendant raises a res judicata defence, stating that the issue has already been 
litigated in a state court or in another arbitration.  
 
The proponents of a more flexible position deny the need to resort to litigation-like 
concepts in order assert the conclusive and preclusive effect of arbitral awards. They 
dispute the applicability of the principle of lis pendens in arbitration and the 
extended effect of arbitral awards to third parties, non-signatories to the arbitration 
agreement. It is asserted that the mere existence and validity of arbitration agreement 
should constitute a bar to court proceeding or arbitration proceedings in a different 
                                                                                                                                          
the determination of rules of law to a source of law. See Banifatemi and Gaillard, IAI Series on 
International Arbitration No. 5 (n 241) 112. 
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seat of arbitration, and as such there is no place for lis pendens in international 
arbitration
301
. 
 
Despite the scarce amount of international commercial awards dealing with the 
principle of res judicata, the few decisions published by ICC indicate that arbitral 
tribunals take into account the doctrine, especially when the effect of partial and 
interim awards is considered in the next stage of the arbitration
302
. As to any 
established practice with regard to the res judicata effect of national courts 
decisions, there is not any.  
 
In a number of ICSID arbitrations, however, arbitral tribunals maintained that 
international arbitrators are not bound by decisions of national courts or other 
international tribunals. Also, several ICSID cases support such interpretation. In 
Amco v. Indonesia
303
, P. T. Wisma, a company indirectly controlled by the 
Indonesian government, has already initiated proceedings before the domestic courts 
of Indonesia, when Amco instituted ICSID arbitration to claim damages for seizure 
of their investment and cancellation of their investment license by Indonesia. In the 
ICSID proceedings, Indonesia submitted that Amco has waived their right to have 
their claim heard by an ICSID tribunal since they had cooperated in the domestic 
proceedings, had not objected the jurisdiction of the national court and had not 
requested a stay of the proceedings. The ICSID tribunal rejected these arguments on 
two grounds. Firstly, it was pointed out that the parties to the two proceedings were 
not identical, and, secondly, the tribunal unequivocally stated that “[i]n any case, an 
                                                 
301
  Julian D. M. Lew, ‘Concluding Remarks’ in Bernardo M. Cremades and Julian D. M. Lew (eds), 
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302
  ICC Case 12510, procedural order of 12 April 2004 in Special Supplement 2010: Decisions on 
ICC Arbitration Procedure A Selection of Procedural Orders issued by Arbitral Tribunals 
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international tribunal is not bound to follow the result of a national court”304. It was 
further asserted by the ICSID tribunal that: 
 
One of the reasons for instituting an international arbitration procedure is precisely that 
parties – rightly or wrongly – feel often more confident with legal institution which is 
not entirely related to one of the parties. If a national judgement was binding on an 
international tribunal such a procedure could be rendered meaningless. Accordingly, no 
matter how the legal position of a party is described in a national judgement, an 
international arbitral tribunal enjoys the right to evaluate and examine this position 
without accepting any res judicata effect of a national court. In its evaluation, therefore, 
the judgments of a national court can be accepted as one of the many factors which 
have to be considered by the arbitral tribunal.
305
 
 
In another case ICSID tribunal was confronted with concurrent/parallel non-ICSID 
arbitration proceedings. Thus, in SGS v. Pakistan
306
, the Claimant instituted ICSID 
proceedings after the Respondent had already initiated arbitration in Pakistan under 
the PSI Agreement. In the ICSID proceedings Pakistan argued that SCS’s claim 
should be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator with seat in 
Pakistan. The tribunal uphold the position that the lis pendens principle did not bar it 
from hearing SGS’s claims, since treaty claims could co-exist. As such, the ICSID 
tribunal had jurisdiction with regard to the alleged violation of the treaty. 
 
However, several commentators among which Georgios Zekos note that 
“[a]rbitrators are beginning to cite previous arbitral awards in rendering subsequent 
awards, in consequence gradually building up an arbitral case-law, an essential 
component of the modern lex mercatoria (…)”307 
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3.3.4 The Judicialised Approach to Arbitral Awards and the Evolving Concept of 
Arbitral Jurisprudence 
 
On the grounds of the aforementioned, it becomes clear that arbitral tribunals might 
be held to interpret and apply the relevant national law in compliance with the 
decisions of the highest courts of that country. At least, this is “the approach 
maintained for international tribunals of public international law, for arbitrators 
sitting in England where the ascertainment of foreign law is generally regarded as a 
matter of fact and also for international arbitrators in general”.308 As for the arbitral 
precedents, it is quite controversial whether and under what circumstances they 
might exist; however it cannot be denied that despite not being formally obliged to 
follow the principles of res judicata and stare decisis
309
, arbitral awards frequently 
serve as decisive authority
310
. As maintained by Emmanuel Gaillard and John 
Savage:  
 
On reading the ICC awards and their commentaries, one significant phenomenon 
becomes clear: the more recent awards are based on earlier decisions, and the decisions 
reached are generally consistent. The publication of awards thus enhances their 
homogeneity. In both arbitration law and international commercial law, arbitral awards 
have now become a private source carrying considerable weight and have undoubtedly 
helped to create the arbitral component of lex mercatoria.
311
 
 
Similar to national jurisdictions, the factors that determine the role and significance 
of case law in international commercial arbitration are: the objectives of international 
commercial arbitration, the role of arbitrators and the hierarchy of legal norms in 
arbitration. Apart from the latter, the theories of the nature and foundations of 
international commercial arbitration
312
, as well as the judicialisation agenda, might 
hold arbitrators to comply with the stare decisis principles. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that one empirical research
313
 suggests that arbitrators do have resort to 
                                                 
308
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309
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case law either to support their argumentation or to justify the outcome of the case. 
Despite fears that arbitral decision-making rests on application of “Solomon-like 
principles of equity”314 , judging on arbitrators’ citation practices it appears that 
arbitral awards are not detached from the applicable law and “the evidence does not 
support the claim that arbitrators routinely disregard the law or decide cases in an ad 
hoc fashion”315. Arbitrators, however, “tend to cite fewer precedents than judges, and 
they arguably engage in less depth with precedents they do cite”316. The citation 
practices of arbitrators are of importance as they “offer insight into whether 
arbitration is capable of generating the public goods associated with precedent”.317 
 
It is perceived that despite not having biding force, “[i]n practice, arbitral awards 
frequently serve as decisive authority”318. This is particularly true for maritime and 
shipping arbitration, sports arbitration and domain name arbitrations. Similarly, in 
some industries in comparison with others there is a greater pressure for re-
evaluating the finality of arbitral awards and applicability of some judicial doctrines, 
such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, and stare decisis. Carlton Snow
319
 argues 
that the aforementioned concepts should be regarded as general principles not only 
in the law of judgments, but also within the context of labour and grievance 
arbitration. The author further asserts that res judicata, collateral estoppel and stare 
decisis “might increase certainty, stability, and finality of labour arbitration awards” 
and “should be incorporated into the body of principles upon which arbitrators rely 
in their decision making process”.320 Although Snow looks at the abovementioned 
doctrines within the scope of labour arbitration, there is no doubt that the same 
reasoning can be applied to commercial arbitration and international arbitration in 
general. More clarity and firmer approach to the concepts of res judicata and stare 
decisis will bring certainty and predictability to the system. The objection is that 
these doctrines are not inherent to international arbitration, hence, they have to be 
introduced in a careful and precise way, so as to avoid contamination of this type of 
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dispute resolution with ideas which will deprive the parties from the flexibility they 
have agreed to enjoy. 
 
Various ambiguities surround the concepts of res judicata, collateral estoppel, stare 
decisis when applied to international arbitration, and more specifically to the rules of 
procedural arbitrability and the requirement for finality of arbitral awards. For 
example, it is doubtful to what extent these doctrines may be applicable in a system 
without hierarchical structure of international courts and tribunals, where there is no 
requirement for the arbitrators to be in possession of a legal qualification, and where 
the arbitrator’s power to resolve a dispute is granted by parties, so that once the latter 
has been achieved, the arbitrator’s function is exhausted and the award is only 
binding for the parties of the dispute. Further, there is uncertainty whether the 
applicability of the principle of final and binding arbitral awards should be addressed 
in an appeal process before a national court or in subsequent arbitration proceedings, 
where the arbitral tribunal will act as an appellate or review body as to the initial 
arbitration. Moreover, it is necessary to examine whether the precedential effect of 
arbitral awards has certain duration, and if so, how to determine the latter. The 
answer to the question of duration of the potential precedential value of arbitral 
awards relates to the theories about the nature and effect of arbitral awards, the role 
and powers of arbitrators, and, ultimately, about the nature and foundation of mere 
arbitration. 
 
In “An Arbitrator’s Use of Precedent”, Snow comments on the precedential value of 
prior arbitration decisions which, though referring to labour litigation, are indicative 
of the uncertainty which surrounds this matter.
321
 The arbitrators’ opinions that are 
cited suggest that various theories are considered to be applicable when deciding on 
the precedential effect and the duration of the latter, such as theories about the 
foundations of arbitration, the nature of arbitration agreement and the nature and 
effect of arbitral awards. Thus, in Consolidation Coal Co.
322
 the arbitrator adopted 
the view that arbitrator’s authority is found in and related to parties’ contract which 
empowers the arbitrator to decide upon the case and “it follows logically that none of 
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these powers may extend beyond the life of the agreement under which they are 
exercised”.323  Another solution is suggested by Prof Marvin Hill, who is of the 
opinion that “the award is (...) binding until the parties themselves amend the 
language of the agreement” because a prior award is binding as a written stipulation 
between the parties.
324
 The latter proposition, however, undermines the possibility of 
arbitral awards to have a precedential effect in future arbitration proceedings (i.e. 
arbitration proceedings between parties not involved in the initial arbitration). Where 
an arbitral award is perceived as a supplement to or part of parties’ arbitration 
agreement, its effect cannot be extended to other arbitration proceedings and the 
award cannot be construed as establishing a rule which is to be followed in similar 
situation (i.e. the doctrine of stare decisis will not be found applicable in arbitration).  
 
Snow observes that American courts apply various tests when being asked to enforce 
prior arbitral awards to new proceedings, such as: (i) “substantially identical” or 
“substantially similar” standard as a basis for reviewing arbitrable decisions 325 , 
where the court may decide to enforce an arbitral award in a later judicial action only 
if some later conduct of the party is “substantially identical” to the original grievance 
that resulted in an arbitration award
326
; (ii) “material factual identity” test, which is 
found to apply to a new dispute between the parties in case the facts of the new case 
are not materially different from the dispute decided in the prior arbitration 
process
327
; (iii) “positive assurance” which requires positive assurance that the prior 
arbitral award was intended to cover a latter dispute or was drafted in such a way 
that the language used by the arbitrator provided for application of the arbitral award 
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in future proceedings
328
; (iv) “particularly egregious circumstances” test, according 
to which a court should review the merits of arbitral decisions to assign them 
precedential value only when there is enough evidence of a pattern of abuse and a 
bad faith disregard of prior arbitral awards
329
.  
 
The discrepancy of the approaches that the courts apply when asked to rule on the 
precedential effect of previous arbitral awards together with the case law and case 
analysis cited by Snow
330
 shows that, on one hand, the courts are reluctant to 
intervene too much in arbitration process and to take a firm stand on disputable 
issues such as applicability of doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis, and, on the 
other hand, that such matters should in principle be decided either explicitly by the 
parties, or by the arbitral tribunal ruling on a subsequent dispute. Although the cases 
cited by Snow concern grievance claims in national labour arbitration proceedings, 
the arbitral and court reasoning might be useful to extract guidelines or principles 
that can also apply to international arbitration. Such concepts may relate to and 
promote the finality of arbitral awards, judicial economy, stability and certainty as to 
the application of the law, less court intervention in and control over arbitration 
process, and pro-arbitration interpretation of legal provisions and parties’ 
stipulations in case of dubious and ambiguous language. Thus, Snow, considering 
the national labour arbitration cases, concludes that: 
 
[w]hen there is an attempt to use an arbitration award as precedent for new parties in 
the same industry, persuasive precedential value is appropriate when the prior award 
established a rule that reflects industry expectations and practices. It should be left to 
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the arbitrator to decide whether the clause as interpreted in the prior arbitration 
proceeding has been breached in the new situation.
331
  
 
The author further states that: 
 
[i]t generally is for an arbitrator, rather than a court, to evaluate questions of procedural 
arbitrability. Hence, approaches to the precedential value to be accorded prior 
arbitration awards that involve a court in an evaluation of the merits of a prior or 
existing grievance ought to be replaced by routine judicial procedures that send such 
disputes back to arbitration. To the extent that prior arbitration decisions have been 
incorporated into the contractual relationship of the parties, courts usually cannot 
analyze prior arbitral decisions without ruling on the merits of the dispute before the 
arbitrator. If, however, courts are to return such disputes to the arbitration forum, 
arbitrators need to formulate concrete principles covering the precedential value of prior 
arbitration awards.
332
 
 
It is doubtful whether the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and stare 
decisis apply in national arbitration, however, it is even more dubious whether and to 
what extent arbitral tribunals can resort to those concepts in international arbitration. 
Taking into account the variety of laws and principles that apply to different aspects 
of arbitration, (i.e. arbitration agreement, arbitration process, merits of the dispute, 
enforcement of arbitral awards, court intervention and setting aside an arbitral 
award), the fact that the dispute has an international element to it
333
, and the diversity 
in the cultural and legal backgrounds of the arbitrators deciding upon a case, one is 
to question whether such rigid, “judicial” doctrines should be introduced to 
international arbitration. Surely, there is validity in the argument that attributing 
precedential value to prior arbitral awards and relying on the concepts of claim and 
issue preclusion will bring more certainty and stability in interpretation of the letter 
of the law, more uniformity in the application of the relevant legal provisions and in 
the treatment of the parties, and ultimately more predictable dispute outcomes. The 
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push for incorporation of doctrines which are not intrinsic to arbitration and its 
general principles
334
, however, raises concerns as to the flexibility of arbitration 
process and the role of arbitral tribunals, making some to fear of too far-stretching 
judicialisation of international arbitration: “[i]t is recognized that any call for an 
application of res judicata in arbitration is contrary to a growing concern with 
“creeping legalism” in arbitration proceedings”335. 
 
Such distress might be overstated because arbitrators are aware that prior arbitral 
awards do not have any binding effect on subsequent arbitration processes. As 
Howan explains “[t]he reasoning upon which the award is based, i.e., the 
interpretation of the contractual relation, is analogous to the ratio decidendi of a 
judicial case”336, however “[i]n contrast to the judicial doctrine of stare decisis, an 
arbitrator’s interpretation of the contractual relation is not technically binding on a 
future arbitrator; [i]nstead, the arbitrator must exercise independent and impartial 
judgment in each case”337. Still, some uniformity in the process of reasoning is 
required to avoid contradictory decisions and undermining the authoritativeness of 
arbitral awards. It is too daring to advocate for a binding and precedential effect of 
arbitral awards and a “supranational stare decisis”338, however, there is no doubt that 
by having regard to the legal reasoning in previous arbitral awards, ruled on disputes 
linked to the same industry, arbitrators will contribute to the establishment of “ipso 
facto stare decisis”339. It may be argued that, indeed, international conventions and 
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model laws, such as the CISG
340
, UNCITRAL ML
341
, UNIDROIT Principles
342
, UN 
Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) (the Hamburg Rules)
343
, etc., 
encourage and promote the creation and establishment of ipso facto stare decisis 
doctrine to ensure uniform application of their provisions. Thus, the process of 
harmonisation and unification of international law, which requires a uniform 
approach in the interpretation and application of the law, affects the development of 
international arbitration. The latter is urged to re-evaluate or accustom to concepts 
which are not historically typical for it.
344
   
 
The need for re-conceptualisation of the doctrine of res judicata is also highlighted 
in the “ILA Final Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration”, where the committee 
admits that it is necessary to develop transnational rules regarding “a more extensive 
notion of res judicata than is known in some civil law jurisdictions regarding claim 
preclusion, which not only covers the dispositive part of an arbitral award but also 
the underlying reasoning” and “the introduction of a standard of abuse of process 
and procedural unfairness”. 345  With that respect International Law Association 
(ILA)
346
 asserts that the concept applied in arbitration should not be based on or 
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associated with any domestic law, for which reason a more neutral term is 
recommended, namely “conclusive and preclusive effects of arbitral awards to 
encompass both positive and negative effects of awards”347. The latter is argued to 
cover the full scope of application of the doctrine of res judicata, however, only with 
respect to previous awards rendered between the same parties in international 
commercial arbitration proceedings.
348
 Yet, there is no uniform definition of 
“conclusive and preclusive effects of arbitral awards”, neither is there clear 
guidelines on the legal provisions or principles that govern the interpretation and 
application of this concept. As the Committee admits: 
 
conflict of laws approach raises difficult characterization issues as to the substantive or 
procedural nature of conclusive and preclusive effects. (...) A conflict of laws 
perspective implies a difficult choice between three different legal systems: the law of 
the place of arbitration of the proceedings leading to the prior award; the law of the 
place of arbitration of the proceedings where res judicata is invoked; and the law 
governing the contract.
349
 
 
Furthermore, as suggested by Christa Roodt “[w]ithout a clear-cut rule for finality, 
there is the risk of relitigation of claims or issues”350. To determine the point of 
finality of arbitral awards, the main point of reference should be the 1958 NYC. 
 
There is a growing body of literature and arbitral awards, which suggest that arbitral 
jurisprudence is not a myth but a reality and that the question of the existence of 
arbitral case law is more pertinent than ever before. Thus it was stated in Dow 
Chemical v Isover Saint Gobain ICC interim award
351
 that:  
 
(…) ICC arbitral tribunals have already pronounced themselves to this effect. The 
decisions of these tribunals progressively create caselaw which should be taken into 
account, because it draws conclusions from economic reality and conforms to the needs 
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of international commerce, to which rules specific to international arbitration, 
themselves successively elaborated should respond.
 352
 
 
As further observed by Pierre Duprey, although, strictly speaking, arbitral awards 
lack the binding force of precedents, certain characteristic features of case law can 
be found in the tribunals’ adjudicatory practice, namely sharing of the same rationale 
and established practice of reference to previous awards
353
. 
 
 
3.4 Lex Mercatoria as a Source of Law 
 
It is widely recognised that in international commercial arbitration parties to an 
arbitration agreement can choose a law beyond national law to govern the merits of 
their dispute
354
. It is party autonomy rather than the sovereign/state that gives 
authority and legitimacy to these sources of law
355
. Such rules of law can consist of 
codified rules, commercial customs and best practices, such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles, Principles of European Contract Law, IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of 
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Gaillard and others (eds), Towards a Uniform International Arbitration Law (1st edn, Juris Net 
2005). 
354
  Parties’ freedom to determine the procedure to be followed is considered as one of the 
advantages of international commercial arbitration over national litigation. This right is 
implicitly recognised by NYC, Art. V(1)(d) and explicitly stated in UNCITRAL ML, Art. 19 
(1), as well as all modern institutional arbitration rules. The conclusion that party autonomy 
extends beyond the choice of a national law to govern the merits of the disputed is derived from 
UNCITRAL ML, Art. 28(1), which states that: “The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in 
accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of 
the dispute” (emphasis added). See also Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage, Fouchard 
Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Emmanuel Gaillard and John 
Savage (eds), Kluwer Law International 1999) 32, para 51 et seq.; Julian D.M. Lew, Loukas A. 
Mistelis, and Stefan Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Kluwer 
Law International 2003) 417, para 17-18, 17-19; Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, Nigel Blackaby, 
and Constantine Partasides, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Alan 
Redfern and others (eds), 4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 94, 95, para 2-34; Andrew 
Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and 
English Law and Practice (1st edn, OUP 2007) 188-200. 
355
  It should be noted, however, that the scope of party autonomy is regulated by both national laws 
and international conventions. See for example UNCITRAL ML, Art. 28(1). 
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Interest in International Arbitration, ILA Recommendations, on the one hand, or 
amorphous bodies of law commonly referred to as transnational rules, general 
principles of law or lex mercatoria
356
, on the other hand. Furthermore, the parties 
may authorise arbitrators to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur, and 
as such apply equitable principles and non-legal standards in arbitrators’ decision 
making. 
 
This section does not endeavour to explore the theories behind the notion of lex 
mercatoria, determination of the concept of lex mecatoria or exploration of the 
historical development of the Law Merchant. The latter issues do not fall within the 
objectives of this chapter and, as such, their detailed presentation will not 
complement the discussion about the judicialisation of international commercial 
arbitration
357
. The focus of this section is to analyse the resort to lex mercatoria and 
                                                 
356
  Gaillard and Savage, ‘Sources of International Commercial Arbitration’ (n 59) 102, paras 190-
192; Gaillard and Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration (n 354) 31, para 51. 
357
  On the development, existence and concept of the New Law Merchant, see Ole Lando, ‘The Lex 
Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 International Comparative Law 
Quarterly 747–768; Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law’ (n 161); Christoph W. O. Stoecker, ‘The 
Lex Mercatoria: To what Extent does it Exist?’ (1990) 7 International Arbitration 101–125; 
Vanessa L.D. Wilkinson, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria Reality or Academic Fantasy?’ (1995) 12 
Journal of International Arbitration 103–118; Lisa Bernstein, ‘Merchant Law in a Merchant 
Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms’ (1996) 144 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1765–1821; Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: 
Towards the Discriminating Application of Transnational Rules’ in Albert Jan van den Berg 
(ed), Planning Efficient Arbitration Proceedings: The Law Applicable in International 
Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series, 1994 Vienna Volume 7 (Kluwer Law International 1996); 
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law 
Merchant: A Discussion of the New Law Merchant (N.Y. Yonkers (ed), Revised. Juris 
Publishing, Inc. 1998); Gesa Baron, ‘Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts Form a New Lex Mercatoria?’ (1999) 15 Arbitration International 11–130; Luke 
Nottage, ‘The Vicissitudes of Transnational Commercial Arbitration and the Lex Mercatoria. A 
View from the Periphery’ (2000) 16 Arbitration International 53–78; Francis D. Rose, Lex 
Mercatoria: Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of Francis Reynolds (1st edn, 
Informa Law from Routledge 2000); Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Sources of the Law of 
International Trade (Clive M. Schmitthoff (ed), 1st edn, Stevens & Sons 1964); Schmitthoff, 
Select Essays on International Trade Law ; Norbert Horn and Clive M. Schmitthoff, The 
Transnational Law of International Commercial Transactions (Kluwer Law International 1982); 
L. Yves Fortier, ‘The New, New Lex Mercatoria, or, Back To The Future’ (2001) 17 Arbitration 
International 121–128; Richard J. Howarth, ‘Lex Mercatoria: Can General Principles of Law 
Govern International Commercial Contracts?’ (2004) 10 Canterbury L. Rev. 36; Celia 
Wasserstein Fassberg, ‘Lex Mercatoria - Hoist with Its Own Petard?’ (2005) 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 
67–82; Bernardo M. Cremades and Steven L. Plehn, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and the 
Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions’ (1984) 2 B.U. Int’l L. J. 
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317–348; Pryles, ‘Application of Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ ; 
Gesa Baron, ‘Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Form a New 
Lex Mercatoria?’ (1999) 15 Arbitration International 11–130; Francis D. Rose, Lex Mercatoria: 
Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of Francis Reynolds (1st edn, Informa Law 
from Routledge 2000); Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - the Lex 
Mercatoria’ ; Peer Zumbansen, ‘Debating Autonomy and Procedural Justice: The Lex 
Mercatoria in the Context of Global Governance Debates - A Reply to Thomas Schultz’ (2011) 
2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 427–433; Helen E. Hartnell, ‘Living La Vida Lex 
Mercatoria’ (2007) 12 Unif. L. Rev. 733-76-; Michael Mustill, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria: The 
First Twenty-five Years’ (1988) 4 Arbitration International 86–119; Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, ‘The 
Many Lives-and Faces-of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in International Business Law’ 
(2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 169–190; David W. Rivkin, ‘Enforceability of 
Arbitral Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria’ (1993) 9 Arbitration International 67–84; Peter M. 
Flanagan, ‘Demythologising the Law Merchant: The Impropriety of the Lex Mercatoria as a 
Choice of Law’ (2004) 15 International Company and Commercial Law Review 297–306; 
Joanna Jemielniak, ‘Lex Mercatoria in Arbitration’ in Legal Interpretation in International 
Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Ashgate 2014); Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria 
and Transnational Governance’ (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 627–646; Vanessa 
L.D. Wilkinson, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria Reality or Academic Fantasy?’ (1995) 12 Journal of 
International Arbitration 103–118; Christoph W. O. Stoecker, ‘The Lex Mercatoria: To what 
Extent does it Exist?’ (1990) 7 International Arbitration 101–125; Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Thirty 
Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Discriminating Application of Transnational Rules’ in 
Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Planning Efficient Arbitration Proceedings: The Law Applicable 
in International Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series, 1994 Vienna Volume 7 (Kluwer Law 
International 1996); Ana M. López-Rodríguez, Lex Mercatoria and Harmonization of Contract 
Law in the EU (1st edn, DJOFPublishing 2003); Mert Elcin, The Applicable Law to 
International Commercial Contracts and the Status of Lex Mercatoria - With a Special 
Emphasis on Choice of Law Rules in the European Community (1st edn, Dissertation.Com 
2010); Gbenga Bamodu, ‘Exploring the Interrelationships of Transnational Commercial Law, 
“The New Lex Mercatoria” and International Commercial Arbitration’ (1998) 10 Afr. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 31–59; Jorge Jaramillo-Vargas, ‘Lex Mercatoria - A Flexible Tool to Meet 
Transnational Trade Law Needs Today’ (2002) 1 Rev. E-Mercatoria 1–18; Thomas E. 
Carbonneau, Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration/a Discussion of the New Law Merchant: A 
Discussion of the New Law Merchant (N.Y. Yonkers (ed), Revised. Juris Publishing, Inc. 1998); 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ‘Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View’ (1990) 6 Arbitration 
International 133–150; Friedrich K. Juenger, ‘The Lex Mercatoria and Private International 
Law’ (2000) 60 La L Rev 1133–1150; Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The new Lex Mercatoria and 
transnational governance, Journal of European Public Policy’ (2006) 13 Journal of European 
Public Policy 627–646; Anthony Connerty, ‘Lex Mercatoria: Reflections from an English 
Lawyer’ (2014) 30 Arbitration International 701–720; Joachim G. Frick, ‘Anational Law (Lex 
Mercatoria)’ in International Arbitration Law Library: Arbitration in Complex International 
Contracts (International Arbitration Law Library Series) (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 
2001); Dalhuisen, ‘The Operation of the International Commercial and Financial Legal Order: 
The Lex Mercatoria and its Application - Moving from the Theories of Legal Positivism and 
Formalism to the Practicalities of Legal Pluralism and Dynamism’ ; Abdul F. Munir 
Maniruzzaman, ‘The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Challenge for International 
Commercial Arbitration?’ (1999) 14 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 657–734; Irineu Strenger, ‘La Notion 
de Lex Mercatoria en Droit du Commerce International (volume 227)’ Collected Courses of the 
Hague Academy of International Law (Brill 1991); Karyn S. Weinberg, ‘Equity in International 
Arbitration: How Fair is “Fair”? A Study of Lex Mercatoria and Amiable Composition’ (1994) 
12 B.U. Int’l L. J. 227–254; Gerard Malynes, ‘Lex Mercatoria: Of Arbitrators and their Awards 
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the use of general principles of law as law governing the merits of the dispute to the 
extent that their application can demonstrate, or not, an on-going process of 
judicialisation.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
(London, 1622)’ (1993) 9 Arbitration International 323–328; Klaus Peter Berger, ‘Lex 
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When considering the possible implications of the judicialisation process in view of 
the use and reference to lex mercatoria in international commercial arbitration two 
general approaches are possible. The first one is by analysing the theoretical 
foundations of lex mercatoria in order to establish whether there is a prevailing 
position in the literature with regard to the acknowledgement of lex mercatoria as a 
source of law in international commercial arbitration and the scope of its application. 
Refusal to recognise lex mercatoria as a source of law, or a formalistic view of lex 
mercatoria as to its interpretative and applicative function, as well as adherence to 
the idea that lex mercatoria has a supplementary role to national legal systems, will 
be an indication of a more rigorous and judicialised view on the source of law in 
international commercial arbitration. In contrast, arbitration users who support the 
position that lex mercatoria is truly autonomous and does not bear any reference to 
any particular national system of law will favour a more flexible approach, which 
aims to foster the “alternative dispute resolution” nature of international commercial 
arbitration and uphold the principle of party autonomy. The second approach to the 
issue lex mercatoria-judicialisation process is by examination of the resort to lex 
mercatoria in arbitrations in order to assess to what extent parties actually rely on it 
and how arbitrators ascertain the lex mercatoria in their decisions.  
 
These two approaches undoubtedly complement each other. It is important to be 
demonstrated whether lex mercatoria is capable of being an autonomous, a-national 
source of law, which can govern international trade contracts without any reference 
to national legal systems, however, it is equally important to analyse whether parties 
designate lex mercatoria as the governing law and how arbitrators construe lex 
mercatoria. This section will examine whether the implications of the judicialisation 
process can be traced to either of the two approaches to lex mercatoria.  
 
The dynamics of the debates
358
 about the existence of lex mercatoria have certainly 
changed in the last decades. As Emmanuel Gaillard precisely explains them: 
                                                 
358
  Emmanuel Gaillard eloquently summarises some debates surrounding lex mercatoria in 
Gaillard, ‘Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria’ (n 357) 570: “On one side of the divide stand authors 
attacking lex mercatoria on ideological, theoretical as well as practical grounds. On the 
ideological front, lex mercatoria has been presented as a ‘less than candid pseudo­legal caprice’ 
(citing A. Zaki, L'Etat et l'arbitrage (Alger 1979) p. 225 et seq.), or, in more moderate terms, 
‘essentially ... a doctrine of laissez-faire’ (citing M. Mustill, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria: The 
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Certain scholars readily recognized and promoted the transnational rules alternative. 
Others, however, denied its existence; then, when confronted with the reality of its 
existence, challenged its advisability as an option available to the parties; and, when 
confronted with the wide acceptance of that option in practice, its availability as a 
choice open to arbitrators in the absence of any choice of law expressed by the parties.
 
 
Today, (…) the debate has refocused on issues of sources and methodology. Indeed, 
transnational rules or lex mercatoria in whatever form are now sufficiently established 
for the heart of the controversy to have shifted, concentrating more recently on the 
establishment in further detail of the content of those rules or the more systematic 
assessment of the means to do so.
359
 
  
Even only on the ground of this single paragraph it could be easily recognised that 
two positions as to existence and application of lex mercatoria can be identified 
among scholars and practitioners. The first one is more formalistic and can be linked 
to the process of judicialisation in international commercial arbitration, while the 
second one appreciates the role of international commercial arbitration as an 
alternative dispute resolution method and advocates for the elevation of lex 
mercatoria to the level of a supranational, non-national or transnational source of 
law, or even an autonomous legal order. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
First Twenty-five Years’, in M. Bos, ed., Liber Amicorum for Lord Wilberforce (Oxford 1987) 
p. 149, esp. p. 181, study reproduced in 4 Arbitration International (1988) 86; De Ly, op. cit. 
note 2, no. 449, p. 289). On the theoretical level, some reproach lex mercatoria for not having 
the characteristics of a complete legal system (citing P. Lagarde, ‘Approche critique de la lex 
mercatoria’ in Ph. Fouchard, ed., Le droit des relations  conomiques internationales   tudes 
offertes   Berthold Goldman (Litec 1982) p. 125. Adde, same author, note on Paris, 13 July 
1989, Valenciana, Rev. arb. (1990) p. 663), which naturally leads to the conclusion that lex 
mercatoria does not exist (citing Stoecker, ‘The Lex Mercatoria: To what Extent does it Exist?’ 
(n 357) 101). Finally, on the practical level, the principles of lex mercatoria have been portrayed 
both as few and far between, and as inconsistent with each other. For many, lex mercatoria is 
only ‘vague law’ (citing A. Kassis, Th orie g n rale des usages du commerce, (LGDJ 1984) 
esp. p. 561 et seq.; G. Delaume, ‘The Proper Law of State Contracts and Lex Mercatoria: A 
Reappraisal’, 3 ICSID Rev. (1988) p. 79), bringing together principles allegedly as contradictory 
as the binding force of contracts and the theory of unforeseeability. The coup de gr ce is 
delivered by those who, very pragmatically, point out that the tremendous amount of academic 
attention devoted to lex mercatoria has only given rise to a very limited number of principles. In 
contrast, some authors take an extremely broad view of lex mercatoria, finding examples of lex 
mercatoria principles in the most diverse sets of circumstances.” 
359
  Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision Making?’. 
(2001) 17 Arbitration International 59–71, 60. 
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The non-recognition of lex mercatoria as an autonomous or a non-national source of 
law is in line with the more rigid approach to the sources of law in international 
arbitration. Those who favour this formalistic view belong to a very wide spectrum 
of arbitration users – from such that deny the existence of modern lex mercatoria, 
through those who challenge the ability of lex mercatoria to solely govern the merits 
of trade disputes, to professionals and scholars who dispute the law-ascertaining 
methods of the new Law Merchant. 
 
The proponents of the formalistic approach to lex mercatoria support the position 
that the latter is not an independent source of law detached from the national legal 
systems, rather they are applied to the extent parties have explicitly or implicitly 
agreed on their application or the applicable law makes reference to them. The 
umbilical cord that connects lex mercatoria with a national legal system is 
demonstrated by the permissive or restrictive regime that national laws adopt with 
regard to the option arbitrators have to choose transnational rules when parties have 
not specified the applicable national law
360
. 
 
According to the formalistic approach lex mercatoria is not elevated to a non-
national or above-national legal system. On contrary, it is asserted that modern lex 
mercatoria consists of general principles of international law, trade customs, 
practices and transnational rules, which originate or are rooted in national legal 
systems. It is claimed that even where arbitral tribunals apply lex mercatoria as rules 
of law governing the merits of the dispute, those rules are of such universal 
character
361
, i.e. so widely recognised and accepted, that they can be considered 
common for all or the majority of the legal systems. This suggests that lex 
mercatoria is not a separate legal order detached from the national legal systems, 
which are inadequate to regulate international trade relations, rather the New Law 
                                                 
360
  See the analysis of Gaillard, ‘Transnational Law’ (n 359) 60, pointing out that some arbitration 
laws provide arbitrators with the option to chose transnational rules when parties have not 
specified the applicable law, e.g. French law since 1981 (New Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 
1496), Dutch law since 1986 (Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 1054); Swiss law since 1987 
(Private International Law Act, Art. 187). In contrast, the UNCITRAL ML, Art. 28, English 
Arbitration Act 1996, s 46, and German Arbitration Act 1985 (ZPO), Art. 1051(2) reject such 
possibility. 
361
  Such rules are for example the obligation to adhere to parties’ common intention and the binding 
force of contracts, as well as the duty to perform contractual obligations in good faith. 
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Merchant is the common ground of customs and usages applicable in many 
jurisdictions. As such lex mercatoria does not supersede national legal systems and 
cannot be applied neither as means of placing the contract above the law or 
displacing the law chosen by the parties, nor as an excuse to use equitable principles 
and considerations where parties have not authorised arbitrators to decide ex aequo 
et bono.  
 
The formalistic approach to lex mercatoria as a source of law can be associated with 
the process of judicialisation in international arbitration. Despite being more rigid, 
this view focuses on the importance of achieving legal certainty in the way 
international trade disputes are resolved.  
 
The acknowledgement of independent existence of lex mercatoria as a non-national 
source of law in international arbitration, however, does not fit entirely into the 
traditional classification and understanding of sources of law. The latter cannot 
explain the authoritativeness and legitimacy of lex mercatoria since it does not 
originate from the state or the sovereign
362
. Although many national laws recognise 
the binding role of customs as sources of law
363
, the concept of lex mercatoria being 
                                                 
362
  Mert Elcin, The Applicable Law to International Commercial Contracts and the Status of Lex 
Mercatoria - With a Special Emphasis on Choice of Law Rules in the European Community (1st 
edn, Dissertation.Com 2010) 16. 
363
  Customary rules developed by traders were gradually incorporated in English common law in 
seventeenth century and were later implemented in the English Sale of Goods Act 1893, 
similarly the American Uniform Commercial Code. “Law Merchant” was considered to be “a 
number of usages, each of which exist among merchants and persons engaged in mercantile 
transactions, not only in one particular country, but throughout the civilized world, and each 
which has acquired notoriety, not only amongst those persons, but also in the mercantile world 
at large, that courts of this country will take judicial notice of it” (Lethulier’s Case (1692) 2 Salk 
443 (per Holt, CJ)). In common law systems customs were also considered a source of law and 
were applied, especially after nineteenth century, to the extent the code permits their use. As 
explained in Jan H. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, 
Financial and Trade Law, Volume 1: Introduction - The New Lex Mercatoria and its Sources 
(5th edn, Hart Publishing 2013) Section 1.4.7 Autonomous Legal Sources: Custom and Practice: 
“Although immanent law, custom as an autonomous source of aw is not contractual but hard law 
as such, no different from other sources of law including legislation and case law. It means that 
it must be applied by judges or arbitrators if its other conditions of applicability are met. That 
was indeed the position in civil law at least until the nineteenth century, but it was also the 
original position in common law. (…) [T]he nineteenth-century civil law of the codification 
became in principle hostile to custom as an independent source of law. (…) Custom was thus 
affected, and at least in private law it became ignored unless statutes specifically referred to it. 
That was done mainly in matters of contract interpretation where custom normally figured 
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an autonomous legal order capable of governing international commercial contracts 
and disputes independently and separately from national legal systems challenges the 
conventional, formalistic approach to source of law. The fundamental theory of 
Professor Goldman goes beyond the provisions of national legal systems and 
determines lex mercatoria as “a set of general principles, and customary rules 
spontaneously referred to or elaborated in the framework of international trade, 
without reference to a particular national system of law.”364  
 
Those who support Prof Goldman’s opinion and view lex mercatoria as an a-
national source of law reconcile the conflict with the prevalent positivist tradition in 
legal thought with the arguably binding force of lex mercatoria by emphasising its 
conceptual nature and the exclusiveness of business community – a prudent 
businessperson is considered to have undertaken to adhere to the rules created by the 
international community of merchants: 
 
The distinguishing feature of (modern lex mercatoria’s) (…) mandatory element from 
that of medieval law merchant is the consensual aspect of modern international trade 
which has roots in an idea from the seventeenth-century natural law arguing that the 
keeping of one’s word is in harmony with the social nature of men and principle of 
good faith. Thus, the contract becomes the inherent source of law, from which other 
components of law merchants are derived, in modern business relationships (…).
365
 
 
The supporters of lex mercatoria maintain with confidence that “[t]he issues is not 
whether an arbitral law merchant exists, but rather: what form does it take, how 
effective is it as a body of law, how extensive is its scope, and does it have a 
mandatory character?”366 Those in favour of a more flexible approach to the sources 
of law in international commercial arbitration, and in particular in favour of arbitral 
autonomy in the form of lex mercatoria, argue that not only the application of 
transnational rules of law does not lead to more uncertainty but, on contrary, it fills 
                                                                                                                                          
besides good faith notions in this respect; see French Code Civil Article 1135; and the German 
Civil Code (BGB) section 157.”  
364
  Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law’ (n 161) 113, 116. 
365
  Elcin (n 360) 17. 
366
  Thomas E. Carbonneau, Carbonneau on International Arbitration: Collected Essays (1st edn, 
Juris Net Llc 2011) 82. 
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the gap left open by national and international instruments by providing either a list 
of codified rules
367
 or a specific toolbox for ascertaining the rules of law (a method 
of decision-making)
368
. 
 
Thus, it is to be noted that where parties fail to specify the law governing the dispute, 
arbitrators are required to explicitly designate rules of law that they consider to be 
appropriate for the resolution of the dispute at hand.
369
 Only after so determining the 
applicable rules the tribunal shall take steps to interpret the contract in compliance 
with such rules. Thus, it is maintained that arbitrators are not entitled to avoid the 
application of laws or rules of law and interpret the contract in a “legal vacuum”:  
 
The requirement in art.21(1) (ICC Rules) that the Tribunal apply rules of law is to be 
contrasted with the provision in art.21(3) that the parties may agree that the Tribunal 
decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur, and therefore without applying 
strict rules of law. In some Awards, Tribunals appear to avoid relying on the applicable 
law and instead rely solely on the construction and interpretation of contract provisions. 
This approach does not appear to be compatible with art.21(1). Although Tribunals are 
to take into account the terms of the contract under art.21(2), a contract cannot be 
interpreted in a legal vacuum. The various legal systems and other rules of law, such as 
the UNIDROIT Principles (…), set out principles of interpretation. Moreover, terms 
used in a contract may have a special meaning depending on the relevant rules of law. 
Therefore, with the exception of interpretation of arbitration clauses themselves and 
then only in France, it appears that a Tribunal should determine which “rules of law” 
are applicable and apply those rules.
370
 
 
The requirement for arbitrators to firstly designate appropriate rules of law and only 
then interpret and apply contractual provisions in compliance with those rules can be 
seen as an implication of the process of judicialisation in international commercial 
                                                 
367
  See Cuniberti, ‘Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria’ (n 357) 391. 
368
  Gaillard, ‘Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria’ (n 355);  Gaillard, ‘Transnational Law’ (n 359). 
369
  See ICC Rules 2012, Art. 21(1); LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014, Art. 22.3; SIAC Arbitration 
Rules 2013, Art. 27.1; HKIAC Arbitration Rules 2013, Art 35.1; SCC Arbitration Rules 2010, 
Art. 22(1). In contrast, see Swiss Rules of International Arbitration 2012, Art. 33(1) stipulate 
that in the absence of a choice of law provision, arbitrators shall decide the dispute by applying 
the rules of law with which the dispute has the closest connection.  
370
  Webster and Bühler (n 249) 298-299, paras 21-10, 21-11. 
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arbitration. Such an obligation clearly identifies arbitrator’s function – to decide the 
dispute at hand according to the relevant rules of law (unless parties have explicitly 
granted the arbitrator power to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur). 
If the arbitrator’s vocation is analysed in connection with the increased legalisation 
of arbitration, i.e. cases being handled by legal counsel, particularly by litigation 
specialists, rather than in-house or corporate lawyers, proliferation of legal practices, 
such as prehearing motions, extensive discovery, preparation of witnesses and 
increased importance of cross-examination, as well as an upsurge in the eloquence 
and formality of written and oral presentations
371
, it becomes an overstatement to 
maintain that international commercial arbitration achieves nothing but rough justice 
because arbitrators’ objectives unlike judges’ ones does not include achieving 
accuracy
372
 and rendering justice
373
 in accordance with the law.  
 
The relevant provisions in the various arbitration rules suggest that where parties fail 
to agree a choice of law provision, the arbitral tribunal may resort to lex mercatoria 
as a common intent of the parties or neutral rules of law. Furthermore it has been 
argued that by applying lex mercatoria to their disputes “parties avoid the 
technicalities of national legal systems as well as rules which are unfit for 
international contracts.”374 If the latter is true one will expect to encounter many 
arbitral awards where lex mercatoria is either specifically designated as the law 
                                                 
371
  For a more detailed analysis on the implications of judicialisation process in the context of 
international commercial arbitration proceedings, see Chapter 4. For some general views on 
judicialisation and/or Americanisation of international arbitration, see Lawrence W. Newman 
and Michael Burrows, The Practice of International Litigation (2nd edn, Juris Net Llc 2013) V-
244. 
372
  On arbitrators and accuracy, see William Park, ‘Arbitrators and Accuracy’ (2010) 1 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 25–53; Neil Andrews, ‘Affordable and Accurate Civil Justice – 
Challenges Facing the English and Other Modern Systems’ (2014) 25 Eur. Bus. L. Rev. 545–
563. 
373
  On arbitration and justice, see Alberti (n 240); Gregory M. Beresford Hartwell, ‘The 
Commercial Way to Justice’ in Stefan Kröll and others (eds), International Arbitration and 
International Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and Evolution (1st edn, Kluwer Law 
International 2011); Horvath (n 23); Nana Japaridze, ‘Fair Enough? Reconciling the Pursuit of 
Fairness and Justice with Preserving the Nature of International Commercial Arbitration’ (2007) 
36 Hofstra L Rev 1415–1446; Peer Zumbansen, ‘Debating Autonomy and Procedural Justice: 
The Lex Mercatoria in the Context of Global Governance Debates - A Reply to Thomas Schultz’ 
(2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 427–433. 
374
  Petar Šarčević, Essays on International Commercial Arbitration (Petar Šarčević (ed), Graham & 
Trotman/ Martinus Nijhoff 1989) 144. 
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governing the dispute or is an applied set of rules of law in absence of a choice of 
law clause.  
 
Klaus Peter Berger, however, argues that the New Law Merchant does not provide 
an international arbitrator with unlimited discretion to consider what is fair and 
equitable in a given case, rather arbitrators are entrusted to consider the basis of the 
general principles of law and rules of transnational commercial law applicable to the 
dispute
375
. 
 
Although parties are free to choose non-national rules of law to govern the 
substantive issues of their dispute and such choice of law agreements are 
enforceable, it has been maintained that incorporating clauses, which designate lex 
mercatoria or general principles of law as the substantive law creates more problems 
than it solves.  
 
Georgios Zekos argues that lex mercatoria has its important place among the sources 
of law in international commercial arbitration and suggests that the customary nature 
of the Law Merchant is one of the reasons for parties to select arbitration as a dispute 
resolution mechanism over national litigation: 
 
[t]here is ratio decidendi in arbitration that does not follow the road of certainty of 
courts. Custom of usages or trade usage, common trade terms or industrial practices are 
illustrative norms which comprise a sort of “rule of industry” that should be regarded as 
rule of law because the written law is the reflection of industrial norms and practice. 
Customary law in the form of industry norms prevails and some merchants chose 
arbitration to plainly avoid the application of legal principles. In other words, law in the 
form of written or customary form plays a role in the arbitration award. In the words of 
Justice Blackmun: “[A]rbitrators are not bound by precedent”
376
 but by the form of 
litigation precedent because arbitrators use a guidance regarding the interpretation of 
law applying to specific facts according previous awards. Written arbitration awards 
                                                 
375
  Berger, The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria  (n 357) 80, 81. 
376
  Zerkos (n 205) 447 citing Shearson/American Express v. McMahon 482 U.S. 220 (1987), 259 
(Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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can guide an arbitrator when deciding a similar case. It has to be taken into 
consideration that law is routed in custom (“customary law”).
377
 
 
Other authors also share the opinion that arbitral case law together with general 
principles of law and trade customs constitute customary law, which may have 
persuasive effect upon arbitrators in their decision-making. They, however, limit the 
scope of the arbitral case law to arbitral awards decided on the basis of lex 
mercatoria application: “it might be assumed that the lex-mercatoria-based arbitral 
decisions form a sui generis case law, influencing further awards and establishing 
decisional patterns, followed not due to their official binding force but because of the 
persuasive force of the presented reasoning”378. Also, as maintained by Ana M. 
Lopez-Rodriguez: 
 
[m]ore precisely, lex mercatoria is the result of a substantive method of adjudication, 
alternative to traditional conflictual techniques (…). Due to the persuasive character of 
the reasoning of some arbitral decisions, it gradually develops into a body of case law, 
which de facto serves the same function as national law, in the resolution of 
international commercial disputes.
379
 
 
 
3.4.1 The 2010 QMUL Survey and ICC Statistical Reports 
 
The assumptions regarding the two approaches to lex mercatoria can be best tested 
in the light of an empirical study on parties’ choice of law governing the dispute. 
The case study aims to reveal (i) whether arbitration users choose lex mercatoria or 
transnational law as rules of law governing the substance of the disputes, and (ii) 
how lex mercatoria is being applied, i.e. what law-ascertaining method is used in 
arbitral awards which designate lex mercatoria to govern the dispute. Arbitration 
users’ preference for choosing national laws rather than transnational rules of law to 
                                                 
377
  Ibid. 
378
  Joanna Jemielniak and Przemyslaw Miklaszewicz, Interpretation of Law in the Global World: 
From Particularism to a Universal Approach (Joanna Jemielniak and Przemyslaw Miklaszewicz 
(eds), 1st edn, Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 12, 13. 
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  Ana M. López-Rodríguez, Lex Mercatoria and Harmonization of Contract Law in the EU (1st 
edn, DJOFPublishing 2003) 111. 
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govern the disputes, as well as arbitrators’ construction of lex mercatoria shall 
indicate, or not, a judicialised approach to the sources of law in international 
commercial arbitration, and in particular to the New Law Merchant. 
 
A natural difficulty and limitation of this case study is the scarce data – a handful of 
the arbitral awards are published and there are almost no empirical studies on the 
choice of governing law in international commercial arbitration. However, some 
information is available and accessible through statistical reports of arbitration 
institutions, as well as thanks to surveys conducted by law firms in cooperation with 
research universities.  
 
A particular attention must be paid to the 2010 QMUL Survey on parties’ choice of 
law in international arbitration
380
 because of its approach to the explored issues. 
Although the study appears similar to the themes explored in the 2006 and 2008 
QMUL Surveys
381
, the 2010 QMUL Survey does not test perceptions but goes a step 
further in exploring the choices and the motives behind the choices that arbitration 
users make
382
. The study consisted of two stages – an online questionnaire 
completed by 136 respondents and in-depth interview of 67 respondents. With 
regard to the choice of law governing the substance of the dispute the study revealed 
that the choice is mostly influence by perceived neutrality and impartiality of the 
legal system with regard to the parties and their contract (66% of the respondents), 
the appropriateness of the law for the type of contract (60% of the respondents) and 
the party’s familiarity with and experience of the particular law (58% of the 
respondents).
383
 The answers suggest that the choice of governing law is an 
important decision for arbitration users. This proposition is supported by the findings 
that 68% of the corporations participating in the study have a dispute resolution 
policy, and that the law governing the substance of the dispute is usually the first 
stipulation agreed between the parties. Hence, the choices of experienced arbitration 
users do not represent random decision-making but are a result of careful 
                                                 
380
  QMUL Survey ‘Choices in International Arbitration’ (2010), available at: 
<http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123290.pdf> 
381
  See 2006 QMUL Survey (n 2), 2008 QMUL Survey (n 3). 
382
  2010 QMUL Survey (n 380) ‘Introduction’. 
383
  Ibid 11. 
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consideration and can be indicative of certain ongoing processes in international 
commercial arbitration. 
 
With regard to transnational laws or rules the respondents were asked whether they 
have used either one of four categories of rules to govern their disputes: (i) broad 
concepts of fairness and equity (such as ex aequo et bono), (ii) international treaties 
and conventions (e.g. CISG), (iii) commercial practices and rules of law related to 
trade and international contracts (e.g. UNIDROIT Principles and INCOTERMS)
384
, 
                                                 
384
  UNIDROIT Principles are commonly recognised as being part of lex mercatoria by representing 
widely used commercial and contract practices. See Baron, ‘Do the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts Form a New Lex Mercatoria?’ (n 357); Fabrizio Marrella, 
‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts in ICC Arbitration, 1999-
2001’ (2001) 12 ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 49–55; Baron, ‘Do the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Form a New Lex Mercatoria?’ ; 
Julian D.M. Lew, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles as Lex Contractus Chosen by the Parties and 
Without an Explicit Choice of-Law Clause : The Perspective of Counsel’ in Special Supplement 
2002: UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in 
International Arbitration (1st edn, ICC Publishing 2002); Pierre Lalive, ‘The UNIDROIT 
Principles as Lex Contractus, With or Without an Explicit or Tacit Choice of Law: An 
Arbitrator’s Perspective’ in Special Supplement 2002: UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International Arbitration (1st edn, ICC 
Publishing 2002); Fabrizio Marrella, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts in ICC Arbitration, 1999-2001’ (2001) 12 ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin 49–55; Yves Derains, ‘The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International 
Commercial Arbitration (1): A European Perspective’ in Special Supplement 2002: UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International 
Arbitration (1st edn, ICC Publishing 2002); E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘The Role of the UNIDROIT 
Principles in International Commercial Arbitration (2): A US Perspective on their Aims and 
Application’ in Special Supplement 2002: UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International Arbitration (ICC Publishing 2002); Michael 
Joachim Bonell, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles as a Means of Interpreting and Supplementing 
International Uniform Law’ in Special Supplement 2002: UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International Arbitration (1st edn, ICC 
Publishing 2002); Marcel Fontaine, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles: An Expression of Current 
Contract Practice?’ in Special Supplement 2002: UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International Arbitration (1st edn, ICC 
Publishing 2002); Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles in Contemporary 
Contract Practice’ in Special Supplement 2002: UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International Arbitration (1st edn, ICC 
Publishing 2002); Fabio Bortolotti, ‘Reference to the UNIDROIT Principles in Contract Practice 
and Model Contracts’ in Special Supplement 2005: UNIDROIT Principles: New Developments 
and Applicationspecial Supplement 2005: UNIDROIT Principles: New Developments and 
Applications (ICC Publishing 2005); Pierre Mayer, ‘The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in 
ICC Arbitration Practice’ in Special Supplement 2002: UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International Arbitration (1st edn, ICC 
Publishing 2002); Fran ois Dessemontet, ‘Use of the UNIDROIT Principles to Interpret and 
Supplement Domestic Law’ in Special Supplement 2002: UNIDROIT Principles of International 
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(iv) other international rules of law (e.g. UCP). The answers of the participants in the 
survey demonstrate a limited use of transnational laws or rules of law in international 
arbitration and a general preference for designating particular national law in 
arbitration agreements. More than 50% of the respondents answered that they have 
never chosen general principles of law, commercial principles of fairness and equity, 
amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono, international treaties or conventions or 
other international rules to govern their disputes (58% have never resorted to general 
principles of law, commercial principles of fairness and equity, 81% have never 
empowered arbitral tribunal to decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono, 
and 53%, respectfully 57%, have never designated either international treaties and 
conventions or other international rules as the law governing their dispute). The only 
exception to the otherwise consistent answers is the occasional use of commercial 
law rules contained in codifications, such as the UNIDROIT Principles and 
INCOTERMS – 48% of the respondents pointed out that they sometimes choose 
such rules to govern their disputes. This information, however, needs to be 
interpreted together with the answer of 39% of the participants who specified that 
they have never designated codified commercial law rules to govern the disputes. 
Moreover, all interviewees highlighted that transnational laws and rules are often 
used as supplementary or definitional concepts alongside a governing national law, 
rather than as a law that is intended to regulate all substantive legal issues.
385
 
 
The results of the 2010 QMUL Survey demonstrate a judicialised approach to lex 
mercatoria and the transnational rules of law. They suggest that arbitration users 
have a higher regard for the legal certainty associated with the application of a 
national law rather than the flexibility of the ad hoc justice achieved by lex 
mercatoria. Even though it is often suggested that a-national or transnational rules of 
law provide a neutral legal framework for parties’ contractual relationships that is 
better suited to address business’s needs, the survey demonstrates a preference for 
selecting a national law to govern the contract. Commercial practices and general 
principles of law play primarily a supplementary or definitional role in international 
                                                                                                                                          
Commercial Contracts: Reflections on their Use in International Arbitration (ICC Publishing 
2002); Connerty, ‘Lex Mercatoria: Reflections from an English Lawyer’ ; Webster and Bühler, 
Handbook of ICC Arbitration: Commentary, Precedents, Materials  
385
 2010 QMUL (n 380) 15. 
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commercial arbitration agreements. In fact, lex mercatoria is almost never chosen as 
the exclusive governing law. It usually has only a limited, auxiliary role, such as 
filling the gaps in the applicable national law. 
 
With that regard, even more revealing is the analysis of the ICC statistical reports 
available in the ICC Dispute Resolution Library. The reports date back to 1997, 
however more detailed information about the choice of law clauses in parties’ 
contracts is available in the reports as of 2000. Examination of ICC awards and ICC-
related practices is worthwhile and indicative of common trends going on in 
international commercial arbitration for two reasons. The first one is that ICC 
international arbitration is truly multinational. Since its creation in 1923, the ICC 
International Court of Arbitration has administered more than 20,000 disputes 
involving parties and arbitrators from nearly 200 countries and independent 
territories.
386
 As of 1997 the number of parties participating in ICC arbitration and 
the countries from which those parties come from is steadily growing. In 1997, 1,290 
parties from 103 countries took part in ICC arbitrations. In the last three years (2012-
2014) the numbers almost doubled and are respectfully 2,023, 2,120 and 2,222 
parties from 137, 138 and 140 countries from all over the world (see figure 1):  
 
 
FIGURE 1: Number of parties and number of the countries from which those parties 
originate in ICC arbitrations for the period 1997-2014 (source: ICC Bulletins) 
                                                 
386
  See the statistics and information on the ICC website, available at: 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Introduction-
to-ICC-Arbitration/Statistics/> 
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The second reason why ICC statistics are not only worth exploring, but also 
suggestive of ongoing global trends, is the caseload of ICC arbitrations. ICC 
arbitrations represent a substantial share of international arbitrations administered by 
leading arbitration institutions (see figure 2): 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Arbitration caseload of 8 major arbitration institutions for the period 2000-
2009. The figures represent international cases only. Source: websites of arbitration 
institutions and Global Arbitration Review (see Mark Bezant, James Nicholson, Howard 
Rosen, “Trends in International Arbitration in the New World Order”, available at: 
<http://globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/67/sections/232/chapters/2683/trends-
international-arbitration-new-world-order/>) 
 
ICC statistical reports covering the period 1999-2013 reveal that at average in 80% 
of all new cases parties have included choice of law clauses in their contracts. Of 
these contracts only a handful of the contracts designate a-national rules of law to 
govern the dispute (see Figure 3): 
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FIGURE 3: New cases for the period 2000-2013, in which parties have specified a 
particular national law or a-national law as the law/rules of law governing the contract, as 
well as percentage of the new case in which there is no choice of law clause (source ICC 
Bulletins) 
 
The above reveals an increasing preference of ICC arbitration users for specifying a 
particular national law as the law governing the dispute. These figures unequivocally 
indicate that parties favour the certainty of choice of law clauses containing specific 
national law over the ambiguities that a-national rules of law can bring. Although lex 
mercatoria can arguably govern trade contracts and provide for greater flexibility of 
commercial transactions in international context, it is almost never the preferred 
choice of law. Indeed, in very few cases do businesses choose a-national rules of law 
to govern their contracts. The analysis of ICC statistical reports shows that parties 
most often select the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles, EU law, INCOTERMS, 
general principles of law, and general principles of equity as the governing law. 
Isolated references are made to other sources such as lex mercatoria, international 
usages of distribution, private international law, the laws of the Dubai International 
Financial Centre, the law of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law 
in Africa (OHADA), and international trade law and international arbitration law.  
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
Parties have pecified a particular 
national law as the governing law 
Parties have not specified a choice 
of law clause in the contract 
Parties have specified anational 
rules or principles as the 
governing law 
 
Page 146 
It needs to be noted that these figures reflect the positive choices that parties have 
made when drafting their contracts and they do not take into account the decisions 
that arbitrators made on the applicable law once the proceedings have commenced. 
In order to examine whether arbitrators’ approach to lex mercatoria is similar to the 
parties’ one, in particular in cases, where parties have not incorporated a choice of 
law clause in their contracts, a more detail analysis of the data contained in the ICC 
Dispute Resolution Library is required. The latter contains about 700 arbitral awards 
and a search of the database revealed only a handful of decisions, which mention lex 
mercatoria. In almost all of those decisions
387
 lex mercatoria is either (i) plead but 
                                                 
387
  ICC Case 5904, final award rendered in 1989 in (1992) 3(2) ‘ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin’; ICC Case 9029, final award rendered in 1998 in (1999) 10(2) ‘ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin’; ICC Case 9419, final award rendered in 1998 in 
(1999) 10(2) ‘ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin’; ICC Case 9875, partial and final 
awards rendered respectively in 1999 and 2000 in (2001) 12(2) ‘ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin’; ICC Case 11976, final award rendered in 2003 in (2012) 23(1) ‘ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin’ 51; ICC Case 5314, interim award rendered in 1988 
in (1993) 4(2) ‘ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin’; ICC Case 5717, interim award 
rendered in 1988 in (1990) 1(2) ‘ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin’ 22; ICC Case 
7319, partial award rendered in 1992 in (1994) 5(2) ‘ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin’ 56; ICC Case 11754, interim order rendered in 2003 in Special Supplement 2010: 
Decisions on ICC Arbitration Procedure A Selection of Procedural Orders issued by Arbitral 
Tribunals acting under the ICC Rules of Arbitration (1st edn, ICC Publishing 2010); ICC Case 
12111, partial award rendered in 2003 in (2010) 21(1) ‘ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin’ (in the case at hand lex mercatoria and, particularly UNIDROIT Principles, are held to 
be the governing rules of law, since parties explicitly designated international law as the law 
governing the contract; however, this award does not demonstrate how the arbitrator ascertains 
the lex mercatoria); ICC Case 12949, procedural order of 7 October 2004 in Special Supplement 
2010: Decisions on ICC Arbitration Procedure A Selection of Procedural Orders issued by 
Arbitral Tribunals acting under the ICC Rules of Arbitration (1st edn, ICC Publishing 2010) (in 
the case at hand lex mercatoria and, particularly UNIDROIT Principles, are held to be 
supplementary rules of law to the governing Mexican law; however, this order does not 
demonstrate how the arbitrator ascertains the lex mercatoria); ICC Case 10385, final award 
rendered in 2002 in Special Supplement 2005: Principles UNIDROIT: nouvelles  volutions et 
applications 87 (in the case at hand, before ruling on the merits of the dispute, the arbitral 
tribunal considers among the preliminary issues the question of the applicable law; the tribunal 
recognises the divergent approaches to lex mercatoria and holds that the applicability of lex 
mercatoria will be assessed if there are any gaps in the contractual stipulations); ICC Case 9879, 
partial award rendered in 1999 in [2001] ‘Chronique de jurisprudence arbitrale de la CCI, in 
Cahiers de l'arbitrage, Gazette du Palais’ (in this case lex mercatoria is applied with regard to 
issues of document production and is equated to general principles of law which are considered 
common to all nations); ICC Case 14208/14236 (n 233); ICC Case 7110, partial awards 
rendered in 1995, 1998, 1999 in (1999) 10(2) ‘ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin’ 
39. 
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disregarded by the arbitral tribunal
388
, or (ii) is applied by arbitrators but the 
principles applied are of such universal character that they could be considered as 
customary rules rather than a-national law or transnational legal order
389
, or (iii) is 
applied but somehow misconstrued
390
.  
 
One of the few arbitral decisions that contain a relatively detailed analysis of lex 
mercatoria’s applicability represents a stark example of the rigorous approach that 
arbitral tribunals take to lex mercatoria. In Final Award in Case 9029
391
 the arbitral 
tribunal rejects Respondent’s claims based on lex mercatoria and UNIDROIT 
Principles, which the latter argues should be taken into account as a supplement to 
national law (Italian law) and a reflection of the relevant legal rules and the 
applicable commercial usages. The arbitral tribunal dismisses Respondent’s 
arguments on three grounds: (i) firstly, because Respondent has failed to prove that 
                                                 
388
  ICC Case 9029 (n 387); ICC Case 9419 (n 387); ICC Case 7319 (n 387); ICC Case 5717 (n 
387). In ICC Case 5717 absent any indication of the law governing the contractual relationship, 
Claimant argues that the international principles of law and lex mercatoria should apply to the 
contract. Although the sole arbitrator holds that parties have agreed that their dispute should be 
resolved by a neutral international tribunal under a neutral set of laws and rules, the arbitrator 
resorts to rules of conflict to determine the national legal system most closely connected to the 
contract. According to the arbitrator “[t]he conflict of laws principles that arbitrators in 
international commercial cases most frequently consider to determine the governing law are (1) 
application of the choice of law system in force at the seat; (2) cumulative application of the 
choice of law systems of the countries having a relation with the dispute; (3) application of 
general principles of conflict of laws; and (4) application of a rule of conflict chosen directly by 
the arbitrator.” Applying the so-designated rules of conflict the sole arbitrators determines the 
national legal system with the greatest connection to the dispute. ICC Case 11754 (n 387). In 
ICC Case 11754 it is common ground between the parties that the terms and conditions of the 
contract are silent about the applicable substantive law. The Claimant argues that a reference to 
certain Indian policy in the contract is indicative of a implied choice of law, or in alternative that 
the arbitrator should apply (1) general principle of international law, (2) principle of lex 
mercatoria, (3) recognised international treaties and conventions, and (4) rules of conflict of 
law. Respondent disagrees that parties have expressly or tacitly agreed to Indian law and objects 
the application of lex mercatoria as governing law. According to Respondent, the arbitrator 
should take the following approach in determining the applicable substantive law: (1) “[t]o 
ascertain and to apply existing international conventions which regulate conflict of laws 
concerning international sale of goods; and (2) [i]n the event that such international conventions 
do not apply to the instant case, to ascertain the applicable substantive law on the basis of certain 
general rules of connection of international private law.” After noting the disagreement and 
disparities in parties’ submission, the sole arbitrator tries to find the common ground in parties’ 
interpretations and proposals. On that basis the arbitrator considers the rule of closest connection 
appropriate for determining the law to be applied to the merits of the dispute in the case at hand.  
389
  ICC Case 9875 (n 387). 
390
  ICC Case 5904 (n 387); ICC Case 11976 (n 387); ICC Case 7110 (n 387). 
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  ICC Case 9029 (n 387). 
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UNIDROIT Principles invoked are part of lex mercatoria and widespread 
“interpretative and applicative trends in international commercial circles”, (ii) 
secondly, because parties are precluded to rely on lex mercatoria and shape the 
procedure in accordance with rules, which do not belong to the national law that has 
been expressly and precisely identified by the parties as the law applicable to the 
contractual relationship, and (iii) thirdly, because the applicable provisions in the 
national law, specified by the parties, are considered to come under the rules of 
public policy, hence their binding nature excludes the application of lex mercatoria. 
Regarding the first ground for dismissal, the arbitral tribunal clarifies that the 
UNIDROIT Principles are not a source of law per se, since they “are not part of 
normative sources of production, and (…) they are designed to constitute a uniform 
model for regulating the negotiation of contractual relations”. As to their relationship 
with lex mercatoria and international trade usages, the tribunal highlights that it is 
questionable to what extent the UNIDROIT Principles reflect lex mercatoria, as they 
are “only partly declaratory, being innovatory in many respects”: 
 
(…) although the UNIDROIT Principles constitute a set of rules theoretically 
appropriate to prefigure the future lex mercatoria should international commercial 
practice adapt to the Principles, at present there is no necessary connection between the 
individual Principles and the rules of the lex mercatoria, so that recourse to the 
Principles is not purely and simply the same as recourse to an actually existing 
international commercial usage.
392
 
 
The second ground on which the arbitrators dismiss Respondent’s claims speaks 
even more loudly about the narrow construction of and the rigorous approach to lex 
mercatoria in international commercial arbitration. The arbitral tribunal clearly 
states in its reasons that lex mercatoria cannot be applied and used for adapting the 
procedure where parties have specified explicitly a national legal system to apply to 
their relationship. This is the case even when the national legal system contains 
references to lex mercatoria. The arbitrators take into account that the national law 
chosen by the parties, i.e. the Italian law and, in particular, the relevant Art. 834 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, makes reference to “international commercial usages”, 
however, they clarify that the latter do not take precedence over national law and 
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they are “of strictly interpretative and integrative value, to the extent that there are 
gaps in national regulations that could usefully be filled by the aforesaid usages”. 
Thus, lex mercatoria is unequivocally distinguished from international commercial 
usages and customs on the grounds that the former is “an expression of notoriously 
very wide scope and interpretation, and could even be termed imprecise and 
debatable”.   
 
This award suggests that arbitrators take a restrictive and rigorous approach to lex 
mercatoria and do not allow the latter to be used by the parties to substitute an 
explicit choice of law provision in the contract or to shape the procedure in a way 
which does not comply with the designated national legal system. In fact, arbitrators 
are concerned about the fairness of the process and strongly adhere to fundamental 
judicial rules that guarantee its justice. Such is, for example, the “rule that the onus 
(to prove that the rules invoked are part of lex mercatoria) is on the party that has 
invoked the application of the lex mercatoria and UNIDROIT Principles”393. Only 
when there is a gap in the national law and a party, relying on the usages, proves 
(with the necessary degree of certainty) that particular, rather than theoretical and 
speculative, interpretative and applicative trends are part of international commercial 
practices, arbitrators can apply them to the contractual relationship. Such an 
approach undoubtedly takes into account and favors international commercial 
community’s need for greater legal certainty and predictability in international 
business transactions, as well as its appeal for fairness and justice in the arbitration 
procedures.  
 
This conclusion is further supported by the legal reasoning in another arbitral award, 
which concerns an agreement between parties that have not specified a choice of law 
provision. In Final Award in Case 9419
394
 Claimant invokes the application of lex 
mercatoria by arguing that the latter is “a kind of codification which can be found in 
the principles of international commercial contracts drawn up by UNIDROIT”, and 
that arbitrator’s power to apply lex mercatoria in absence of any reference to a 
specific national law is vested in “universally acknowledged principles of 
                                                 
393
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394
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international commerce”. The sole arbitrator dismisses Claimant’s plea for 
application of lex mercatoria and even states that the latter does not exist. It has to be 
noted that in this award arbitrator’s reasoning is based on the provisions of Art. 13.3 
ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration 1988, which stipulate that in absence of 
any indication by the parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrator shall apply the 
law designated as the proper law by the rule of conflict, which he deems appropriate. 
Following the rules of conflict, the arbitrator necessarily ends up designating a 
specific national legal system to apply to the contractual relationship. Since the ICC 
Rules of Arbitration 2012 in Art. 21(1) grant the arbitrators greater adjudicative 
freedom to determine the applicable rules of law in the absence of any choice of law 
agreement between the parties, i.e. the arbitral tribunal designates the rules of law 
that are most appropriate not necessarily following a conflict of laws analysis, the 
sole arbitrator’s decision on the applicable law might have been different if the case 
were to be decided in view of the 2012 ICC Rules.  
 
It is worth noticing that the sole arbitrator in this arbitration comments on the 
applicability of UNIDROIT Principles, conceding that they may be considered as “a 
kind of codification of the lex mercatoria”395. The arbitrator, however, states that the 
UNIDROIT Principles:  
 
(…) cannot constitute a normative body in themselves that can be considered as an 
applicable supranational law to replace a national law, at least as long as the arbitrator 
is required to identify the applicable law by choosing the rule of conflict that he 
considers most appropriate, in accordance with the provisions laid down by the 
international conventions and as provided for in the rules of arbitration within the scope 
of which he operates.
396
 
 
The above suggests that, absent a choice of law provision in the contract, when 
arbitrators follow the rules of conflict
397
 in order to determine the appropriate rules 
                                                 
395
  Ibid. 
396
  Ibid. 
397
  Whether and to what extent arbitrators follow rules of conflict in order to designate the law/rules 
of law applicable to the contractual relationship is a very pertinent question when discussing the 
process of judicialisation in international commercial arbitration. If it is demonstrated that 
arbitrators do follow a conflict of law analysis that is very similar to the law-ascertaining method 
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of law applicable to the contract, they would always arrive at a at the designation of 
a specific national legal system and national law. Only in case the latter contains 
gaps and makes specific reference to the application of international commercial 
usages, the UNIDROIT Principles and lex mercatoria can be invoked as 
interpretative and applicative trends. This method of law ascertaining provides for a 
very limited use of lex mercatoria. It ultimately aims to minimise the uncertainty 
that the lack of choice of law creates. 
 
The limited interpretative and applicative function of lex mercatoria is demonstrated 
in another case where the parties have not specified a choice of law provision
398
. The 
                                                                                                                                          
of national courts, this could be taken as an implication of the judicialisation process. Since this 
issue concerns the application of the sources of law in international commercial arbitration, this 
question will be considered in Chapter 5, which focuses on the mechanics of arbitral decision-
making. For the sake of the analysis here, however, it is worth pointing out that absent choice of 
law clauses arbitrators can ascertain the law either by determining a conflict of law system, 
which will point to the applicable national law, or by application of substantive rules of law 
without having recourse to any conflict of laws system. With that respect arbitrators can enjoy 
greater freedom than national courts because, on the one hand, they can determine the applicable 
rules of law without reference to the rules of conflict (see ICC Case 2172, Doc. No. 410/2384 
(1974) where the arbitrator did not apply any conflicts rule but based their decision on a 
substantive position common to German and Swiss law: “it is necessary to underline from the 
outset that the question of the law applicable is only of interest if there exists between the 
systems of law to which the parties are submitted a true conflict of laws. As German and Swiss 
laws impose similar solutions in matters of the law of obligations and of commercial law, one 
may thus, as a general rule abandon the research for the applicable law.”), and on the other hand, 
they do not have an automatically applicable set of conflict of laws rules to apply (see Filip de 
Ly, ‘Conflicts of Law in International Arbitration - An Overview’ in Franco Ferrari and Stefan 
Kröll (eds), Conflict of Laws in International Arbitration (Sellier European Law Publishers 
2011) 3 maintaining that “[t]he difficulties and complexities of the topic of private international 
law in international commercial arbitration (…) stem from the fact that arbitrators in 
international commercial cases are not only facing a conflict of laws question (which law 
applies) but also a conflict of conflicts of law question (which system of private international 
law applies.”) Once, arbitrators choose to apply a conflict of law system, however, their law-
ascertaining method resemble the one of national courts. The arbitrators’ mandate with respect 
to choosing the applicable substantive law is viewed as a two-part responsibility by Gary Born 
(Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 2620): “First, the arbitral tribunal must 
select a conflict of laws rule, from among various possible conflicts systems, to be applied to 
choose the applicable law. This task arises because the arbitral tribunal differs from a national 
court, among other things, because it does not necessarily have an automatically-applicable set 
of conflict of laws rules to apply – as a national court does. Second, after selecting a conflict of 
laws rule, the arbitrators must then apply that rule to the parties’ dispute and determine what 
substantive law the relevant conflicts rules select. At this stage of its mandate, the arbitral 
tribunal’s task is similar to that of a national court, applying a conflict of laws rule to particular 
facts and issues, in order to select an applicable system of law.” 
398
  ICC Case 9875 (n 387). 
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case concerns several licensing agreements granting exclusive distribution to one of 
the parties. It is plead by the parties that either French or Japanese law should apply 
to the dispute at hand. The arbitral tribunal disagrees and states that the difficulties to 
find decisive factors qualifying one or the other national law as applicable to the 
contract reveal the inadequacy of the choice of a domestic legal system to govern 
this case. According to the arbitrators: 
 
[t]he most appropriate ‘rules of law’ to be applied to the merits of this case are those of 
the lex mercatoria, that is the rules of law and usages of international trade which have 
been gradually elaborated by different sources such as the operators of international 
trade themselves, their associations, the decisions of international arbitral tribunals and 
some institutions like UNIDROIT and its recently published Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts.
 399
 
 
While in the Partial Award the arbitral tribunal designates lex mercatoria as the 
applicable rules of law, in the Final Award the arbitrators ascertain its content. It is 
found that the principles to be applied in the case at hand are consideration/reference 
to the intention of the parties and parties’ conduct, as well as the principle of good 
faith, which is construed as parties’ obligation to abide by the contractual terms400. 
The principles so ascertained are of such universal and general nature that they could 
be considered common for all civilised legal systems. In fact, what the arbitral 
ultimately do to reach a decision is careful consideration of the facts of the case, 
including contractual stipulations between the parties and parties’ conduct. It is 
difficult to see how the designation of lex mercatoria as applicable rules of law to 
the dispute has helped the arbitral tribunal in their decision-making. According to 
Art. 17(2) ICC Rules of Arbitration 1998 the arbitral tribunal shall take account of 
the provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages in all cases. This is 
indeed what the tribunal in ICC Case 9875
401
 has done and the reference to lex 
mercatoria does not seem to contribute much more with regard to the legal reasoning 
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  Ibid. In particular, the arbitral tribunal says that “[i]t would be contrary to (…) (the principle of 
good faith and fair dealing in international trade) to do indirectly what the contract prevents 
from doing directly.” 
401
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applied. Lex mercatoria is narrowly construed as being identical to trade customs 
and usages.   
 
Another award further demonstrate the limited interpretative and applicative function 
of lex mercatoria. In ICC Case 11976
402
 the parties have specifically designated 
Brazilian law to govern their contractual relationship. The sole arbitrator 
nevertheless rules that reference to lex mercatoria is allowed because Art. 17(2) ICC 
Rules of Arbitration compels arbitrators to take into account the trade usages and the 
contractual stipulations. Once again lex mercatoria is narrowly construed as being 
equivalent to trade usages. The result is careful consideration of parties’ knowledge 
or ignorance of certain facts, their experience and competences, in order to 
adequately construe the contract in compliance with the common intention of the 
parties. This interpretative technique can be considered as common for both 
arbitrators and courts, and the designation of lex mercatoria as supplementary rules 
of law does not really make any difference as to the legal reasoning applied. 
 
A further reference to an arbitral award
403
 in the ICC Dispute Resolution Library can 
be used as an illustration of the insufficiency of lex mercatoria and its impotence to 
govern all issues arising out of international trade contracts without any referral to a 
national legal system. In ICC Case 5904
404
 the parties have explicitly selected 
general principles and normal usages of international trade to govern their contract. 
The arbitral tribunal, however, rules that lex mercatoria does not prove advantageous 
in filling some of the gaps in parties’ agreement. Instead of trying to ascertain the lex 
mercatoria in an attempt to fill the void, the arbitrators directly apply standards of 
commercial reasonableness and relevance in order to determine the national legal 
system most closely connected to the contract. 
 
Finally, the two approaches to lex mercatoria are starkly demonstrated in Partial 
Awards in Case 7110 (Extracts)
405
, where, absent explicit choice of law provisions, 
one of the issues to be determined by the arbitral tribunal is the question of 
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governing law. The case concerns a long-term contractual relationship between two 
parties resulting in a number of contracts covering the sale, supply, modification, 
maintenance and operation of equipment, and support services relating thereto. 
Claimant argues for the application of either (i) general principles of private 
international law or (ii) [the] private international law [of State X], while Respondent 
contends instead that “the proper law of the Contracts is English law or, 
alternatively, that the tribunal should apply general principles of law”406.  
 
On the ground that six out of nine of the contracts contain the expressions “natural 
justice”, “rules of natural justice” or “laws of natural justice” in association with the 
resolution of disputes through commercial arbitration, the majority of the arbitral 
tribunal concludes that parties did not want to have recourse to “legal notions of one 
of the national juristic systems the application of which is at stake”407, and rules that 
the meaning and the scope of the expression “natural justice” should be ascertained 
from the autonomous perspective of both private international law and international 
commercial arbitration. As such it is held that: 
 
[b]eing international and commercial state contracts, reference in the Contracts to 
natural justice or the like, together with the absence of reference to any national law, 
can then be only reasonably construed as pointing to the application of such substantive 
legal rules and principles adapted to the Contracts and the facts and circumstances 
surrounding them, which, by not belonging to any discrete national legal system, satisfy 
the parties’ concerns as to the neutrality of the applicable proper law. Substantive rules 
and principles fulfilling such requirements may only be general legal rules and 
principles regarding international contractual obligations and enjoying wide 
international consensus.
 408
  
 
The majority of the arbitral tribunal further decides that lex mercatoria, or the 
“general legal rules and principles enjoying wide international consensus, applicable 
to international contractual obligations”, is reflected by the UNIDROIT Principles409. 
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  It is interesting to note that the majority of the arbitrators consider the UNIDROIT Principles to 
be the central component of the general rules and principles regarding international contractual 
 
Page 155 
It is also suggested that parties’ concerns about the enforceability of an award based 
on general legal rules and principles applicable to international obligations, should 
be dispelled since learned opinions indicate that an award based on lex mercatoria is 
enforceable, “particularly when the award has not been rendered in England or is not 
subject to English law and the laws of the national jurisdiction in which the award is 
made do not render invalid an award made on such terms” 410 . This statement, 
however, suggests that national courts could have a rather rigorous and formalistic 
approach to arbitral awards based on lex mercatoria on account of the vagueness and 
lack of precision of the principle on which the award is rendered.  
 
The reasoning of the majority of the arbitrators demonstrate the flexible approach to 
lex mercatoria as a source of law in international commercial arbitration and its 
capability to govern international trade contracts. In contrast, the opinion of the 
dissenting arbitrator evidences a disposition to a more formalistic approach. 
According to the dissenting arbitrator a lack of explicit choice of law does not 
necessarily indicate the unwillingness of the parties to abide by the law of a national 
legal system when a dispute needs to be formally resolved. Following this line of 
reasoning, it should be construed, in the opinion of the dissenting arbitrator, that 
parties have not explicitly contracted out of the application of accepted legal rules 
                                                                                                                                          
obligations, and to enjoy wide international consensus, for several reasons, namely: (1) the 
UNIDROIT Principles are a restatement of international legal principles applicable to 
international commercial contracts made by a distinguished group of international experts 
coming from all prevailing legal systems of the world, without the intervention of states or 
governments, both circumstances redounding to the high quality and neutrality of the product 
and its ability to reflect the present stage of consensus on international legal rules and principles 
governing international contractual obligations in the world, primarily on the basis of their 
fairness and appropriateness for international commercial transactions falling within their 
purview; (2) at the same time, the UNIDROIT Principles are largely inspired [by] an 
international uniform-law text already enjoying wide international recognition and generally 
considered as reflecting international trade usages and practices in the field of the international 
sales of goods, which has already been ratified by almost 40 countries, namely, the 1980 Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods; (3) the UNIDROIT Principles are specially 
adapted to the Contracts being the subject of this arbitration, since they cover both the 
international sale of goods and supply of services; (4) the UNIDROIT Principles (see their 
Preamble) have been specifically conceived to apply to international contracts in instances in 
which, as it is the case in these proceedings, it has been found that the parties have agreed that 
their transactions shall be governed by general legal rules and principles; and (5) rather than 
vague principles or general guidelines, the UNIDROIT Principles are mostly constituted by 
clearly enunciated and specific rules coherently organised in a systematic way. ICC Case 7110 
(n 387). 
410
  Ibid. 
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for determination of the applicable law, such as the rules of conflict of laws. 
Contrary to what is held by the tribunal, the dissenting arbitrator states that the 
reference to “natural justice” simply indicates:  
 
only a desire on the part of the framers of those Contracts to stress that all arbitral 
procedures adopted, and all steps taken by the arbitral tribunal or any of its members, 
must be consistent with the rules of natural justice – understandable enough, since 
otherwise there is a real risk that any award would be vulnerable to attack in many 
countries as being unenforceable, in the same way as would a foreign judgement 
arrived at after a similarly defective process.
411
 
 
It is further contended that the lack of any reference to “general principles of law” or 
“UNIDROIT Principles” should be interpreted as nothing more than a lack of 
explicit choice of law provision. According to the dissenting arbitrator this triggers 
the second sentence of Art. 13(3) of the then-applicable ICC Rules of Arbitration 
1988, namely the reference to rules of conflict, which in turn designates the proper 
law to the contracts. This reasoning of the dissenting arbitrator seems to be in line 
with the majority of arbitral awards rendered under the ICC Rules of Arbitration 
1988 and in particular Art. 13(3).  
 
Given the foregoing it could be concluded that the process of judicialisation can be 
traced in both parties’ and arbitrators’ approach to lex mercatoria and general 
principles of law as sources of international commercial arbitration. Although the 
existence of the New Law Merchant is no longer largely disputed and the debates on 
lex mercatoria has re-focused on its content and ascertaining, the application of lex 
mercatoria in the arbitral awards demonstrates the limitations of its interpretative 
and applicative functions. 
 
On the one hand, lex mercatoria and general principles of law are rarely the express 
choice of law stipulated in the contract. In fact, the analysis of the ICC statistical 
reports demonstrates that there is a declining tendency for designating a-national law 
to govern parties’ contract. On the other hand, the available arbitral awards indicate 
that arbitrators do not readily resort to lex mercatoria and general principles of law; 
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and when they do the applied rules of law are of such universal character that it 
renders lex mercatoria very similar to customary rules of law.  
 
Moreover, except when parties have explicitly stipulated lex mercatoria as the 
governing law, arbitral tribunals apply a rigorous approach in the determination of 
the applicable law often resorting to the conflict of laws rules. In the handful of cases 
where the applicability of lex mercatoria is considered, arbitrators either dismiss the 
claims for application of lex mercatoria, or construe the lex mercatoria narrowly, or 
even misconstrue it. Regardless of whether lex mercatoria governs a contract, 
arbitral tribunals strive to ascertain with certainty parties’ intentions and have regard 
to the facts of the cases and parties’ conduct. Indeed, arbitrators base their decisions 
on careful consideration of the contractual stipulations and invoke the applicable law 
only to fill the gaps thereto: 
 
(arbitrators) prefer to rely on a direct assessment of the facts and circumstances of each 
instance in order to determine the actual or supposed intention of the parties to be 
bound by the arbitration clause, or to sanction behaviour considered abusive. Such an 
approach is certainly explained by the essentially factual nature of the issue ... It ... 
depends above all on a precise analysis of the facts of each case, which makes the 
question of deciding on the applicable law less essential.
412
 
 
Such an approach leaves limited room for the application of lex mercatoria, which 
often even proves to be unsuitable when specific issues are concerned, e.g. interest.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It follows from the above that the prevailing approach to the sources of law in 
international commercial arbitration is a legalistic, judicialised one. The strict 
adherence to judicial precedents, the incipient arbitral jurisprudence and the 
diminishing use of lex mercatoria foster the process of judicialisation. While there is 
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merit in suggesting that by following national court decisions arbitrators uphold the 
rule of law and contribute to the stability of the legal systems and the certainty in 
parties’ commercial dealings, there are also strong arguments in favour of a more 
flexible and autonomous approach, particularly with regard to arbitral awards and lex 
mercatoria. When rendering a decision arbitrators should be governed by the 
particularities of the case at hand and should not be tempted to step into the 
lawmaker’s shoes and attempt to advance matters of policy, which do not necessarily 
apply or are suitable in international commercial arbitration settings. 
 
This is not to say that considerations of legal certainty and predictability are not 
relevant in international commercial arbitration but that arbitrators should carefully 
balance between competing interests, i.e. certainty and flexibility, predictability and 
efficiency, etc. It is worth considering, for example, whether the need for certainty 
and predictability with regard to the rules of law applicable in the arbitral process is 
similar to the one concerning the rules of law applicable to the merits of the dispute. 
While, it may be appropriate to assign a quasi-stare decisis effect to awards or 
interim awards dealing with procedural issues in order to ensure that institutional 
arbitration rules will be applied in a consistent manner, it is strongly suggested that 
arbitrators should maintain the flexibility of their decision-making when it comes to 
the substantive issues of the dispute. 
 
Finally, it is also argued that arbitrators should distinguish between cases where 
parties have indicated the law governing the contract and those in which they have 
not. This is because the arbitrator’s approach should be tailored to the specifics of 
the dispute before them and parties’ expectations. Thus, for example, in absence of a 
choice of law provision and in light of the particular facts of the case, arbitrators are 
encouraged to avoid the rigidity of the conflict of law rules and search for a flexible 
solution. By doing so arbitrators interpret and apply the sources of law less like 
judges and more like professionals within the industries. 
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CHAPTER 4  FACTORS DRIVING THE PROCESS OF 
JUDICIALISATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 
 
Objectives 
 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the most significant factors driving the 
judicialisation of international arbitral process, namely the pursuit of fair and just 
arbitral process, increasing regulation of arbitration proceedings and proliferation of 
litigation-style practices. The objective is to evaluate the level of judicialisation that 
has been achieved in international arbitration proceedings and examine whether 
internal or external to the arbitral process forces are fostering the changes. These 
findings will shed light on the impact of the judicialisation process on arbitration 
users and provide the informative basis for a discussion as to whether the effects of 
the judicialisation process can be controlled.  
 
Although it can be successfully argued that the commercialisation of international 
commercial arbitration also serves as an impetus for the judicialisation process, the 
correlation between these developments will not be examined here. For the purposes 
of this chapter it is considered sufficient to point out that with the success of 
international commercial arbitration came expectations for greater predictability and 
consistency in arbitral decision making, certainty of what the arbitral process entails, 
including the costs associated with it, and raising demands for transparency
413
. While 
the impact of parties’ expectations on the mechanics of arbitral decision making is 
analysed in Chapter 5, the changes that the commercialisation of international 
commercial arbitration brings and the correlation between the processes of 
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commercialisation and judicialisation are areas outside the scope of this thesis and 
require further research.  
 
Another topic that is not discussed in detail in this chapter but is linked to the 
changes observed in international commercial arbitration proceedings is costs. While 
it is tempting to think of the rising costs of international commercial arbitration as a 
factor driving the process of judicialisation
414
, the increased costs associated with 
international arbitration proceedings are, in fact, an implication of the judicialisation 
process. High costs can often be the result of cumbersome, inefficient and legalised 
arbitration proceedings. In order to understand what drives up the costs of the 
arbitral process, it is considered important to examine the underlying developments 
and practices that foster the process of judicialisation in international commercial 
arbitration proceedings. This approach will help achieving the objectives of this 
chapter, namely to inform the arbitration users of the consequences of judicialised 
arbitration and suggest ways of curbing the negative effects of the process of 
judicialisation. 
 
 
4.1 The Pursuit of Fair and Just Process 
 
Privatisation of civil justice
415
 by delegating adjudicative function to international 
arbitral tribunals is both encouraging and challenging. International commercial 
arbitration is seen as a viable alternative to the public civil justice system
416
, 
particularly in countries where the courts are slow, cumbersome or even corrupted. It 
provides flexible solutions to the business community and almost universal 
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415
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enforceability of arbitral awards. “The commercial way to justice”417 , however, 
poses challenges and inherent controversies, since justice is being rendered by 
“somebody who has no intrinsic authority, being neither a Judge nor any officer of 
the State”418. The consequences of this “anomaly”, e.g. disputes are decided by 
arbitrators without any qualification, arbitrators do not have any (contractual) 
relationship with counsel or any disciplinary power over them, arbitral awards do not 
have any precedential value, etc., are gradually being remedied by the process of 
judicialisation. International commercial arbitration has evolved from a lawless 
alternative dispute resolution method
419
 and potentially abuse-ridden process to a 
transnational system of justice
420
 constituting an integral part of the system of global 
governance
421
, which not only facilitates the resolution of trade disputes but also 
fosters economic development
422
 and enforces the rule of law
423
. 
 
The pursuit of fairness and justice by upholding the principles of due process and 
fair treatment of the parties is one of the perennial problems of international 
commercial arbitration. Due to the increasing privatisation of civil justice, as well as 
the rise in the size and complexity of cases brought to arbitration, international 
commercial arbitration is no longer concerned only with the “mere” resolution of 
disputes
424
. Emphasis has been placed on the way disputes are resolved
425
. In the 
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words of Susan Franck there is a paradigm shift from a dispute resolution method 
which is informal, fast and equitable to one that is legitimate in the eyes of both the 
parties and the state and guarantees equal access to justices by cherishing due 
process and neutrality
426
: 
 
Historically, arbitral awards were not revered so much for their legal analysis, but more 
for their sense of fairness and industry knowledge. But with the proliferation of 
alternative dispute resolution, or ADR, mechanisms, international business has become 
more sophisticated resolution of disputes. Arbitrators are no longer prized for their 
capacity to reach compromise outcomes, particularly where other ADR mechanisms, 
such as mediation and negotiation, can achieve this objective more effectively Today, 
businesses use international arbitration to provide a neutral, adjudicative dispute 
resolution process where arbitrators independently apply the law to facts, and this in 
turn promotes the legitimacy of international arbitration. (…) [C]urrent literature 
suggests that arbitrators’ urge to render neutral and impartial decisions reflects the 
“judicialization” of arbitration (…).
427
 
 
Traditionally the application of due process in national legal systems is divided into 
two categories, namely a) substantive due process, and b) procedural due process, on 
account of the distinction made between the two types of law
428
. The substantive law 
creates, defines and regulates rights, whereas the procedural law governs the exertion 
of rights or the enforcement of substantive law generally speaking. In international 
commercial arbitration, however, the emphasis is placed on procedural due process 
                                                                                                                                          
resorting to the binding decision of a third person chosen by the parties themselves – instead of 
going to the State courts”. 
425
  See Richard W. Naimark and Stephanie E. Keer, ‘International Private Commercial Arbitration: 
Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People’ (2002) 30 Int’l Bus Law 203–
209. The survey conducted by Richard W. Naimark and Stephanie E. Keer on the perceptions 
and expectations of attorneys and their clients in international commercial arbitration reveal that 
the overwhelming majority of the participants rank ‘a fair and just result’ of arbitration as the 
most important aspect of international commercial arbitration (90% for respondents, 75% for 
claimants, and 81% combined). 
426
  See also Rogers, ‘Fit and Function in Legal Ethics' (n 64); Catherine A. Rogers, ‘Regulating 
International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct’ (2005) 
41 Stan. J. Int’l L. 53–121, 66. 
427
  Susan D. Franck, ‘The Role of International Arbitrators’ (2006) 12 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
504, 507. 
428
  Fabricio Fortese and Lotta Hemmi, ‘Procedural Fairness and Efficiency in International 
Arbitration’ (2015) 3 Groningen Journal of International Law 110–124, 111. 
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because of the lack of recourse against arbitral awards on account of error of law. 
With the exception of some jurisdictions
429
, most national laws do not allow review 
of arbitral awards to correct errors of law
430
. Thus, in international commercial 
arbitration procedural due process serves two functions – it not only manifests the 
fairness of the proceedings, but also becomes a measurement of the correctness of 
the award and ultimately the legitimacy of the whole arbitral process
431
.  
 
The significance of due process to international arbitration is demonstrated by the 
inclusion of provisions in the 1958 NYC to safeguard the arbitration proceedings. In 
particular an award may be refused recognition and enforcement on account of 
inability of a party to present their case
432
, as well as because of violation of the 
arbitral procedure by conducting the latter not in accordance with the agreement of 
the parties or not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration 
took place
433
. Art. IX ECICA and Art. 36 UNCITRAL ML
434
 are almost a verbatim 
adoption of Article V of the NYC, thus reiterating the importance of due process in 
international commercial arbitration. In addition to those general provisions the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule 1976
435
 (now substituted by the UNCITRAL 
                                                 
429
  See e.g. English Arbitration Act 1996, s 69. 
430
  See e.g. a recent decision by the Singapore High Court in the case of Quarella SpA v Scelta 
Marble Australia Pty Ltd [2012] SGHC 166, in which the Court has once again dismissed an 
attempt to set aside an arbitral award on the purported basis that the arbitrator had wrongly 
interpreted the choice of law clause, which parties had chosen to govern the distributorship 
agreement. 
431
  According to Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, ‘Fussing about the Forum: Categories and 
Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Competition’ (1996) 21 Law & Social Inquiry 285–312, 
285, 299 cited in Christopher R. Drahozal, ‘Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and 
International Commercial Arbitration’ (2000) 33 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 79–146, 96: “The 
legitimacy of international commercial arbitration is no longer built on the fact that arbitration is 
informal and close to the needs of business; rather legitimacy now comes more from a 
recognition that arbitration is formal and close to the kind of resolution that would be produced 
through litigation – more precisely, through the negotiation that takes place in the context of 
U.S.-style litigation”. 
432
  NYC, Art. V(1)(b). 
433
  NYC, Art. V(1)(c); see also Maxi Scherer, ‘New York Convention: Violation of Due Process, 
Article V(1)(b)’, 2013. 
434
  See also UNCITRAL ML, Art. 18 Equal Treatment of Parties, which emphasises the 
significance of fair process “The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be 
given a full opportunity of presenting his case”. 
435
  See for example UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976, Art. 15(1): “Subject to these Rules, the 
arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided 
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Arbitration Rules 2010), ICC Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation 1988 (now 
substituted by the ICC Arbitration Rules 2012)
436
, LCIA Arbitration Rules 1998
437
 
(now substituted by the LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014), and the rules of other 
arbitration institutions
438
 have contributed to the development of a legal framework 
                                                                                                                                          
that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is 
given a full opportunity of presenting his case”. 
436
  ICC Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation, Art. 11 does not contain provisions that build on the 
protection of arbitral process; instead it they make reference to the municipal procedural law that 
may be applied by the arbitrators. In contrast ICC Rules of Arbitration, Art. 22 reads “1) The 
arbitral tribunal and the parties shall make every effort to conduct the arbitration in an 
expeditious and cost-effective manner, having regard to the complexity and value of the dispute. 
2) In order to ensure effective case management, the arbitral tribunal, after consulting the 
parties, may adopt such procedural measures as it considers appropriate, provided that they are 
not contrary to any agreement of the parties. 3) Upon the request of any party, the arbitral 
tribunal may make orders concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings or of any 
other matters in connection with the arbitration and may take measures for protecting trade 
secrets and confidential information. 4) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall act fairly and 
impartially and ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present its case. 5) The 
parties undertake to comply with any order made by the arbitral tribunal.” 
437
  See LCIA Arbitration Rules 1998, Art. 14.1(i) “The parties may agree on the conduct of their 
arbitral proceedings and they are encouraged to do so, consistent with the Arbitral Tribunal's 
general duties at all times: (i) to act fairly and impartially as between all parties, giving each a 
reasonable opportunity of putting its case and dealing with that of its opponent.” Art. 14.2. 
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties under Article 14.1, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the 
widest discretion to discharge its duties allowed under such law(s) or rules of law as the Arbitral 
Tribunal may determine to be applicable; and at all times the parties shall do everything 
necessary for the fair, efficient and expeditious conduct of the arbitration.” 
438
  See for example CAMCA Arbitration Rules 1996, Art. 17: “1. Subject to these rules, the tribunal 
may conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that the 
parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair 
opportunity to present its case. 2. Documents or information supplied to the tribunal by one 
party shall at the same time be communicated by that party to the other party or parties.” In 
contrast to the simplicity of the earlier provisions safeguarding the arbitral process, the 
provisions of some most current arbitration rules strike with their comprehensiveness and 
profoundness, e.g. ICDR International Dispute Resolution Procedures (Including Mediation and 
Arbitration Rules) 2014, Art. 20 Conduct of Proceedings: “1. Subject to these Rules, the arbitral 
tribunal may conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that 
the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a 
fair opportunity to present its case. 2. The tribunal shall conduct the proceedings with a view to 
expediting the resolution of the dispute. The tribunal may, promptly after being constituted, 
conduct a preparatory conference with the parties for the purpose of organizing, scheduling, and 
agreeing to procedures, including the setting of deadlines for any submissions by the parties. In 
establishing procedures for the case, the tribunal and the parties may consider how technology, 
including electronic communications, could be used to increase the efficiency and economy of 
the proceedings. 3. The tribunal may decide preliminary issues, bifurcate proceedings, direct the 
order of proof, exclude cumulative or irrelevant testimony or other evidence, and direct the 
parties to focus their presentations on issues whose resolution could dispose of all or part of the 
case. 4. At any time during the proceedings, the tribunal may order the parties to produce 
documents, exhibits, or other evidence it deems necessary or appropriate. Unless the parties 
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safeguarding the arbitration proceedings. This legal framework of international 
conventions and institutional arbitration rules is complemented by general notes, 
guidelines and recommendations aimed at assisting parties, counsel and arbitrators in 
resolving trade disputes in compliance with the principle of due process. 
 
The principle of due process is governed by a complex system of sources of law 
applicable in and to arbitration
439
 that shapes the notions of fairness, justice and 
equal treatment in international commercial arbitration. It comprises (i) the lex 
arbitri, namely the international conventions, national laws and case law, where 
applicable
440
, that contain the procedural safeguards or the quality standards of due 
process
441
; (ii) arbitral procedural law
442
; (iii) institutional arbitration rules or rules 
                                                                                                                                          
agree otherwise in writing, the tribunal shall apply Article 21. 5. Documents or information 
submitted to the tribunal by one party shall at the same time be transmitted by that party to all 
parties and, unless instructed otherwise by the Administrator, to the Administrator. 6. The 
tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence. 7. 
The parties shall make every effort to avoid unnecessary delay and expense in the arbitration. 
The arbitral tribunal may allocate costs, draw adverse inferences, and take such additional steps 
as are necessary to protect the efficiency and integrity of the arbitration.” 
439
  For the difference between the law applicable to arbitration and the law applicable in arbitration 
see Paulsson, ‘Arbitration in Three Dimensions’ (n 61); Alastair Henderson, ‘Lex Arbitri, 
Procedural Law and the Seat of Arbitration: Unravelling the Laws of the Arbitration Process’ 
(2014) 26 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 886–910. 
440
  For the relevance of national court decisions as a source of law in international commercial 
arbitration see Sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
441
  See Simon Greenberg, Christopher Kee, and J. Romesh Weeramantry, International 
Commercial Arbitration: An Asia-Pacific Perspective (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 
2010) 58, para 2.14 “The lex arbitri legitimises and provides a general legal framework for 
international arbitration. The relevant law itself might be found in an independent statute on 
international arbitration or it might be a chapter in another law, such as a civil procedure code or 
a law also governing domestic arbitration. However, the lex arbitri of a given jurisdiction can 
also include other statutes and codes (even those not specifically dealing with arbitration), and 
case law which relates to the basic legal framework of international arbitrations seated there.”  
442
  It has been argued that arbitral procedural law is not necessarily the lex arbitri governing the 
arbitration. See ibid 59, para 2.16: “The procedural law sets out the parameters of the procedure 
and support for international arbitration. It provides, for example, mandatory rules about how 
arbitration can be conducted. These include rules requiring equal treatment, due process and the 
independence of arbitrators.” Ibid 60, para 2.18, 2.19, 2.20, 2.21: “The arbitral procedural law 
and the lex arbitri are rarely separated. For this reason, many people do not distinguish between 
lex arbitri and procedural law, or alternatively use the terms as synonyms. While this approach 
is understandable, it is nevertheless problematic and better avoided. (…) The potential for 
confusion and need for a clear distinction arise from the fact that arbitrating parties in some 
jurisdictions may select an arbitral procedural law that is different from the lex arbitri. This 
means that the parties may seat their arbitration in one jurisdiction and choose the procedural 
law of a different jurisdiction. (…) There is English authority on point that may be instructive, at 
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applicable in ad hoc arbitration; (iv) arbitration agreements, which according to the 
principle of party autonomy may be used by contracting parties to tailor the arbitral 
process; (v) other rules of law, guidelines, recommendations or general principles of 
fairness and due process; and above all (vi) parties’ stipulations to the extent they do 
not violate mandatory rules of law. The abovementioned sources of law form an 
elaborate legal framework that not only safeguards the arbitral process and upholds 
the principles of due process and fair treatment of the parties, but also suggests an 
emerging hierarchy of norms in international commercial arbitration
443
. In this 
developing system of legal rules and social norms
444
, mandatory rules of law and 
rules of transnational public policy, such as natural justice and due process, occupy 
the highest level of the hierarchy of norms. 
 
The growing number of sources of law in international commercial arbitration, the 
increasing regulation of arbitration proceedings and the quest for due process can be 
seen as implications of the process of judicialisation. Some authors perceive these 
new developments as detrimental to some of the intrinsic features of arbitration, such 
as the informality and flexibility of the arbitral process and the broad discretion of 
                                                                                                                                          
least for common law jurisdictions. Lord Justice Kerr clearly recognised in Naviera Amazonica 
Peruana SA v Compania Internacional de Seguros del Peru [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 116, at p. 120 
(English Court of Appeal) that “there is equally no reason in theory which precludes parties to 
agree that an arbitration shall be held at a place or in country X but subject to the procedural 
laws of Y”. In Union of India v McDonnell Douglas Corporation [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 48 the 
Queen’s Bench Division of the Commercial Court was asked to determine the lex arbitri where 
the arbitration clause selected London as the seat of arbitration but expressly identified the 
Indian Arbitration Act 1940 as applicable. Justice Saville noted that the English law admitted the 
theoretical possibility of parties choosing the procedural law notwithstanding a contradictory 
choice of seat. (…) Justice Saville ultimately concluded that choosing a foreign procedural law 
could not have been the parties’ intentions. Also Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, and Hunter (n 
24) 183, para 3.60 “It is true, of course, that the lex arbitri may deal with procedural matters – 
such as the constitution of an arbitral tribunal where there is no relevant contractual provision – 
but (…) the lex arbitri is much more than a purely procedural law.” 
443
  See Renner, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Norms in Transnational Law?’ (n 62). The emerging 
hierarchical system of the norms in international commercial arbitration give rise to a new model 
of arbitral governance, different from the contractual and judicial models, namely the 
constitutional mode. As explained in Sweet, ‘The Evolution of International Arbitration (n 36): 
“The constitutional model supplements the judicial model, embedding the arbitral legal order 
within an overarching legal framework that includes general principles of law, international 
economic law, and human rights, including property rights and guarantees of due process.” 
444
  See Karton, ‘Norms Arising from the Values Shared by International Commercial Arbitrators’ 
(n 138). 
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the arbitral tribunal to seek a fair rather than legalistic outcome to the dispute
445
. 
They go to argue that these new trends threaten the mere existence of arbitration as a 
dispute resolution method: 
 
Changes to the international arbitration environment over recent decades (…) have led 
to the increasing judicialisation of international arbitration: judicial procedures, judicial 
style regulation and judicial behavioural norms have all been adopted, and even judicial 
structures, such as a supervisory division, are being contemplated. As a result, the 
simple and idealistic understanding of international arbitration has become increasingly 
less accurate. If this continues to occur, the risk is that a highly effective and successful 
dispute resolution mechanism will be lost to the international business community. (…) 
The judicialisation of international arbitration must cease and, indeed, a process of de-
judicialisation should be carried out.
 446
    
 
Others are much more optimistic suggesting that “[i]t is possible that the pursuit of 
fairness and justice, with its increasing desirability, will guarantee continued 
viability of the process without interfering with the practical feasibility of 
arbitration.” 447 
 
                                                 
445
  These new developments are sometimes referred to as “formalisation” or “legalisation” of 
international commercial arbitration (see for example  Phillips (n 23)); Helmer (n 1); Catherine 
A. Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (1st edn, OUP 2014) 29, 30, paras 1.36, 1.37). 
The “formalisation” of international commercial arbitration is seen by the author of this thesis as 
one of the implications of the process of judicialisation rather than as a separate and 
distinguished trend. This is because the judicialisation process encompasses developments 
associated with the formalisation of international commercial arbitration but also can explain 
other trends, such as the increased transparency (regarding arbitrators’ appointments, disclosure 
and decision-making), the development of arbitral precedents, the declining use of amiable 
compositeur and lex mercatoria, and the proliferation of adversarial approach to international 
commercial arbitration. The formalisation can be observed at both procedural and substantive 
level. At a procedural level, this trend is associated with the development of rules that govern 
and standardise issues related to arbitrators’ disclosure, taking and evaluation of evidence, 
rendering arbitral decisions with reasons, etc. At a substantive level, formalisation is linked to 
declining use of amiable compositeur and lex mercatoria. Since the presence of choice of law 
clauses in the arbitration agreements requires application of national law, the scope for 
employment of equitable principles is limited. The result is increased predictability and certainty 
as to the outcome of the dispute as, on one hand, the application of law that is not well 
developed or not codified is avoided, and, on the other hand, arbitrators are not granted the 
power to reconcile the legal rules with what is considered fair and equitable but simply 
authorised to apply the law. 
446
  Horvath (n 23) 270. 
447
  Japaridze (n 371) 1416. 
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Despite the potential loss of some core characteristics of international commercial 
arbitration, the expanding regulation and the globalisation of the arbitral process
448
 
are instrumental in the development of international arbitration and its 
transformation into a “transnational system of justice”449. The globalisation of the 
arbitral process results in a “growing consensus among national legal systems about 
general principles of arbitration procedure”450 , which safeguard due process and 
equal treatment of the parties. As Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler points out, the 
implications of the globalisation process are somewhat paradoxical. On the one 
hand, the UNCITRAL ML has contributed to the harmonisation of national 
arbitration laws
451
 – with a great majority of states having adopted the territoriality 
principle under the UNCITRAL ML with some or no adjustments. On the other 
hand, even though it is now commonly accepted that an international commercial 
arbitration is governed by the national arbitration law of the seat of arbitration (not 
the rules of the local civil procedure), the “national law has less and less actual 
bearing on the arbitration proceedings”452, thus allowing for an unlimited number of 
states to recognise the legitimacy of the adjudication process
453
.  
 
These developments, namely the expanding harmonisation of national arbitration 
laws together with the declining use of the particular mandatory laws of the seat of 
                                                 
448
  See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Globalization of Arbitral Procedure’ (2003) 36 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 1313–1333. 
449
  Gaillard, ‘The Present – Commercial Arbitration as a Transnational System of Justice’ (n 191). 
450
  Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Globalization of Arbitral Procedure’ (n 448) 1318. 
451
  See Status of UNCITRAL ML, statistics managed by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, available 
online:<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_sta
tus.html> 
452
  Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Globalization of Arbitral Procedure’ (n 448) 1315. 
453
  For the difference between the three representations of international arbitration, i.e. the 
monolocal view, the Westphalian vision, and the transnational vision, see Gaillard, ‘The Present 
– Commercial Arbitration as a Transnational System of Justice’ (n 191) 66, 67: “These visions, 
mental constructs or representations, strongly influence the views held on a number of questions 
ranging from whether the arbitrators are empowered to determine their own jurisdiction, the 
conduct of the arbitral proceedings, the determination of the law applicable to the merits of the 
dispute, or the fate of the resulting arbitral award, including the controversial question of 
whether an award set aside in the country of the seat of the arbitration may nevertheless be 
enforced in other jurisdictions.” See also Thomas Schultz, Transnational Legality: Stateless Law 
and International Arbitration (1st edn, OUP 2014); Joshua Karton, ‘International Arbitration 
Culture and Global Governance’ in Walter Mattli and Thomas Dietz (eds), International 
Arbitration and Global Governance: Contending Theories and Evidence (1st edn, OUP 2014). 
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arbitration, result in the establishment of a general consensus about the applicability 
of two major principles in international commercial arbitration, i.e. party autonomy 
and due process. The scopes of those principles, however, vary from national legal 
system to national legal system. As pointed out by Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, the 
term “due process” can refer to: 
 
(…) a number of notions with varying names under different national laws, including 
natural justice, procedural fairness, the right or opportunity to be heard, the so-called 
principe de la contradiction and equal treatment. More recently, procedural efficiency 
has been increasingly advocated by scholarly writers and taken into account in practice 
by arbitral tribunals and courts. However, it has not achieved the same recognition as 
the first two principles. (…) Consensus on principles does not mean agreement on 
details.
454
 
 
Fabricio Fortese and Lotta Hemmi suggest a good starting point for developing a 
working definition of due process in international arbitration:  
 
(…) due process in international arbitration requires, first, that the parties’ agreement to 
arbitrate their dispute will be respected and enforced, that they will effectively have 
access to arbitration as their chosen means of justice, and that they will have a 
meaningful opportunity to participate in the lawful constitution of the arbitral tribunal. 
The core guarantees of procedural due process comprise the arbitrator’s duty to treat the 
parties equally, fairly and impartially, and to ensure that each party has an opportunity 
to present its case and deal with that of its opponent. It also comprises the arbitral 
tribunal’s duty to deal with all of the issues that are put to it. Therefore, access to 
arbitration is not enough; the procedure itself must also be fair.
455
 
 
The importance of due process guarantees in international arbitration is 
demonstrated by the fact that both national legislation and international conventions 
recognise and impose requirements of due process. Within this general framework of 
due process the arbitration community relies on self-regulation mechanisms to 
develop and refine the notion of due process. For example, arbitration institutions 
have introduced explicit provisions in the most recent editions of their arbitration 
                                                 
454
  Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Globalization of Arbitral Procedure’ (n 448) 1321, 1322. 
455
  Fortese and Hemmi (n 426) 112. 
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rules that the proceedings should be conducted in an expeditious manner
456
. The 
latter requirement reflects the trite law that justice delayed is justice denied and 
invites the tribunals to carefully balance fundamental principles of international 
arbitration, such as the parties’ right to be heard and their right to a speedy trial, as 
well as the parties’ freedom to tailor the arbitral process and the arbitrator’s duty to 
ensure the efficient and timely completion of their mandate to resolve the dispute at 
hand. 
 
In those difficult conundrums, one can trace the process of judicialisation where 
solutions that guarantee procedural discipline by all participants in the arbitration 
proceedings are being favoured
457
. As mentioned above, the increasing regulation of 
                                                 
456
  See for example ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, Art. 22(1); SIAC Arbitration Rules 2013, Rule 
16.1; SCC Arbitration Rules, Art. 19(2). 
457
  Arbitral tribunals face a delicate counterpoise between fairness and efficiency, legal certainty 
and procedural flexibility. Arbitrator’s mandate to render a final and binding decision between 
the parties is subject, on the one hand, to mandatory rules of law and general principles such as 
due process or natural justice and, on the other hand, to parties’ instructions regarding the 
management of the case. Party autonomy and procedural flexibility are counterbalanced by 
procedural efficiency, fairness and transparency regarding the rights and duties of all 
participants in the arbitral process. Given that the process of judicialisation is characterised by 
increased regulation of arbitration proceedings, formalisation of the arbitral process, and 
heightened focus on reasonable conduct and fair treatment in the proceedings, the implications 
of the same process can be discern in arbitral awards and court decisions that promote 
observance of procedural discipline and parties’ right to access to justice. Example of the latter 
include appropriate disclosure, promptly and timely raised objections regarding violation of due 
process, safeguarding parties’ right to access to justice by giving the parties the opportunity to 
comment and make submissions on matters that are likely to form the subject of decision, etc. 
The following decisions and arbitral awards demonstrate this approach. In its decision 
4A_352/2007 in (2008) 26 ASA Bulletin 322, the Federal Tribunal (the Supreme Court of 
Switzerland) considered whether or not the appellant’s right to be heard had been violated by the 
arbitral tribunal to the extent that a number of arguments submitted by the party had not been 
considered by the arbitrators. In rejecting the appeal, the Federal Tribunal reiterated that 
international arbitrators sitting in Switzerland did not have to address every single point of fact 
or law raised by the parties. A violation of the right to be heard – Swiss parlance for due process 
– is only found where the arbitral tribunal refuses or fails to consider some essential points. 
Thus, in its decision 4A_433/2009 in (2011) 29 ASA Bulletin 673, the Federal Tribunal held 
that the right of the parties to be heard did not require reasons to be included in an international 
arbitral award. However, this right was breached when some important arguments or evidence 
were overlooked by the arbitrators. The Federal Tribunal annulled the arbitral award as it found 
that the arbitral tribunal did not take into consideration an argument made by claimant in the 
post-hearing submissions. In its decision 4A_682/2011 in (2014) 32 ASA Bulletin 137 the 
Federal Tribunal confirmed previously stated opinion that a party taking the view that the right 
to be heard was violated must raise the issue in the arbitral proceedings immediately and give 
the arbitral tribunal the opportunity to remedy the violation. A party failing to do so forfeits the 
right to raise the argument of a violation of due process in front of the Federal Tribunal. In 
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international arbitration and the globalisation of arbitral process contributes 
significantly to safeguarding the principle of due process by refining the rights and 
obligations of parties, arbitrators and counsel in arbitration proceedings. The pursuit 
of fair and just process is further enhanced by developments relating to arbitrators’ 
neutrality, such as proposals to reconsider the limitation of arbitrators’ liability, the 
introduction of a double standard to ensure an unbiased tribunal, and the shift of 
control over the arbitral process.    
 
 
4.1.1 Arbitrator’s Vocation and the Double Standard for Arbitrator’s Impartiality 
and Independence 
 
The foundations of the judicialisation process can be associated with some theories 
about the nature of international commercial arbitration, in particular the 
                                                                                                                                          
Zermalt Holdings SA v Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd [1985] 2 E.G.L.R. 14 it was held that 
whilst an arbitrator can rely on his expertise in general matters, specific matters likely to form 
the subject of decision should be exposed to the comments and submissions of the parties. The 
arbitrator had failed to do this in the case of two such specific considerations, which appeared in 
those paragraphs of the award setting out the reasons for his decision. Furthermore, in a recent 
decision by the Paris Court of Appeal, namely Cour d'appel de Paris, 17 November 2011, Pôle 1, 
Ch. 1. RG n° 09/24158, Société Licensing Projects (LP) et autres contre Société. Pirelli & C. 
SPA et autres, parties’ right to access to justice was elevated to a new level. The Paris Court of 
Appeal annulled an ICC award because the counterclaim of the respondent, which had been put 
into liquidation by a Spanish Court, was withdrawn when the respondent failed to pay the 
separate advance on costs that had been fixed in relation thereto. Finally, state courts support 
arbitral tribunals in refusing unreasonable requests for document production and rarely set aside 
arbitral awards on the ground that the tribunal has rejected production of documents. A recent 
case before the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht; OLG) of Frankfurt (OLG, 17 Feb. 
2011, 26 Sch 13/10, decision uphold by the German Supreme Court with a resolution dated 2 
Oct. 2010 (III ZR 8/11)) attracted the attention of practitioners as the Court set aside an award 
because the arbitral tribunal rejected document production request in violation of the procedure 
agreed upon by the parties. In its decision the Court held that the arbitral tribunal violated the 
agreement of the parties as laid down in the procedural order by refusing to order the production 
of all documents that had been made available to the party-appointed experts. The Court further 
stated that it is only in the discretion of the tribunal to order or not to order document production 
when the tribunal itself established the procedural rules. In contrast, in the case at hand, the 
arbitral tribunal was bound by the parties’ agreement and had to grand the request for production 
of documents. The Court found that the requirement under §1059(2) No. 1 (d) 
Zivilprozessordnung (the German Code of Civil Procedure), namely that the violation of the 
parties’ agreement affected the award, was met. It was held that a different outcome would have 
been possible if the agreed procedure had been respected. This decision, in fact, reiterates the 
importance of observing the principle of due process, particularly in disputes where one of the 
parties does not have access to documents, on which it relies to prove its case (as was the 
situation in the case at hand). 
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jurisdictional theory and some aspects of the hybrid theory
458
, while its implications 
can be traced in various new developments relating to the arbitral process, such as, 
for example, the establishment of a double standard for arbitrator’s neutrality.   
 
According to the jurisdictional theory arbitrator’s adjudicative function resembles 
the judicial one. This is so because, on the one hand, arbitrator’s power is drawn 
from the state by means of state’s support of arbitration, and, on the other hand, the 
arbitrator, just like a judge, is required to apply the rules of law and their award is 
“regarded as having the same status and effect as a judgement handed down by 
judges sitting in a national court”459. However, the theory that is widely endorsed 
today is the hybrid or mixed theory, which is a compromise between the 
jurisdictional and the contractual theories: 
 
[t]he liberal attitude adopted by most states towards international arbitration generally 
supports the mixed or hybrid theory as the most reflective of the juridical nature of 
international commercial arbitration.
460
 
 
According to the hybrid theory arbitration has both contractual and jurisdictional 
elements. The former are rooted in parties’ agreement giving rise to arbitration and 
parties’ freedom to select arbitrators, the rules governing the arbitration procedures 
and the seat of arbitration, while the latter are linked to the supervisory powers of the 
courts at the seat of arbitration and the mandatory rules of national legal regimes 
which govern the arbitrability of the dispute, the compliance of arbitration 
procedures with general principles of due process, and the enforceability of the 
arbitral awards. According to the distinguished Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter:  
 
International commercial arbitration is a hybrid. It begins as a private agreement 
between the parties. It continues by way of private proceedings, in which the wishes of 
the parties play a significant role. Yet it ends with an award that has binding legal force 
and effect and which, on appropriate conditions, the courts of most countries of the 
world will recognise and enforce. In short, this essentially private process has a public 
                                                 
458
  Yu (n 198); Emilia Onyema, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrator’s 
Contract (1st edn, Routledge 2010). 
459
  Yu (n 198) 258. 
460
  Onyema (n 456) 58. 
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effect, implemented with the support of the public authorities of each State and 
expressed through that State's national law.
461
 
 
Indeed, international arbitration is a private process that has a public effect and the 
focus on the latter is constantly increasing. With more and more disputes being 
brought to arbitration and the majority of those disputes being high-stake ones
462
, 
parties’ expectations as to the quality of the arbitration services and the neutrality of 
the process are rising. This assertion is supported not only by the findings of a recent 
survey
463
 but also by the fact that arbitrators’ independence and impartiality has been 
a topic of heated debates for some time now. Since the supervising role of national 
courts is intentionally minimised “to insulate decision-making process from national 
bias or interference” and states’ “support for international arbitration has 
traditionally taken the form of policies of non-interference”, “primary regulators of 
international arbitrators are the arbitral institutions”464 and other professional bodies, 
such as the International Bar Association and Swiss Arbitration Association. They 
shape and refine the standards of arbitrator neutrality by amending the rules of 
arbitration institutions, promoting new guidelines and recommendations on conflicts 
of interest in international commercial arbitration and advocating for tighter 
requirements for arbitrator disclosure. These new developments are congruent with 
the quest for fair and just arbitral process. The regulation of arbitrator’s duties and 
conduct and the increased transparency in the selection and appointment of 
arbitrators safeguard the legitimacy of the arbitral process and guarantee the fairness 
of the proceedings and the equal treatment of the parties. They, however, inevitably 
lead to a more formalised and judicialised process.  
 
An often-heard criticism of regulation of international commercial arbitration by 
means of procedural soft law is that it leads to judicialisation of the arbitral process. 
William Park rightly observes that “[a]t first blush, judicialised arbitration may seem 
                                                 
461
  Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, and Hunter (n 24) 29, para 1.84. 
462
  See n 549. 
463
  See the survey conducted by Richard W. Naimark and Stephanie E. Keer on the perceptions and 
expectations of attorneys and their clients in international commercial arbitration commented in 
Naimark and Keer (n 425). 
464
  Catherine A. Rogers, ‘The Vocation of the International Arbitrator’ (2005) 20 Am U Int’l L Rev 
957–1020, 970, 971. 
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a contradiction in terms”465 and proceeds to ask the question “[b]ut is this really so 
bad?”466. The author contends that the answer to this question should be negative on 
the grounds that “[a]rbitration proceeds in the shadow of judicial power, enlisted to 
seize assets and grant res judicata effect to awards. So it is not at all surprising that 
litigants expect ordered arbitral proceedings.
467” 
 
It is therefore also not surprising that the judicialisation of international commercial 
arbitration by means of increased regulation and rise of the transparency and fairness 
of the arbitral process have a positive impact on the perceived legitimacy of the 
proceedings. With the issues of conflicts of interest becoming ever more pertinent
468
, 
a judicialised arbitral process provides for greater legal certainty, legitimacy and 
justice.  
 
A significant change in the regulation of arbitrator’s vocation was the introduction of 
a double standard an arbitrator to be both independent and impartial. Although the 
UNCITRAL ML contains the requirement every arbitrator to be independent and 
impartial
469
, the ML has not been adopted universally. There are national arbitration 
laws, such as the Swiss PILA, Art. 180, that simply require independence on the part 
of arbitrators. Some institutional arbitration rules also used to specify only 
arbitrator’s independence as a standard for neutrality. For example Art. 7 ICC Rules 
1998 stated: “every arbitrator must be and remain independent of the parties 
involved in arbitration”. With the growing popularity of international commercial 
arbitration and the heightened focus on how justice is rendered, these discrepancies 
                                                 
465
  Park, ‘The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration’ (n 138) 145. 
466
  Ibid. 
467
  Ibid 146. 
468
  See Detlev F. Vagts, ‘The International Legal Profession. A Need for More Governance?’ 
(1996) 90 Am J Int’l L 250, 250 where the author described the community of international 
arbitrators as 'an exclusive club in the international arena'; also in Rogers, ‘The Vocation of the 
International Arbitrator’ (n 464) 960 it is argued that the access to arbitration market is 
“essentially controlled by what might be considered a governing ‘cartel’ of the most elite 
arbitrators.” 
469
  See UNCITRAL ML, Arts. 11(5) and 12. The requirement of the UNCITRAL ML that an 
arbitrator must be independent and impartial is considered to be a mandatory provision from 
which parties may not derogate, however parties are free to agree that certain disclosed 
relationship between an arbitrator and a party shall not be considered sufficiently substantial as 
to qualify as a justifiable doubt and to lead to the disqualification of the selected arbitrator.  
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between various national laws and institutional arbitration rules as to the arbitrators’ 
standard of impartiality raise doubts about the neutrality of the proceedings and the 
legitimacy of the process in general.  
 
The differences in the wording of the provisions laid down in the institutional 
arbitration rules relating to the independence and impartiality of arbitration have 
been minimised with the latest amendments of the rules. Thus, Art. 11 ICC 
Arbitration Rules 2012 states that “[e]very arbitrator must be and remain impartial 
and independent of the parties involved in arbitration”; according to Art. 14 SCC 
Arbitration Rules 2010 “[e]very arbitrator must be impartial and independent”; Art. 
9 Swiss Rules of International Arbitration 2012 states: “[a]ny arbitrator conducting 
an arbitration under there Rules shall be and remain at all times impartial and 
independent of the parties”; Art. 11.1 HKIAC Arbitration Rules 2013 states: “[a]n 
arbitral tribunal confirmed under these Rules shall be and remain at all times 
impartial and independent of the parties”; according to Art. 10.1 of the SIAC 
Arbitration Rules 2013 “[a]ny arbitrator, whether or not nominated by the parties, 
conducting an arbitration under these Rules shall be and remain at all times 
independent and impartial, and shall not act as advocate for any party”; S 15 DIS 
Arbitration Rules 1998 states: “[e]ach arbitrator must be impartial and independent”; 
and according to Art. 5.3 LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014 “[a]ll arbitrators conducting 
an arbitration under these Rules shall be and remain at all times impartial and 
independent of the parties; and none shall act in the arbitration as advocates for any 
party”.470 
 
The unification of the wording of the arbitration rules regarding arbitrators’ 
impartiality and independence demonstrates, on the one hand, the role of arbitration 
institutions in regulating matters of public interest, and, on the other hand, the efforts 
of the international commercial arbitration community to safeguard the neutrality of 
the arbitration process. Since it is often claimed that “arbitration is only as good as 
                                                 
470
  DIS Arbitration Rules 1998, SCC Arbitration Rules 2010, ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, HKIAC 
Arbitration Rules 2013, SIAC Arbitration Rules 2013, LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014. 
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the arbitrators”471 the focus on arbitrator’s vocation and conduct is significant. The 
double requirement underpins the whole arbitral process and serves as a guarantee 
for its integrity and fairness. Arbitrators must meet the standard of neutrality in order 
to be able to perform their adjudicative function, as the latter is incompatible with 
any prejudgement or predisposition towards one of the parties.  
 
The principle that arbitrators must be and remain independent and impartial is now 
universally accepted
472
. There is a general consensus that the requirement an 
arbitrator to remain impartial entails lack of bias or prejudice against, or 
predisposition towards a particular party, counsel or party’s case, while arbitrator’s 
independence is “a situation of fact or law, capable of objective verification”473, i.e. 
independence from the parties and parties’ counsel is lack of any personal, 
professional, financial, or social relations between the arbitrator and the party or the 
counsel. Thus, the obligation on an arbitrator to be impartial and independent covers 
both subjective and objective appearance of bias and prejudice. The first one relates 
to arbitrator’s state of mind or attitude, while the second one is usually materialised 
in a relationship between an arbitrator and a party/its counsel. The concepts of 
independence and impartiality can often overlap and the boundaries between the two 
notions can be blurred, but the co-existence of the two requirements guarantees that 
                                                 
471
  See Laurent Lévy and Yves Derains, Is Arbitration only As Good as the Arbitrator? Status, 
Powers and Role of the Arbitrator, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 
8 (Laurent Lévy and Yves Derains (eds), 1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2011). 
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  For more detailed analysis on the requirement arbitrators to be independent and impartial, see M. 
Scott Donahey, ‘The Independence and Neutrality of Arbitrators’ (1992) 9 Journal of 
International Arbitration 31; Alan Scott Ray, ‘On Integrity in Private Judging’ (1998) 14 
Arbitration International 115–155; Hong-lin Yu and Laurence Shore, ‘Independence, 
Impartiality, and Immunity of Arbitrators - US and English Perspectives’ (2003) 52 International 
Comparative Law Quarterly 935–967; Steyn, ‘England: The Independence and/or Impartiality of 
Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration’ [2008] 'ICC Special Supplement 2007: 
Independence of Arbitrators' 91; Fran ois Terré, ‘Independence and Arbitrators’ [2008] 'ICC 
Special Supplement 2007: Independence of Arbitrators' 101; Dominique Hascher, 
‘Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: 3 Issues’ (2012) 27 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 789; 
Martin Maisner, ‘Liability and Independence of the Arbitrator’ in Alexander J. Bělohlávek and 
Naděžda Rozehnalova (eds), Czech and Central European Yearbook of Arbitration - 2012: 
Party Autonomy versus Autonomy of Arbitrators (1st edn, Juris Net Llc 2012).  
473
  Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage, ‘The Status of the Arbitrators’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and 
John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 1999) 563. 
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the whole spectrum of situations where there might be (an appearance of) bias, 
prejudice or pre-disposition will be covered.  
 
Despite the worldwide acknowledgement of the double requirement on arbitrators to 
be independent and impartial, the quest for fairness and justice in international 
commercial arbitration is far from over. It is claimed that: 
 
Even today, the status of the arbitrators is largely a matter for private rules and ethical 
codes. However, the development of arbitration has been accompanied by a perceived 
deterioration of its moral standards. The rights and obligations of arbitrators are called 
into question increasingly often, and while national law often remains highly elliptical 
on these issues, they have become a matter of some concern to the courts and 
practitioners.
474
 
 
Impartiality and independence are fundamental standards of arbitrator’s conduct, 
however they may be difficult to prove. Since impartiality is a state of mind, it is 
often difficult for the parties to provide direct proof of it. While independence is 
easier to prove and, in principle, it is sufficient to guarantee the arbitrators’ freedom 
of judgment and the fairness of the arbitral process, a link of dependence with one of 
the parties or parties’ counsel does not necessarily lead an arbitrator to be biased and 
predisposed. Thus, for example, it is commonly recognised that in trade arbitrations 
parties and arbitrators are professionals in the same field and, as such, the mere fact 
of existing business relationships may not necessarily justify arbitrator’s 
disqualification
475
. The difficulties to provide a comprehensive definition of the 
qualities of independence and impartiality required of arbitrators, the exclusiveness 
of the arbitrators’ club476, as well as the inherent conflict between the principle of 
                                                 
474
  Gaillard and Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (n 
354) 556, para 1010. 
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  In Philipp Brothers v. Drexel et al, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 1990 Rev. Arb. 497, 
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party autonomy, manifested by party’s freedom to appoint an arbitrator, and the 
principle of due process, continue to be driving factors for the business community’s 
search for more ways to guarantee the neutrality of the arbitral process.  
 
Currently, there are four general trends in that direction. The first one is associated 
with national courts’ approaches to arbitrator’s bias and the tests applied to 
safeguard the neutrality of the arbitral process. The second trend is related to the on-
going regulation of international commercial arbitration by means of procedural soft 
law, such as the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration 
2014 and AAA Code of Ethics. These sets of rules aim to introduce more specific 
provisions regarding arbitrator’s duty of disclosure and burden of disclosure. The 
continuing regulation of arbitrators’ duty to disclose is closely linked to the third 
trend, which seeks the establishment of a general rule of full disclosure for 
arbitrators and greater transparency in the arbitral process. The forth trend reflects 
the increasing calls for abandoning the system of party-appointed arbitrators in order 
to eliminate the innate conflict between the principle of due process and parties’ 
right to appoint arbitrator. Without going into too much detail on the specifics of 
those developments, the latter will be analysed from the perspective of the (fear of) 
judicialisation of international commercial arbitration. What is of importance to the 
analysis in the following paragraphs is whether any or all of those trends can be 
linked to the process of judicialisation either as a driving factor for its development 
or as an implication or a consequence of its existence.  
 
As stated above, the first trend relates to variations in national courts’ approaches to 
assessing arbitrators’ impartiality and independence. Since conducting a comparative 
research on judicial tests for arbitrators’ bias goes beyond the objectives of this part, 
for the purposes of the latter the position of English courts shall be taken as an 
illustration of this first development
477
. Under English law, the double requirement 
that an arbitrator is impartial and independent is derived from different sources of 
law. The impartiality rule flows from the statutory law, namely Arbitration Act 1996, 
                                                                                                                                          
(eds), 1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2004) 156; also Jan Paulsson, ‘Ethics, Elitism, 
Eligibility’ (1997) 14 J. Int’l Arb. 19, arguing against the term “mafia”. 
477
  Among the reasons for choosing the position of the English courts as an example is the fact that 
the decisions of those courts are in English and are easily accessible. 
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s 33(1)(a), which provides that “The tribunal shall act fairly and impartially as 
between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case 
and dealing with that of his opponent (…)”; while the independence standard is 
applicable by virtue of common law and institutional rules.  
 
It is undisputed in the case law and in the literature that actual bias is always 
actionable, i.e. an award rendered by an arbitrator who was biased against one of the 
parties or their counsel will be null and void, hence unenforceable, in every 
jurisdiction. As stated by Sam Luttrell “this rule is so widely accepted that it is part 
of the lex mercatoria. It is so well settled as to be uncontroversial (…)”.478 National 
courts will always protect the principle of due process and public policy by refusing 
to enforce an award that is rendered in manifest disregard of natural justice.  
 
Thus, the diversity in national courts’ approaches is observed not with regard to 
actual arbitrators’ bias, rather than with regard to apparent bias or objective bias. 
Despite the universal acceptance of the principle of parties’ equal treatment, the 
uniformity brought in the challenge provisions and the provisions dealing with 
arbitrators’ independence and impartiality479 both in national laws and arbitration 
rules, the approaches of national courts to apparent bias vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. According to English Arbitration Act 1996, s 24(1)(a) a party to arbitral 
proceedings may apply to the court to remove an arbitrator if there are circumstances 
that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality. English courts resort to three 
competing tests to evaluate arbitrators’ apparent bias and rule on arbitrators’ 
challenges. These are: (i) the “reasonable apprehension” test or the “Sussex 
Justices” test480, according to which an apparent bias is proven if “a fair minded and 
informed observer”481 would have a “reasonable apprehension” that the arbitrator 
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  Sam Luttrell, Bias Challenges in International Commercial Arbitration: The Need for a ‘Real 
Danger’ Test (International Arbitration Law Library Series) (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 
2009) 6. 
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was biased; (ii) the “real possibility” test or the “Porter v Magill”482 test, which 
requires “a fair minded and informed observer” to conclude that there was a “real 
possibility” that the arbitrator was biased; and (iii) the “real danger” test or the 
“Gough” test483 , according to which the court must find that there was a “real 
danger” of bias for apparent bias to be proven484.  
 
Currently the prevailing test applied by English courts is the “real possibility” test485. 
This approach is less intrusive for the arbitral proceedings than the “reasonable 
apprehension” test, since it sets higher standard of proof than the “Sussex Justices” 
test, hence leads to lower chances for court intervention: 
 
While a suspicion (or apprehension) may be reasonably founded insofar as it has been 
formed in the mind of a person as a result of his or her exercise of the faculty of reason, 
the facts upon which the suspicion is based may not necessarily interact to produce the 
result that the apprehended outcome is a real possibility. (…) The evidentiary burden 
imposed by the ‘real possibility’ test is (…) markedly higher than that which an 
applicant must discharge to make out a reasonable apprehension under Sussex 
Justices.
486
  
 
Justice Deane of the High Court of Australia maintained in Webb v The Queen
487
 
that the “real danger” test standard replaced “apparent bias” with a new form of 
“actual (but unconscious) bias” focused on evidence rather than on the perception of 
the parties. On the other hand the “real danger” test does not differ much from the 
“real possibility” test. In Re Medicaments (No. 2)488, Lord Phillips MR examined 
extensively the test applied by English courts in order to conclude that there is not 
any substantial difference between a real risk or danger, and a real possibility. What 
is of importance for the court is to find an answer to the question “Is there a real 
danger of injustice having occurred as a result of bias” and according to the 
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  Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357, [2002] 1 All ER 465. 
483
  R v Gough (n 481). 
484
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“Gough” test “[a] real danger clearly involves more than a minimal risk, less than a 
probability”.489  
 
Under English law, arbitrators are subject to the same standard of impartiality as 
judges are, and the courts have dismissed appeals for application of a more stringent 
standard to be applied to arbitrators. In Norbrook Laboratories Ltd v. Tank
490
 and 
ASM Shipping Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of England
491
 the court applied the test for 
apparent bias established in Re Medicaments (No. 2)
492
 and Rustal Trading v Gill & 
Duffus
493
. The position of the English courts is in conformity with the “status” 
school of thought, which view the adjudicative function of arbitrators as a quasi-
judicial function. The latter grants the arbitrator an element of “status” that entitled 
them to treatment similar to that of a judge.
494
  
 
Such an approach can be linked to the process of judicialisation of international 
commercial arbitration on account of the trust vested in arbitrators to perform their 
duties to the required standard of independence and impartiality. The “real danger” 
or the “real possibility” tests guarantee fair conduct of the arbitral process, while, at 
the same time, safeguard the proceedings against unnecessary court intervention. It is 
argued that this brings greater certainty in the arbitral process and avoids arbitrators’ 
disqualifications on the grounds of mere suspicion or apprehension of bias. 
Furthermore, the evidentiary burden imposed by “real danger” or the “real 
possibility” tests also shields the proceedings from parties and counsel who want to 
challenge arbitrators in order to delay or impede the arbitral process. This approach 
undoubtedly contributes to the quest for fairness, certainty and justice in 
international commercial arbitration.  
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The growing practice of arbitrators’ challenges has become notoriously known as the 
“black art” of bias challenge495. One factor that has contributed to the increasing 
                                                 
495
  Luttrell (n 478) 279. It is worth mentioning that some state courts have taken serious measures 
to disciplining parties and counsel who frivously challenge arbitrators or engage in dilatory 
tactics after the conclusion of the arbitration. In Landmark Ventures Inc. v. Cohen and Int'l 
Chamber of Commerce, No. 13 Civ. 9044, 2014 WL 6784397 (Nov. 26, 2014) the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York denied claimant’s request for vacatur of the award 
and found that  the arbitrator and arbitral institution – both named as defendants – had absolute 
immunity from suit based on the parties’ contract incorporating Art. 40 of the ICC Rules and the 
federal common law doctrine of arbitral immunity. The court found that the “acts that Landmark 
allege[d] the Arbitrator and ICC improperly performed were all done in connection with the 
arbitration. The ICC Rules, which the parties agreed to follow, granted the Arbitrator the 
authority to make discovery rulings, manage case deadlines, award attorney's fees, and interpret 
the contract at issue in the dispute in connection with the arbitration” (at 3). In addition, “under 
well-established Federal common law, arbitrators and sponsoring arbitration organizations have 
absolute immunity for conduct in connection with an arbitration”. “Such absolute immunity for 
actions done in connection with arbitration is ‘essential to protect the decision-maker from 
undue influence and [to] protect the decisionmaking process from reprisals by dissatisfied 
litigants’” (quoting Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch. Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 
1990)). The court imposed on the Landmark attorney a $20,000 sanction for filing a frivolous 
claim “to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others.” In another case, 
namely DigiTelCom, Ltd. v. Tele2 Sverige AB, No. 12 Civ. 3082, (Jul. 25, 2012) the Federal 
court in the Southern Disctrict of New York imposed sanctions on the loser in an arbitration that 
sought to vacate the award. The court justified its decision by explaining that “(…) Plaintiffs do 
not cite any particular principle of law that the Tribunal is supposed to have ignored or any 
reason beyond pure speculation to conclude that the Tribunal was not fair and impartial (…). 
Citing virtually no relevant authority, Plaintiffs merely identify the standard for vacating an 
arbitration award at the outset of their papers and then proceed to attack the Tribunal’s findings, 
as well as its integrity, by suggesting that it was biased (…) without providing any basis 
whatsoever for such an accusation. This kind of petition serves only to cause the parties to incur 
unnecessary expense and delay the implementation of the Award”. In DMA International, Inc., 
v. Qwest Communications International Inc., 585 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 2009) the US Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Tenth Circuit) sanctioned lawyers for appealing the confirmation 
of an arbitral award and ordered those lawyers personally to pay the opposing party's attorneys' 
fees. The English High Court takes a different approach to unmeritous or frivolous challenges 
against arbitral awards. Where the Court finds  some form of abuse of process or an apparent 
lack of merits of the challenge in question the Court orders the successful party’s costs to be 
assesed on an indemnity basis. This approach is followed in Konkola Copper Mines v U&M 
Mining Zambia Ltd [2014] EWHC 2374) where the High Court dismissed a challenge against an 
award rendered in four consolidated LCIA arbitrations. The Court commented on the high 
proportion of unfounded challenges, suggesting that costs sanctions would deter parties from 
making frivolous challenges. (See also Exfin Shipping (India) Ltd Mumbai v Tolani Shipping Co 
Ltd Mumbai [2006] EWHC (Comm)). The Hong Kong courts have gone even further by holding 
that in the absence of special circumnstances, as a matter of principle indemnity costs will 
normally be appropriate in unsuccessful challenges to an arbitral award. In Pacific China 
Holdings Ltd v Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd CACV 136/2011 (May 9, 2012) the Hong Kong 
Court of Appel unanimously overturned the decision of the Hong Kong Court of First Instance 
and reinstated the award, finding that the matters raised by the applicant did not constitute 
grounds for setting aside the award under Art. 34(2) of the UNCITRAL ML. The Court clarified 
that ‘only a sufficiently serious error’ undermining due process could be regarded as a violation 
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instances of challenges is the ever-bigger expectations of arbitrators to be 
independent and impartial and arbitration to provide the same level of fair play as the 
public adjudicatory process. The judicialisation of international commercial 
arbitration, the latter otherwise being a mechanism of private and alternative nature, 
and, as such, not necessarily abiding by the standards applicable to the public civil 
justice system, evolves as a trend that aims to address such expectations. Judicialised 
arbitration is concerned not only with the question whether justice is served but how 
it is served. One needs to be reminded, however, that arbitrators cannot be likened to 
judges in all respects. After all arbitrators are directly appointed by parties because 
of their expertise, predisposition to certain issues, and professional and cultural 
background. In that respect the legal fiction of arbitrator being judge may have 
outlived its usefulness and applicability in modern arbitration. It is, however, a 
viable notion in judicialised arbitration, where the balance between the principles of 
party autonomy and due process is tipped to the latter one.  
 
The other factor that has contributed to the increasing instances of arbitrators’ 
challenges is less likely to be linked to a sudden boom in arbitrators’ misbehaviour, 
but more so to the variety of norms, guidelines and recommendations that have been 
laid down by the arbitration community in the last few years. Although the 
procedural soft law seeks to safeguard the arbitral process and assist arbitration users 
in the execution of their obligations, it may indeed provide greater opportunities for 
mischievous counsel to obstruct the proceedings and cause unnecessary delays.  
 
As already mentioned above
496
, the second, third and fourth trends aiming to ensure 
greater fairness in the arbitral process are linked to increasing regulation of 
                                                                                                                                          
of Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) (this was the principal ground on which Pacific China had based its 
application). In order to establish a breach, it must be shown that the conduct of the arbitral 
tribunal was of a ‘serious’ or even ‘egregious’ nature. The Court also reiterated that the tribunals 
enjoy wide, discretionary case management powers. Following the decision in Gao Haiyan & 
Anor v Keeneye Holdings Ltd & Anor (No2) [2012] 1 HKC 491, the Hong Kong Court of 
Appeal awarded indemnity costs against the applicant who attempted unsuccessfully to set aside 
an arbitral award. The Court of Appeal held that, even if the court was not bound by the decision 
in Gao Haiyan v Keeneye, it would find that indemnity costs were appropriate where a party 
unsuccessfully argues to set aside an arbitral award. The above cases demonstrate the courts’ 
willingness to sanction parties and counsel engaging in dilatory tactics or frivolous actions that 
undermine the finality of arbitral awards.  
496
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arbitrator’s duty to disclose, appeals for establishing a full disclosure requirement, 
and even calls for abolishing the system of party-appointed arbitrators. These 
developments are the result of lack of regulation of the nature and scope of 
arbitrators’ duty to disclose, which in view of the growing popularity of international 
commercial arbitration undermines not only the efficiency of the arbitral process, but 
also its legitimacy. An arbitrator should enter the arbitral process free of disposition 
and in conformity with the reasonable measure of integrity. Indeed, “[a] relative 
measure of distance from troubling connections to litigants, along with a willingness 
to listen carefully to both sides of a dispute, constitutes essential elements of basic 
due process”497 and natural justice.  
 
Although the double requirement for arbitrator’s independence and impartiality sets 
high and thorough standards for conformity – high because the arbitrator is obliged 
to disclose any information which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to 
his/her impartiality and independence, and thorough because the standards include 
both subjective and objective appearance of bias, the sources of arbitrator’s 
obligation to remain impartial and independent do not provide explicit framework as 
to whether an arbitrator has an absolute or less-than-full duty to disclose. Until 
recently, there was also neither hard, nor soft law clarifying the evidentiary burden in 
the disclosure process. It was unclear whether the arbitrator or the parties should 
seek disclosure of information and transparency in the proceedings. Even though the 
determination of those issues is often fact-specific and, as such, there is no one-suits-
all-situations answer, the lack of any regulation in the field raised many concerns 
among the arbitration community. The latter’s response was the introduction of 
guidelines and recommendations embodied in soft law instruments, such as the IBA 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, since they provide 
some directions as to what needs be disclosed and what standards should apply. 
 
The guidelines, however, are not binding upon arbitrators and parties, unless parties 
have explicitly agreed to their applicability to arbitration. Furthermore, the set of 
rules has no bearing on the national judges who may be called to decide on 
arbitrator’s challenge. Some jurisdictions have adopted the position that breach of 
                                                 
497
  William W. Park, ‘Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent’ (2009) 46 San Diego 
Law Review 629–704, 632. 
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ethical standards as set in arbitration rules does not suffice for setting aside an 
arbitral award because arbitration rules and codes of ethics do not have normative, 
hence binding nature.
498
 Moreover, the binding effect of such soft law instruments is 
called into question, even where parties have agreed on their applicability, because 
the prospective waiver of party’s right to seek transparency in the process by placing 
the whole burden of disclosure on the arbitrator could be considered unenforceable.  
 
Thus, despite the fact that IBA Guidelines and other rules of ethics provide some 
clarity about the extent of the double requirement for independence and impartiality 
                                                 
498
  In Gary B. Born, International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements: Drafting and 
Enforcing (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2010) 78 the author maintained that “The IBA 
Guideline are not binding on either national courts or arbitral institutions, and have been the 
subject of some criticism, on the grounds that they are needlessly detailed and susceptible of 
encouraging challenges to booth arbitrators and awards. They nonetheless provide an important 
perspective on customary attitudes towards an arbitrator’s obligations of independence and 
impartiality.” See also W Limited v M SDN BHD [2016] EWHC 422 (Comm) where the Court 
held that the applicable law was English law and IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration simply did not apply. The Court, however, pointed out that the even 
though the Guidelines were not binding, they could still be of assistance to the Court (following 
Sierra Fishing Company and others v Farran and others [2015] EWHC 140 (Comm); [2015] 1 
All ER (Comm) 560 at [58] per Popplewell J and Cofely Limited v Anthony Bingham [2016] 
EWHC 240 (Comm) at [109] per Hamblen J; but cf. A and Others v B and Another [2011] 
EWHC 2345 (Comm); [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep 591 at [73] to [78] per Flaux J) and proceeded to 
examine them. The Court concluded that the Guidelines could not get judicial approval as they 
contain some weaknesses. The Court found it hard to understand why a situation where advice is 
being given to an affiliate and the arbitrator is not involved in that advice (particularly without 
reference to the arbitrator's awareness or lack of awareness of that advice) should automatically 
fall in the Non-Waivable Red List. To determine whether there could be a conflict (apparent or 
real) required ‘case-specific judgment’. The Court also suggested that if a disclosure of such a 
situation were made, it should be open to the parties to accept that situation by waiver. The 
Court also considered some of the situations allocated to the ‘Waivable Red List’, which, 
amongst others, included where the arbitrator had given legal advice on the dispute to a party. 
The Court considered that “these situations would seem potentially more serious than the 
circumstances of the present case; again suggesting that the circumstances of the present case do 
not sit well within a ‘Non-Waivable Red List’”. This case identifies the potential weaknesses of 
soft law instruments that attempt to introduce too rigid and non case-sensitive guidelines. A 
mechanical application of any rules or guidelines, without the application of careful judgment as 
to the specific circumstances of the case and the possibility for parties to accept any deviations 
from the rules by waiver, is clearly not the correct approach to take in a system that exists to 
serve the needs of international business. See, however, Cofely Ltd where the Court considered 
the disclosure requirements under Rule 3 of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators' Code of 
Professional and Ethical Conduct for Members (October 2000). The Court noted that the CIArb 
acceptance of nomination form called for disclosure of ‘any involvement, however remote’ with 
either party over the last five years. This suggests that strict disclosure requirements will be 
binding upon arbitrators when the appointment acceptance form incorporates by way of 
reference a code of ethics or guidelines on professional conduct.   
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of arbitrators and the scope of their disclosure duty, a lot of issues remain unsettled. 
For example, although the guidelines place the burden to seek information on 
arbitrators, there are no guarantees that parties will be excused from making 
(reasonable) enquires. The increasing regulation of arbitrator’s vocation aims to 
guarantee the fairness of arbitration proceedings and level the playing field for 
arbitration users. Those in favour of this trend argue that the introduction of more 
rigorous regulation of the arbitral process and arbitrator’s conduct, in particular, will 
bring greater efficiency, justice and predictability in arbitrations. The critics of the 
overregulation of international commercial arbitration contend that the latter results 
in formalisation of the arbitral process
499
, while adding little value to the arbitration 
itself. By reminding that everything is in flux, William Park alludes to the fact that 
the current search for ethical standards applicable to arbitrators may be futile 
because “[n]ew patterns of misbehavior create new types of ethical challenges. Few 
criteria for evaluating arbitrator independence and impartiality will likely stay 
foolproof for long, given how ingenious fools often prove themselves to be.”500  
 
The pursuit for fairness and justice via regulation of the arbitral process and 
professionalisation of arbitrator’s vocation 501  can undoubtedly be linked to the 
judicialisation of international commercial arbitration. While some regulation is 
welcome as it increases the trust in the system, the introduction of ever more 
rigorous guidelines on arbitrator’s conduct502 does not necessarily benefit arbitration 
users. The adoption of the “real possibility test” by national courts is an example of a 
balanced approach to the need to ensure the fairness of the arbitral process. It 
safeguards the impartiality of the arbitration proceedings, while at the same time 
guaranteeing that court intervention is not excessive.  
 
Different is the approach adopted by soft-law instruments, such as the IBA 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration. Although, their 
purpose is to clarify the rights and obligations of both arbitrators and parties 
                                                 
499
  On the formalisation of international arbitration, see Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration 
(n 445) 29-30. 
500
  Park, ‘Arbitrator Integrity’ (n 497) 630, 631. 
501
  On the professionalisation of arbitrator’s vocation see Section 5.1. 
502
  For the debate as to whether international arbitrators are over-regulated or under-regulated see 
Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (n 445) 57-60. 
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particularly with regard to situations giving rise to conflicts of interest, the 
establishment of rigid lists and water-tight rules is incompatible with the nature of 
international commercial arbitration and the function of arbitrators. The latter are 
service providers who should remain impartial and independent in the process of 
adjudicating the dispute but are nevertheless appointed by the parties. Thus, there is 
an inherent dichotomy associated with the arbitrator’s mandate. The development of 
rigid soft-law instruments offers a judicialised approach to resolving the issues 
arising out of this dichotomy. It confines party autonomy and leads to unnecessary 
disqualification of arbitrators.  
 
In order to level the playing field and guarantee the impartiality of the arbitral 
process it has been suggested that the system of party-appointed arbitrators should be 
abolished. It has further been argued that the codification of ethical rules and 
standards would increase the authoritativeness of the system and promotes 
arbitrator’s professionalisation. In our view, the above would lead to overregulation 
and judicialisation of international commercial arbitration as fundamental features of 
this alternative method for dispute resolution are discarded.    
 
Requiring arbitrators to abide by strict disclosure rules could inflict unnecessary 
restrictions on parties’ autonomy to choose arbitrators, as well as on the ability of 
arbitrators to rely on their professional judgement, experience and even cultural 
background in these matters. William Park argues that, while the increase of ethical 
rules and standards is, without doubt, an ongoing trend, it is less than clear whether it 
is a healthy one: 
 
Simply put, soft law serves as a constraint on arbitral autonomy. Any regulatory 
instrument will limit “flexibility” and “discretion” – those hallowed words that can 
trigger genuflection in even the most impious of arbitrators.
503
 
 
The confidence in the professional conduct of arbitrators may be shaken if more 
regulation is introduced on the premise that arbitrators are not prone to be and 
remain independent and impartial. It needs to be appreciated that international 
                                                 
503
  Park, ‘The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration’ (n 136) 142. 
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arbitrators are operating in a constantly developing market and, as such, they adapt 
and adjust in order to provide competitive services. Moreover, it is widely 
acknowledged that today’s international commercial arbitration, even absent of 
binding rigorous rules for ethics, has enough mechanisms to ensure that the process 
between disputing parties will be handled with the necessary diligence and 
impartiality. These mechanisms are embedded in the way arbitral process is 
conducted and the decision is made.  
 
Thus, an arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence (Art. 12(2) UNCITRAL 
ML). A party is also entitled to seek recourse against the award on the grounds of 
Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) UNCITRAL ML, namely if the arbitral process was not conducted 
in accordance with parties’ agreement or the applicable law. In addition, although 
this defence is rarely successful, a party may also resort to Arts. V(1)(b) and V(1)(d) 
NYC and seek to defy the enforcement of  an award on the grounds of violation of 
due process or irregularity in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or arbitral 
procedure. In view of decision-making, arbitration also has a mechanism to 
guarantee the integrity of the arbitral process. The default rule that arbitrators resolve 
disputes in view of the facts and the applicable law, and only when explicitly 
authorised by parties can decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur, is an 
assurance that parties will benefit from the predictability of well-developed national 
jurisprudences, rather than facing the uncertainty of equitable principles and possible 
predisposition of an arbitrator toward one of the parties. 
 
Further formalisation and judicialisation of the arbitral process, including arbitrator’s 
vocation and conduct, may bring unnecessary constraints for both parties and 
arbitrators. The lack of profound regulation in many areas of international 
commercial arbitration is an advantage and a disadvantage, a blessing and a curse. 
The foundations of the system are rooted in strong and reliable principles, such as 
party autonomy, procedural flexibility and commercial reasonableness, leaving room 
to furnish each arbitration with the appropriate fittings in view of the business needs 
of the parties. With that regard William Park is right in his assertion that: 
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Modern arbitration is either blessed or plagued, depending on perspective, with a lack 
of fixed standards related to how arbitrators conduct proceedings. Little “hard law” 
exists with respect to how the specifics of how an arbitral tribunal should gather 
evidence and hear argument in its effort to determine the facts, interpret the contract, 
and apply the law governing the parties’ dispute.
504
 
 
The process of judicialisation manifested through increased regulation of arbitrator’s 
vocation and formalisation of the arbitral process may enhance arbitration’s integrity 
but it also creates many pitfalls. As in other areas, the devil is in the detail.  
 
 
4.1.2 Arbitrator’s Liability  
 
Arbitral immunity is a well-established principle in international arbitration, which 
excludes arbitrators from certain liabilities.
505
 It aims to safeguard international 
arbitrators against frivolous lawsuits brought by parties who are dissatisfied with the 
merits of the arbitral award. It also seeks to uphold the administration of justice and 
the integrity of the system. Arbitrators’ immunity limits the opportunity for 
aggrieved parties to hold arbitrators personally liable and claim damages against 
them when disputes are not decided according to parties’ liking. It is argued that all 
adjudicators need to have sufficient immunity to adjudicate disputes without fear 
from vexatious litigation. In the opinion of one author “the integrity of international 
arbitration must be preserved by limiting as far as possible party claims against 
arbitrators based on adverse awards”.506 
 
                                                 
504
  Ibid 143. 
505
  See e.g. Lew, Mistelis, and Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (n 354) 
288, 289. Also Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) 154 explaining that in common law 
countries arbitrators are granted immunity when they are acting in a quasi-judicial function, 
while in civil law countries arbitrators have broad immunity, though not an absolute one.  
506
  Eduardo Silva Romero, ‘Immunity and Liability of Arbitrators: What is the proper balance?’ in 
Dossier of the ICC Institute of World Business Law: Players’ interaction in International 
Arbitration (1st edn, ICC Publishing 2012) 91. 
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With the growing popularity of international commercial arbitration
507
 there is a 
greater focus on how justice is served in this private adjudication system. These 
developments lead to reconsideration of the double standard for arbitrator’s 
independence and impartiality and increased sensitivity to potential arbitrators’ 
misconduct. Questions related to the scope and limit of arbitrator’s liability 508 
become very pertinent because of the relevance of those issues to the quest for fair 
and just arbitral process. On the one hand, a system granting full or partial exclusion 
of arbitrator’s liability guarantees the arbitrator’s immunity, independence and 
impartiality, however, on the other hand, it may create too much room for 
misconduct, particularly given the fact that arbitrators are financially motivated to be 
appointed in more and various arbitrations. In the words of Susan D. Franck: 
                                                 
507
  See for example text to n 632.  
508
  For general or more profound analysis on arbitrator’s liability and different regimes on 
arbitrator’s immunity see Dennis R. Nolan and Roger I. Abrams, ‘Arbitral Immunity’ (1989) 11 
Indus. Rel. L.J. 229–266; Andrea Mettler, ‘Immunity vs. Liability in Arbitral Adjudication’ 
(1992) 47 Arbitration Journal 24–35; Mark A. Sponseller, ‘Redefining Arbitral Immunity: A 
Proposed Qualified Immunity Statute for Arbitrators’ (1993) 44 Hastings Law Journal 421–447; 
‘Final Report on the Status of the Arbitrator’ (1996) 7 ‘ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin’; Gaillard and Savage, ‘The Status of the Arbitrators’ (n 473); Susan D. Franck, ‘The 
Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and Proposal for Qualified 
Immunity’ (2000) 20 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1–59; Lew, Mistelis, and Kröll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (n 352); Matthew Rasmussen, 
‘Overextendind Immunity: Arbitral Institutional Liability in the United States, England, and 
France’ (2003) 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1824–1875; Yu and Shore, ‘Independence, Impartiality, 
and Immunity of Arbitrators’ (n 470); Peter B. Rutledge, ‘Toward a Contractual Approach for 
Arbitral Immunity’ (2004) 39 Ga. L. Rev. 151–214; Emmanuela Truli, ‘Liability v. Quasi-
Judicial Immunity of the Arbitrator: The Case against Absolute Arbitral Immunity’ (2006) 17 
Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 383; Elizabeth Wilhelmi, ‘How Far is Too Far? Reexamining the 
Continuing Extension of Arbitral Immunity to Arbitral Organizations’ (2006) 1 J. Disp. Resol. 
319–333; Jenny Brown, ‘The Expansion of Arbitral Immunity: Is Absolute Immunity a 
Foregone Conclusion’ (2009) 2009 Journal of Dispute Resolution 225–238; Frank-Bernd 
Weigand, Practitioner’s Handbook on International Commercial Arbitration (Frank-Bernd 
Weigand (ed), 2nd edn, OUP 2009); Sara Roitman, ‘Beyond Reproach: Has the Doctrine of 
Arbitral Immunity Been Extended Too Far for Arbitration Sponsoring Firms?’ (2010) 51 Boston 
College Law Review 557–594; Maisner (n 470); Karl Pörnbacher, ‘Liability of Arbitrators - 
Judicial Immunity versus Contractual Liability’ in Alexander J. Bělohlávek and Naděžda 
Rozehnalova (eds), Czech and Central European Yearbook of Arbitration - 2012: Party 
Autonomy versus Autonomy of Arbitrators (1st edn, Juris Net Llc 2012); Eduardo Silva Romero, 
‘Immunity and Liability of Arbitrators: What is the proper balance?’ in Dossier of the ICC 
Institute of World Business Law: Players’ interaction in International Arbitration (1st edn, ICC 
Publishing 2012); Matthew Bricker, ‘The Arbitral Judgment Rule: Using the Business Judgment 
Rule to Redefine Arbitral Immunity’ (2013) 92 Tex. L. Rev. 197–229; Born, International 
Commercial Arbitration (n 131); Dario Alessi, ‘Enforcing Arbitrator’s Obligations: Rethinking 
International Commercial Arbitrators’ Liability’ (2014) 31 Journal of International Arbitration 
735–784. 
 
Page 191 
 
(…) arbitration is now the preferred dispute resolution mechanism for international 
commercial disagreements. Unfortunately, because of perceived misconduct by 
arbitrators and the risk of party manipulation, the arbitration process has come under 
increasing attack through civil actions against arbitrators. As a result of these concerns, 
the issue of an arbitrator’s immunity has received increased attention, and the scope of 
arbitrator immunity is currently a controversial issue.
509
  
 
The matter of arbitrator’s liability is regulated in national legislations but the 
statutory provisions are also complemented by applicable institutional arbitration 
rules or by explicit agreements between parties in dispute and arbitrators. The 
approaches to arbitral immunity adopted in national legislations are associated with 
the two main schools of thought, namely the jurisdictional and the contractual 
theories
510
. Common law jurisdictions traditionally support the exclusion of liability 
for arbitrators on the grounds that arbitrators perform an adjudicative function, 
which is akin to a judicial one, while in civil law jurisdictions arbitrator’s liability is 
determined from the perspective of the relationship between the arbitrator and 
parties, which is a contractual one
511
.  
 
The association of jurisdictional theory with the judicialisation of international 
commercial arbitration comes to one’s mind quickly but prematurely. Examining the 
process of judicialisation through the lens of the clash between the two concepts of 
arbitrator’s function does not contribute much to the analysis on the driving factors 
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  Franck, ‘The Liability of International Arbitrators’ (n 508) 1, 2. 
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  For more information on those theories see p 250 et seq. 
511
  In Pörnbacher (n 506) 215 the author summarises the approaches adopted by the civil law and 
common law jurisdictions in a similar fashion. According to him “The vast majority of national 
arbitration regimes seek to protect arbitrators from civil liability, again with differences as 
regards the extent of such protection. Only some Middle Eastern countries seem to hold 
arbitrators personally liable for all wrongful conduct, including negligence. As regards the 
dogmatic concept behind the arbitrator’s immunity, common law jurisdictions seem to follow 
mostly a concept of judicial immunity, viewing arbitrators as functionally comparable to judges. 
By contrast, most civil law traditions rather focus on the contractual character and the origin of 
the arbitrator’s appointment.” See also Franck, ‘The Liability of International Arbitrators’ (n 
506) 4: “Traditionally, civil law and several Arab countries emphasize the contractual nature of 
the arbitrator's receptum arbitri and use this as a baseline for establishing potential liability. In 
contrast, common law approaches tend to focus more upon the potentially tortious nature of an 
arbitrator's conduct as a violation of a duty of care.” 
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and the implications of this development. The reason that each school of thought 
follows one or another approach does not necessarily have anything to do with the 
process of judicialisation, rather it is an indication of different cultural traditions. 
Moreover, the theory that is most widely accepted today is the mixed or hybrid 
school of thought according to which neither arbitrator performs a judicial function, 
nor is the award a contract. The followers of the hybrid theory assert that arbitral 
awards are a result of arbitrators performing an adjudicative function; however, 
contrary to the jurisdictional theory they argue that this function is exercised within 
the limits of the private jurisdiction created and fixed by the parties by their 
agreement.  
 
Thus, analysing the process of judicialisation in international commercial arbitration 
by associating it with a particular school of thought does not add a lot to the debates 
regarding the scope and limits of arbitrator’s liability. Instead of focusing too much 
on the conceptual framework justifying the approaches adopted by the states in 
national legislations, it is worth considering whether arbitration users either by 
express agreements or by reference to institutional arbitration rules limit or extend 
arbitrator’s liability and why. Looking at the matter of arbitral immunity from this 
perspective is justifiable on two grounds. Firstly, the process of judicialisation is 
driven by the arbitration users rather than the national legislatures
512
. Regardless 
whether this is a conscious movement or a unintended development, i.e. 
judicialisation being either deliberately pursued or evolving as a by-product of the 
quest for fairness and justice in the arbitral process, the attitude of arbitration users to 
arbitral immunity shall reveal whether one could link the latter with the process of 
judicialisation and the pursuit of fair and justice in international commercial 
arbitration. And secondly, most national legislations allow for express limitation of 
arbitrator’s liability. Whether arbitration users take advantage of this option or not 
will demonstrate their understanding of arbitral impartiality, independence and 
immunity and, consequently, of what constitutes a just arbitral process.  
 
Arbitrator’s liability can be limited either by an express agreement between parties 
and arbitrators or by reference to a set of arbitration rules, which contain provisions 
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  If anything most states adopt an arbitration-friendly approach and national courts are reluctant to 
interfere with arbitration proceedings. See also Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this thesis. 
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on arbitral immunity. Since analysing express agreements for limitation of 
arbitrator’s liability is not feasible due to the confidentiality of such agreements and 
the lack of databases that provide the opportunity for such agreements to be 
searchable, the analysis will proceed in consideration of some of the widely used 
institutional arbitration rules.   
 
All arbitration rules of the major arbitration institutions contain provisions limiting 
arbitrator’s liability513 to the extent this is permissible under the applicable national 
                                                 
513
  Pursuant to Art. 40 ICC Arbitration Rules 2012 “The arbitrators, any person appointed by the 
arbitral tribunal, the emergency arbitrator, the Court and its members, the ICC and its 
employees, and the ICC National Committees and Groups and their employees and 
representatives shall not be liable to any person for any act or omission in connection with the 
arbitration, except to the extent such limitation of liability is prohibited by applicable law.”; 
Sections 44.1 and 44.2 DIS Arbitration Rules 1998 “All liability of an arbitrator for any act in 
connection with deciding a legal matter is excluded, provided such act does not constitute an 
intentional breach of duty. All liability of the arbitrators, the DIS, its officers and its employees 
for any other act or omission in connection with arbitral proceedings is excluded, provided such 
acts do not constitute an intentional or grossly negligent breach of duty.”; Art. 46 VIAC 
Arbitration Rules 2013 “The liability of arbitrators, the secretary General, the Deputy secretary 
General, the Board and its members and the Austrian Federal economic Chamber and its 
employees for any act or omission in relation to the arbitration is excluded to the extent legally 
permissible.”; Art. 45(1) Swiss Arbitration Rules 2012 “Neither the members of the board of 
directors of the Swiss Chambers” Arbitration Institution, the members of the Court and the 
Secretariat, the individual Chambers or their staff, the arbitrators, the tribunal-appointed experts, 
nor the secretary of the arbitral tribunal shall be liable for any act or omission in connection with 
an arbitration conducted under these Rules, except if the act or omission is shown to constitute 
intentional wrongdoing or gross negligence.”; Art. 48 SCC Arbitration Rules 2010 “Neither the 
SCC nor the arbitrator(s) are liable to any party for any act or omission in connection with the 
arbitration unless such act or omission constitutes wilful misconduct or gross negligence”.; Art. 
43.1 HKIAC Arbitration Rules 2013 “None of the Council of HKIAC nor any committee, sub-
commitee or other body or person specifically designated by it to perform the functions referred 
to in these Rules, nor the Secretary General of HKIAC or other staff members of the Secretariat 
of HKIAC, the arbitral tribunal, any Emergency Arbitrator, tribunal-appointed expert or 
secretary of the arbitral tribunal shall be liable for any act or omission in connection with an 
arbitration conducted under these Rules, save where such act was done or omitted to be done 
dishonestly.”; Art. 34.1 SIAC Arbitration Rules 2013 “SIAC, including the President, members 
of its Court, directors, officers, employees or any arbitrator, shall not be liable to any person for 
any negligence, act or omission in connection with any arbitration governed by these Rules.”; 
Art. 31.1 LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014 “None of the LCIA (including its officers, members and 
employees), the LCIA Court (including its President, Vice-Presidents, Honourary Vice-
Presidents and members), the Registrar (including any deputy Registrar), any arbitrator, any 
Emergency Arbitrator and any expert to the Arbitral Tribunal shall be liable to any party 
howsoever for any act or omission in connection with any arbitration, save: (i) where the act or 
omission is shown by that party to constitute conscious and deliberate wrongdoing committed by 
the body or person alleged to be liable to that party; or (ii) to the extent that any part of this 
provision is shown to be prohibited by any applicable law.”; Art. 1.6 JAMS International 
Arbitration Rules 2011 “Except in respect of deliberate wrongdoing, the arbitrator or arbitrators, 
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law. These provisions usually stipulate that arbitrators are not liable for any act or 
omission in connection with the arbitration save for wilful, intentional or conscious 
wrongdoing, gross negligence or fraud. While AAA Arbitration Rules 2014, Art. 38 
provide that arbitrators enjoy full immunity to the extent such a limitation of liability 
is prohibited by the applicable law, SIAC Arbitration Rules 2013 limit arbitrator’s 
liability for any negligence, act or omission in connection with the arbitration (Art. 
34.1) and HKIAC Arbitration Rules 2013 stipulate that an arbitrator is not liable for 
any act or omission unless such an act is done or omitted to be done dishonestly (Art. 
43.1), i.e. arbitrator has acted in bad faith or fraudulently. These provisions grant 
relatively broad immunity to arbitrators to exercise their adjudicative function. 
Although arbitrators do not enjoy full immunity, the limitation of their liability as 
stipulated under institutional arbitration rules protects arbitrators from frivolous 
lawsuits brought by parties who are dissatisfied with the merits of the arbitral award. 
On the other hand, the lack of full immunity safeguards the arbitral process from 
malicious arbitral conduct and wrongdoings and upholds the integrity of the 
proceedings.  
 
The approaches adopted in the cited institutional arbitration rules mirror the 
positions taken by legislatures and courts in arbitration-friendly states. Arbitrators 
are granted broad immunity to perform their adjudicative function without the threat 
of vexatious litigation. Thus, In England and the USA there has been a long tradition 
of granting arbitrators immunity from suit – in the absence of bad faith in England 
and full immunity undertaken in fulfilling their duties as arbitrators in the USA. The 
immunity of arbitrators was established by two decisions of the House of Lords in 
                                                                                                                                          
the JIAC and JAMS International will not be liable to a party for any act or omission in 
connection with the arbitration.”; Art. 38 AAA Arbitration Rules 2014 “The members of the 
arbitral tribunal, any emergency arbitrator appointed under Article 6, any consolidation 
arbitrator appointed under Article 8, and the Administrator shall not be liable to any party for 
any act or omission in connection with any arbitration under these Rules, except to the extent 
that such a limitation of liability is prohibited by applicable law. The parties agree that no 
arbitrator, emergency arbitrator, or consolidation arbitrator, nor the Administrator shall be under 
any obligation to make any statement about the arbitration, and no party shall seek to make any 
of these persons a party or witness in any judicial or other proceedings relating to the 
arbitration.”; Art. 37 CEPANI Arbitration Rules 2013 “(1) Except in the case of fraud, the 
arbitrators shall not incur any liability for any act or omission when carrying out their functions 
of ruling on a dispute. (2) For any other act or omission in the course of an arbitration 
proceeding, the arbitrators, CEPANI and its members and personnel shall not incur any liability 
except in the case of fraud or gross negligence.”;  
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Sutcliffe v Thackrah
514
 and Arenson v Arenson
515
. This principle is now explicitly 
stated in English Arbitration Act 1996, s 29(1) “an arbitrator is not liable for 
anything or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his function as 
arbitrator unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith”. Australian 
Arbitration Act, s 28(1) also follows the approach of express arbitral immunity. In 
Australia Arbitrators are not liable for anything done or omitted to be done in good 
faith in their capacity as arbitrators.  
 
German, Austrian and Italian laws provide for implied arbitral immunity save for 
situations of intentional or wilful misconduct.
516
 In Germany even though there is 
not a specific provision in the German Arbitration Act 1998 regulating arbitrator’s 
immunity, it is considered an implied term that arbitrators are liable to the parties in 
the same way as court judges are, namely under Section 839(2) of the BGB. 
According to the latter “If an official breaches his official duties in a judgment in a 
legal matter, then he is only responsible for any damage arising from this if the 
breach of duty consists in a criminal offence.” This provision, however, does not 
preclude the parties from expressly stipulating a term to the contrary. In addition an 
arbitrator may be liable for negligence under the general rules of the law of 
obligations. In such cases the conduct of the arbitrator will be in violation of the 
Civil Procedure Code or ZPO (Zivilprozessordnung), Section 1036.  
 
Similarly in Switzerland there is no provision in Chapter 12 of the Swiss PILA, 
which exempts arbitrators from liability claims by the disputing parties. As such 
arbitrator’s liability is determined by the general rules governing contractual liability 
under Art. 97 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. According to the latter a party to a 
contract shall compensate any damages incurred by the other party if she has not 
performed their contractual obligations unless she proves that no fault is attributable 
to her. The receptum arbitri
517
 is considered to be a mandate or quasi-mandate, and 
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  According to the ‘Final Report on the Status of the Arbitrator’ (n 506) 29: “In every case, the 
arbitrator and the parties are bound by a specific contract. The subject matter of this receptum 
arbitrii, sometimes referred to as the ‘contract of investiture’, is the arbitrator's performance of a 
very special task: to settle the dispute between his contracting parties”. 
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as such the arbitrator is liable for negligence or any other inappropriate conduct or 
omission. 
 
French law also follows the approach of implied liability adopted by Swiss law. The 
general rule is that the liability of an arbitrator to the parties is a contractual one and 
a party can bring a claim of damages against an arbitrator under Art. 1142 French 
Civil Code. Arbitrator is exempted from liability for errors committed in the 
adjudication of the dispute or in the content of the award
518
. 
 
Given the aforementioned, it can be concluded that stipulations concerning 
arbitrator’s liability incorporated by reference to specific arbitration rules does not 
differ much from the applicable statutory provisions, which generally grant broad 
immunity to arbitrators. On the one hand, as demonstrated above the immunity 
provisions in the arbitration rules do not provide for considerable limitation or 
extension of arbitrator’s liability, and, on the other hand such provisions for 
exclusion of liability are valid to the extent they are permissible under the applicable 
national law. It should also be mentioned that institutional arbitration rules do not 
contain provisions elaborating on issues such as what constitutes gross negligence or 
wilful misconduct. These matters are left for clarification to the relevant national 
courts. 
 
The broad immunity enjoyed by arbitrators even according to national laws, which 
favour the contractual school of thought, can be viewed as an implication of the 
process of judicialisation in international commercial arbitration. Such immunity is 
viewed as a mechanism to protect the impartiality and integrity of the arbitral 
process. Despite the availability of other built-in procedural safeguards to prevent 
abuses of the decision-making process, such as the adversarial nature of the process, 
the right of judicial review, the procedure for challenging an arbitrator, both national 
laws and institutional arbitration rules limit arbitrator’s liability most often for wilful 
misconduct, fraud and gross negligence. Even more, this limitation of liability is 
extended to arbitration institutions to ensure that the latter will perform their 
functions with regard to arbitration proceedings without fear from vexatious 
                                                 
518
  See Bompard c/ Consorts C et autres, Gaz. Pal., Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 13 June 
1990, 1990 II somm. Rev Arb, 1996, pp 475–476. 
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litigation.
519
 Depending on the applicable law the liability of arbitration institutions 
can be excluded or at least reduced if the institution in question demonstrates that 
even had it fulfilled its duties the damage would still have been incurred. Thus, both 
arbitrators and arbitration institutions are protected for all actions performed in their 
arbitral capacity.
520
 
 
Although the process of judicialisation can be traced to the approach taken towards 
arbitrator’s and arbitration institutions’ immunity, further extension of arbitral 
immunity, which is being sought by some commentators, will not support or add 
value to the quest for fairness and justice in international commercial arbitration and 
is not necessarily compatible with the latter’s nature. It is also argued that 
“arbitrators are in much the same position as judges, in that they carry out more or 
less the same functions”521, however, it has to be born in mind that arbitrators are 
service providers in a private system for dispute resolution, alternative to the public 
adjudicative system. A broad but less-than-full arbitral immunity is a safeguard for 
the integrity of the adjudicative process and provides the necessary balance between 
two contradicting principles – on the one hand, provision of professional services in 
exchange for remuneration, and, on the other hand, serving private/privatised justice. 
Still, since arbitrator’s function is to render justice only between the disputing parties 
(i.e. the award does not bind third parties) and arbitrator’s vocation is a deregulated 
one (unlike judges’), an absolute immunity for arbitrators may potentially do more 
harm than good to the arbitral process by undermining its legitimacy, trustworthiness 
and good standing.  
 
                                                 
519
  See the wording of the immunity provisions in the institutional arbitration rules cited in n 513. In 
all provisions arbitration institutions are expressly excluded from liability, similarly to 
arbitrators. In England, Arbitration Act 1996, s74 grants immunity an institution on the 
appointment or nomination of an arbitrator for any act or omission of that arbitrator unless the 
failure or omission was in bad faith. Such immunity is provided for both arbitration institutions 
and other organisations that offer services of an appointing authority. US courts also have held 
that immunity should extend to institutions in order to effectuate the policies underpinning 
arbitral immunity. See for example Austern (n 495). 
520
  See Wally v. General Arbitration Council of the Textile and Apparel Indus., 630 N.Y.S.2d 627, 
628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1995). 
521
  Sutcliffe v. Thackrah (n 514). 
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Finally, the broad arbitral immunity and the limited opportunity for parties to extend 
arbitrator’s liability522 is considered to be an important mechanism for providing 
legal certainty to the arbitral process by ensuring arbitral awards have final and 
binding effect between the parties in dispute. Although there is merit in the argument 
that the relationship between arbitrators and parties is of a contractual nature, and, as 
such, the rights, obligations and liabilities are subject to agreement between them, 
considerations of public policy nature as to the standards for finality and legal 
certainty of arbitration proceedings seem to have priority. The process of 
judicialisation of international commercial arbitration aims to enhance those 
standards and ensure justice is served in fair proceedings.  
 
 
4.2 Regulation of the Arbitral Process through Procedural Soft Law 
– A Step Towards Further Judicialisation of International 
Commercial Arbitration? 
 
International commercial arbitration gained popularity as a dispute resolution 
method because of the flexibility and confidentiality of arbitration proceedings, the 
international enforceability of arbitral awards and parties’ freedom to appoint 
arbitrators
523
. With the increasing use of this method and the growing number of 
high-stake disputes resolved by arbitration, the system of privatised justice is 
continuously evolving. Some of the developments take their toll on innate features of 
international commercial arbitration, such as time- and cost-efficiency
524
. These new 
trends cause heated debates in the arbitration community.  
 
The challenges in international commercial arbitration can well be illustrated by 
taking a look at the topics debated at the International Council for Commercial 
                                                 
522
  See Pörnbacher (n 506) 220, para 11.26. 
523
  These characteristics were pointed out to be among the most valuable characteristics of 
international arbitration in the most current international arbitration survey, namely QMUL 
Survey ‘Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration’ (2015), available at: 
<http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/164761.pdf> 
524
  See n 601. 
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Arbitration (ICCA) conferences throughout the years
525
. ICCA is one of the most 
influential international organisations. It has official status as an NGO accredited by 
the United Nations and in that capacity it has participated actively in the preparation 
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, and 
UNCITRAL ML. ICCA congresses attract a large number of arbitration users from 
all over the world and the meetings have made significant contributions to the 
development of dispute resolution theory and practice.  
 
The topics discussed at the ICCA conferences are a reflection of the most current 
trends in international arbitration and an indication of arbitration users’ concerns526. 
For example, the second ICCA Congress in 1984 was dedicated to the UNCITRAL 
ML and focused on overarching issues, such as arbitration agreement, court 
intervention and enforceability of arbitral awards. The following two congresses 
were largely devoted to comparative law debates and looking for solutions to 
overcome regional differences. The 1990 ICCA conference was the first meeting 
entirely focused on issues related to preventing delays and disruption in arbitration 
and achieving effective arbitral proceedings. From 1990 on the questions of 
efficiency and due process became recurrent topics – the 1994 congress dealt with 
possible methods of increasing efficiency, while the discussions at the 1998 
conference were focused on how to achieve efficiency without sacrificing due 
process and implementing measures against dilatory tactics in international 
arbitration. With the increasing complexity of arbitral process the debates at the 
                                                 
525
  The ever-increasing complexity of arbitration proceedings and the development of international 
commercial arbitration as a system of privatised justice can also be demonstrated by the changes 
that ICCA Yearbooks undergo during the years. While the first ICCA Yearbooks were printed in 
slim volumes of 250 or so pages, the latest Yearbooks grew both in weight and size with the 
most current volumes spreading over 700 pages or even 1100 pages (available at: 
<http://www.arbitration-icca.org/publications/yearbook_table_of_contents.html>).  
526
  It is very interesting to observe the changes not only in the sizes of the ICCA volumes but also 
in the topics thereto. The first Yearbooks contained national reports on arbitration, court 
decisions on the NYC and updates on recent amendments on arbitration statutes, while the latest 
issues demonstrate the growing harmonisation of national arbitration laws and institutional 
arbitration rules and the continuous attempts to overcome regional cultural and legal differences. 
The focus of the debates has shifted from the anchoring effect of the seat of arbitration to 
enhancing international commercial arbitration as a transnational system of justice and 
encouraging further development of the international arbitration culture. Although these 
developments are encouraging one cannot ignore the alarming calls for decreasing the 
complexity of arbitration proceedings. 
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ICCA conferences concentrated on arbitration participants’ conduct 527 , effective 
advocacy in arbitration
528
, rule-based solutions to procedural issues and the need for 
more precision in the arbitration proceedings and arbitral decision-making
529
.  
 
The keynote address at the 2012 ICCA congress delivered by Sundaresh Menon, 
former Attorney General and current Chief Justice of Singapore, is the climax of 
arbitration users’ reflections on the development and future of international 
arbitration. Chief Justice Menon acknowledges the positive trends in international 
commercial arbitration, such as the rise of institutional arbitration and the 
harmonisation of national arbitration laws and various sets of arbitration rules. The 
speaker, however, is not hesitant to concede that: 
 
(…) [Another] major feature of arbitration today is the altogether different character 
and complexion of the arbitration process itself. Arbitration was once much vaunted for 
being faster, cheaper, less formal and more efficient than the more cumbersome court 
process. Arbitrators were not expected to be legal experts. Their decisions mattered 
only to the parties before them and more often than not, these were commercial actors 
who wanted a quick, final outcome to resolve their differences. 
 
Today, arbitration is a highly sophisticated, procedurally complex and exhaustive 
process dominated by its own domain experts. (…) Arbitrators, mindful of the 
principles of natural justice and the fact that there is no appeal against their decision, 
are sometimes compelled to endure protracted submissions and responses to 
submissions on every conceivable point. 
 
Detailed frameworks and rules with an emphasis on legal accuracy, precision and 
certainty have overtaken the ad hoc compromise-oriented system. Just as arbitration has 
                                                 
527
  The 2000 ICCA congress dealt with arbitrator’s responsibilities for proper conduct of 
proceedings, 2006 ICCA congress discussed contemporary practice in the conduct of 
proceedings, and the keynote address at the 2010 ICCA congress was dedicated to advocacy and 
ethics in international arbitration.  
528
  The 2010 ICCA congress was devoted to advocacy and ethics in international arbitration.  
529
  The 2009 ICCA congress discussed recent developments in the arbitral process and rule-based 
solutions to procedural issues, the 2012 conference explored in great detail evidence production, 
witnesses, experts and hearings, the relationship between international arbitration and regulators, 
and the 2014 ICCA congress focused on burden of proof and standard of proof in international 
commercial arbitration, document production and document management, discovery and matters 
of evidence in international commercial arbitration. 
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taken centre stage in the resolution of high value international commercial disputes, it 
has also become an increasingly complex and formal process burdened by formidable 
costs.
530
 
 
Chief Justice Menon’s speech 531  echoes the concerns raised at another global 
arbitration event, namely the Annual Goff Lecture, and in particular the Tenth 
Annual Goff Lecture delivered by Mr Fali Nariman, then President of ICCA and 
current President of Bar Association of India. The lecture, entitled “The Spirit of 
Arbitration” draws attention to the preoccupation of modern international 
commercial arbitration with legal accuracy and procedural complexity: 
 
There is far too much of the ‘letter [of the law]’ in modern International Commercial 
Arbitration (ICA) as practised: there is just too much legal baggage taken on board the 
good ship ICA - as a result, it moves slowly and ponderously, and is unable to weather 
the strong seas of change. ICA has become almost indistinguishable from litigation, 
which it was at one time intended to supplant. And the baggage continues to increase - 
with law, more law, legalese, and more legalese: and much disputation about 
‘applicable law’, ‘multi-party arbitrations’, ‘agreements in writing’, ‘discovery in 
foreign arbitration’, ‘lex mercatoria’, etc. etc., etc.
532
 
 
Fali Nariman unequivocally links the legalisation and increasing regulation of 
international commercial arbitration to the process of judicialisation. Indeed, by 
prescribing ever more intricate rules and procedures to ensure parties’ access to 
justice and due process, international commercial arbitration is becoming 
indiscernible from litigation. Even though the development of rules, guidelines, 
recommendations, codes of ethics, best practices, etc. aims to guarantee the fairness 
and justice of the arbitral process, it has become a pervasive problem itself
533
, 
                                                 
530
  Menon (n 36) 12, 13.  
531
  The speech of Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon raised some fundamental thought provoking 
questions on the future of international arbitration and opened a global debate. See for example 
"4th LSE Arbitration Debate 'Is Self–Regulation of International Arbitration an Illusion?' 
between Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon and Professor Jan Paulsson, moderated by Mr. Toby 
Landau QC", 2013 available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ShMaMWmHZ8>  
532
  Nariman, ‘The Spirit of Arbitration’ (n 23) 262. 
533
  See for example Ugo Draetta, ‘The Transnational Procedural Rules for Arbitration and the Risks 
of Overregulation and Bureaucratization’ (2015) 33 ASA Bulletin 327–342; Michael Schneider, 
‘The Essential Guidelines for the preparation of Guidelines, Directives, Notes, Protocols and 
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rendering the privatised system for civil justice inflexible and rigid, just as its public 
counterpart:  
 
One oft­heard criticism of procedural soft law is that it leads to the “judicialisation” of 
arbitration: procedural transformation of arbitral dispute resolution to resemble court 
litigation more closely.
534
 
 
Thus, on the one hand, the introduction of too many airtight rules and guidelines can 
slow down the proceedings and cause disruptions. A formalised process 
characterised by procedural intricacy and necessitating the employment of refined 
advocacy tool kit may lead to inefficiency and ultimately delays in serving justice to 
the parties. On the other hand, however, the continuous development of soft law 
instruments aims to address the needs of the business community. Best practices and 
recommendations could be useful guidance when arbitrators are faced with complex 
international transactions with more than one international element where the lack of 
explicit and unequivocal rules may result in a serious potential threat of violation of 
due process. 
 
While Chief Justice Menon and senior advocate Fali Nariman are concerned about 
the process of judicialisation and black-letter legalism in international commercial 
arbitration The Right Hon. the Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales advocates for an increasing court intervention. In a speech given 
at the BAILII Lecture in March 2016 the Lord Chief Justice Thomas criticised the 
restrictive grounds for appeal under the Arbitration Act 1979 and the Nema 
Guidelines and currently under Arbitration Act 1996, s 69. In the Lord Chief 
Justice’s view the diversion of more claims from the courts to arbitration does not 
contribute to upholding the rule of law and “reduces the degree of certainty in the 
law that comes through the provision of authoritative decisions of the court”535.  The 
                                                                                                                                          
other methods intended to help international arbitration practitioners to avoid the need for 
independent thinking and to promote the transformation of errors into’ in Laurent Lévy and Yves 
Derains (eds), Liber Amicorum, Essays in Honor of Serge Lazareff (1st edn, Editions A. Pedone 
2011). 
534
  Park, ‘The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration’ (n 138) 145. 
535
  The Right Hon. The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 
‘Developing Commercial Law through the Courts: Rebalancing the Relationship between the 
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suggested way forward is encouraging greater use of the power under section 45 to 
enable the court to give decisions on points of law and changing the section 69 test 
because “the restriction in relation to appeals where the question is one of general 
public importance is (…) a serious impediment to the growth of the common 
law.”536 
 
In light of the debate about the judicialisation of international commercial arbitration 
the remarks made by the Lord Chief Justice Thomas are quite unsettling. They 
suggest a fundamental change to modern international commercial arbitration, as we 
know it, and reversing the privatisation of civil justice
537
. The future of arbitration as 
depicted by the Lord Chief Justice is one of extended court intervention, diminished 
efficiency and increased formality. Fundamental features of international 
commercial arbitration such as finality of arbitral awards and limited judicial 
supervision will be deeply affected if the changes suggested by the Lord Chief 
Justice Thomas are implemented. International commercial arbitration will cease to 
be an alternative to litigation and will instead become its counterpart, which 
champions public interest over private ones. 
 
 
4.2.1 Regulated, Self-regulated or Over-regulated 
 
The starting point in discussing whether international commercial arbitration has 
become “over-regulated”, and as a result “judicialised”, is to attempt to bring some 
clarification to the terms “regulation” and “self-regulation” within the context of 
international commercial arbitration. This task is of particular complexity as there 
are no widely accepted working definitions of “regulation” and “self-regulation” in 
the available literature
538
. The lack of comprehensible theories about the meaning of 
                                                                                                                                          
Courts and Arbitration’ 2016 at 10, available at: 
<https://aberdeenunilaw.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/lcj-speech-bailli-lecture-201603091.pdf>  
536
  Ibid 13. 
537
  See text to n 415, 416. 
538
  With the exception of Catherine Rogers who endeavours to define self-regulation in the context 
of international arbitration, see Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (n 445) 221, para 
6.10-6.6.30, authors use the terms regulation and self-regulation without distinguishing between 
their characteristics. 
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“regulation” and “self-regulation” in the context of international commercial 
arbitration could be rooted in the hybrid nature
539
 of this method of dispute 
resolution and the absence of a hierarchical system of norms in international 
arbitration. The continuously growing number of actors and the changing sociology 
of international arbitration
540
 also add to the difficulty of distinguishing between the 
regulators, the service providers and the users. According to Catherine Rogers 
“regulation is usually conceived of as a top-down, command-and-control operation; 
it is imposition of coercive state power through rules (…)” 541. Sanctioned by state 
power the rules have legitimacy and serve the public interest. In contrast, self-
regulation in international commercial arbitration is associated with the initiative of 
international business community to regulate the standards of behaviour of its 
members, which suggests that the soft law rules are not enforced by public force
542
. 
It is driven by arbitration institutions, international organisations and non-
governmental bodies that act in industries’ interest. Rules or behavioural standards 
                                                 
539
  According to the predominant theory about the foundations of international arbitration, the latter 
has both contractual and jurisdictional elements. Due to the hybrid nature of international 
commercial arbitration, the clear-cut distinction between the notions of regulation, self-
regulation and harmonisation could be challenging at very least. The difficulties associated with 
defining those terms in the context of international arbitration as well summaries by Bernard 
Hanotiau “For decades, there have been debates over the juridical nature of international 
arbitration: is it an alternative, autonomous, method of dispute resolution, subject to self-
regulation by the parties, or is it a system of delegated justice regulated by a particular national 
law?” in Hanotiau, ‘International Arbitration in a Global Economy’ (n 10) 91. 
540
  See Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Sociology of International Arbitration’ (2015) 31 Arbitration 
International 1–17 where the author differentiate between the actors in international arbitration 
on the ground of their function putting forward the idea that international arbitration has moved 
from a solidaristic model to a polarised model: “Although the essential players (parties and 
arbitrators) remain the same, arbitration nowadays includes a host of new actors: the numerous 
service providers, including the ‘merchants of recognition’ that distribute legitimacy within the 
field of international arbitration; and the value providers who provide guidance as to the way 
international arbitration should develop and how arbitral social actors should behave.” 
541
  Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (n 445) 221, para 6.01. 
542
  See Fortese and Hemmi (n 426) 114, where it is argued: “Soft law norms are generally 
understood to be those that cannot be enforced by public force. These norms can emanate from 
State actors, be they legislators, governments or international organisations. These can also 
emanate from non-State actors, such as private institutions and professional or trade associations 
with an international character. (…) In spite of the lack of enforceability, the addressees of soft 
law norms can perceive it as binding and, even if they do not, they may choose to abide by it of 
their own accord. This normative weight is enhanced when soft law rules are codified.” 
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that result from self-regulation initiative procure legitimacy when they comply with 
the mandatory legal framework as defined by the state.
543
 
 
States, which recognise international commercial arbitration as a valid method of 
resolving trade disputes, provide the regulatory framework, within which the arbitral 
tribunals exercise their delegated adjudicative function. Thus, national legislatures 
are the primary, external regulator of international commercial arbitration. By 
prescribing rules and exercising supervisory powers through the national courts, 
states ensure that parties’ right to access to justice is not violated. These rules are 
found in the national systems of law, in particular, (i) in the arbitration law of the 
country, which is the seat of arbitration, and (ii) in the laws of the countries, in which 
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award is sought
544
. 
 
It is true that there was a period of increased state regulation in the 20
th
 century, 
which saw the introduction of arbitration legislation in many countries. Although 
this might be considered as the beginning of the process of judicialisation in 
international commercial arbitration (i.e. national legislatures prescribed rules in 
order to ensure that parties’ right to access to justice is guaranteed and these rules are 
backed up by sanctions – the non-enforceability of arbitral awards), to a great extent 
this development is better defined as a harmonisation process. The enactment of 
international conventions on arbitration (operating through the national laws of the 
states that have agreed to be bound by the) and the UNCITRAL ML, the recognition 
of the importance of international arbitration in resolving trade disputes and fostering 
                                                 
543
  For additional analysis on the concepts of regulation, self-regulation and governance see 
Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ 
(2000) 54 International Organization 421–456; Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: 
Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self Regulation in a “Post-regulatory” World’ (2001) 
54 Current Legal Problems 103–146; Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1–35; Peer Zumbansen, ‘Sustaining Paradox 
Boundaries: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and International Law’ (2004) 15 Eur. 
J. Int’l L. 197–211; Dupret (n 91); Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Strengthening 
International Regulation Through “Transnational New Governance”’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 501–578; Peer Zumbansen, ‘Debating Autonomy and Procedural 
Justice' (n 370); Jan Klabbers and Touko Piiparinen, Normative Pluralism and International 
Law: Exploring Global Governance (Jan Klabbers and Touko Piiparinen (eds), 1st edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2013); Schultz (n 451). 
544
  For further analysis on the sources of law see Chapters 2 and 3. 
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economic development
545
, and the arbitration-friendly stance that many states have 
adopted, have brought about the modernisation and harmonisation of nationals laws 
that regulate the international arbitration process. It is indeed widely acknowledged 
that the adoption of UNCITRAL ML lead to displacement of the “patchwork of 
hitherto disparate pieces of domestic legislation”546. The enactment of UNCITRAL 
ML in some ninety jurisdictions worldwide
547
 contributed to the development of a 
global paradigm of minimal curial intervention by specifying restrictive grounds on 
which the intervention of the courts could be sought. The UNCITRAL ML provides 
some guidelines as to the basic tenets of the arbitral process leaving great scope for 
party autonomy and procedural flexibility. It would, therefore, be difficult to argue 
that the process of judicialisation observed in today’s international commercial 
arbitration is driven by that very harmonisation of national arbitration laws.  
 
This is why instead of focusing on the regulation of international commercial 
arbitration through national legislatures and state courts, as analysing those 
regulators would not add much to the discussion relating to the causal link between 
the process of judicialisation and the ongoing “over-regulation” of the arbitral 
process
548
, one should question the role of “self-regulation” and the proliferation of 
soft laws in the over-regulation of international commercial arbitration.  
                                                 
545
  See McConnaughay, ‘The Role of Arbitration in Economic Development and the Creation of 
Transnational Legal Principles’ (n 422). 
546
  Menon (n 36) 8. 
547
  See Frederic Bachand and Fabien Gelinas, The Uncitral Model Law After Twenty-Five Years: 
Global Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Juris Publishing, Inc. 
2013) 6. 
548
  For comprehensiveness of the analysis it should be pointed out that some practitioners argue that 
involvement of national courts in international commercial arbitration is not decreasing. For 
example, the Honourable Andrew Rogers QC notes that arbitration proceedings have become 
like national court trials and have come under greater judicial scrutiny. Hon Andrew Rogers QC 
cites the fact that courts in the common law system had “enlarged the permissible field of 
arbitrability beyond recognition”, to the point that “[a]s a result of today’s approach to 
arbitrability there are many problems which will require resolution by the courts” – see Andrew 
Rogers QC, ‘Arbitrability’ (1994) 10 Arbitration International 263–276, 263, 276. In addition 
among the forefront of international arbitration issues is the question who decides whether an 
arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a particular case. While US courts have 
recently held that the issue of jurisdiction is to be decided by the courts unless parties have 
specifically reserved that decision for the arbitrators (see e.g. First Options of Chicago, Inc v 
Kaplan 514 U.S. 938 (1995)), the European courts have generally considered the question as one 
to be decided by the arbitrator/arbitral tribunal. Whether or not the arbitrability of international 
trade disputes has been extended with the assistance of the courts is beyond the scope of this 
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While defining what self-regulation means in the context of international 
commercial arbitration, it is worth considering whether there are merits in the claims 
that instead of bringing efficiency and flexibility excessive self-regulation leads to 
delays, disruptions and even obstruction of justice in the arbitral process. According 
to Pierre Lalive the causes for the over-regulation of international commercial 
arbitration may be rooted in the globalisation of international trade and the 
increasing complexity of international commercial disputes
549
: 
 
International Commercial Arbitration is no longer today a simple chapter of 
International Business Law; for a variety reasons, it has become a complex, 
sophisticated and difficult subject. So much so that it is probably one of the main duties 
of modern specialists of Private International Law and International Trade to try to 
make it simpler, and to resist the complications (procedural or substantive) introduced 
either by State Authorities, by International Institutions, or by law practitioners 
themselves — whether such complications are caused by self-interest or by the modern 
disease of overregulation.
550
 
 
In Pierre Lalive’s view this general tendency to over-regulate is driven by national or 
international institutions that “continuously enact detailed rules or directives which 
are perhaps useful to assist unqualified practitioners and beginners, but are apt to 
                                                                                                                                          
thesis. The questions regarding competence to decide jurisdiction does not fall within the 
objectives of this Section either. 
549
  That international commercial arbitration is becoming increasingly complex and that more high-
stake disputes are brought to it that ever before can be illustrated by the statistics of one of the 
biggest and most well-respected arbitration institution, ICC. ICC has a true global reach and 
proven international character of its arbitrations, which is a very good representation of the 
international trade disputes being resolved by arbitration. Since its creation in 1923, the ICC 
International Court of Arbitration has administered more than 20,000 disputes involving parties 
and arbitrators from some 200 countries and independent territories. According to the official 
ICC statistics, which can be found on its website, there is a constantly increasing number of 
cases involving more than two parties, as well as cases with amount in dispute over $1 million. 
In 1997 the cases involving more than two parties were 20% of all new requests for arbitration 
and the cases with amount in dispute over $1 million were 63.30%. For the period 2004-2014, 
there is a steady increase in those numbers, as the cases involving more than two parties were 
respectively 31%, 32%, 32%, 31%, 34%, 31%, 33%, 31%, 31%, 33%, 33%, while the cases with 
amount in dispute over $1 million were respectively 58.80%, 54.30%, 55.40%, 57.40%, 72.50%, 
77.10%, 75.90%, 77.30%, 76.20%, 78.20%, 76.50%. 
550
  Lalive, ‘Arbitration – The Civilised Solution’ (n 424). 
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create new procedural complications and to diminish flexibility”. 551  Among the 
scholars and practitioners that share Lalive’s concerns of over-regulation are Ugo 
Draetta
552
, Michael Schneider
553, Günther Horvath554, Giorgio Bernini555, William 
Park
556
, Fali S. Nariman
557
, Andrew Okekeifere
558
, Toby Landau and J. Romesh 
Weeramantry
559
, etc. 
 
At the 2012 ICCA Conference in Singapore Toby Landau commented that initially 
the regulators and codifiers were focused on the fundamental procedural components 
of the arbitral process, which was undoubtedly beneficial to the international 
business community
560
. However “ever-more excruciating detail has been applied to 
every aspect of the arbitral process” to the extent that “[r]egulation has increasingly 
given way to micromanagement”561: 
 
(…) as the frequency and compass of contemporary international arbitration has 
increased, a corresponding and exponential increase in regulatory activity has also 
taken place in this field. More and more – often self-appointed – organizations are now 
busy compiling and publishing rules, principles, codes, protocols, models, guidelines, 
                                                 
551
  Ibid 491. 
552
  Draetta (n 533). 
553
  Schneider, "The Essential Guidelines for the preparation of Guidelines, Directives, Notes, 
Protocols and other methods intended to help international arbitration practitioners to avoid the 
need for independent thinking and to promote the transformation of errors into 'Best Practices'" 
(n 533). 
554
  Horvath (n 23).  
555
  Giorgio Bernini, ‘The Future of Arbitration: Flexibility or Rigidity?’ in Julian D.M. Lew and 
Loukas Mistelis (eds), Arbitration Insights: Twenty Years of the Annual Lecture of the School of 
International Arbitration: Sponsored by Freshfileds Bruckhaus Deringer (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International 2007) 54. 
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  Park, ‘The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration’ (n 138) 142, para 7-4. 
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  Nariman, ‘The Spirit of Arbitration’ (n 23).  
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  Andrew I. Okekeifere, ‘Commercial Arbitration As the Most Effective Dispute Resolution 
Method: Still a Fact or Now a Myth?’ (1998) 15 Journal of International Arbitration 81–106. 
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  Toby Landau and J. Romesh Weeramantry, ‘A Pause for Thought’ in Albert Janvan den Berg 
(ed), International Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age?, ICCA Congress Series, Volume 17 
(1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2013). 
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  Ibid 496. 
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interpretations, recommendations, notes and best practices. The result is an already 
bewildering web of arbitral soft law norms.
562
 
 
Ugo Draetta echoes those observations and identifies the disadvantages for 
international arbitration community if this trend continues: 
 
Transnational procedural rules applicable to arbitration are being issued in such an 
increasing number that many have asked themselves whether the international 
arbitration community has placed itself on a slippery slope towards overregulation. This 
would definitely be a negative outcome, as it would limit the discretionary powers 
traditionally enjoyed by arbitrators when applying procedural rules. Such discretionary 
powers, when properly exercised, have proven to be one of the greatest and most 
attractive assets for arbitration as an institution, as they allow arbitrators to take 
procedural decisions tailored to the specific circumstances of the case, without having 
to follow one-size-fits-all solutions.
563
 
 
It is important that international commercial arbitration preserves its uniqueness in 
providing flexible solutions to international trade disputes and does not fall into the 
inertia and complacency of providing a one-size-fits-all mechanism for managing 
arbitration proceedings and rendering arbitral decisions. Indeed both extensive 
regulation through soft law instruments and adherence to the “letter”564 could result 
in international commercial arbitration losing its “lightness of touch”565 and turning 
                                                 
562
  Ibid 496. 
563
  Draetta, (n 531) 333. 
564
  See  Nariman, ‘The Spirit of Arbitration’ (n 23) 262 arguing that “There is far too much of the 
‘letter’ in modern International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) as practised: there is just too 
much legal baggage taken on board the good ship ICA – as a result, it moves slowly and 
ponderously, and is unable to weather the strong seas of change. ICA has become almost 
indistinguishable from litigation, which it was at one time intended to supplant. And the baggage 
continues to increase – with law, more law, legalese, and more legalese: and much disputation 
about ‘applicable law’, ‘multi-party arbitrations’, ‘agreements in writing’, ‘discovery in foreign 
arbitration’, ‘lex mercatoria’, etc. etc., etc.” 
565
  See ibid noting that “Arbitration has lost that lightness of touch that characterized its early 
manifestations: motivated or reasoned decisions – majority, concuring and dissenting – are now 
increasingly long and turgid, and too full of legal learning. If private awards were intended for 
the parties alone (as they should be) they would be relatively short, the conclusions and main 
reasons being presented in a simple format. But some of the ‘players’ in international arbitration 
are increasingly tempted to address a much wider audience (…). And the hope of creating 
something that will form part of a body of ‘legal opinion’ inspires an even more elaborate 
composition. Often an award will quote or cite from other awards rendered in what is stated to 
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into a rigid, ponderous and ineffective system where the formalised process and the 
legalised approach in decision-making
566
 are the norm rather than the exception. It is 
this concern about over-regulation that made Michael Schneider ironically note that: 
  
The principle objective of guidelines is to reduce the scope of independent thinking by 
their users, and to replace it by what the Guideline Producers believe the users should 
think or do. (…) No matter how remote or how trivial the issues, the Guideline 
Producers will find some reason why the users require guidance.
567
 
 
When reflecting on the role of self-regulation in international commercial arbitration, 
commentators seem to be in agreement that self-regulation could be defined as 
regulation within the international community
568
. The latter is driven by internal 
regulators, i.e. the arbitral institutions, international organisations and non-
governmental organisations, such as International Bar Association, American 
Arbitration Association, International Law Association, Association for International 
Arbitration, etc.  
 
A distinction could be made between regulation of the arbitral process by means of 
institutional arbitration rules and through guidelines, recommendations, best 
practices and codes of conduct. This is because while the former hinges on 
implementation of rules developed by service providers by explicit agreement 
between the parties, and as such could be regarded as regulation by consent, the 
latter is an example of pure self-regulation, whereby the international community, 
acting through international organisations and non-governmental bodies, formulates 
and monitors its adherence to certain legal and/or professional standards. Thus, it 
seems to be appropriate to use the term “self-regulation” only when referring to the 
                                                                                                                                          
be a similar fact-situation – ignoring the caution expressed by England's Lord Chancellor (way 
back in 1901), that every decision must be read as applicable to the facts proved and not as an 
exposition of the whole law on the subject; that every case in which expressions of law are to be 
found is qualified and conditioned by its own peculiar facts.” 
566
  See Section 2.3 Arbitral Awards as a Source of Law, particularly text to n 334, 335. 
567
  Schneider, "The Essential Guidelines for the preparation of Guidelines, Directives, Notes, 
Protocols and other methods intended to help international arbitration practitioners to avoid the 
need for independent thinking and to promote the transformation of errors into 'Best Practices'" 
(n 531) 564, 565.  
568
  See e.g. Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon’s definition for self-regulation given at the ‘4th LSE 
Arbitration Debate' (n 566).  
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promotion of guidelines, recommendations, reports, practice notes, best practices, 
codes of conduct and other soft law instruments developed by international 
institutions and organisations.  
 
Despite the fact that the primary role of international arbitral institutions remains the 
same, i.e. to provide international arbitration services by administering the cases 
decided under their auspices, the functions of international arbitral institutions have 
changed. Arbitral institutions have outgrown their role as mere service providers and 
are now among the regulators
569
 of the transnational system of justice that 
international commercial arbitration has become
570
. Despite the tremendous strain 
that the dramatic changes to the international arbitration environment have put on the 
arbitral institutions in the last decade or so
571
, the latter continue to enhance the 
access to justice through unification of arbitration procedural practices and 
harmonisation of the institutional arbitration rules. As Carita Wallgren-Lindholm 
explains: 
 
                                                 
569
  See e.g. the agreement reached between Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon and Jan Paulsson at the  
‘4th LSE Arbitration Debate' (n 531) that the arbitral institutions should take the leading role in 
achieving the desired level of self-regulation in international arbitration. 
570
  Gaillard, ‘The Present – Commercial Arbitration as a Transnational System of Justice’ (n 189).  
571
  The ever-growing caseload, the arrival of new parties, such as third-party funders, and the 
increasing complexity of international trade disputes have put significant pressure on both 
arbitral institutions and arbitrators. In today’s international arbitration proceedings arbitrators 
face ever more delicate counterpoise between fairness and efficiency, legal certainty and 
procedural flexibility. While arbitrators must keep the process light and moving and conduct the 
arbitration in an expeditious manner (see e.g. ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, Art. 22; LCIA 
Arbitration Rules 2014, Art. 14.4; SIAC Arbitration Rules 2013, Art. 16.1; HKIAC Arbitration 
Rules 2013, Art. 13.1; SCC Arbitration Rules 2010, Art. 19(2); Swiss Rules of International 
Arbitration 2012, Art. 15.7), they have to allow parties to present and defend their case fully 
enough, so that the parties are treated fairly and equally and the proceedings are managed in a 
just fashion. There is, however, an inherent conflict in balancing those obligations. Efficiency 
and flexibility involves making the arbitral process shorter, cheaper and deregulated, but the 
pursuit of fairness and justice may implicate additional time and cost and require more strict 
regulation of the rights and obligations of arbitration users. Still, William Park argues that 
procedural efficiency and flexibility do not necessarily exclude fairness and justice “In 
arbitration, fairness requires some measure of efficiency, since justice too long delayed becomes 
justice denied. Likewise, without fairness an arbitral proceeding would hardly be efficient, since 
it would fail to deliver a key element of the desired product: a sense that justice had been 
respected.” in Park, ‘The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration’ (n 138) 144. 
Unfortunate by-products of the inherent conflicts present in high-stake international arbitrations 
are the increased costs and the decreased speed of the arbitration proceedings.  
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Arbitral institutions are also important opinion leaders in the development of 
international arbitration and when institutions amend their rules similar trends, not 
unsurprisingly, can be discerned in the revision work of different institutions.
572
  
 
Recent examples of harmonisation of procedural practices pertain to the rules 
concerning emergency arbitrators, joinder of parties and consolidation of arbitration 
proceedings. The ICDR was the first major arbitral institution to introduce 
emergency arbitrator provisions as part of its amended rules in 2006. Now most 
major arbitral institutions have adopted similar provisions. The SCC and the SIAC 
incorporated provisions regulating emergency arbitrators in their arbitration rules in 
2010, the ICC – in 2012, the HKIAC – in 2013, and the LCIA and JAMS – in 2014. 
The CEPANI was among the first arbitral institutions to provide regulation of 
multiparty arbitrations
573
. In 2012 the CIETAC revised its arbitration rules and 
adopted provisions regarding consolidation of arbitrations. In 2015 it included 
specific provisions governing multiple contracts and joinder of parties. The ICC, 
HKIAC and ICDR followed the example set by the CIETAC and adopted rules on 
consolidation and joinder in their 2012, 2013 and 2014 Arbitration Rules 
respectively. The new 2016 SIAC Rules include new joinder, intervention and 
consolidation provisions. These examples show that arbitral institutions play an 
important role in developing new practices and tools to tackle complex and high-
stake international trade disputes, thus safeguarding due process and parties’ right to 
access to justice. Regardless of the changes to the international arbitration 
environment, the pursuit of fair and just arbitral process remains the guiding 
principle driving self-regulation processes in the field: 
 
(…) it is clear that the landscape of international commercial arbitration is changing and 
the traditional key characteristics of the process, such as speed, cost, informality, and 
confidentiality, are becoming both less practical and less lucrative. It is possible that the 
                                                 
572
  Carita Wallgren-Lindholm, ‘Ad Hoc Arbitration v. Institutional Arbitration’ in Giuditta 
Cordero-Moss (ed), International Commercial Arbitration: Different Forms and their Features 
(1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2013) 64. 
573
  See 2005 CEPANI Arbitration Rules, Art. 12. 
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pursuit of fairness and justice, with its increasing desirability, will guarantee continued 
viability of the process without interfering with the practical feasibility of arbitration.
574
 
 
Arbitral institutions also lead the way in regulating arbitrator’s counsel’s conduct 
and harmonising the professional standards applicable to parties’ representatives in 
international commercial arbitration. For example, the CIArb promulgated The 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Code of Professional and Ethical Conduct for 
Members in 2009. The Code imposes strict disclosure obligations upon an arbitrator 
that have accepted an appointment in a case administered by CIArb
575
. The LCIA is 
another pioneer in adopting provisions intended to further regulate the conduct of 
legal representatives. The new LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014 contain general 
guidelines intended to level the field for counsel appearing in LCIA arbitrations. 
Although the guidelines are of general character, they represent a significant 
development in the field of international commercial arbitration for two reasons. 
Firstly, together with the new rules on legal representatives
576
 the Guidelines 
emphasise the important role of arbitral institutions as regulators of counsel’s 
conduct in international arbitration proceedings. Secondly, they vest arbitrators with 
explicit rights to sanction misbehaving counsel by ordering any measures necessary 
to guarantee the fulfilment of arbitrator’s mandate. This overtly indicates the limits 
to party autonomy in arbitration proceedings and affirms the principal agenda in 
today’s international commercial arbitration, namely guaranteeing every parties’ 
right to access to justice and ensuring a fair and just arbitral process.  
                                                 
574
  Japaridze (n 371) 1416. See also the survey conducted by Richard W. Naimark and Stephanie E. 
Keer the results of which demonstrated the “overwhelming relative importance of the fairness 
and justice of the process” compared to other traditional key characteristics of international 
commercial arbitration in Naimark and Keer (n 425). 
575
  See Cofely Ltd (n 498) where the Court considered the disclosure requirements under Rule 3 of 
the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators' Code of Professional and Ethical Conduct for Members 
(October 2000). 
576
  It should be noted that the LCIA Rules 2014 also lay the first stone in establishing legal 
representation as the norm in international arbitration proceedings. In contrast to Art. 18 of the 
LCIA Arbitration Rules 1998, the new Art. 18 is unequivocally named Legal Representation, as 
opposed to Party Representation. Although Art. 18.1 of the LCIA Rules 2014 does not explicitly 
forbid any other form of representation and, in fact, stipulates that a party “may be represented” 
by one or more legal representatives, the new provision conveys a strong message – 
international commercial arbitration is no longer the informal forum for resolution of trade 
disputes. Instead it has become an arena for professional players. See also the results of a survey 
conducted by Gerald Phillips and presented in Phillips (n 23). 
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The above demonstrates that international arbitral institutions are directly engaged in 
the self-regulation of international commercial arbitration. Given that more than 85% 
of the international arbitral awards are rendered through arbitral institutions
577
, the 
role of the latter in shaping trends and developments in the area of international 
commercial arbitration is undeniable. International arbitral institutions directly 
oversee the selection, appointment and challenge processed under their rules, 
promote new procedural tools and practices, scrutinise the quality and even the 
substance of arbitral awards
578
, and are taking steps towards disciplining and 
sanctioning counsel appearing in international arbitrations under their auspices. To 
put it short, arbitral institutions not only administer arbitration cases, but also 
regulate, control and intervene in international arbitration proceedings to safeguard 
the compliance with the principles of due process and natural justice.  
 
The concern of many members of the arbitration community
579
, however, is that the 
international arbitral institutions and international organisation respond to the 
challenges in international commercial arbitration by formalising the process, 
introducing litigation-like practices and bringing in too many soft-law 
instruments
580
. The result is increased length and costs of arbitration proceedings, as 
well as proliferation of tactics aimed at circumventing the rigid rules. 
  
That international commercial arbitration is subject to an increasing self-regulation 
could not be denied. One just needs to consider the frequency with which arbitral 
institutions are implementing new institutional rules and notes
581
, and the rapid 
                                                 
577
  See the results of the 2006 QMUL (n 2).  
578
  See for example ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, Art. 33. 
579
  See n 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559. 
580
  See e.g. Paula Hodges, ‘The Arbitrator and the Arbitration Procedure, The Proliferation of “Soft 
Laws” in International Arbitration: Time to Draw the Line?’ in Christian Klausegger and others 
(eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2015 (1st edn, MANZ Verlag Wien 
2015). 
581
  The ICC adopted revised Arbitration Rules in 2012, followed by the Note on Article 36(4) of the 
2012 ICC Arbitration Rules, 2014 Note on Emergency Arbitrator Proceedings, 2016 Note to 
Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration and new ICC Rules of 
Arbitration including the introduction of an expedited procedure for small claims will come into 
force on 1 March 2017. Similarly, the LCIA adopted revised Arbitration Rules in 2014, followed 
by the Notes for Arbitrators 2015, Notes for Parties 2015, and the Notes on Emergency 
 
Page 215 
proliferation of recommendations, best practices and guidelines developed by 
international organisations. The revised arbitration rules contain ever more eloquent 
and airtight provisions
582
, new litigation-like tools
583
 or even professional standards 
                                                                                                                                          
Procedures 2015. The HKIAC updated its rules in 2013 and has promulgated the 2013 Practice 
Note on Tribunal Fees, Expenses, Terms & Conditions (Schedule 2), 2013 Practice Note on 
Tribunal Fees, Expenses, Terms & Conditions (Schedule 3), 2014 Practice Note on the 
Challenge of an Arbitrator, 2016 Practice Note on Consolidation of Arbitration, 2014 Guidelines 
on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal. The SIAC is among the arbitral institutions 
with most revisions of its arbitration rules. It adopted updated rules in 1997, 2007, 2010, 2013 
and has recently introduced its SIAC Arbitration Rules 2016, which apply from 1 Aug. 2016. 
The SIAC also promulgated Practice Note for Administered Cases in 2014 and Code of Ethics 
for an Arbitrator in 2015. Interestingly, there is an institution that has adopted rules that provide 
for an optional appellate review of arbitral awards. The AAA announced its Optional Appellate 
Arbitration Rules in 2013, which could be applied whether or not the underlying award was 
conducted pursuant to the AAA’s or ICDR’s rules. The Optional Appellate Arbitration Rules 
2013 could be seen as another implication of the process of judicialisation as they undermine the 
principle of finality as a fundamental characteristic of international arbitration and introduce a 
mechanism for a comprehensive review of arbitral awards. It remains to be seen, however, how 
courts in other countries react to enforceability issues raised by the Optional Appellate 
Arbitration Rules. For example, it is questionable whether courts will refuse enforcement of the 
underlying arbitration award, subject to an appellate review under the Optional Appellate 
Arbitration Rules, if they are unaware of the review process.  
582
  The implications of the process of judicialisation can be traced to the development of more 
detailed arbitration procedural rules. The gradual evolvement of arbitration procedural rules 
from sketchy and vague to more detailed and comprehensive can be illustrated by comparing the 
earlier versions of arbitration rules with the most recent set of rules. Thus, for example, in the 
ICC Arbitration Rules 1988 contain 26 articles and 3 appendices, while the 2012 Rules have 41 
articles and 5 appendices. The rules of other international arbitral institutions, such as the SCC, 
SIAC, HKIAC and CEPANI demonstrate the same progression. The arbitral institution with the 
most detailed rules remains CIETAC. The 2015 version of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules 
contain 84 articles and 3 appendices. The language of the institutional arbitration rules is also 
changing. An example could be given with the revisions to Art. 18 of the LCIA Arbitration 
Rules 1998. In its original version Art. 18 consists of two paragraphs and states ’18.1. Any party 
may be represented by legal practitioners or any other representatives. 18.2 At any time the 
Arbitral Tribunal may require from any party proof of authority granted to its representative(s) 
in such form as the Arbitral Tribunal may determine.’ In comparison Art. 18 of the LCIA Rules 
2014 has six paragraphs and introduces several significant changes. Firstly, the Rules make 
specific reference to legal representatives rather than party representatives. Secondly, the 
principle of party autonomy that allows parties to select a representative by their choice is 
restricted by subjecting the change or addition of legal representative following the constitution 
of arbitral tribunal to the approval of the arbitrators. In addition, the arbitral tribunal is granted 
the discretionary power to sanction misbehaving counsel that have violated the general 
provisions contained in the Annex to the LCIA Rules 2014. Another example could be given 
with the SIAC Arbitration Rules. In the SIAC Arbitration Rules 1991 the general principle that 
an arbitrator shall be independent and impartial is expressed in three short paragraphs of one 
sentence each (see SIAC Arbitration Rules 1991, Rule 10). Art. 10 of the SIAC Arbitration 
Rules 1991 states that an arbitrator shall remain at all times independent and impartial and shall 
disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his/her impartiality and 
independence. In contrast the SIAC Arbitration Rules 2013 under Art. 10 contain over seven 
paragraphs of detail rules governing the impartiality, qualifications, appointment and disclosure 
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incorporated by reference to codes of ethics
584
. The soft law instruments published 
by international organisations and non-governmental bodies are also becoming more 
detailed and exhaustive, which does not necessarily add to the degree of consistency 
and predictability to the arbitral process that they seek to achieve. Although the “soft 
laws” are not strictly binding, unless parties have not agreed to their applicability, 
arbitral tribunals and courts often refer to them when looking for suitable solutions to 
the situation at hand. Unfortunately, the existence of so many rules, notes, guidelines 
and recommendations does not necessarily speed up the arbitral process or increase 
the efficiency of the proceedings
585
. Despite the attempts of arbitral institutions to 
                                                                                                                                          
duties of arbitrators. The SIAC Arbitration Rules 1991 also contained a provision, Rule 24, 
spelling out nine tribunals’ additional powers, namely the powers to determine the rules of law 
governing or applicable to the contract and arbitration agreement, allow joinder of third parties 
to arbitration, conduct enquiries, extend or abbreviate time limits, and order correction of any 
contract or arbitration agreement (to the extent there is common agreement between the parties 
and the rules of law permit such correction), document production, preservation or disposal of 
property, or inspection of property. In the most recent SIAC Arbitration Rules 2013 the 
corresponding provisions defining arbitrators’ additional powers are almost twice as many as in 
the earlier edition of the arbitration rules. According to Art. 24 of SIAC Arbitration Rules 2013, 
along with the powers already mentioned earlier, the arbitral tribunal has the power to issue an 
award for unpaid costs of the arbitration, order parties to provide security for legal or other costs 
or for any amount in dispute in the arbitration, decide issues not expressly or impliedly raised in 
parties’ submissions, etc. Although not all changes associated with the adoption of more detailed 
arbitration rules are perceived as a positive development, the amendment of provisions that 
reflect a newly adopted policy of transparency of the arbitral institutions is welcoming. Thus, the 
revision of the ICC rules on costs should be considered a move towards the right direction. See 
also Arthur L. Marriott, ‘Pros and Cons of More Detailed Arbitration Laws and Rules’ in Albert 
Jan van den Berg (ed), Planning Efficient Arbitration Proceedings: The Law Applicable in 
International Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series, Volume 7 (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 
1996) 70-71 where the author argues that “[t]here is a legitimate concern in many quarters (as 
was, for example, expressed at the recent conference in London on Radical Procedural Reform), 
that international arbitration rules and practice are becoming too rigid, formal, and legalistic, 
with the result that the proceedings are too protracted and too expensive. Insofar as rules 
contribute to this by complexity and by detailed attempts to cover every procedural eventuality, 
then they are to be deprecated. An illustration of an aspect of practice and policy where we may 
have gone too far to the detriment of arbitration, is the current concern with concepts of 
neutrality, impartiality and independence. Under American influence, both rules and practice 
have moved to adopt the criteria of American domestic litigation as to what constitutes 
impartiality and independence. These concepts are being increasingly extended.” 
583
  In order to deal with multi-party situations arbitral institutions have employed tools that are 
available in national court litigation, namely consolidation of arbitration proceedings and joinder 
of parties.   
584
  See n 575 and the text to it. 
585
  As arbitration users continue to experience the adverse effects of judicialisation of international 
commercial arbitration (the latter causing high costs and delays in arbitral process), a newly 
established Court of Innovative Arbitration (COIA) seeks to turn back the clock and simplify the 
arbitral process. In contrast to the rules of other arbitral institutions, the COIA Arbitration Rules 
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introduce more rules in order to tackle the challenges in modern international 
arbitration, the formalisation and overregulation of the proceedings add to the 
growing sophistication of international commercial arbitration. Commenting on the 
“the increasing concern over what is referred to as the ‘judicialization’ of 
international arbitration” 586, Bernard Hanotiau argues that: 
 
Institutions have also their part of the responsibility. The increased complexity of the 
internal rules that they sometimes apply for the management of their cases entails 
adverse consequences. The setting up of an arbitral tribunal may now require several 
months where in the past it was achieved in a few days. Internal procedures followed by 
some institutions may lead to awards being notified in certain cases several months 
after they have been delivered to the institution.
587
 
 
The shift towards greater self-regulation is incited by the complexity of international 
trade disputes, the arrival of new parties (e.g. third-party funders) and the expanded 
role of some participants in the arbitration proceedings (e.g. legal representatives, 
                                                                                                                                          
contain only 19 provisions. Several articles deserve attention. The Preamble sets the objectives 
of the COIA Arbitration Rules, namely to provide for a simple, quick and inexpensive 
mechanism for dispute resolution. The latter is to be achieved by cooperation of the parties and 
their counsel, which requires compliance with the short time limits and limited number of 
written submissions. To ensure that arbitration under the auspices of the COIA would indeed be 
time- and cost-efficient, the Rules stipulate that the “COIA is entitled to refuse to proceed with 
the arbitration if the COIA President considers that arbitration under these Arbitration Rules is 
not appropriate to resolve the dispute” (Art. 1.3). This is an important discretionary power that 
the President of the Court will exercise from the outset of the proceedings. Other measures taken 
by the COIA to speed up the resolution of disputes involve the default requirement for email 
communication with the Court (Art. 5.2); appointment of a sole arbitrator (Art. 7.1); short time 
limits to challenge the arbitrator (Art. 7.4); arbitrator’s discretion to determine the procedure in 
the arbitration (Art. 13.1); no document production phase, unless decided otherwise by the 
arbitrator in his sole discretion (Art. 13.2); attempt by the arbitrator to bring about settlement to 
the dispute, unless neither party objects (Art. 13.3); the default rule that no hearings are held 
(Art. 14.1); arbitrator’s right to decide the dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties are unable to 
reach an agreement on the applicable rules of law (Art. 16.2, Art. 16.3); with the exception of 
complex cases rendering an award within six months after payment of the initial advance on 
costs (Art. 17.4). For economic approach to efficiency see Robert B. Kovacs, ‘In International 
Arbitration: An Economic Approach’ (2012) 23 American Review of International Arbitration 
155, Richard O. Zerbe, Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics (1st edn. Edward Elgar 
2001), also see generally Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University 
Press 1983); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (9th edn, Aspen Publishers 2014) 
586
  Hanotiau, ‘International Arbitration in a Global Economy’ (n 10) 99. 
587
  Ibid 100. 
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expert witnesses)
588
. The need for certainty and predictability has arisen drastically, 
and the answers are sought in the implementation of new practices, such as joinder 
of third parties, consolidation of proceedings, extensive document production, and 
lengthy witness examinations and cross examinations, etc. Unfortunately, the result 
is procedural heaviness of the arbitral process, delays and increased costs. These new 
developments, together with the commercialisation
589
 of international arbitration, 
explain the increasingly adversarial manner, in which arbitrations are conducted, and 
the resort to “soft laws” aiming at bringing certainty in the arbitration proceedings 
and safeguarding the fairness of the arbitral process. It is the pursuit of justice and 
even the truth in international commercial arbitration
590
 that is fostering the self-
regulation and judicialisation processes. Bernard Hanotiau also regards the changing 
attitudes or culture in international commercial arbitration as the factors driving the 
judicialisation of international commercial arbitration: 
 
                                                 
588
  See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ‘Soft Law in the Organization and General Conduct of Commercial 
Arbitration Proceedings’, 2014, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, stating: “Soft Law plays 
an increasingly prominent role in evolving standards for organizing and conducting commercial 
arbitration proceedings. In recent years a wide variety of non-binding guidelines have emerged 
out of international discourse regarding process management and more particular concerns about 
cost, delay and inefficiency in arbitration. (…) The challenges have multiplied as arbitration has 
become increasingly complex, with growing emphasis on information exchange, motion practice 
and other incidents of pre-hearing process. Commercial arbitration processes have thus 
experienced what some have described as ‘creeping judicialization’ – a tendency to become 
more like litigation (and, particularly, litigation along the lines of the U.S. model) and thus 
increasingly lengthy and expensive.” 
589
  See Pierre Lalive, ‘Sur une “Commercialisation” de I’Arbitrage’ in Claude Reymond and others 
(eds), Liber amicorum Claude Reymond (1st edn, Paris LexisNexis Litec 2004); also Redfern (n 
23) 25 commenting on criticisms that international arbitration has been judicialised and 
commercialised: “There is resentment at what is perceived to be the ‘commercialisation’ of a 
basically simple process of dispute resolution.” The quotation from Redfern implies that the 
process of commercialisation affects some inherent features of international commercial 
arbitration, such as the informality and flexibility of the proceedings. The term 
commercialisation, as used in this thesis, adds another layer to the definition used by Redfern. It 
is suggested that with the growth of third party funding in international commercial arbitration 
the arbitration process has been increasingly used not only for enforcing legal rights but also for 
the purpose of making a profit. This arguably has effect on international commercial arbitration 
proceedings by increasing the need for legal certainty and predictability. This is an area that 
requires further research.  
590
  See William W. Park, ‘Truth-Seeking in International Arbitration’ in Markus Wirth and others 
(eds), Search for ‘Truth’ in Arbitration: Is Finding the Truth What Dispute Resolution Is About? 
- ASA Special Series No. 35 (1st edn, Juris Net 2011) 2 stating that ‘truth-seeking lies at the core 
of what arbitration is about, and cannot long be avoided in any serious discussion of the subject’. 
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[T]he arbitration process has changed from relatively informal to increasingly formal 
and complex. This generates extended delays and increased costs. It is generally 
considered that this is to be attributed to what is often referred to, rightly or wrongly, as 
the “Americanization” of international arbitration. (…) [I]n continental Europe, there is 
no duty for advocates to present to the court or the panel documents that are adverse to 
the position they defend. With the center of power having shifted to large multinational 
law firms, mostly from the common law world, the focus has also shifted to another 
approach to litigation: the role of the panel is now to discover the truth of the case and 
this implies the adoption of a procedure which resembles more and more the American 
courts' procedure, with a large number of witness statements, expert reports, and the 
production of all possible documents which might be relevant to the resolution of the 
dispute.
591
 
 
It is considered in this thesis that the “Americanisation”, legalisation, 
bureaucratisation, formalisation, and/or professionalisation of international 
commercial arbitration fall within the scope of the more general development, which 
is the process of judicialisation. While the former concepts present fragmentary 
explanations for the changes in modern arbitration proceedings, the term 
“judicialisation” gives a full account of the factors driving the developments in 
international commercial arbitration. 
 
The judicialisation of international commercial arbitration is understood as a shift 
towards legalised, rule-based dispute resolution mechanism, in which procedural 
rules and professional standards are strictly observed and arbitrators follow a 
formalised process to reach a decision, namely by reasoning logically from facts, 
legal rules and previous decisions. A judicialised method for resolving disputes is 
perceived to safeguard parties’ right to access to justice, the fairness of the process 
and the equal treatment of the parties. This is indeed what the increasing self-
regulation in international commercial arbitration aims to achieve – levelling the 
play field, impartial and fair arbitral process, equal access to justice, and 
predictability. In William Park’s view procedural soft law has a potential to foster a 
sense of equal treatment “by promoting the perception that procedure is “regular” 
                                                 
591
  Hanotiau, ‘International Arbitration in a Global Economy’ (n 10) 99. 
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and according to a “rule of law” principle”592, by ensuring that similar cases are 
treated in similar fashion. Although the ever more detailed and airtight rules may 
bring some degree of certainty and greater confidence in the system of dispute 
resolute, they also produce unfortunate by-products, such as excessive formalisation 
of the arbitral process, further grounds for challenging arbitrators that dare exercise 
their discretion, delays and increasing costs
593
.  
 
In order to avoid turning international commercial arbitration into a litigation-lite 
mechanism for resolving trade disputes, the suggested way forward is selective self-
regulation as opposed to a comprehensive one. It is necessary to precisely pinpoint 
the aspects that would benefit from more detailed regulation and let the rest of the 
features evolve steadily. The main characteristics of international commercial 
arbitration, such as flexibility of the arbitral process, parties’ freedom to appoint 
arbitrators of their choice, wide discretionary powers of the arbitral tribunal to rule 
on evidentiary matters, should remain unchanged. In view of the latest studies 
conducted in the field of international arbitration
594
, the arbitration community needs 
to undertake further actions to curb the costs and delays in international arbitration 
                                                 
592
  Park, ‘The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration’ (n 138) 146. 
593
  See e.g. Michael E. Schneider, ‘President’s Message: Yet another Opportunity to Waste Time 
and Money on Procedural Skirmishes: The IBA Guidelines on Party Representation’ (2013) 31 
ASA Bulletin 497–501. 
594
  2006 QMUL Survey (n 2); 2008 QMUL Survey (n 3); 2010 QMUL Survey (n 378); QMUL 
Survey ‘2012 Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process’ (2012), available at: 
<http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/164483.pdf>; 2013 QMUL Survey (n 15); 2015 
QMUL Survey (n 521); ‘BLP International Arbitration Survey 2012 - Research Based Report on 
Perceived Delay in the Arbitration Process’; ‘BLP International Arbitration Survey 2013 - 
Research Based Report on Perceptions of Document Production in the Arbitration Process’; 
‘BLP International Arbitration Survey 2014 - Research Based Report on Choice of Venue for 
Inrenational Arbitration’, available at: 
<http://www.blplaw.com/media/International_Arbitration/BLP_International_Arbitration_Surve
y_2014.pdf>; ‘BLP International Arbitration Survey 2015 - Research Based Report on the Use 
of Tribunal Secretaries in International Commercial Arbitration’, available at: 
<http://www.blplaw.com/media/International_Arbitration/BLP_International_Arbitration_Surve
y_2015.pdf>; ‘CIArb Costs of International Arbitration Survey 2011’, 2011; Tony Cole, Ilias 
Bantekas, Federico Ferretti, Christine Riefa, Barbara Warwas, and Pietro Ortolani, ‘European 
Parliament Study on Legal Instruments and Practice of Arbitration in the EU’, 2014; Thomas J. 
Stipanowich and Zachary P. Ulrich, ‘Commercial Arbitration and Settlement: Empirical Insights 
into the Roles Arbitrators Play’, 2014, Legal Studies Research Paper Series; Thomas J. 
Stipanowich and Zachary P. Ulrich, ‘Arbitration in Evolution: Current Practices and 
Perspectives of Experienced Commercial Arbitrators’, 2014, Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series. 
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proceedings. Adopting stricter rules and more transparent procedures on calculation 
and allocation of arbitration costs, granting arbitrators greater discretionary powers 
to determine the arbitration procedure and rule on evidentiary mattes in absence of 
parties’ agreement, and improving arbitrators’ selection process would decrease the 
costs and tackle problems associated with dilatory tactics and excessive document 
production. It is reassuring to observe that some arbitral institutions are already 
taking steps in this direction
595
. 
 
Another argument in favour of selective self-regulation is associated with the 
benefits of preserving the flexibility of arbitral process and the wide discretionary 
powers that arbitrators currently enjoy. Imagine the following two scenarios. In 
Scenario No. 1 international arbitration community and most notably arbitration 
institutions develop comprehensive rules to regulate various aspects of the 
arbitration proceedings, e.g. counsel’s conduct, arbitrators’ duties, evidentiary rules, 
conflict of interests, third party funding, etc. Parties that opt for institutional 
arbitration and those that explicitly agree to the application of certain soft law 
instruments would undoubtedly benefit from having greater certainty as to the rules 
applicable in the arbitral process. Such an approach, however, might unnecessarily 
limit arbitrator’s discretionary powers and turn arbitrators into mere observers of the 
disputes before them. The parties would not be able to take full advantage of 
arbitrator’s expertise and might lose the added value that comes with wide 
arbitrator’s discretionary powers. When the dispute arises, parties might become 
aware that the strict provisions agreed beforehand are not well suited to the dispute 
at hand and do not contribute to its speedy and efficient resolution. In this scenario, 
in the absence of parties’ consent, arbitrators would lack authority to adjust the rules 
applicable to the arbitral process, as they could not override provisions agreed by the 
parties. Such an approach suggests that any changes to the procedures can effectively 
be done only by way of parties’ cooperation. If the control over the arbitration 
proceedings is entirely shifted to parties, lack of cooperation between the latter 
would lead to unnecessary disruptions and delays. Shifting the control over 
formalised proceedings to arbitrators, and international commercial arbitration 
becomes indiscernible from national litigation. 
                                                 
595
  For example ICC revised the Note on Personal and Arbitral Tribunal Expenses in 2013 and 
adopted a Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration in 2016. 
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In Scenario No. 2 parties agree to more vague arbitration rules that leave enough 
room for arbitrators to make use of their discretionary powers. When a dispute arises 
and parties cannot reach an agreement on a particular procedural issue, arbitrators 
would have the flexibility to weigh competing views, consider the specificity of the 
case at hand, rely on their expertise and render a partial or final award depending on 
the stage of the proceedings. There is a certain unpredictability associated with this 
approach, however this is what makes international commercial arbitration so case-
sensitive and is the key to a business-friendly dispute resolution method. The 
suggested shift towards more proactive arbitrators combined with selective 
regulation seems to be in line with what large transnational businesses need. In 2006 
Michael McIlwrath and Ronald Schroeder surveyed their litigation colleagues from 
all branches of General Electric and presented their findings in an article
596
. The 
authors observed that: 
 
The view that the parties can impose greater efficiency rests on a faulty premise, which 
is that it is easily within their power to exercise more control over the procedure once a 
dispute arises, including by strictly enforcing time limits. This is not, in our submission, 
a valid premise in most disputes. It ignores that the parties are unlikely to be in good 
relations, at least with respect to the subject matter in dispute, and in some instances 
one of them (or their lawyers) may have an interest in delaying the determination of 
issues, not in expediting them—to delay payment of damages or to create financial 
pressure on the opposing party through delay and undue expense.
597
 
 
In light of the conflicting interests of the parties (and their representatives), a 
proactive arbitrator would bring the necessary balance and efficiency to the 
proceedings. On the basis of their findings Michael McIlwrath and Ronald Schroeder 
concluded that the improvements that would be appreciated by businesses involve 
development of arbitration rules that authorise and encourage tribunals to “identify at 
the outset of the proceedings any legal or factual issues amenable to early disposition 
that will narrow/focus the issues in dispute, and establish procedures for resolving 
                                                 
596
  Michael McIlwrath and Roland Schroeder, ‘The View from an International Arbitration 
Customer: In Dire Need of Early Resolution’ (2008) 74 Arbitration 3–12. 
597
  Ibid 9. 
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those issues”598. In addition the authors recommend that arbitration institutions “use 
their monitoring role and authority to ensure that tribunals are being proactive in 
managing the arbitration to make it faster and as reasonably streamlined as possible 
(…)”599. 
 
The two scenarios above represent the conflicts and limitations associated with strict 
regulation and absent or lenient regulation. William Park observes: 
 
The very nature of legal process contains an inherent tension between generality and 
specificity. (…) An overly broad rule would fail by denying recognition to critical 
distinctions among different cases. No rule at all, however, will often detract from the 
parties’ sense of fairness, which is often fostered more by fidelity to pre-established 
standard than by the content of the standards themselves.
600
 
 
To this it could be added that too rigid rules limit party autonomy, could create even 
more grounds for challenging procedural decisions and lead to delays and increased 
costs. It is illusionary to believe that those “critical distinctions among different 
cases”, in the words of William Park, can be achieved by regulating every aspect of 
the arbitral process. So far, international arbitration community has relied on 
arbitrators’ expertise to tip the necessary balance between specificity and generality. 
It is time for the former to decide whether it will adhere to this approach in order to 
avoid the downsides of excessive regulation. The suggested way forward is selective 
self-regulation that addresses only those aspects of international commercial 
arbitration that hamper time- and cost-efficiency but safeguard party autonomy and 
arbitrators’ wide discretionary powers601. 
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  Ibid 11. 
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  Ibid. 
600
  Park, ‘The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration’ (n 138) 149 at para 7-30. 
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  See also McIlwrath and Schroeder (n 594) 4 where the authors argue that in order to address 
businesses’ frustration with current practices in international commercial arbitration, the latter 
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efficiency: “The overriding objectives generally advanced (when choosing an appropriate forum 
and procedure for resolving disputes) are fairness, efficiency (including speed and cost) and 
certainty in the enforcement of contractual rights and protections. These are complementary 
objectives, and to focus on one at the expense of the others leads to a result inconsistent with the 
expectations of the business world and denies basic commercial needs. Too often the practice of 
international arbitration has done just that, by focusing on perceived concepts of due process to 
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4.3 Litigation-Style Practices in International Arbitration 
Proceedings – The Example with Discovery 
 
The study of the process of judicialisation would be incomplete without examining 
in greater detail the changes in international commercial arbitration associated with 
the diversification of the international arbitration community, the introduction of 
new practices and the increasingly adversarial style of the proceedings
602
. The 
analysis hereto is building on the propositions developed in the preceding sections, 
in particular the idea that the process of judicialisation is associated with the pursuit 
of fairness, justice and greater certainty in international commercial arbitration. 
Unfortunate by-products of satisfying arbitration user’s aspiration to justice and 
search for the truth
603
 are the increasing costs, delays and procedural rigidity. 
 
This section aims to analyse the implications of judicialising the arbitral process by 
introducing litigation-style practices and adversarial approach in international 
arbitration proceedings. In particular, the developments associated with the process 
of judicialisation will be assessed by considering the proliferation of litigation-lite 
discovery in international commercial arbitration. Although other practices, such as 
pre-hearing motions, witness preparation, cross-examination of witnesses and 
experts also contribute to the judicialisation of the arbitral process, the benefits of 
extensive discovery and document production practices appear to be more 
controversial and their implications – more far-reaching. In addition, among the 
objectives of this section is to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the 
                                                                                                                                          
the detriment of efficiency, resolution and certainty. This is unfortunate, as fairness is no longer 
the main feature to distinguish international arbitration from court litigation in many countries. 
Indeed, in many international transactions, choices will exist between competing public and 
private adjudication systems, each of which satisfy fairness concerns.” 
602
  See e.g. Hartwell (n 371) 231 arguing that the international commercial arbitration has been 
overwhelmed by lawyers and litigiousness as a result of that: “Although in historical time traders 
and experts used to act both as arbitrators and as the representatives of the parties, lawyers have 
come to dominate in both roles. In some specialised markets the tradition of the judgement of 
one’s peers still holds sway, but most ordinary commercial arbitration is now conducted 
according to a simulacrum of the Court procedure of the State.” 
603
  See text to n 590. 
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adversarial and inquisitorial approaches in order to establish which one is more 
conducive to the fundamental characteristics of international commercial arbitration 
and which one fosters the process of judicialisation. Finally, the analysis on the “new 
litigation toolbox” aims to establish whether some practices and approaches are more 
compatible with international commercial arbitration than others and, building on 
that conclusion, to recommend a way forward. 
 
 
4.3.1 Discovery 
 
There seems to be a broad consensus among the international arbitration community 
that the conduct of arbitration proceedings has changed dramatically in the last 
decade or so. Andrew Clarke raises several concerns regarding the modern arbitral 
process and argues that those issues “have the potential to change fundamentally the 
nature of international arbitration so that it ceases to serve the purposes that has 
brought it such success” 604. Among others these concerns include discovery, delays 
and costs. Other authors also comment on the evolution of international arbitration 
proceedings:  
 
Many arbitration practitioners have noted, with growing concern, the tendency to 
import litigation procedures into the arbitration process. One example of this is constant 
push for a greater number of and more detailed submissions, as well as more 
voluminous evidence. Whereas once it was usual to try to keep submissions as simple 
as possible and evidence to a minimum, today it is not uncommon to have several 
rounds of lengthy written submissions, together with numerous witness statements, 
counter-witness statements in response and rebuttal witness statements, as well as 
expert reports on every conceivable issue.
605
 
 
The explanations and possible causes of the challenges in international arbitration 
proceedings vary drastically and “blame” is attributed to parties606, counsel607 and 
                                                 
604
  Andrew Clarke, ‘International Arbitration: Current Corporate Concerns’ (2009) 20 ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 42–50, 46, 47. 
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  Horvath (n 23) 259, 260. 
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arbitrators
608
. Some see the changes in the arbitral process, including the increased 
use of litigation-style practices, as an unfortunate by-product resulting from the 
cultural diversification in international commercial arbitration.  
 
Arbitrators come from different cultural and professional backgrounds, which eases 
the proliferation of new practices and the expansion of new trends. Many arbitrators 
tend to sit on panels hearing from commercial, maritime and shipping cases, to 
insurance, consumer or grievance disputes.
609
 Arbitrators’ experience in variety of 
areas might affect the way the former weigh conflicting principles or doctrines.  
 
Furthermore there are a great number of arbitrators who have started their careers as 
solicitors, barristers or state judges and have changed their professional orientation 
afterwards. This litigation experience inevitably influences their attitude to 
arbitration, bringing new features to the arbitration process. Vijay Bhatia particularly 
focuses on the issues of discovery and cross-examination to explore the 
judicialisation process of international commercial arbitration
610
. In his view: 
 
International commercial arbitration offers an interesting site for the study of witness 
examination as an interdiscursive phenomenon across professional, jurisdictional, 
linguistic and cultural boundaries. It is contentious not only because it is shared across 
two rather distinct practices – i.e., litigation and arbitration, bringing together 
international participants, particularly stakeholders who carry their individual baggage 
in the form of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds and languages, as well as 
interdisciplinary expertise – but also because it is meant to integrate two distinct legal 
systems and cultures, i.e., common law culture and civil law culture.
611
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  See e.g. Edna Sussman, ‘Can Counsel Ethics Beat Guerrilla Tactics?: Background and Impact of 
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Brasileira de Arbitragem 98–105. 
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Indeed “individual baggage”612 and previous professional experience is capable of 
influence in arbitration practice. A study on securities arbitration conducted by 
Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch, and A. Pritchard reveals that attorney-arbitrators behave 
differently from their non-attorney colleagues.
613
 The authors find that “attorney-
arbitrators who have represented brokerage firms in other securities arbitration cases 
are significantly less generous with arbitration awards”.614 On contrary, award size is 
not contingent on the fact that attorneys who have represented only investors, or both 
investors and brokerages houses in arbitration proceedings serve as arbitrators.
615
  
 
Though there is no empirical study to support the assumption, it can be argued that 
arbitrators who do not have legal experience might also have different approach to 
some aspects of arbitration in comparison with their colleagues who do have a legal 
qualification. For example, arbitrators who are not legal graduates might be more 
inclined to favour fair and equitable reasoning rather than strict legal reasoning to 
justify certain outcome of the case. Similar suggestion is made by Charles Moxley 
who contends that the ideal arbitrator is the one who can meet the clients’ 
expectations and the lawyer/client should choose an arbitrator depending on whether 
the case is primarily about the facts and technical data or the legal issues. Thus,  
 
[i]n cases involving substantial legal or procedural issues, each side will typically want 
at least one lawyer. In cases involving substantial technical issues, each side will 
typically want at least one technical expert. Yet such predilections should not be 
                                                 
612
  In Ray (n 470), the author acknowledges that decision-making in arbitration is influenced by 
arbitrators’ backgrounds. He points out that: “An abundant literature continues to remind us that 
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preferences of an arbitration chair.” 
615
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followed on a knee-jerk basis. Attorneys need to exercise judgment based on the 
specific case. If their client seems more likely to win based on application of the law, 
perhaps an effort should be made to select an all-lawyer panel. If the client seems more 
likely to win based on industry practice or other non-legal considerations, perhaps a 
panel made up solely of industry experts should be sought.
616
 
  
Moxley further asserts that there is a difference in the approach in the reasoning that 
lawyers and non-lawyers apply to decide on the dispute:  
 
Having participated in many deliberations on panels with lawyers and industry experts, 
it seems to me that industry practice is generally substantially consistent with the law 
and provides a fair result. Yet there are cases where law and practice conflict and where 
strict application of law conflicts with considerations of fairness and equity.
617
 
 
The lack of requirement for arbitrators to possess a legal qualification or training in 
order to be eligible to be elected as such, as well as the absence of harmonised 
regulation on the arbitrator’s conduct, often have been in the scholars’ focus but calls 
for dealing with the matter on an international level have become more and more 
frequent in the past couple of years.
618
 
 
While the proliferation of new practices in international commercial arbitration is 
correctly associated with cultural diversification of the pool of arbitration 
participants as well as natural evolution of the dispute resolution mechanism, the 
judicialisation process in particular is often attributed to the “Americanisation” of 
this field. It is argued that the large transnational law firms spread Anglo-American 
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  Charles J Moxley, ‘Selecting the Ideal Arbitrator’ (2005) 60 Dispute Resolution Journal 24–28, 
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style procedures across the globe and thus contaminate international commercial 
arbitration with litigiousness and adversarialism: 
 
These large transnational law firms which dominate in international business law have 
also contributed to this transformation by making arbitration a specialty of their practices 
as part of the services they offer their big multinational clients (e.g. by representing their 
clients in international commercial arbitrations). This also reflects what has been referred 
to as the ‘americanization’ of international business law and transactions through the use 
of English in international business which tends to spread certain norms, ideas and 
principles that Anglo-American law expresses. Greater emphasis was placed on 
American style courtroom procedures, for example, more adversarial proceedings, 
exchange of pleadings, extensive pre-trial discovery of documents, examination and 
cross-examination of witnesses and use of expert witnesses.
619
 
 
For many authors increasing legalisation of the arbitration proceedings is entirely 
due to the “Americanisation”620 of international commercial arbitration. Although 
the link between the two developments is undeniable, to attribute the ongoing 
changes in the arbitral process only to its “Americanisation”, runs the risk of 
depicting a sketchy picture. In fact, the proliferation of litigation-lite practices in 
international commercial arbitration is also caused by the processes of globalisation, 
commercialisation
621
 and judicialisation.  
 
The rise of international commercial arbitration in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries was a response to growing international trade, mainly in Europe, and the 
desire for an internationally enforceable, commercially sensible mechanism to 
resolve disputes. With the increasing popularity of international commercial 
arbitration the need for harmonisation became palpable. The adoption of the NYC 
and the enactment of the arbitration-friendly UNCITRAL ML in over 70 countries 
boosted the confidence in this method for dispute resolution and further fostered its 
development.  
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The globalisation of international trade inevitably incited the arrival of new 
participants in arbitration proceedings. The increasing caseload, the growing number 
of high-stake disputes and the involvement of transnational law firms
622
 and third 
party funders in international commercial arbitration rendered its 
commercialisation
623
 inevitable. This, of course, raised the stakes and increased the 
need for certainty and precision. As international commercial arbitration is no longer 
a club of gentlemen
624
, a self-contained and close-knit community, the direction 
taken to address the search for justice and predictability is by judicialising 
arbitration, and the arbitral process in particular – by introducing further regulation 
and employing practices and techniques borrowed from national litigation. Thus, the 
proliferation of litigation-lite practices is, on the one hand, linked to the presence of 
US-trained lawyers and their role in shaping international commercial arbitration as 
participants that carry “all the bag and baggage of (…) national litigation systems 
into the international arbitration room” 625 , and, on the other hand, to the 
judicialisation of international commercial arbitration, the latter perceived as a way 
to promote the rule of law. 
 
As procedural rules and litigation practices are seen as a measurement of the fairness 
of the process and the justices achieved, lawyers wholeheartedly resort to them in 
search of the truth in international commercial arbitration. It is claimed, however, 
that to avoid the adverse effect of litigation-style practices in international 
commercial arbitration, a flexible concept of fairness is to be constructed. Fairness 
should be understood in its narrow meaning and should be limited to the procedural 
aspects of international commercial arbitration. It should guarantee parties’ access to 
justice but is not to be equated to accuracy and precision with regard to arbitral 
awards.  The search for truth in international commercial arbitration is in fact the 
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search for a flexible commercial solution to a particular trade dispute. Since the 
doctrine of precedent does not apply to international arbitral awards “the truth that 
arbitrators must endeavour to uncover is not an abstract truth, but the truth relating to 
the disputed facts on which the success of a particular claim depends” 626. As pointed 
out Yves Derains: 
 
There is no reason why the production of documents by the parties in a specific case 
should exceed the core bundle that they eventually use as evidence at the hearing or as a 
basis for their post-hearing briefs. (…) While there is no denying that, in some cases, the 
issues are so complex that the submissions must be correspondingly detailed, this is 
certainly not true in every case. In fact, in the vast majority of cases, such voluminous 
documentation is a hindrance rather than help.
627
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of the above it is argued that the judicialisation of international commercial 
arbitration proceedings is driven to a greater extent by internal factors rather than 
external ones. While the harmonisation of private international law, including 
national arbitration laws, has reinforced the primacy of party autonomy in 
international commercial arbitration and paved the way to its “Golden Age”, 
increasing self-regulation of the arbitral process and the proliferation of litigation-
style practices bring formality, black-letter legalism and excessive costs.  
 
Arbitration users are increasingly seeking fairness and justice in international 
commercial arbitration, which indicates changes in businesses’ expectations of 
arbitrators and the arbitral process as a whole.
628
 Demands for consistency and 
                                                 
626
  Yves Derains, ‘Towards Greater Efficiency in Document Production before Arbitral Tribunals-
A Continental Viewpoint’ in Special Supplement 2006: Document Production in International 
Arbitration (1st edn, ICC Publishing 2006) 86. 
627
  Ibid. 
628
  While there is benefit in a generalised conclusion when considering matters in a transnational 
context, it is to be noted that arbitration users’ expectations of the process differ based on their 
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precision in arbitral decision-making and search for the truth in arbitration 
proceedings create an inevitable tension between the traditional characteristics of 
international commercial arbitration and a judicialised approach to the arbitral 
process. 
 
Thus, it is argued that the judicialisation process is a by-product rather than a 
consciously pursued development in the area of international commercial 
arbitration
629
. This conclusion together with the observation that the process of 
judicialisation is driven by internal forces is of importance because it suggests that 
the future of international commercial arbitration is the hands of arbitration users. 
The latter are responsible for striking a balance between the traditional 
characteristics of international commercial arbitration and the pursuit of fairness, 
justice and the truth in the arbitral process.  
                                                                                                                                          
Psychology in International Arbitration’, summary of presentation available at: 
<http://www.brunel.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/299528/Cultural-Dimensions,-
Psychological-Expectations-and-Behavioral-Patterns-in-Arbitration_Fan-Kun.pdf> 
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  This is not necessarily the case with other branches of arbitration, such as labour and consumer 
arbitration, where the existence of mandatory arbitration clauses suggests public policy 
influence, hence external to arbitration factors.  
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CHAPTER 5  JUDICIALISATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
AND THE MECHANICS OF ARBITRAL DECISION-
MAKING 
 
Objectives 
 
This chapter aims to complete the analysis of the process of judicialisation by 
considering whether the judicialisation has also permeated arbitral decision-making 
process. In light of the conclusions reached in the previous chapters, there appears to 
be expectations from arbitrators to act judicially and promote consistency and 
precision in their decision-making process.  
 
It is of importance to examine whether arbitrators conform to such expectations and 
foster the judicialisation agenda or whether they are inclined to uphold the traditional 
characteristics of international commercial arbitration. As arbitrators are entrusted 
with dissolving the tension between the pursuit of fairness and justice in 
international arbitration proceedings and the alternative nature of arbitration, 
analysing the mechanics of arbitral decision-making will suggest whether arbitrators 
take a quasi-judicial or industry-insider’s approach when dealing with issues of fact 
or law.   
 
The conclusions reached in this chapter seek to inform arbitration users as to how 
parties’ expectations and perceptions of what arbitrator’s function entails influence 
arbitral decision-making. This is why instead of closely examining arbitrator’s 
decision-making process, the evolution of arbitrator’s status will be used as an 
illustration of the mechanics of arbitrator’s decision-making.  
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5.1 Arbitrators in the Eyes of the Public  
 
The development of a sophisticated framework of international instruments, national 
legislation, arbitration rules and soft laws has not only strengthened the role of the 
rule of law in international commercial arbitration, but has also enhanced the 
legitimacy of this method for dispute resolution in the eyes of the public, the 
arbitrators and the institutions. As already discussed in Parts 2 and 3, the growing 
body of arbitral law safeguards parties’ fundamental rights and aims at providing the 
necessary certainty and predictability. The emphasis on due process in arbitration 
proceedings is considered to ensure parties’ right to access to justice. In addition, the 
party’s right to appoint an arbitrator coupled with the double standard for arbitrator’s 
impartiality and independence give businesses control over the arbitral process, 
while also warranting a fair dispute resolution process and, in most cases, an 
accurate arbitral award.  
 
It is fair to say that given the evolution of international commercial arbitration, 
today’s arbitrators are not perceived as mere service providers but as adjudicators 
who administer justice and act judicially. Arbitrators compete to preside over the 
largest, most high profile and complex cases, and this is often reflected in the 
elaborate reasoning of their awards
630
. The new generation of international 
arbitrators is in stark contrast to the “small, intimate group of European ‘grand 
notables’ or ‘Grand Old Men’” 631  in the era of “rough-hewn, Euro-centric, and 
equity-driven” 632  international arbitration, arbitrators who were trusted for their 
shared sense of duty. The dominant opinion of the pioneers of arbitration was that 
“arbitration should not be a profession: ‘Arbitration is a duty, not a career’”.633 The 
                                                 
630
  See Julia A. Martin, ‘Arbitrating in the Alps Rather Than Litigating in Los Angeles: The 
Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution’ 
(1997) 49 Stanford Law Review 917–970, 967. Julia Martin argues that one of the disadvantages 
of the ICC arbitration is the way arbitrators’ fees are set as it has an effect on the reasoning of 
the arbitral awards. According to the author, since arbitrators’ fees under the ICC Rules are set 
based on “the complexity of the case, as reflected in the award”, arbitrators have “an incentive to 
write unnecessary elaborate opinions”. 
631
  Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (n 445) 61. 
632
  Ibid. 
633
  Dezalay and Garth, Dealing in Virtue (n 23) 34. 
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arbitrators of yesteryear were often “commercial men”634 and had a paternalistic role 
in the arbitral process, as they frequently acted as amiables compositeurs. They 
decided disputes based on the factual context and avoided application of substantive 
rules of law
635
. In the modern sophisticated international arbitration, however, 
arbitrator’s vocation is seen less as a noble duty fulfilled in a self-contained 
process
636
 and more like a professional occupation carried out in a transnational 
system of law. The new generation of arbitrators operate in a complex, globalised 
economic and legal environment
637
:    
 
As the nature and range of disputes have expanded and diversified, arbitrators have 
adjusted to the new environment. The new generation of arbitrators can no longer 
invoke “grand principles of law” or vague notions of equity with the same innate sense 
of legitimacy on which the earlier generation relied. Instead, they have adopted a more 
technocratic and procedurally rigorous approach to arbitral decision-making. This more 
technocratic and managerial approach appeals to modern parties, who are drafting 
increasingly complex and detailed contracts, which they want enforced with legal 
precision.
638
 
 
Indeed legal accuracy and efficient case management are the most highly regarded 
qualities of the new generation of arbitrators. Both scholars and arbitration users 
seem to be in agreement that justice in international commercial arbitration is served 
when there is a proper truth-seeking process in place guarantying not only a timely 
resolution of the dispute but also an accurate one. In the words of William Park: 
                                                 
634
  Craig (n 10) 6. 
635
  Brunet, ‘Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration’ (n 23) 42. 
636
  Craig (n 10) 7. 
637
  See Maxi Scherer, ‘The Globalization of International Commercial Arbitration’ (2010) 2 Revue 
des Juristes de SciencesPo 64–69; Lynch (n 23); Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Globalization of Arbitral 
Procedure’ (n 446); Hanotiau, ‘International Arbitration in a Global Economy’ (n 10); 
Böckstiegel, ‘Past, Present, and Future Perspectives of Arbitration’ (n 41); Leahy and Bianchi (n 
1). 
638
  Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (n 445) 64. Prof Rogers’s conclusion is based on the 
analysis carried out by Dezalay and Garth, Dealing in Virtue (n 23) were among the first to 
argue that arbitration was “becoming too much like litigation” (Dezalay and Garth, Dealing in 
Virtue (n 23) 38). The debate about the role of arbitrators in an “over-technical”, “over-
proceduralized or over-judicialized” arbitration is continued in Thomas Schultz and Robert 
Kovacs, ‘The Rise of a Third Generation of Arbitrators? Fifteen Years after Dezalay and Garth’ 
(2012) 28 Arbitration International 161–172. 
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Although justice delayed can mean justice denied, a sense that truth mattes remains 
vital to a perception that justice is being done. Arbitration becomes a lottery of 
inconsistent and unpredictable results without some investment of the time and money 
required for a rigorous search for facts and law in which litigants receive a meaningful 
opportunity to present their cases. (…) An arbitrator’s main duty lies not only in 
dictating a peace treaty, but in delivery of an accurate award that rests on a reasonable 
view of what happened and what the law says.
639
 
 
Accuracy, precision and consistency are characteristics that businesses involved in 
high-stake arbitrations cherish and seek. Arbitrators providing their services on the 
global competitive market must respect those values if they want to be appointed on 
a case. Shared by the whole arbitration community those values become social 
norms that affect arbitral decision-making. They also trigger the processes of 
professionalisation
640
 and judicialisation of international commercial arbitration. 
                                                 
639
  Park, ‘Arbitrators and Accuracy’ (n 372) 27. 
640
  See Ralf Michaels, ‘Roles and Role Perceptions of International Arbitrators’ in Walter Mattli 
and Thomas Dietz (eds), International Arbitration and Global Governance: Contending 
Theories and Evidence (1st edn, OUP 2014) 60-61 where the author argues that the increasing 
professionalisation is directly linked to the judicialisation of international commercial 
arbitration. The latter, however, is not simply a response to the increased complexity of trade 
transactions and contracts. It is contended that “the judicialization of international arbitration 
proceedings, the introduction of US-style procedures, and the tendency toward a more 
adversarial process” were not incidental but rather “that complexity was in part produced 
deliberately because it invited devices used to specifically enhance the competitiveness of US 
practitioners.” Although it is true that the introduction of litigation-like techniques and the 
increasingly adversarial style of arbitration proceedings can be linked to the process of 
judicialisation, claims that the latter are the result of a plot orchestrated by US practitioners in 
order to get a piece of the pie are somewhat far-fetched. The judicialisation of international 
commercial arbitration can only be described as a “deliberate” process to the extent that 
“deliberate” means “not self-driven” as opposed to “intentional”. The Americanisation of 
international commercial arbitration is rooted in the globalisation of the markets, the 
commercialisation of arbitration and the fact that arbitrators and counsel come to arbitration with 
their cultural and legal background. Multiple legal and social norms amalgamate in this system 
in order to give rise to new norms that shape the culture of transnational commercial arbitration. 
William Park gives the following example of this process: “Just as international arbitration has 
been ‘Americanized,’ arbitration in the United States has to some extent begun to reflect the 
European emphasis on written testimony and reasoned awards. Perhaps the most striking 
examples can be found in the new American standard for arbitrator ethics. Traditionally, party-
appointed arbitrators in the United States were considered partisan and thus permitted ex parte 
communications with their appointers. Ultimately, however, American arbitration came into line 
with global standards, imposing a presumption of independence for all arbitrators, regardless of 
how they were selected.” in Park, ‘Arbitrators and Accuracy’ (n 372) 37, 38. 
 
Page 237 
Thus it is argued that both professionalisation and judicialisation curb the arbitral 
decision-making process
641
. 
 
The “professionalisation (…) creates specific communication-forms in regard to the 
application and interpretation of law”642, which affect the way the arbitral process is 
managed. The result is arbitration proceedings that are much more formalised and 
legalised. The process of judicialisation, on the other hand, is about creating norms 
that guarantee parties’ access to justice, while also meet their expectations as to how 
justice is served. 
 
The ongoing professionalisation of international arbitration raises debates about the 
roles of both arbitrators and counsel and whether the status quo meets public 
                                                 
641
  The judicialisation of international commercial arbitration is driven by the will of the arbitration 
users. As businesses preferences shift, the arbitrator’s conduct follows the trend and this 
inevitably has an effect on the whole arbitral process, including arbitrator’s decision-making. 
Prof Catherine A. Rogers suggests that there may also be a sociological factor having bearing on 
arbitrator’s conduct and the “product of international arbitrators’ work”, i.e. justice (Rogers, 
‘The Vocation of the International Arbitrator’ (n 464) 984): “[t]his (arbitration) market has come 
under increased pressure in recent years because the number of arbitrators and arbitration 
proceedings has increased sharply and their work product has come under greater scrutiny. At 
least partially in response to these pressures, arbitrators have begun to display a ‘professional 
impulse,’ meaning efforts to present themselves as a profession. Sociological accounts of the 
professions tell us that in seeking to present themselves as a profession, international arbitrators 
are inevitably seeking to express what has developed as a shared identity, as well as to obtain 
certain benefits associated with professionalization, such as added prestige, exclusivity, and 
regulatory autonomy.” (in ‘The Vocation of the International Arbitrator’ (n 464) 960-961). Prof 
Rogers further argues that with the professionalisation of international arbitratoration arbitrators 
regard their vocation “as a primarily entrepreneurial venture” and as a consequence 
“international arbitrators are less constrained by shared traditions or by an inherent sense of 
obligation, which means that they are less subject to the informal social controls that operated 
when the community was still comprised of an elite in-group” (Rogers, ‘The Vocation of the 
International Arbitrator’ (n 464) 966-967). Despite the shift in arbitrator’s perception as to their 
vocation, arbitrators are still subject to informal social controls that moderate their conduct and 
decision-making. With the growing popularity of international arbitration arbitrators are in the 
spotlight of public attention. The greater the public attention to international arbitration is, the 
bigger the pressure is on arbitrators to render services to a very high standard. In psychology and 
social science this is known as the priming effect. Evidence of priming studies suggests that a 
“reminder of being watched prodded people into improved behaviour” (Daniel Kahneman, 
Thinking, Fast and Slow (2nd edn, Penguin Books 2012) 58, 50-58). In addition, the new 
generation of arbitrators renders its services in a highly competitive and sophisticated market. As 
a result arbitrators are even more suseptible to parties’ expectations and the projections of the 
public for the arbitrator’s role.  
642
  B. Landheer, ‘The Evolution of Sociological Thinking about International Society and 
International Law’ in Hague Academy of International Law (ed), Collected Courses of the 
Hague Academy of International Law (Volume 091) (1st edn, Brill Nijhoff 1957) 29. 
 
Page 238 
expectations. The calls for ethical codes are a clear indication that arbitrators have 
stopped being simply service providers and that arbitrator’s vocation has become a 
profession in its own right
643
.    
 
Several recent surveys illustrate how arbitral decision-making is curtailed by the 
professionalisation of arbitrators and parties’ agreement. The studies also 
demonstrate that the most important characteristics of the third generation of 
arbitrators are knowledge of the law and experience with the arbitration practice. 
This supports the assumption that users’ satisfaction with arbitration is dependent on 
the way arbitrators administer justice. Never before has Redfern and Hunter’s dictum 
“[p]robably the most important qualification for an experienced arbitrator is that he 
[or she] should be experienced in the law and practice of arbitration”644 held so true.  
 
Thus, in the 2013 QMUL study, respondents considered arbitrator’s expertise to 
include (1) commercial understanding of the relevant industry sector; (2) knowledge 
of the law applicable to the contract; and (3) experience with the arbitration 
process.
645
 It comes as no surprise that one of the highly valued features of today’s 
international commercial arbitration is, in fact, arbitrator’s knowledge of the sources 
of law and experience in applying the law. The significance of the latter can be 
appreciated when considering the growing number of the sources of law in 
international commercial arbitration, as well as the complexity of issues pertaining to 
the definition of “the source of law” in international commercial arbitration, 
ascertainment of the biding force, weight and persuasiveness of the sources of 
law
646
, and application of the doctrines of precedent, lis pendens, res judicata
647
, etc. 
                                                 
643
  According to Ralf Michaels “the much-described professionalization of international arbitration 
is really, at its roots, a change in the roles of arbitration practitioners” (Michaels, ‘Roles and 
Role Perceptions of International Arbitrators’ (n 640) 49). The author continues: “The 
professionalization of international arbitration has led to an alignment at least of the function of 
the arbitrator to that of a judge. Contemporary arbitration procedures are frequently so adversary 
in nature that the common interests of the parties, which could define a service, are difficult to 
identify.” (Michaels, ‘Roles and Role Perceptions of International Arbitrators’ (n 640) 70). 
644
  Redfern, Hunter, Blackaby, and Partasides, Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (n 117). 
645
  See 2013 QMUL Survey (n 15). 
646
  See for example Strong, Research and Practice in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Sources and Strategies (n 131) 11, para 2.07 where it is pointed out that distinction between the 
legal authorities in the context of international commercial arbitration is not an easy task because 
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In a different study Thomas Shultz and Robert Kovacs were interested in finding out 
“how the required characteristics for being a successful arbitrator have changed 
between the first half of the nineties and today”648. The assumption that prompted 
the authors to conduct the survey was that “changes in the global practice of 
arbitration seem likely to reflect on what people expect today from arbitrators”649. 
The results confirmed that public expectations have changed and revealed that the 
most highly regarded attributes for arbitrators were specialisation in the law and 
practice of arbitration and management abilities. Somewhat surprisingly, given the 
heated discussions about the increasing costs and delays in international arbitration, 
the ability to encourage settlement between the parties and the cost of arbitrator
650
 
were not considered an essential characteristic of the new generation of arbitrators. 
 
Given that modern international commercial arbitration is shaking off its conciliatory 
features and is turning into a process that values precision over equity, and due 
process over efficiency, the arbitrators of today are perceived as adjudicators that 
render justice in a transnational system of law. As Prof Lalive unequivocally stated, 
international commercial arbitration “can no longer be seen as a simple and cheap 
domain reserved to a few distinguished amateurs” 651 . This method for dispute 
resolution has evolved and with it the public expectations of arbitrators and their role 
in the arbitral process have changed too: 
 
[u]ntil about twenty years ago, international arbitration was an ad hoc compromise-
oriented process characterized by its informality and emphasis on fairness. Arbitral 
decisions were not revered so much for their legal accuracy or precision as much as for 
their sense of fairness and practical wisdom. (...) The arbitrator was expected to render 
                                                                                                                                          
some of the sources of law contain mandatory provisions, while others promote general 
principles of law with mere persuasive effect. 
647
  See Chapter 3. 
648
  Schultz and Kovacs (n 635) 164. 
649
  Ibid. 
650
  Ibid.  
651
  Pierre Lalive, ‘Irresponsibility in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1999) 7 Asia Pacific 
Law Review 161–176, 162. 
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a just and equitable result, even if that sometimes meant disregarding the express terms 
of the contract or the clear provisions of chosen law.
652
 
 
While: 
 
[t]oday, arbitration is a highly sophisticated, procedurally complex and exhaustive 
process dominated by its own domain experts. The lack of an avenue of appeal, coupled 
with minimal curial intervention, was meant to simplify things. Instead, these factors 
have given rise to the realization that there is little room for error in arbitration. The 
modern era of arbitration is characterized by insulated arbitral decision-making with 
minimal review. For our clients, arbitration has become a one-strike proposition leading 
to the escalation of costs, as parties inevitably chase the best arbitrators and the best 
lawyers to give themselves the best chance of winning their case.
653
 
 
It should be noted that the professionalisation of arbitrators of today goes hand in 
hand with the institutionalisation of international commercial arbitration. Many of 
the prominent arbitrators are often members of institutional courts of arbitration
654
 or 
affiliated with arbitration associations and non-governmental organisations, such as 
Association for International Arbitration (AIA), International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), etc. Those organisations seek to promote ADR, 
collaborate with other ADR institutions, encourage scholarship and publication, and 
organise training and educational activities. Often those organisations are open to 
membership, fellowship and/or affiliation. Some even offer professional courses and 
grant certificates to those who successfully pass specifically tailored assessments. 
This demonstrates aspiration to professionalise the vocation of international 
arbitrators and guarantee that it is performed to a professional standard. 
 
Back in 1985 Jan Paulsson spotted the side effects of the success of international 
commercial arbitration: 
                                                 
652
  Rogers, ‘Fit and Function in Legal Ethics’ (n 64), 350 et seq. 
653
  Menon (n 36). 
654
  See for example SIAC Court of Arbitration, available at <http://siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-
43/about-us/court-of-arbitration>, ICC Court of Arbitration, available at: 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/About-ICC/Organization/Dispute-Resolution-Services/ICC-
International-Court-of-Arbitration/List-of-Current-Court-Members/>, LCIA Court of 
Arbitration, available at: <http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/the-lcia-court.aspx>, etc.   
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The age of innocence has come to an end for international commercial arbitration. (…) 
Once the delightful discipline of a handful of academic aficionados, somewhere on the 
fringes of private international law, it has become a matter of serious concern for great 
numbers of professionals determined to master a process because it is essential to their 
business. They labour, but not for love. (…) The days of genial artisans are gone; 
international arbitration has become a serious industry not only for businessmen and 
lawyers, but also for arbitrators, and indeed for the proliferating institutions that seek to 
maintain, increase, or establish a caseload of important arbitrations. (…)
655
  
 
The incisive observations of Prof Paulsson regarding the professionalisation of 
arbitrators and the arbitral process remain valid even today:   
 
(…) international arbitral process shows signs of becoming more formalistic, more 
court-like; French speakers refer to la juridictionnalisation de l'arbitrage. Litigants 
become more sophisticated, and come up with more difficult procedural stratagems. 
Practising lawyers represent client, not ideals – and they often represent defendants. 
The result is that the arbitrator's much-vaunted freedom to adopt procedures as he sees 
fit is cramped by the vehemence of the parties' procedural arguments; in order not to 
appear biased, arbitrators more and more often prefer to justify procedural rulings by 
reference to pre-existing rules rather than their own discretion. Accordingly, the law of 
arbitration, grist for the academic mill and once the dominant if not the only great 
subject of international arbitration, must now share at least equal time with more 
mechanical matters: the practice of arbitration.
656
 
 
Today international commercial arbitration is dominated by arbitration institutions 
and professional arbitrators. According to the 2006 QMUL Survey
657
 businesses 
have a clear preference for institutional arbitration as opposed to ad hoc arbitration, 
with 76% of corporations opting for institutional rather than ad hoc arbitration. In 
the 2008 QMUL Survey
658
 the number of respondents that have used institutional 
arbitration was even higher, namely 86% of awards were rendered by arbitration 
                                                 
655
  Jan Paulsson, ‘Introduction’ (1985) 1 Arbitration International 2–5, 2. 
656
  Ibid 3. 
657
  2006 QMUL Survey (n 2). 
658
  2008 QMUL Survey (n 3).  
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institutions rather than through ad hoc arbitration. Statistical reports released by 
arbitration institutions confirm this trend. The popularity of institutional arbitration, 
as opposed to ad hoc arbitration, is steadily growing. The official statistics of 
Arbitration Institute of the SCC, for example, show that 168 cases of the 2015 
caseload were administered under the SCC Rules or the SCC Rules for Expedited 
Arbitrations, while only in 12 cases, or nearly 7% of all cases, parties requested 
SCC’s administrative services as appointing authority in ad hoc arbitrations. 
Although ad hoc arbitration has the potential to be more flexible, cost efficient and 
expedient than institutional arbitration it is rarely chosen by the parties.
659
  
 
As mentioned above, the professionalisation of arbitrator’s vocation is driven by 
arbitration users’ regard for legal accuracy and certainty. The expectations of the 
public that an arbitrator will render a decision by applying the law and observing the 
arbitration practice, as opposed to invoking equitable principles, are engraved in the 
choice of law provisions in the arbitration agreements. By agreeing that a particular 
national law will govern the merits of the dispute, parties limit arbitrators’ power and 
curtail arbitral decision-making by favouring legal certainty and predictability over 
flexibility and equity. Studies demonstrate that there is a steady increase in the 
percentage of contracts that include express choice of law clauses in the last 15 years 
(see Figure 4). While in 2000 about 77% of the contracts relating to new ICC cases 
contained a choice of law clause, this percentage was 90% in 2013
660
. Explicit 
choice of law clauses leave little room for the application of lex mercatoria and trade 
usages. They also indicate parties’ preference for a legalistic approach to the sources 
                                                 
659
  Among the reasons for the preference of institutional arbitration is the fact that ad hoc 
arbitration can often result in deadlocks. Ad hoc arbitration depends on the cooperation between 
the parties, particularly in cases when the dispute has already arisen and the parties have not 
agreed the terms of arbitration. In such situations it proves helpful to have an institution that 
supervises the appointment and impartiality of arbitrators, the compliance with procedural 
deadlines and the neutrality of the whole process. Negotiating a full set of rules that meet 
parties’ needs may require more time than arbitrating a dispute under the auspices of arbitration 
institution with well-established rules. The uncertainties associated with ad hoc arbitration make 
this form of alternative dispute resolution undesirable and unsuitable for high stake disputes and 
multiparty arbitrations. Given that in the last 15 years about 30% of the new requests for ICC 
arbitration involve more than 2 parties and between 50% to 75% of the new cases involve 
disputes over $1 million, it is not surprising that businesses prefer the expertise of the arbitration 
institutions and the degree of certainty that comes with the pre-set institutional arbitration rules 
over the flexible but unpredictable ad hoc arbitration. 
660
  Statistics based on data from the ICC Bulletins and ICC website. 
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of law, since parties are reluctant to take advantage of the flexibility that application 
of lex mercatoria offers. In fact, such an approach is also endorsed by the arbitrators, 
who in the absence of a choice of law provision would not hastily apply lex 
mercatoria.
661
   
 
 
(FIGURE 4: Data collected from the ICC Bulletins and ICC website) 
 
The 2010 QMUL Survey
662
 further highlights the importance of the choice of law 
clauses to businesses and sheds some light on parties’ attitudes to choosing the law 
governing the substance of the dispute. The study reveals that 68% of the 
corporations have a dispute resolution policy and almost all of those that have a 
policy also have a position on the preferred law to govern the substance of the 
dispute (94%).
663
 In fact, the law governing the substance of the dispute is of such 
importance to businesses that 51% of the respondents pointed out that they usually 
select it first when negotiating an arbitration clause.
664
 According to the same survey 
                                                 
661
  See text to and following n 369. See also ICC Case 13129, award rendered in 2005 in Jean-
Jacques Arnaldez, Yves Derains, and Dominique Hascher (eds), Collection of ICC Arbitral 
Awards 2008-2011 (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2013) 337 where the arbitrator noted: “I 
have reservations as to the real existence of anything that can be described as lex mercatoria. (I 
am of course aware of the extremely learned debate that has continued on this topic for the past 
quarter-century or more.)” 
662
  2010 QMUL Survey (n 380). 
663
  Ibid 5. 
664
  Ibid 8. 
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considerations about the neutrality and impartiality of the legal system, the 
appropriateness of the law for the type of contract in question, and the familiarity 
with the particular law influence businesses’ choices as to the law governing the 
substance of the disputes.
665
 These findings can be explained by the fact that the 
certainty and commercial soundness that come with the selection of a particular 
national law are of great value to arbitration users. The study further suggests that 
even when parties want to limit the impact of the governing law, they prefer 
negotiating an extensively drafted contract instead of choosing anational rules of law 
or transnational principles to govern the merits of the dispute.
666
  
 
Although anational rules and transnational principles have the potential to be 
universal and equitable, they are more uncertain in terms of their content. This could 
explain the reluctance of business parties to use transnational laws or rules to govern 
their disputes. 81% of the respondents in the 2010 QMUL Survey pointed out that 
they have never used determination ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur, and 
51% have never used general principles of law, commercial practices or fairness and 
equity.
667
 Still, some 26% of the participant in the study said they “sometimes” use 
general principles of law, commercial practices or fairness and equity, while 16% 
use them “often”.668 It should be noted, however, that the interviewees often used the 
transnational rules as supplementary or definitional concepts alongside a governing 
national law rather than as a law that solely regulates all aspects of the contractual 
relationship between the parties.
669
 Indeed such an approach is more in line with the 
statistics gathered from arbitration institutions.  
 
In the great majority of contracts businesses have explicitly agreed on a particular 
national law as the law governing the merits of the dispute. Only in about 2-3% of 
the cases the choice of law clauses specifies anational rules or transnational 
                                                 
665
  Ibid 11-12. 
666
  Ibid 16. According to 29% of the respondents an extensively drafted contract can limit the 
impact of the governing law “to a great extent” and 53% thought it could limit it to “some 
extent”. Only 15% considered that a type of contract often referred to as a “regulatory” can limit 
the impact of the governing law to a limited extent only. 
667
  Ibid 15. 
668
  Ibid. 
669
  Ibid. 
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principles as the governing law. This insignificantly small percentage is in stark 
contrast with the historically high number of arbitration cases. It demonstrates a 
change in businesses’ attitude to choice of law clauses, namely an overwhelming 
regard for certainty and predictability. According to the ICC Statistical Reports in 
2003 there were 580 new requests for arbitration and only 2 underlying contracts 
referred to rules or bases for deciding the dispute, such as equity, ex aequo et bono 
or amiable composition; in 2004 and 2007 there were no such references; in 2009, 
2010 and 2011 when the ICC had a record high number of new requests for 
arbitration only 1 or 2 contracts authorised the tribunals to decide ex aequo et 
bono.
670
 
 
The above attitudes and practices show that arbitration users carefully negotiate their 
arbitration agreements and make deliberate choices that favour certainty and 
foreseeability. By choosing institutional over ad hoc arbitration and by incorporating 
choice of law clauses in their contracts businesses express their preference for rules 
of law that are accessible, clear, predictable and intelligible. This inevitably 
influences the perceptions about arbitrator’s role and how arbitrators administer 
justice. There is added pressure that not only party’s agreement will be respected but 
also the law will be applied accurately. 
 
 
5.2 Arbitrators in the Eyes of the Institutions  
 
The implementation of the UNCITRAL ML in many national arbitration laws has 
marked an era of limited curial intervention in international commercial arbitration. 
This policy of minimum court interference is not tolerance towards injustice
671
 but 
                                                 
670
  In Ahmet Cemil Yildirim, ‘Amiable Composition in International Arbitration’ (2014) 24 Journal 
of Arbitration Studies 33–46, 34 the author observes that while doing his research he 
encountered ex aequo et bono awards from the 1950’s and 1960’s. He then argues that “the 
awards by amiable compositeur arbitrators were intensified in the 1970’s and 1980’s”, however 
“the number of this kind of arbitral awards decline in late 1980’s and early 1990’s” to reach the 
point when today “the publication of the awards by amiable compositeur arbitrators is quite 
rare”. 
671
  In Bandwith Shipping Corporation v. Intaari [2007] EWCA Civ 998 Waller LJ stated: “In my 
view the authorities have been right to place a high hurdle in the way of a party to an arbitration 
seeking to set aside an award or its remission by reference to section 68 and in particular by 
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respect for the autonomy of contracting parties. In GreCon Dimter Inc. v. J. R. 
Normand Inc.
672
 the Supreme Court of Canada held that recognition of the principle 
of party autonomy “goes hand in hand with the legislature’s tendency toward 
recognizing the existence and legitimacy of the private justice system, which is often 
consensual and is parallel to the state’s judicial system.”673 
 
International commercial arbitration is widely accepted as a legitimate form of 
dispute resolution, while arbitrators are considered to perform a quasi-judicial 
function. In Case No. 10 of 127j
674
 it was held that “the arbitrator’s duty is in 
harmony with the judicial function”. In a different case the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom considered the “general international legal understanding of the 
nature of an arbitrator’s engagement” and endorsed the view expressed in Gary Born 
“International Commercial Arbitration” (2009), namely that the functions of an 
arbitrator are judicial in nature.
675
 Reversing the Court of Appeal’s decision, the UK 
Supreme Court found it surprising that the Court of Appeal concluded that 
arbitrators were employees of the parties given that: 
 
(…) as long ago as 1904 (RGZ 59, 247), the German Reichsgericht identified the 
particular nature of an arbitral contract, in terms which (…) have a relevance to 
arbitration generally, when it said (in translation): “It does not seem permissible to treat 
the arbitrator as equivalent to a representative or an employee or an entrepreneur. His 
office has … an entirely special character, which distinguishes him from other persons 
                                                                                                                                          
reference to section 33. Losers often think that injustice has been perpetrated when their factual 
case has not been accepted. It could be said to be “unjust” if arbitrators get the law wrong but if 
there is no appeal to the court because the parties have agreed to exclude the court, the decision 
is one they must accept. It would be a retrograde step to allow appeals on fact or law from the 
decisions of arbitrators to come in by the side door of an application under section 33 and 
section 68.” (at [38]) See also Bulfracht (Cyprus) Ltd v Boneset Shipping Co Ltd “The MV 
Pamphilos” [2002] EWHC 2292 (Comm) 681 at 687: “In many cases, such as this, the 
arbitrators have been appointed because of their professional legal, commercial or technical 
experience and the parties take the risk that, in spite of that experience, errors of fact may be 
made or invalid inferences drawn without prior warning. It needs to be emphasized that in such 
cases there is simply no irregularity, serious or otherwise. What has happened is simply an 
ordinary incident of the arbitral process on the arbitrator’s power to make findings of fact 
relevant to the issues between the parties.” 
672
  [2005] 2 SCR 401. 
673
  Ibid at [38]. 
674
  Court of Appeal of Cairo, Commercial Arbitration, 4 January 2011. 
675
  Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40 at 77. 
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handling the affairs of third parties. He has to decide a legal dispute in the same way as 
and instead of a judge, identifying the law by matching the relevant facts to the relevant 
legal provisions. The performance expected from him is the award, which constitutes 
the goal and outcome of his activity. It is true that the extent of his powers depends on 
the arbitration agreement, which can to a greater or lesser extent prescribe the way to 
that goal for him. But, apart from this restriction, his position is entirely free, freer than 
that of an ordinary judge.”
676
 
 
It was further held by the Supreme Court judges that: 
 
The arbitrator is in critical respects independent of the parties. His functions and duties 
require him to rise above the partisan interests of the parties and not to act in, or so as to 
further, the particular interests of either party. As the International Chamber of 
Commerce (the ICC) puts it, he must determine how to resolve their competing 
interests. He is in no sense in a position of subordination to the parties; rather the 
contrary. He is in effect a ‘quasi-judicial adjudicator’.
677
 
 
The decision in Jivraj v Hashwani
678
 followed the Court of Appeal’s position in K/S 
Norjarl A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd
679
. In the latter case it was found 
that the arbitration agreement is a bilateral contract between the parties to the main 
contract and by accepting the appointment the arbitrator becomes a third party to the 
arbitration agreement. Although the source of the arbitrator’s obligation to resolve a 
dispute or disputes, which have arisen or may arise in respect of a defined legal 
relationship between the parties
680
, is contractual, the function of the arbitrator is a 
quasi-judicial one: 
 
Under that trilateral contract, the arbitrator undertakes his quasi-judicial functions in 
consideration of the parties agreeing to pay him remuneration. By accepting 
                                                 
676
  Ibid 76. 
677
  Ibid 41. 
678
  Ibid. 
679
  [1992] QB 863. 
680
  See Arbitration Act 1996, s 6; German Arbitration Act 1998, Section 1029; Singapore 
International Arbitration Act with 2012 amendments, Art. 2A. Also Methanex Motonui Ltd, 
Methanex Waitara Valley Ltd v. Joseph Spellman [2004] 1 NZLR 95. Those characteristics of 
arbitration distinguish the role of an arbitrator from the one of a mediator, conciliator, certifier, 
valuer, etc. 
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appointment, the arbitrator assumes the status of a quasi-judicial adjudicator, together 
with all the duties and disabilities inherent in that status.
681
 
 
The view that arbitrators perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function appears to be 
widely accepted
682
. The High Court of South Africa held in Johan Louw Konstuksie 
                                                 
681
  K/S Norjarl A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd [1992] QB 863 at 885.  
682
  See Venezuela No. 2, Tanning Research Laboratories, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tropic de Venezuela 
C.A., Juzgado Sexto de Primera Instancia, Caracas, 2 August 2006 (as translated in Albert Jan 
van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2008 Volume XXXIII, Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration, Volume 33 (1
st
 edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) at 1228-1239: 
“The power to administer justice emanates from the citizens and is exercised in the name of the 
Republic by authority of the Law.’ Hence, the parties themselves can either submit their claims 
to the organs of the State (the courts) and grant them the power to decide on their disputes, or 
choose a different path – that is grounded in the same popular power – and submit their claim to 
a different organ, e.g., the arbitrators.” Also Astivenca Astilleros de Venezuela, C.A. v. Offshore 
Oceanlink III AS, Supreme Court (Constitutional Court) of Venezuela, No. 1067/2010; Clarence 
Frere, et al. v. Orthofix, Inc. and others, US No. 352, United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, 99 Civ. 4049 (RMB) (MHD), 6 December 2000; Total Support 
Management (Pty) Ltd and Another v. Diversified Health Systems (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd and 
Another (457/2000) [2002] ZASCA 14 (25 March 2002); TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co 
Ltd v. Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 83; Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 
U.S. 574 (1960) where it was stated that an arbitrator does not have a general duty to administer 
justice, which transcends the parties; ADG and another v. ADI and another matter, Supreme 
Court of Singapore, High Court, 15 April 2014; Sea Containers Ltd v. Ict Pty Ltd [2002] 
NSWCA 84 (18 April 2002) at 11: “Parties choose and appoint arbitrators from candidates who 
are entrepreneurs engaged in practice as barristers or solicitors or in other fields of endeavour. 
(…) But once appointed, an arbitrator is no longer an entrepreneur so far as the parties are 
concerned. The arbitrator accepts a quasi judicial position governed by law. Like a judge, not 
only must the arbitrator be impartial, the arbitrator must not give the appearance of bias. In 
Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corporation Limited 
[1981] AC 909 at 980 Lord Diplock observed that the concept of “arbitration” as a method of 
settling disputes carried with it by necessary implication that the person appointed as arbitrator 
to decide the dispute should be and should remain throughout free from all bias for or against 
any of the parties.” The double standard of impartiality and independence is another 
characteristic that arbitrators and judges share and has an impact on arbitrator’s decision-
making: See Section 3.1.1; AMEC Construction Pty Limited v. Coal and Allied Operations Pty 
Limited (Unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, Cole J, 29 April 1993) “There is a problem latent 
in every arbitration. An arbitrator, par excellence, is in a quasi-judicial position. He must avoid 
both the reality and the appearance of bias. The receipt by a judge of money or other benefits is 
the classic example of conduct which is unacceptable since, at its lowest, it raises the possibility 
of bias. Yet an arbitrator is paid by the parties.”; Austern (n 495) where it was held that judicial 
immunity is extended to arbitrators because they perform quasi-judicial functions; “the 
functional comparability of the arbitrators’ decision-making process and judgments to those of 
judges … generates the same need for independent judgment, free from the thread of lawsuits.”; 
Parties not indicated, Court of Appeal of Tunis, Case No. 25825, 13 March 2012: “The arbitrator 
exercises a judicial task, even if the task is incidental to the dispute. The same fundamental 
qualities required of a judge are also required of an arbitrator, being the neutrality and the 
independence to ensure justice between individuals and integrity when sentencing. Whether the 
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(Edms) Bpk v. Mr Mitchell, Another (unnamed in the judgment)
683
 that an arbitrator 
performs a judicial function and is expected to observe and apply the fundamental 
rules governing judicial proceedings. This does not mean that arbitrators are 
governed by the technical procedural rules applicable to judges in national courts. 
On contrary, arbitrators enjoy great procedural flexibility within the limits of 
fundamental procedural rules more often referred to as the rules of natural justice
684
:  
 
By submitting their dispute to arbitration the parties have manifested a wish to have 
their dispute determined judicially, with the natural justice that that entails. They have 
an open choice in this regard. They can dispense with natural justice by referring their 
dispute to expert determination rather than arbitration (…). Opting for arbitration rather 
than expert determination is synonymous with adopting natural justice safeguards.
685
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
matter is related to state justice or private justice, the goal is the same i.e. the achievement of 
justice and the protection of individual rights.” (As cited in 7(1) International Journal of Arab 
Arbitration 2015, 53-73, 62); Not Indicated v. Not Indicated, Higher Regional Court of 
Thuringia (Thüringer Oberlandesgericht or Thüringer OLG), 4 Sch 3/06, 8 August 2007; Not 
indicated v. Not indicated, Corte Suprema de Justicia (Supreme Court of Argentina), 11 
November 1997 (as reported in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
2000 Volume XXV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 25 (1
st
 edn, Kluwer Law 
International 2000) 443-534; Not Indicated v. Not Indicated, Cairo Court of Appeal, Seventh 
Commercial Circuit, 72/117, 8 January 2002. 
683
  High Court of South Africa, Cape Provicial Division, 6748/2000, 10 December 2001. 
684
  Note also the words of Turner L.J. in Haigh v. Haigh (1861) 5 L.T. 507 at 508: “…Arbitrators, 
like other judges, are bound, when they are not expressly absolved from doing so, to observe in 
their proceedings the ordinary rules which are laid down for the administration of justice; and 
this court, when called upon to review their proceedings, is bound to see that those rules have 
been observed.” (As quoted in David St. John Sutton, Judith Gill, and Matthew Gearing, Russell 
on Arbitration (24th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 180); ONGC v. Western Geco, Supreme 
Court of India, Civil Appeal No. 3415/2007, 4 September 2014; Not Indicated, Cairo Court of 
Appeal (n 682): “(…) impartiality, the very substance of the principle of autonomy of the courts, 
is not confined to judicial work. It is equally necessary in arbitration proceedings because the 
arbitrator, who, like a judge, performs the fundamental function of settling disputes, must also 
follow judicial procedure by observing the right of due process and the right of defense when 
verifying the allegations and examining the parties' claims, and must settle the dispute either by 
applying the provisions of the law or on the basis of the principles of fairness and equity. The 
arbitrator's function is of an objective, not a personal, nature.” (As cited in (2010) 2(2) 
International Journal of Arab Arbitration 124-128, 125. 
685
  Methanex Motonui Ltd (n 680) at [46].  
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The principle that arbitrator’s function is subject to natural justice safeguards has 
gained universal approval
686
. In ADG and another v. ADI and another matter 
Vinodh Coomaraswamy J held: 
 
The core concept of natural justice as it has been developed in administrative law no 
doubt applies to a tribunal. But one must remember that an arbitral tribunal’s powers 
over the parties spring from their consent and not from the coercive powers of the state 
or of a public body.
687
 
 
The dichotomy between the notions that arbitrator’s power is rooted in parties’ 
agreement but an arbitrator nevertheless performs a quasi-judicial function is 
resolved by the imposition of the natural justice safeguards. On the one hand, 
arbitrators are subject to the flexible procedure agreed between the parties. Such 
procedural rules are usually tailored to suit the needs of the parties and meet their 
expectations of arbitration as a dispute resolution process.
688
 The flexible arbitral 
procedure is also often a manifestation of arbitrator’s knowledge of the industry and 
professional experience.
689
 On the other hand, as arbitrators are entrusted to 
adjudicate disputes and perform a judicial function they must adhere to the concepts 
of due process and the rules of natural justice. In fact, arbitrator’s obligation to abide 
by the principles of natural justice is the justification of the judicial philosophy of 
minimal curial interference with the arbitral process.
690
 
 
It must be noted that the balance in the abovementioned dichotomy is tipped towards 
party autonomy and parties’ expectations of international commercial arbitration as a 
dispute resolution mechanism.
691
 This is why the rules of natural justice should not 
                                                 
686
  ADG and another (n 682); Anwar Siraj v. Ting Kang Chung [2003] 2 SLR 287; Soh Beng Tee & 
Co Pte Ltd v. Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR 86; Premium Brands Operating GP 
Inc. v. Turner Distribution Systems Ltd., British Columbia Court of Appeal, CA038214, 18 
February 2011. 
687
  ADG and another (n 682) at [113]. 
688
  Ibid. 
689
  Similarly to judges arbitrators are also entitled to use their general knowledge and experience to 
influence their assessment of the reasonableness and appropriateness of a claim: see VV, Another 
v. VW [2008] SGHC 11. 
690
  Soh Beng Tee (n 686) at [60]. 
691
  ADG and another (n 682) at [113], where a claim for breach of natural justice was brought on 
the grounds that the party’s right to be heard has been violated. The Court found that: “The right 
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be construed rigidly but they are dependent on their context.
692
 When a court 
accesses whether an arbitral tribunal has complied with the rules of natural justice, 
the former has to take into account the consensual nature of arbitration, the structure 
of the decision-making body and the nature and purpose of the tribunal’s decision 
itself.
693
  
 
Subject to the standards set by the rules of natural justice and empowered by the 
arbitration agreement, arbitrators make procedural decisions and render final awards 
“after weighing the competing considerations” and arguments put forward by the 
parties
694. The autonomy and flexibility in the arbitrators’ decision-making process 
are not restrained by technical rules of evidence, but they nevertheless have their 
limits. Arbitrators, much like judges, are not exempt from taking into account 
relevant and probative evidence and have to base their decisions on such evidence:   
 
These technical rules of evidence, however, form no part of the rules of natural justice. 
The requirement that a person exercising quasi-judicial functions must base his decision 
on evidence means no more than it must be based upon material which tends logically 
to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined, or 
to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of some future event the 
occurrence of which would be relevant. It means that he must not spin a coin or consult 
an astrologer, but he may take into account any material which, as a matter of reason, 
has some probative value (…).
695
 
                                                                                                                                          
to be heard as it is applied in arbitration is much less concerned with protecting the vulnerable 
against arbitrary governmental or quasi-governmental action and much more concerned with 
achieving practical results which fulfil the parties’ expectations of arbitration as a dispute 
resolution process. A further reason in international commercial arbitration is that one of its 
goals is for businesses to achieve precisely the expeditious, economical and final determination 
that the SIAC Rules mandate. It is for that reasons that the parties consciously agree to the 
Tribunal’s procedural flexibility and consciously accept the limited rights of recourse under the 
IAA.” 
692
  ADG and another (n 682) at 118; Premium Brands Operating GP Inc. (n 686) at 43. 
693
  ADG and another (n 682) at 118. 
694
  Ibid 112. 
695
  R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 488. See also 
AQU v. AQV [2015] SGHC 26, Supreme Court of Singapore, High Court, Originating Summons 
No 133 of 2014, 30 January 2015 at 18 where the court followed the rationale in R v Deputy 
Industrial Injuries Commissioner and held that “(…) it is clear that the principles of natural 
justice are not breached just because an arbitrator comes to a conclusion that is not argued by 
either party as long as that conclusion reasonably flows from the parties’ arguments.” Also in 
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Since arbitrators are bound by the rules of natural justice, they “act judicially” when 
resolving disputes brought to arbitration. The compliance with the rules natural 
justice is considered to be the essence of the judicial function and the duty to act 
judicially
696
. Fairness, impartiality and even independence can be binding on an 
architect or an engineer, who has been employed to act as a valuer or certifier 
because of their skills and experience, but the engineer or the architect cannot be 
bound by the rules of natural justice
697
:  
 
The rules of natural justice are formalised requirements of those who act judicially. 
Compliance with them is required of judges and arbitrators and those in equivalent 
                                                                                                                                          
TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 972 the 
High Court stated that the arbitrators can make findings not argued for by the parties “[i]f an 
unargued premise flows reasonably from an argued premise” (at [65]). However, in Front Row 
Investment Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Daimler South East Asia Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 80 
the High Court accepted that it would be a breach of natural justice for an arbitrator to disregard 
submissions and arguments made by parties without considering the merits thereof (at [31], [32] 
and [39]). It would equally be a breach of natural justice for an arbitrator to have regard to the 
submissions and arguments of the parties without really trying to understand them (TMM 
Division Maritima SA de CV at [89]). 
696
  In The Vimeira [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 66, at 76 Ackner LJ explains what the function of an 
arbitrator entails: “The essential function of an arbitrator (…) is to resolve the issues raised by 
the parties. The pleadings record what those issues are thought to be and, at the conclusion of the 
evidence, it should be apparent what issues still remain live issues. If an arbitrator considers that 
the parties of their experts have missed the real point (…) then it is not only a matter of obvious 
prudence, but the arbitrator is obliged, as a matter of natural justice, to put the point to them so 
that they have an opportunity of dealing with it (…).” See also Zermalt Holdings SA (n 457) at 
15 where Bingham LJ stressed that: “If an arbitrator is impressed by a point that has never been 
raised by either side then it is his duty to put it to them so that they have an opportunity to 
comment. If he feels that the proper approach is one that has not been explored or advanced in 
evidence or submission, then again it is his duty to give the parties a chance to comment. If he is 
to any extent relying on his own personal experience in a specific way, then that again is 
something that he should mention so that it can be explored. It is not right that his decision 
should be based on specific matters which the parties never had the chance to deal with, nor is it 
right that a party should first learn of adverse points in a decision against him. That is contrary 
both to the substance of justice and to its appearance (…).” 
697
  See Hounslow London Borough Council v Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd. [1971] Ch. 
233 at 260, Megarry J “For the rules of natural justice to apply, there must (…) be something in 
the nature of a judicial situation”. Also Canterbury Pipe Lines v The Christchurch Drainage 
Board (1979) 16 BLR 76 at 98 “(…) the Engineer, though not bound to act judicially in the 
ordinary sense, was bound to act fairly and impartially. (…) In relation to persons bound to act 
judicially fairness requires compliance with the rules of natural justice.” 
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positions, but not of an engineer giving a decision under clause 66 of the ICE 
conditions.
698
 
 
The significance of natural justice in arbitral proceedings is demonstrated by the fact 
that the rules of natural justice are part of a state’s public policy. An arbitral award 
can be refused recognition and enforcement if it would be contrary to the public 
policy of the country where enforcement is sought according to Art. 2(b) of the 
NYC.
699
 The great emphasis on the standards set by the rules of natural justice, due 
process, fairness and impartiality aims at ensuring private parties’ access to justice. 
As the Supreme Court of Canada held in Michelle Seidel v. TELUS Communications 
Inc.
700
: 
 
Access to justice (…) no longer means access just to the public court system. 
Historically, judges were reluctant to relinquish their grasp on dispute resolution, and 
they even viewed alternative dispute resolution as antithetical to the parties’ interests. 
This era is gone. (…)
701
  
 
Indeed there is now a dramatic change in the courts’ approach to international 
commercial arbitration and arbitrator’s vocation in particular. Arbitrators are now 
widely appreciated as service providers who administer justice in the private system 
of law. The acknowledgement of the quasi-judicial function of arbitrators, as 
manifested in the judicial philosophy of minimal curial intervention, has contributed 
to the evolution of international commercial arbitration. In the last 20-30 years 
international commercial arbitration has made an enormous leap in its development. 
It has ceased to be an informal, lawless
702
, ad hoc mechanism of dispute resolution 
                                                 
698
  Amec Civil Engineering Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport [2005] EWCA Civ 291, 17 
March 2005 at 46. 
699
  See for example TCL Air Conditioner (n 682) where it was held that “No international 
arbitration award should be set aside for being contrary to Australian public policy unless 
fundamental norms of justice and fairness are breached” at [111]. 
700
  Michelle Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., Supreme Court of Canada, 33154, 18 March 
2011 at [54]. 
701
  Ibid. 
702
  See Drahozal, ‘Is Arbitration Lawless?’ (n 134); Abraham and Montgomery (n 417); 
McConnaughay, 'The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness' Arbitration' (n 134); Lee (n 417).  
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and has been transformed into an institutionalised, professionalised, hierarchical
703
 
system – a kind of “offshore litigation”704. International commercial arbitration is 
now often referred to as a “transnational legal order” 705, “transnational system of 
justice”706 and a “form of global governance”707, while arbitrators are perceived not 
only as service providers but adjudicators and “system builders”708: 
 
(…) international arbitration has become increasingly institutionalized, 
professionalized, and judicialized. At the same time, it has gained significance beyond 
specific disputes or disputing parties. International arbitration has become an institution 
that contributes to the shaping of law. (…) International arbitrators are therefore not 
only transnational adjudicators, but they also contribute to the progressive development 
of transnational law.
709
  
 
The change in institutions’ perceptions to arbitrators’ functions is further 
demonstrated by the shift in the theoretical justifications of the foundation of 
international commercial arbitration. Legislatures and courts now adopt the view that 
arbitrators are neither agents, nor employees of the parties
710
. Instead the most 
                                                 
703
  Renner, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Norms in Transnational Law?’ (n 62); Alexis Mourre, 
‘Arbitral Jurisprudence in International Commercial Arbitration: The Case For A Systematic 
Publication Of Arbitral Awards In 10 Questions...’, 2009.  
704
  Dezalay and Garth, Dealing in Virtue (n 23) 34. 
705
  Ibid; Schultz (n 451); Paulsson, ‘Arbitration in Three Dimensions’ (n 61).  
706
  See Gaillard, ‘The Present – Commercial Arbitration as a Transnational System of Justice’ (n 
191); Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘The Emerging System of International Arbitration: Defining 
“System”’ (2012) 106 American Society of International Law. Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting 287–297. 
707
  See Mattli and Dietz (n 419); Eduardo Zuleta, ‘International Jurisprudence, Global Governance, 
and Global Administrative Law’ in David D. Caron and others (eds), Practising Virtue: Inside 
International Arbitration (1st edn, OUP 2015); Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria 
and Transnational Governance’ (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 627–646; Webster 
and Bühler (n 249). 
708
  See Stephan W. Schill, ‘International Arbitrators as System-Builders’ (2012) 106 Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 295–297.  
709
  David D Caron, Stephen W. Schill, Abby Cohen Smutny, and Epaminontas E Triantafilou, ‘An 
Introduction’ in David D. Caron and others (eds), Practising Virtue: Inside International 
Arbitration (1st edn, OUP 2015) 2. 
710
  Under the agent theory arbitrators are believed to be agents of the parties. Thus, until recently in 
US arbitrations the party-appointed arbitrators were partisan representatives of the appointing 
sides and each was expected to compete for the vote of the presiding, neutral arbitrator (see 
Astoria Med. Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 182 N.E.2d 85, 89 (N.Y. 1962); Sunkist 
Soft Drinks v Sunkist Growers 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 (1994). 
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widely accepted theory today is the hybrid theory, which has been developed on the 
basis of the contractual and jurisdictional theories. Gary Born outlines the reasons 
for the overwhelming support for the hybrid theory: 
 
Arbitration manifestly exhibits attributes of contractual relations, albeit of an unusual 
type. (…) At the same time, arbitration also manifestly involves attributes of 
jurisdictional authority and adjudicative decision-making, different from other forms of 
contractual relations. The arbitration agreement does not produce a typical 
“commercial” bargain, but instead results in a particular kind of dispute resolution 
process, where the decision-maker must be impartial and independent and must apply 
adjudicatory procedures in reaching a decision.
711
 
 
The support of one or another theory of the foundation of international commercial 
arbitration has a direct impact on the arbitrator’s functions and arbitrator’s decision-
making by extension. For example, the endorsement of the jurisdictional and 
contractual theories compel adherence to national case law as a source of law in 
international commercial arbitration, while the proponents of the autonomous theory 
favour a flexible approach whereby the autonomous nature of international 
commercial arbitration is recognised.  
 
The autonomous theory takes a functional approach to determining the foundations 
of international arbitration. The supporters of the autonomous theory argue that the 
character of international arbitration is to be decided by considering its use and 
purpose.
712
 Following this approach international arbitration is elevated to a supra-
national level and recognised as an autonomous legal order. This representation 
accepts that international arbitration is rooted in a distinct transnational legal order, 
rather than in one or several national legal systems: 
 
In the field of international business relations, it is the convergence of national legal 
orders that, through their widespread acceptance of arbitration, legitimizes its existence. 
By conferring to the arbitrators the power to adjudicate international business disputes 
when the parties so wish, and by recognizing the result of the arbitral process, i.e. the 
                                                 
711
  Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 216, 217. 
712
  Yu (n 198) 278. 
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award, without reviewing the merits of the dispute, the international community has 
granted arbitration true autonomy.
713
 
 
According to the autonomous theory the legitimacy of international arbitration is 
rooted in the will of all states that have joined or adhere to international conventions 
and other international instruments governing the conduct of international 
arbitration, such as the NYC, UNCITRAL ML, etc
714
. By exercising their 
adjudicative function arbitrators clarify existing and produce new transnational rules, 
thus contributing to the formation of “truly international and universally applicable 
public policy”715. Where a national law, and by extend national case law, violates 
transnational public policy, the former should not be applied and arbitrators are free 
to disregard parties’ agreement in favour of body of national or a-national rules of 
law that comply with transnational public policy.
716
 
 
In contrast, those that support the jurisdictional theory contend that the adjudicative 
function and mandate of arbitrators oblige them to strictly apply the rules of law: 
 
The jurisdictional function of an arbitral tribunal requires it to decide what rules of law 
cover the facts of the case, and having done so, it must, in the same manner as a 
national court, determine whether and to what extent the parties have respected, or 
failed to comply with them. When it adjudicates upon the claims and defences in the 
dispute, it grants to the successful party or parties such relief and remedies as are 
specified in the relevant rules of law and have been requested by such party, by 
assessing for example the extent of any loss or damage suffered, and the amount of any 
compensation due in respect thereof
717
. 
                                                 
713
  Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration (1st edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2010) 59. 
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  Gaillard, ‘The Present – Commercial Arbitration as a Transnational System of Justice’ (n 191) 
68. 
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  Paris Court of Appeal, May 25, 1990, Fougerolle v Procofrance, Rev. crit. DIP, 1990, p 753, as 
translated by Emmanuel Gaillard in Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration (n 713) 
60. 
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  Pierre Mayer, ‘Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law’ (2001) 17 
Arbitration International 235–247, 239. 
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Arbitration Law and Practice: A Dynamic Civil Law Approach to International Arbitration (2nd 
edn, Kluwer Law International 2009) 131. 
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Application of the rule of law includes not only compliance with the national and 
international laws but also adherence to national judicial precedents to the extent that 
court decisions are given binding effect in the state jurisdiction in question. The 
proponents of the jurisdictional theory maintain that: 
 
(…) arbitrators resemble judges of national courts because the arbitrators’ powers are 
drawn from the states by means of the rules of law. As with judges, arbitrators are 
required to apply the rules of law of a specific state to settle the disputes submitted to 
them. (…) Moreover, an arbitrator is required to carry out the arbitration proceedings in 
accordance with the will of the parties’ to the extent that the lex fori allows.
718
 
 
This view also is strongly supported by Julian Lew, who argues that: 
 
(…) the arbitrator, like the judge, draws his power and authority from the local law; 
hence the arbitrator is considered to closely resemble a judge. (…)The only difference 
between judge and arbitrator is that the former derives his nomination and authority 
directly from the sovereign, whilst the latter derives his authority from the sovereign 
but his nomination is a matter for the parties.
719
 
 
Thus, arbitrators are granted a special status by the states and they perform their 
function in public interest in its broad sense – it is in public interest to permit private 
individuals to decide disputes between parties when the latter have agreed so
720
. 
Since arbitrator’s role is seen as a quasi-judicial one “an arbitrator, similar to a 
                                                 
718
  Yu (n 198) 259; see also Samuel, ‘The Nature of Arbitration’ (n 268).  
719
  Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards (Oceana Publications 1978) para 66. 
720
  Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 131) 1978: “Arbitrators do not merely provide 
the parties with a service, but also serve a public, adjudicatory function, possessing binding 
adjudicatory powers and immunities from suit and liability, that cannot be equated with the 
provision of service in a commercial relationship. The proper analysis is therefore to regard the 
arbitrator’s contract as a sui generis agreement specifying the terms on which this adjudicative 
function, requiring independence from the parties, is to be exercised vis--à--vis particular parties 
and on particular terms.” See also Michaels, ‘Roles and Role Perceptions of International 
Arbitrators’ (n 640) 70-71 stressing that “party autonomy is charged with more and more social 
expectations: By enforcing the will of the parties, the arbitrator is thought to fulfil a role for the 
wider society, which is allegedly interested in private dispute resolution. (…) The arbitrator’s 
private role in dispute resolution thus becomes a public role as well; private interests dissolve 
into public interests, or are at lease congruent with them”. 
 
Page 258 
judge, is also required to follow the law”721 in order to settle the dispute between the 
parties.  
 
The contractual theory supports similar approach to the binding effect of judicial 
case law in international commercial arbitration proceedings. The reasoning is not 
derived from arbitrator’s adjudicative function rather it is based on the principle of 
party autonomy and the supremacy of parties’ expectations722.  
 
The basic premise of the contractual theory is the dominion of the agreement 
between the parties. Arbitrators’ decision-making process is dependent on parties’ 
agreement and their expectations. Where parties have explicitly selected a national 
law to apply to the dispute, arbitrators are obliged to follow the applicable national 
law, including court decisions, as this is in compliance with parties’ agreement and 
does not go against their expectations. Failing to find an express or implied choice of 
law arbitrators may have to follow the conflict of laws rules of the lex arbitri to 
determine the proper law. However, because of the contractual nature of arbitration, 
and distinct from jurisdictional theory, the parties have also the freedom to choose 
any laws, including a-national rules of law as the law applicable to the dispute.
723
 
Apart from parties’ freedom to select a-national or transnational rules of law as the 
substantive law, most modern institutional arbitration rules explicitly grant 
arbitrators the power to apply rules of law which they determine to be appropriate, in 
the absence of express parties’ agreement. 
 
Another distinction between the contractual and the jurisdictional theories is the 
contractualists’ contention that whole arbitration process is based on agreements, 
including arbitrator’s mandate to resolve the dispute between the parties. Thus, the 
nature of the arbitrator’s brief is of private rather than a public character and is 
                                                 
721
  Yu (n 196) 262. 
722
  See TCL Air Conditioner (n 682), Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales District 
Registry, VID 1042 of 2012, VID 1043 of 2012, VID 1044 of 2012, 16 July 2014 where it was 
held that “The system enshrined in the Model Law was designed to place independence, 
autonomy and authority into the hands of arbitrators, through a recognition of the autonomy, 
independence and free will of the contracting parties.” para 109. 
723
  Yu (n 198) 274. 
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drawn from the parties’ agreement, which allows arbitrator to judge.724 According to 
Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage the origins of the arbitrator’s mandate are 
contractual because the latter is based on two agreements – the arbitration agreement 
between the parties and the contract binding the parties to the arbitrators.
725
 The two 
authors further explain that the rights and obligations of the arbitrators “are not 
covered in any depth by the traditional sources of international arbitration law such 
as national legislation, arbitral case law and international conventions” but are 
“largely a matter for private rules and ethical codes”.726  
 
The contractual theory, however, fails to provide satisfactory answers about 
arbitrator’s immunity and the difference of the arbitrator’s adjudicative function 
from the conciliatory function of mediators and conciliators. This is why some 
proponents of the contractual theory concede that: 
 
(…) [The] judicial power is the principal characteristic of their [arbitrators’] role and 
enables arbitration to be distinguished from superficially similar concepts such as 
expert proceedings, conciliation and mediation. This appears clearly in a recent decision 
of the European Court of Justice, which held that ‘the services of an arbitrator are 
principally and habitually those of settling a dispute between two or more parties’ and 
could not therefore be assimilated to the representation of a party and the defense of its 
interests, services performed by lawyers.
727
 
 
As already hinted at above, the shortcomings of the contractual and the jurisdictional 
theories lead to the creation of the hybrid theory, which is now the prevailing theory 
of the foundations of international commercial arbitration. The hybrid theory is 
premised on a supposition, widely shared by the national courts, namely that: 
 
(…) arbitrators are decision-makers and perform a quasi-judicial function without 
exercising any (state) judicial power, as there is no act of delegation of state power: 
                                                 
724
  Ibid 268. 
725
  Gaillard and Savage, ‘The Status of the Arbitrators’ (n 473) 557. 
726
  Ibid 556. 
727
  Ibid 559-560 citing ECJ Case C–145/96, von Hoffmann v. Finanzamt Trier, 1997 E.C.R. 1-4857, 
and the opinion of the advocate general N. Finelli; 1998 REV. ARB. 166; 125 J.D.I. 562 (1998), 
and observations by M. Aurillac. 
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they resolve disputes and their decisions may be given state judicial power at the time 
and place of enforcement. Hence the arbitration function is equivalent to the function of 
a judge, but not of a particular state’s judge. While a judge is vested in principle with 
state power, the arbitrator’s decision is only in effect vested with the same power. This 
was recognised by the European Court of Justice in Nordsee v Reederei where it stated 
that only state courts exercise state power.
728
 
 
Under the hybrid theory, the constitution of arbitration and the powers of the 
arbitrator are based on the parties’ agreement, while the validity of the agreement 
and enforcement of the arbitral award are decided in conformity with public policy 
or mandatory rules of the relevant laws.
729
 Thus, the hybrid theory acknowledges the 
adjudicative functions of arbitrators within the scope of parties’ agreement, the 
connection between arbitration proceedings and the place where tribunal has its seat, 
and the effect of arbitral awards, which resembles the effect of court decisions.  
 
What this means about the mechanics of arbitrators’ decision-making and the way 
arbitrators apply the law is that arbitral tribunals are obliged to honour parties’ 
express choice of law and in absence of explicit provisions to resort to the conflicts 
of law principles to determine the relevant rules of law. Unless the parties have 
explicitly stated that they opt for amiable compositeur arbitration, arbitral tribunal 
should respect parties’ agreement and apply the law chosen by the parties. Any 
applicable national law should be interpreted in the way that is customary in the state 
at hand. As it is arbitrators’ duty to respect parties’ choice and to act with due care, it 
would be reasonable to expect that an arbitral tribunal will depart from a long-
standing line of reasoning only where the latter is inapplicable to the case or 
irrelevant. Such an approach favours legal certainty and predictability in the 
application of the law and cares for parties’ will and expectations. 
 
In the light of the above it could be argued that both the judicial approach to 
arbitrators’ functions and the prevailing theory of the foundations of international 
commercial arbitration compel arbitrators to consider not only their contractual 
mandates but also their adjudicative or quasi-judicial role when performing their 
                                                 
728
  Lew, Mistelis, and Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (n 354) 80. 
729
  Yu (n 196) 276, 277. 
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duties. Arbitrators are service providers and their mandates are rooted in the 
arbitration agreement, however with the increasing emphasis on arbitrators’ 
impartiality and independence, and the standard to which they conduct arbitrations, 
there is a growing demand for reassessing arbitrators’ role as administrators of 
justice. In this spirit Lord Neuberger maintains that as: 
 
(arbitrators) administer justice, and they must therefore act in accordance with the law 
and be seen to act in accordance with the law. (…) (In addition) given that arbitration is 
the remedy of choice for many commercial parties, there is a powerful case for saying 
that arbitration should be held to the same high standard we hold the court process, and 
that must include its rule of law credentials. 
730
 
 
 
5.3 Arbitrator’s Own Perception of Their Function 
 
The preceding two sections demonstrate that the evolution of the system of 
international commercial arbitration in the last 20-30 years have led to some changes 
in the institutional and public perceptions of arbitrators’ functions. In order to 
understand whether those changes have had an impact on arbitrator’s decision-
making it is important to analyse whether there has also been a development in the 
way arbitrators apprehend their mission.  
 
It has indeed been maintained for many years that due to the ad hoc justice that 
international commercial arbitration serve and the contractual character of this 
dispute resolution mechanism arbitrator’s mandate differs from the judicial, 
particularly with regard to the rigidity with which the rules of law should be 
followed. Some arbitration users contend that “if an arbitrator is tempted to stretch 
the law in order to achieve what is perceived to be a more ‘just’ result, he has greater 
freedom to do so”.731 Back in 1989 Alan Redfern, a distinguished English arbitrator, 
                                                 
730
  Lord Neuberger (n 421). 
731
  Dezalay and Garth, ‘Fussing about the Forum’ (n 431) at 285, 295; Charles Kaplan, ‘Brief 
Reflections on the Application of Norms by International Arbitrators’ in Miguel Ángel 
Fernández-Ballesteros and David Arias (eds), Liber Amicorum Bernardo Cremades (1st edn, 
Wolters Kluwer España 2010) 672; Franck, ‘The Role of International Arbitrators’ (n 425) 505: 
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unequivocally supported the view that arbitral tribunals are much more concerned 
with meeting parties’ expectations than with the consistency of their decisions: 
 
By its whole nature and constitution, an arbitral tribunal is far more ready, and far freer, 
than a conventional judicial tribunal to deal with the actual case in front of it. An 
arbitral tribunal is usually established to deal with a particular case. Once it has 
pronounced its decision, its function is over. In such cases, there is less need to be 
concerned with consistency of decisions. There is more scope for tailoring the award to 
the particular merits of the dispute, and there is generally no court of appeal to ensure 
uniformity of arbitral decisions.
732
 
 
There is a wide consensus that despite some similarities judges and arbitrators have 
inherently different functions especially in relation to the rule of law credentials
733
. 
Professor Pierre Mayer summarises those differences as follows: 
                                                                                                                                          
“Historically, arbitration awards were not revered so much for their legal analysis, but more for 
their sense of fairness and industry knowledge.”; Rogers, ‘Fit and Function in Legal Ethics’ (n 
64) 417; Rogers, ‘Regulating International Arbitrators’ (n 426) 55; Rogers, Ethics in 
International Arbitration (n 445) 61. 
732
  Redfern, ‘International Commercial Arbitration: Winning the Battle’ (n 222) 11-1 et seq. 
733
  This section attempts to look at the arbitrator’s vocation through the eyes of arbitrators, however 
for more detailed analyses on arbitrator’s status, rights and obligations by renown commentators 
and practitioners see: Born, ‘Chapter 13: Rights and Duties of International Arbitrators’ ; James 
H. Carter, ‘The Rights and Duties of the Arbitrator: Six Aspects of the Rule of Reasonableness’ 
in The Status of the Arbitrator, ICC Pub. No. 564 (1st edn, ICC Publishing 1995); Allan Philip, 
‘The Duties of an Arbitrator’ in Lawrence W. Newman and Richard D Hill (eds), The Leading 
Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (2nd edn, Juris Publishing, Inc. 2008); Alessi, 
‘Enforcing Arbitrator’s Obligations: Rethinking International Commercial Arbitrators’ Liability’ 
; ‘Final Report on the Status of the Arbitrator’ ; Lévy and Derains, Is Arbitration only As Good 
as the Arbitrator? Status, Powers and Role of the Arbitrator, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of 
World Business Law, Volume 8 ; Gaillard and Savage, ‘The Status of the Arbitrators’ ; Park, 
‘The Predictability Paradox - Arbitrators and Applicable Law’ ; Klaus Peter Berger, ‘To What 
Extent Should Arbitrators Respect Domestic Case Law? - The German Experience regarding the 
Law on Standard Terms’ in Dossier of the ICC Institute of World Business Law: The Application 
of Substantive Law by International Arbitrators (1st edn, ICC Publishing 2014); Richard M 
Mosk, ‘Deliberations of Arbitrators’ in David D. Caron and others (eds), Practising Virtue: 
Inside International Arbitration (1st edn, OUP 2015); J. William Rowley and Robert Wisner, 
‘Party Autonomy and Its Discontents: The Limits Imposed by Arbitrators and Mandatory Laws’ 
(2011) 5 World Arbitration & Mediation Review 321–335; Philipp Peters, ‘The Arbitrator and 
the Arbitration Procedure - Presiding Arbitrator, Deciding Arbitrator: Decision-Making in 
Arbitral Tribunals’ in Christian Klausegger and Peter Klein (eds), Austrian Yearbook on 
International Arbitration 2011 (1st edn, Manz’sche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung; 
Manz’sche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung 2011); Antonias Dimolitsa, ‘The Equivocal 
Power of the Arbitrators to Introduce Ex Officio New Issues of Law’ (2009) 27 ASA Bulletin 
426–440; Schill, ‘International Arbitrators as System-Builders’ ; Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, ‘To 
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A judge’s mission and obligations are clear: they consist in rendering justice, i.e. in 
defining the respective rights of the parties as they result from the applicable law. This 
is all that the parties themselves expect of the judge. They do not expect him to upset 
the established order so as to impose, in breach of the law, what he subjectively 
considers as fair. The position of an international arbitrator is very different. (…) [H]e 
owns no duty of obedience. His only obligations arise from what can be considered as 
the mission of an arbitrator.
734
 
 
Professor Mayer continues with reflections on what the arbitrator’s mission entails. 
According to him there is a lot of uncertainty as to what standpoint an arbitrator 
should adopt, particularly with regard to parties’ expectations and arbitrator’s own 
conception of their responsibility. This differentiates an arbitrator from a judge. An 
arbitrator must have regard to conflicting considerations arising out of the applicable 
rule of law, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the search for a fair solution, 
which most closely conforms with the true will of the parties.
735
 Considerations 
about the legitimate expectations of the parties guide arbitrators in reconciling the 
never-ending dichotomy between law and equity and law and contract and they are 
what distinguish arbitrators from national judges.  
                                                                                                                                          
What Extent Do Arbitrators in International Cases Disregard the Bag and Baggage of National 
Systems?’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), ICCA Congress Series No. 8 (Seoul 1996) (1st edn, 
Kluwer Law International 1998); Rogers, ‘The Vocation of the International Arbitrator’ ; 
Onyema, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrator’s Contract ; Phillip Landolt, 
‘Arbitrators’ Initiatives to Obtain Factual and Legal Evidence’ (2012) 28 Arbitration 
International; Mayer, ‘Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law’ ; 
Michaels, ‘Roles and Role Perceptions of International Arbitrators’ ; Pierre A. Karrer, 
‘Responsibility of Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions’ in Lawrence W. Newman (ed), The 
Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (2nd edn, Juris Publishing, Inc. 2008); 
Sigvard Jarvin, ‘The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator’s Powers’ (1986) 2 Arbitration 
International 140–163; Cindy G. Buys, ‘The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of 
Law in Commercial Arbitration’ (2005) 79 St John’s L Rev 59–96; Franck, ‘The Role of 
International Arbitrators’ ; Jan H. Dalhuisen, ‘International arbitrators as equity judges’ in Peter 
H. F. Bekker and others (eds), Making Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy Essays 
in Honour of Detlev Vagts (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2010); Ray, ‘On Integrity in 
Private Judging’ ; Dezalay and Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration 
And The Construction Of A Transnational Legal Order (Language & Legal Discourse) ; Patrik 
Schöldström, The Arbitrator’s Mandate: A Comparative Study of Relationships in Commercial 
Arbitration under the Laws of England, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland (1st edn, Stockholm: 
Jure, 1998 1998); James Allsop, ‘The Authority of the Arbitrator’ (2014) 30 Arbitration 
International 639–660.   
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  Mayer, ‘Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law’ (n 716) 240, 241. 
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The “will of the parties” or the principle of party autonomy is the guiding general 
principle in international commercial arbitration. Arbitrators recognise that their 
authority is based on the arbitration agreement and that the principle of party 
autonomy “prevails almost universally”736. According to one tribunal: 
 
It is a fundamental principle that any arbitration must be founded on the consent of all 
the parties thereto and the consent must be recognized as such by law. Especially in an 
international arbitration (…) the consent of each party must be unambiguously 
demonstrable if any resulting Award is to be safely enforceable.
737
 
 
The principle of party autonomy, subject only to public policy rules and mandatory 
laws, has permeated the whole arbitration process. Arbitrators are aware of the 
primacy of the will of the parties more than ever before
738
. They perform their 
obligations with due care and serve the type of justice that parties want and expect. 
The foundations of arbitrator’s mandate remain unchanged – to resolve parties’ 
dispute taking into account parties’ agreement and expectations. This suggests that 
since arbitrator’s mission is very tightly linked to parties’ will arbitrators are inclined 
to see themselves as service providers that should respect the primacy of party 
autonomy
739
.  
                                                 
736
  ICC Case 7920 of 1993 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1998 
- Volume XXIII, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 23 (1st edn, Kluwer Law 
International 1998) at 80 [1]. 
737
  ICC Case 7453 of 1994 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
1997, Volume 22 (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 1998) at 107 [10]. 
738
  See Donahey (n 472) 42 stating that “party autonomy gives the parties the flexibility necessary 
to structure the procedure in a way best suited to their needs. It is this flexibility that has led to 
the success of commercial arbitration and made it the preferred means of resolving international 
commercial disputes.” 
739
  Arbitrators largely acknowledge the triumph of party autonomy and consider the wishes of the 
parties congruent with the principles of the arbitral system. Interviews with arbitrators conducted 
by Joshua Karton reveal that arbitrator’s decision-making is constrained by party autonomy both 
with respect to procedural decisions and decision on the merits of disputes (in Karton, ‘Norms 
Arising from the Values Shared by International Commercial Arbitrators’ (n 138) 87-89). One 
arbitrator pointed out that arbitrators are reluctant to decline changes to the timetable when both 
parties request the latter, even though this may lead to additional delay and costs. Another 
arbitrator expressed caution about raising issues that the parties have not addressed. Given the 
considerations of the interviewed arbitrators it could be argued that besides the mandatory rules 
of law it is up to the parties to decide how much justice and what kind of process they want. 
Arbitrators seem to share this perspective. For example, with regard to the debate whether the 
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As a question of law, conflict of law issues and contract construction give an 
interesting insight into arbitrator’s perception of their function. They represent a 
particularly suitable research topic because they confront arbitrators with conflicting 
choices, i.e. either to follow a formalistic approach to the conflict of law issues in 
conformity with the rules of lex fori or lex arbitri
740
, or to apply a more flexible 
method for ascertaining the applicable law and parties’ stipulations. Where arbitral 
tribunals take the first route they will be seen to act as judges, the implication being 
that they see their function as a quasi-judicial one. On the other hand, if arbitrators 
give highest consideration to parties’ expectations and make use of their widely-
recognised discretion to select rules of law that are most suitable to the legal 
relationship between the parties, they will demonstrate that they consider their 
mandate to be in service of the parties. This is so because aside from instances when 
a mandatory provision contains a rule of qualification or compels arbitrators to apply 
certain conflict of law rules, arbitral tribunals are not obliged to comply with conflict 
of law rules
741
. Since arbitrators have no lex fori
742
 they are free to select the rules of 
                                                                                                                                          
iura novit curia rule or the foreign-law-as-fact rule apply in international commercial arbitration 
proceedings, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler suggests the following approach: “The parties shall 
establish the contents of the law applicable to the merits. The arbitral tribunal shall have the 
power, but not the obligation, to conduct its own research to establish such contents. If it makes 
use of such power, the tribunal shall give the parties an opportunity to comment on the result of 
the tribunal’s research.” (in Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘“The Governing Law—Fact or 
Law?”—A Transnational Rule on Establishing its Contents’ in M. Wirth (ed), Best Practices in 
International Arbitration, ASA Special Series No. 26 (1st edn, Basel: ASA 2006) at 181). Similar 
views are shared by Jeffrey Waincymer, ‘International Arbitration and the Duty to Know the 
Law’ (2011) 28 Journal of International Arbitration 201–242 and Julian D. M. Lew, ‘Proof of 
Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration’ in Klaus Peter Berger and others (eds), 
Festschrift für Otto Sandrock zum 70. Geburstag (1st edn, Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH 
Heidelberg 2000). 
740
  See Bruno Zeller and Camilla Baasch Andersen, ‘Discerning the Seat of Arbitration – An 
Example of Judicialization of Arbitration’ (2015) 19 Vindobona Journal 2. 
741
  Julian D. M. Lew, ‘Relevance of Conflict of Law Rules in the Practice of Arbitration’ in Albert 
Jan van den Berg (ed), Planning Efficient Arbitration Proceedings: The Law Applicable in 
International Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series, 1994 ViennaEfficient Arbitration 
Proceedings: The Law Applicable in International Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series, 1994 
Vienna Volume 7 (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 1996) 448; Redfern, Hunter, Blackaby, and 
Partasides, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (n 117) 124; Šarčević (n 
371) 137-139. Although UNCITRAL ML contains a reference to conflict of laws rules in Art. 28 
(2) many national laws and arbitrations rules explicitly specify that failing an express agreement 
by the parties, arbitrators shall decide the dispute by applying rules of law which they consider 
most appropriate – see e.g. French Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 1496; ICC Rules 2012, Art. 
21(1). See also ECICA, Art. VII(1). 
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law they consider to be most appropriate for the dispute at hand
743
. By applying lex 
fori or lex arbitri in the above scenario arbitrators will take a legalistic approach, 
which will not necessarily correspond with parties’ expectations, the transnational 
nature of international commercial arbitration and the function of arbitrators. In 
contrast, if arbitrators consider the true will of the parties when characterising the 
relations between the disputants, they will demonstrate a more flexible approach that 
distinguishes them from national courts. As one commentator argues, the more 
transnational one arbitration is in terms of having various connecting factors to 
different states, the more appropriate it becomes to resolve any conflict issues by 
reference to transnational standards derived from international customs and trade 
practices rather than by having recourse to conflict of law rules.
744
 It should be born 
in mind, however, that arbitrators would rarely be faced with the difficulty to 
ascertain the law applicable to the merits of the dispute as current trends show that 
nearly 9 in 10 contracts contain a choice of law provision
745
.  
 
Indeed, many of the older awards take a formalistic approach by applying the 
conflict of law rules of the lex fori, while a more pragmatic and flexible approach 
that corresponds with the legitimate expectations of the parties have been 
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  ICC Case 1422 of 1966 and ICC Case 4132 of 1983 in Sigvard Jarvin and Yves Derains (eds), 
Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 / Recueil des Sentences Arbitrales de la CCI 
1974-1985 (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 1994) 186 and 164 respectively. 
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  According to the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure Section 603 the arbitral tribunal has to 
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given state shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the substantive 
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Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Relations (Art. 41 – where parties have made no choice of law, 
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the tribunal will determine the applicable law according to the conflict of law rules it considers 
applicable in the given case. See also ICC Cases 2585 of 1976, 2558 of 1976, 2886 of 1977, and 
3880 of 1983 in Jarvin and Derains, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (n 741). 
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  Veijo Heiskanen, ‘And/Or: The Problem of Qualification in International Arbitration’ (2010) 26 
Arbitration International 441–466, 455. 
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  See p 234. 
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increasingly adopted in more recent arbitral decisions. In a series of awards the 
arbitral tribunals applied a legalist approach by ascertaining the applicable law 
through reference to the conflict rules of the lex fori. In ICC Case 5607
746
 a dispute 
arose between an Italian company (Claimant) and a Turkish company (Respondent) 
after parties’ joint application for a tender was accepted. Respondent initiated 
discussions with Claimant on the implementation of the project and sent an order to 
Claimant described as “final and firm”. Claimant signed and returned the order but 
Respondent subsequently halted the negotiations arguing that no contract had been 
made between the parties. Claimant contended that having prepared to perform the 
services under the order it was entitled under Austrian law to receive the full amount 
it would have received had it performed the services. In addition, Claimant requested 
compensation for the substantial losses it suffered on account of Respondent’s 
conduct. The arbitral tribunal noted that a contract containing an explicit choice of 
law provision existed between the parties but, given that Respondent had not signed 
the terms of reference under the then Art. 13 of the ICC Rules, it had to engage in 
interpretation of the will of the parties. The arbitrators held that there were no 
reasonable grounds to suppose that the reference to Austrian law was meant to have 
effects going beyond the simple prorogatio fori, since the dispute had no other 
connection with Austria other than the seat of arbitration. Thus, the parties did not 
intend to provide for the application of Austrian substantive law to their relations – 
whether contractual or extra-contractual. Despite this conclusion, however, the 
tribunal held that parties intended the application of Austrian civil procedure and 
Austrian conflict of law rules. Such inference did not really take into account Section 
603 of the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure. The latter states that any agreement as 
to the law or the legal system of a given state shall be construed, unless the parties 
have expressly agreed otherwise, as directly referring to the substantive law of the 
state and not to its conflict of laws rules. By relying on lex fori to characterise the 
contract between the parties as a contract for work (Werkvertrag) the tribunal took a 
legalistic approach very much like the one applied by national judges. 
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  ICC Case 5607, award rendered in 1989 in (2002) 13(2) ‘ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin’ 55. 
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Another arbitral case criticised for resorting to lex fori is ICC Case 8175
747
. The seat 
of arbitration between two Canadian Claimants and an Indian Respondent was Paris. 
The dispute between the parties concerned the proper meaning and application of the 
price variation formulae contained in the contract, the latter being governed by 
Indian law. Claimants contended that they were entitled to additional sums and 
sought interest on the principal sums claimed, while Respondent argued that, in fact, 
it overpaid one of the Claimants and no interest was due. The tribunal held that 
French conflict rules should be applied in order to determine Claimants’ entitlement 
to interest and the interest rate. Luckily this decision did not lead to some injustice. 
As French conflict rules treat questions relating to interest as a substantive issue, the 
tribunal applied Indian law to these matters. 
 
The conflict rules of the lex fori were also followed in ICC Case 5731
748
, ICC Case 
5460
749
, ICC Case 4504
750
, ICC Case 6476
751
 and ICC Case 9415
752
. In the latter 
case an Indian purchaser and a Turkish seller entered into a purchase and sale 
contract. Claimant terminated the contract on account of Respondent’s failure to 
supply the contracted quantity in accordance with the contract specifications. 
Respondent contended the validity of the termination and raised counterclaims based 
on tort. The contract did not contain a choice of law provision and parties were in 
disagreement as to which law should apply to the merits of the dispute. After noting 
that the seat of arbitration was in the Netherlands, the tribunal held that the starting 
point for the determination of the applicable law was Art. 1054(2) Dutch Arbitration 
Act 1986, according to which, where parties have failed to specify the applicable 
                                                 
747
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748
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law, the arbitral tribunal shall make its award in accordance with the rules of law, 
which it considers appropriate. In an interim award it was held that in determining 
the applicable law the tribunal will apply both Dutch conflict of law rules and the 
conflict of law rules generally applied by international arbitrators in similar cases.  
 
Although in arbitrators’ opinion the outcome accorded with the legitimate 
expectations of the parties and contained a pragmatic element of applying only one 
system of law to the contractual and extra-contractual claims, the decision strikes 
with its legalistic approach. The latter is manifested both in the outline of the award 
and its reasoning. The tribunal laid out a route map for ascertaining the applicable 
law in four steps, namely: (i) step 1 – considering the lex arbitri, (ii) step 2 – 
considering the institutional arbitration rules, (iii) step 3 – following the route 
contained in the institutional arbitration rules, and (iv) step 4 – determining which 
substantive law applies. The map was applied both to the contractual and extra-
contractual claims, even though the Respondent had not formulated the precise tort 
that Claimant was alleged to have committed. In a minority dissenting opinion a 
member of the arbitral tribunal criticised the findings with respect to the tort alleged 
by Respondent pointing out that arbitrator’s mandate has its important limitations, 
namely to render a decision on the grounds of the claims and counterclaims put 
forward by the parties, rather than to build a case for either of the parties: 
 
(…) the Arbitral Tribunal is not called upon to decide a hypothetical question as to what 
would be the law applicable to the Tort which the Respondent might specify until that is 
done. The function of the Arbitral Tribunal is to decide the questions which arise before 
it and discuss the law in so far as it is necessary for that purpose. It is not a part of our 
function to lay down the law in the abstract or on a hypothetical footing with a view to 
guide either party.
753
  
 
Thus, the justice that arbitrators administer is a truly ad hoc one. It is limited to the 
particular parties and the specific facts of the case. As explained in ICC Case 3267 
“[t]he arbitral tribunal is a conventional court and its jurisdiction is per se not 
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defined by law but by contract.”754 Even arbitrator’s interpretation of the law has a 
defined function and should serve an idiosyncratic purpose. The letter of the law 
should be invoked only when necessary, i.e. if the legal issue could not be settled by 
contract interpretation. When “all legal issues in (an) arbitration depend on the 
construction and system of the contractual documents” 755, then arbitrator’s mandate 
will be fulfilled with settlement of the dispute according to the interpretation of the 
contractual provisions. Thus, in ICC Case 9117
756
 the arbitral tribunal pointed out 
that the applicable legal provisions were to be applied only when matters and issues 
which had not been contractually agreed between the parties could not be determined 
by having regard to trade usages:  
 
For the Tribunal it is clear that, in the first instance, the contractual terms as agreed by 
the Parties in the framework of their contractual relationship shall be looked at and 
applied to determine the disputed issues. In case of ambiguity and to the extent 
necessary, contractual terms may have to be interpreted by the Tribunal. In addition to 
the foregoing, the Tribunal has to have regard to the relevant usages of the trade (…). 
Regarding any further issues which might come up and which are not governed by any 
of the foregoing, the Tribunal will have to determine the proper law of contract 
according to the socalled “objective approach”.
757
 
 
Such more flexible approach in ascertaining the proper law of the contract that 
corresponds with this perception of arbitrator’s vocation was also taken in ICC Case 
12494
758
. The case concerned a contract concluded between a manufacturer of goods 
in an Eastern European state (Respondent) and a buyer in a South Asian state 
(Claimant). After noting that under the relevant institutional arbitration rules and lex 
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  ICC Case 3267, award rendered in 1984 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration 1987 - Volume XII (1
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 edn. Kluwer Law International, 1987) 87-96, in which the 
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  ICC Case 9117, award rendered in 1998 in (1998) 10(2) ‘ICC International Court of Arbitration 
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arbitri the arbitral tribunal was not required to use any particular conflict of laws 
rules in order to ascertain the applicable law, the arbitrators engaged in careful 
examination of the nature and purpose of the underlying contract between the 
parties. The tribunal determined that the contract was for sale of equipment and 
relied on the agreed CPT Incoterm to establish when delivery of the goods took 
place. The arbitrators then had regard to “the relevant international conventions as 
evidence of trade usages and internationally recognized principles applicable to 
conflict of law issues”759 and pointed out that although parties had relied on those 
conventions in their submissions, the conventions had inherent limitations. Finally 
the tribunal held that the contract was governed by the law of state Y, the latter being 
the most closely connected with the characteristic performance of the contract. 
 
It is now widely recognised
760
 that the centre of gravity or the connection test is a 
choice of law principle that better reflects commercial practices and parties’ 
legitimate expectations than a mechanical application of the conflict rules of the lex 
fori. This more direct and flexible approach takes into account the specifics of the 
legal relations between the parties and the variety of the connecting factors that may 
exist. That international arbitrators respect parties’ will and aim to deliver the type of 
justice that disputants want is demonstrated by arbitrators’ careful consideration 
when employing their discretion to apply the rules of law that are most appropriate 
to the specific contractual relationship at hand rather than as a general principle or 
hypothetical.  
 
In ICC Case 7319
761
 a French supplier (Claimant) and an Irish distributer of products 
(Respondent) had entered into a distribution agreement on an non-exclusive basis, 
but at a very early stage in the commercial relationship, the Respondent contested 
the quality of the products and refused to pay the amounts due to Claimant under the 
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contract. The choice of law clause in the contract stated that the agreement was to 
“be constructed in accordance with and governed by laws and regulations applying 
to members of the European Economic Community”. Although Claimant argued that 
by not choosing any particular national law the parties wanted to refer to an 
international system of law, similar to lex mercatoria, the sole arbitrator rejected the 
contention that anational rules of law should govern the merits of the dispute. In 
arbitrator’s opinion the facts demonstrated that the intention of the parties was not to 
refer to anational rules and to exclude any national law rather than after eliminating 
by mutual agreement the national laws of both parties, the latter were unable to agree 
on a particular national law. The arbitrator was reluctant to supplant parties’ 
intentions and introduce uncertainty in the contractual relations by applying 
anational rules of law: 
 
the failure of the parties to agree on the law governing the Agreement cannot, in the 
sole arbitrator's opinion, be interpreted as an implied reference to some vague 
international legal or trade principles. Such reference must be made expressly and, if 
not expressly, then in an implied manner which gives reasonable certainty to the 
arbitrators or the courts, respectively, that the parties indeed agreed to submit their 
dispute to anational law or international trade principles, particularly considering the 
fact that such anational laws and principles, if not properly defined, are difficult if not 
impossible to assess.
762
 
 
The above does not suggest that arbitrators are generally unwilling to apply anational 
rules of law in international commercial arbitrations but that they carefully consider 
the particularities of the case in order to deliver the type of dispute that parties want 
and have opted for. Thus, by holding parties’ will and legitimate expectations in a 
very high regard and by tailoring both the procedural rules but also the substantive 
rules to the individual case arbitrators administer not only procedural but also 
substantive justice. Indeed, arbitrators enjoy a greater flexibility in application and 
interpretation of the substantive law than national judges and the fact that they select 
and apply the rules of law that are most suitable to a particular case speaks of their 
important function as adjudicators. Maybe somewhat paradoxically but precisely 
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because arbitrators administer ad hoc justice, they manage to deliver a fair and just 
decision suited to the dispute at hand.  
 
The above considerations were taken into account in ICC Case 7110
763
, in which the 
arbitral tribunal was faced with a dispute arising out of a number of contracts 
covering the sale, supply, modification, maintenance and operation of equipment, 
and other support services. The contracts between the parties contained choice of law 
provisions making references to “amicable resolution by the parties”, settlement 
“according to natural justice” and “to the laws of natural justice”. Claimant argued 
that there was no evidence of explicit or implied choice of law by the parties as the 
latter did not expressly agree on the applicable law and that the references to natural 
justice were too vague. Thus, Claimant contended that the tribunal should follow the 
applicable conflict of law rules. Respondent’s position was that the arbitral tribunal 
should resort to the voie indirecte and as a result apply English law. In the alternative 
Respondent argued that general principles of private international law regarding 
contracts for the international supply of goods or services should apply. In addition 
Respondent contended that the expressions “natural justice”, “the laws of natural 
justice” and the “rules of natural justice” referred to principles of procedural fairness 
and did not have any bearing on the law applicable to the substance of the contracts. 
If those expressions had a substantive meaning, which Respondent maintained was 
not present in this case, it could be interpreted to be a reference to the principles of 
equity and morality; however, such meaning could not be reconciled with the fact 
that the tribunal was called to decide a commercial dispute by application of the law 
and not in equity. 
 
Firstly, the tribunal had to decide whether there was an express or implied choice of 
law by the parties.  Indications as to the applicable law were to be construed both on 
the basis of an objective test revealing what the parties’ reasonable intentions and 
expectations regarding the applicable law as evidenced by all circumstances 
surrounding the negotiations of the contracts would have been, as well as through a 
contextual approach applied to the contractual terms likely to evidence the applicable 
law. The arbitrators examined and discussed at length the terms “natural justice”, 
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“laws of natural justice” and “rules of natural justice”, the negotiation process 
between the parties, the nature and characteristics of the contracts, the latter held to 
be state contracts, as well as the considerations of the parties with regard to the 
neutrality of the applicable law. It was also pointed out that parties could opt for 
localised or delocalised international commercial arbitration and by including 
references to “natural justices” and “rules of natural justice” the parties expressed 
their intentions to delocalise the state contracts and remove them from national legal 
systems, and to detach the arbitral process from the seat of arbitration. Most 
interesting, however, were tribunal’s findings in relation to the notion of justice in 
international commercial arbitration. The arbitrators unequivocally stated that 
international commercial arbitration is a system that is concerned with and renders 
not only procedural but also substantive justice and by opting for international 
commercial arbitration parties agree to have access to this type of justice, which is 
not necessarily the same as the one that would be obtained from national courts: 
 
An obvious confirmation that notions of justice in international commercial arbitration 
are not merely procedural but are also substantive is that the majority of national 
statutes dealing with international arbitration, international conventions regarding 
arbitration not just concerned with the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
agreements and awards, and international arbitration rules contain procedural 
provisions and choiceoflaw provisions, i.e. provisions pointing to choiceoflaw solutions 
only becoming relevant because the dispute has been submitted to international 
commercial arbitration and which may well differ from those that would have been 
otherwise obtained had the decision of the case been left to municipal courts and their 
private international law systems.
764
 
 
Thus it was held that although the parties excluded the application of any particular 
national legal system to the contracts, they indicated their intention that the contracts 
be governed by general legal rules and principles adapted to the needs of 
international transactions and enjoying wide international consensus. Since in the 
tribunal’s view the UNIDROIT Principles primarily reflected such widely accepted 
general rules and principles they were to be applied to the contracts.  
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The above arbitral award is of interest because it demonstrates arbitrator’s unique 
role in ascertainment of the governing law, application of the legal rules and 
interpretation of the contractual provisions. Of paramount importance for arbitrators 
seems to be the true intent of the parties, which influences the substantive justice that 
parties obtain. In the decision in question the arbitral tribunal distinguished between 
the two approaches to determine the applicable law, namely either by resorting to the 
“supposedly choiceoflaw neutral and dispassionate criteria, such as a talismanic 
notion of the localization of the characteristic obligation or an amorphous grouping 
of contracts or the closest connection noticeable in some national legal systems”765 
or by “taking into account the parties’ concerns and expectations as to substantive 
justice, including neutrality as to the applicable law”766. This flexible approach to 
ascertaining the applicable law and interpreting parties’ intentions is in contrast with 
the more objective method employed by national courts. As argued by one 
distinguished arbitrator the “usual way” of deciding cases in international 
commercial arbitration is “exclusively on the interpretation of contracts and 
relevance of trade usages, so that very little depends on the question of the applicable 
law”767. 
 
A recent study on the role of arbitrators in adjudicating the merits of international 
commercial disputes
768
 supports these conclusions. Karton observes that although 
international arbitral tribunals do generally interpret contracts in a manner consistent 
with the governing law, their primary interpretative task is discerning the true 
common intention of the parties.
769
 In this way arbitrators do not always actually 
apply the rules of interpretations in the governing law
770
 but resolve parties’ claims 
by “interpreting and applying the provisions of the Contract (…) in the normal way, 
i.e. by looking at the Contract from the point of the view of the parties and by giving 
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the words used by them a plain and ordinary meaning so as to arrive at their 
presumed intentions”771. Even when faced with a question of law, as “ultimately, 
matters of interpretation are legal questions for the arbitral tribunal to decide” 772, 
arbitrators often seek solutions from commercial practice
773
 and trade usage and 
refer to transnational law, soft law instruments and other “optional” sources of 
authority
774
. However, the increasing tendency to adopt a legalistic approach to 
issues of law in order to comply with parties’ and court’s expectations775 should not 
be underestimated.  
 
The unique contract construction applied by arbitrators in international commercial 
disputes appears to be considerably consistent
776
. At the centre of the arbitral 
interpretative approach lie considerations about the true intentions of the parties 
rather than strict observance of a particular method of interpretation. In the absence 
of a choice of law clause arbitrators are not obliged to adopt a legalistic approach to 
matters of interpretation by reference to a national law or arbitral case law. Instead 
they are encouraged to seek a flexible solution in consideration of parties’ manifest 
intentions. Thus in ICC Case 13129
777
 the sole arbitrator expressed their 
“reservations as to the real existence of anything that can be described as lex 
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mercatoria” and applied ordinary principles of contractual construction. The 
arbitrator noted that “[a] strict, legalistic approach is not helpful when the 
interpretation of a contract such as this is in question” because “[t]his contract is 
typical of many contracts negotiated between trades whose main concern is to do the 
deal, who are not lawyers and who do not rely on lawyers to draft their 
contracts(…)”778. In view of those considerations the arbitrator refused to follow the 
“last shot” approach when interpreting the parties’ exchanges and correspondence as 
“to hold otherwise would (…) fly in the face of parties’ manifest intentions”.779 
 
As Lévy and Robert-Tissot argue, by favouring the true intentions of the parties over 
a strict interpretative approach arbitrators favour the predictability of the 
performance of the contract rather than legal security
780
. While some arbitrators and 
scholars criticise this flexible method of law ascertainment and contract construction 
and take a “pro-accuracy” position781, others applaud it for revealing parties’ true 
intentions in a commercial context: “Done properly, reaching solutions by 
interpreting the parties’ intentions rather than by sophisticated judicial reasoning 
deserves praise (…)”782. 
 
The extensive research of arbitral awards that has been undertaken in the light of this 
section indicates that arbitrators take either a flexible or legalistic approach not only 
with relation to law ascertainment but also in consideration of issues of fact. A 
highly judicialised arbitral decision-making process is characterised by a legalistic 
approach to the sources of law and weight of evidence. Arbitrators employing a 
formalistic approach to questions of facts rely heavily on documentary evidence and 
often follow the so-called “best evidence rule” 783. In contrast, when arbitrators resort 
to their professional experience and common logic to decide issues of fact they 
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behave like industry insiders and take a flexible approach to deliver commercial 
justice. To demonstrate the difference between the two approaches several arbitral 
awards that discuss the application of trade usages to parties’ contract will be 
discussed. 
 
It is a well-established principle that parties to a commercial contract are bound by 
usages that are widely observed in international trade.
 784
 Arbitrators are equally 
obliged to take into account such usages in their decision-making process.
785
 
Ascertaining what constitutes a trade usage, however, is a difficult and challenging 
question. Arbitrators approach this issue in two ways – either legalistically by 
relying on expert evidence, arbitral awards and sources of codified practices, such as 
the UNIDROIT Principles, CISG, INCOTERMS, UCP, etc., or as industry insiders 
by referring to their own experience and applying common logic when assessing the 
weight of the evidence.  
 
A legalistic ascertainment of trade practices is demonstrated in a number of ICC 
awards. In ICC Case 7903
786
 the arbitral tribunal applied INCOTERMS 1990 “as an 
indication of international trade usage, and because neither party has provided 
evidence of a different definition of ‘delivered duty paid’”. A similar approach was 
adopted in ICC Case 8502
787
 where the tribunal made reference to the CISG and 
UNIDROIT Principles, “as evidencing admitted practices under international trade 
law.” In ICC Case 11976788 the sole arbitrator considered several ICC awards and 
scholarly materials, which were found to be an illustration of lex mercatoria and 
usages of international trade.  
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A much more lenient approach to commercial practices, as well as contract 
interpretation, was adopted in ICC Case 16816
789
. The arbitrator relied on common 
sense rather than codified trade usages in finding that a party is subject to implied 
obligations, in particular the obligation of reasonable care and skill:  
 
I agree that such an obligation would arise, as a matter of both common sense and 
necessary implication, in a case where one party places itself in the hands of another 
professing ability and expertise in relation to the tactics required for performing the task 
with which it is entrusted.
790
 
 
Common sense and commercial logic were also applied in ICC Case 9483
791
 where 
the sole arbitrator considered relevant trade regarding interest payment. The 
arbitrator noted that a yearly interest of 21.6% as applied to US dollars could not 
reasonably be regarded as a trade usage as it was too high in view of equity and 
commercial practice. Instead the interest rate should be adapted with regard to the 
evolution of commercial circumstances.  
 
However, despite a few arbitral awards, which follow a flexible approach to fact-
finding and evidentiary weight, it seems that the majority of awards adopt a more 
formalistic method. Arbitrators seek to rely on binding authority as opposed to their 
own experience as industry insiders
792
 and they often subject parties’ claims to a 
high standard of proof
793
. Arbitrators are mindful of the fact that there is no appeal 
                                                 
789
  ICC Case, 16816, award rendered in 2011 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 2015 - Volume XL (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2015) 236-293.  
790
  Ibid 272. 
791
  ICC Case 9483, award rendered in 1998 in (2007) 18(1) ICC ‘International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin’ 86. 
792
  See e.g. the wording in ICC Case 10166, award rendered in 2000 in (2011) 22(2) ‘ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin’ 64: “In the absence of binding authority I hold and 
adjudge that the Respondents have failed to prove to my satisfaction that the testimony of [A] is 
inadmissible in evidence”. 
793
  See e.g. ICC Case 11976 (n 387), as opposed to “the balance of probability standard” (Desert 
Line Projects L.L.C. v. The Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case ARB/05/17 at [158]; WIPO Case 
No. D2001-0201 Rogers Cable Inc. v Arran Raja Lal, Administrative Panel Decision at [7.1]), 
“the inner conviction of an arbitrator standard” (Bernard Hanotiau, ‘Satisfying the Burden of 
Proof: The Viewpoint of a “Civil Law” Lawyer in the Standards and Burden of Proof of Proof in 
International Arbitration’ (1994) 10 Arbitration International 345) or “the standard of 
comfortable satisfaction” (CAS 2013/A/3256 Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü v. UEFA, Award, para. 
277; CAS Case 2001/A/343 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) v H., Award, para. 20). 
 
Page 280 
against their decisions and they aim at administering private justice that meets 
parties’ expectations, while confirming to the general standard to act judicially794. 
This includes not only ensuring that parties are given a fair and reasonable
795
 
opportunity to present their cases but also that parties’ agreements will be respected 
and substantive justice will be delivered. When parties have agreed a choice of law 
provision, arbitrators are expected to respect and follow the national court decisions 
and promote consistency and predictability
796
. By applying the sources of law in 
predictable way arbitrators do, on the one hand, uphold the rule of law and foster the 
judicialisation agenda, and, on the other hand, respect parties’ legitimate 
expectations. 
 
It follows from the above that since arbitrator’s mandate is contingent on party 
autonomy the substantive justice that arbitrators serve is influenced by parties’ 
will
797
. As Roy Goode observes the choice of arbitration has an impact on the 
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Page 281 
determination of substantive rights in international disputes.
798
 While arbitrators are 
tempted to decide as much as possible by construing the contractual provisions, 
however, they are also well aware of the limitations of the interpretative methods. As 
one tribunal explains “A court or tribunal should not, in the guise of construction, 
interpretation or implication, add or excise terms; nor distort the meaning of those 
used and thereby make a new contract for the parties” 799 . This demonstrates 
willingness on the side of arbitrators to tackle issues unresolved by interpretation on 
the basis of the applicable law.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the mechanics of arbitral decision-making demonstrates that 
arbitrators appreciate the uniqueness of their mandate by upholding the primacy of 
party autonomy, while acting judicially nevertheless. Due to this inherent dichotomy 
in arbitrator’s mandate, arbitrators are susceptible to judicialisation. In their capacity 
of service providers arbitrators are influenced by arbitration users’ expectations and 
needs, while as adjudicators they are subject to institutional perceptions as to what 
the arbitrator’s vocation entails. 
 
While some level of judicialisation ensures that arbitrators guarantee parties’ access 
to justice and endorse general principles like due process and fair and equal 
treatment, expectations of arbitrators to behave like judges and approach questions 
of law legalistically, make arbitrator’s decision-making process rigid and formalistic. 
If international commercial arbitration is to continue to be a successful alternative to 
litigation arbitrators should be encouraged to rely on their expertise and common 
sense to deliver the commercial justice that arbitration users value so much.  
  
                                                                                                                                          
B. von Mehren, ‘An International Arbitrator’s Point of View’ (1999) 10 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 
203–214, at 209). 
798
  Goode (n 32). 
799
  ICC Case 15610, award rendered in 2010 in (2014) 25(1) ‘ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin’ 70. 
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CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this thesis was to examine the process of judicialisation in 
international commercial arbitration and the extent to which it has permeated both 
the arbitration proceedings and arbitral decision-making. The purpose of this 
concluding chapter is not to repeat all conclusions made in the body of the study, 
rather to link them together and emphasise areas of further research. In addition, this 
chapter is a reflection on the advantages and disadvantages of the process of 
judicialisation in international commercial arbitration. 
 
International commercial arbitration is consensual by nature, however, in order to 
have real effect it has to be recognised and endorsed by a national legal system, 
which places this dispute resolution mechanism within the normative system. This 
suggests that some degree of judicialisation is unavoidable, since the alternative 
nature of international commercial arbitration has its limits. As Chapters 2 and 3 
demonstrate, the judicialisation phenomenon in international commercial arbitration 
is further propagated by a formalistic approach to the sources of law and their 
classification.  
 
Empirical research is required to determine the benefits of applying a formalistic 
approach to the classification of the sources of law in international commercial 
arbitration. In view of the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3, however, it is suggested 
that such an approach brings legalism and judicialisation in the law-ascertainment 
process and contractual interpretation. Furthermore, by distinguishing between the 
sources of law in international commercial arbitration through their classification, a 
development of a hierarchical system of norms is encouraged. On the one hand, this 
supports the legitimacy of international arbitration proceedings in the eyes of the 
institutions and the public, but, on the other hand, it contributes to the judicialisation 
of this dispute resolution mechanism. Some authors even contend that that the 
establishment of a hierarchy of norms in the “private justice system” demonstrates a 
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move towards self-constitutionalisation.
800
 This is an area that deserves further 
research. 
 
The judicialised approach to the sources of law is not entirely consistent with the 
flexibility that is traditionally enjoyed by arbitrators, as it gives rise to a propensity 
for a strict adherence to the letter of the law. Instead it is argued that arbitrators 
should follow a flexible approach to the sources of law and contractual 
interpretation. One of the perceived benefits of international commercial arbitration 
is the commercially minded problem-solving approach of arbitrators when 
interpreting the contract and determining the applicable rules of law. In contrast to 
common law judges
801
 who take a contract to be an objective record of parties’ 
intentions
802
, arbitrators, much like civil law judges, are prompt to reveal the 
subjective intention of the parties
803
 or even the “true intent” of the parties. To do so 
arbitrators should not be quick to apply any given rules of law but should firstly 
carefully consider the facts of the case and parties’ legitimate expectations. 
 
In cases where the parties have designated a particular national law to govern their 
contractual relationship, arbitrators’ approach to the sources of law, i.e. their binding 
force and authoritativeness, is to be determined according to the applicable law. 
Similarly, if parties have agreed a choice of law provision, arbitrators should 
interpret the contract by following the chosen law’s rules of interpretation804. Where 
there is no choice of law provision, however, arbitrators are encouraged to adopt a 
flexible approach to the sources of law and contractual interpretation having regard 
                                                 
800
  See generally Moritz Renner, ‘Private Justice, Public Policy: The Constitutionalization of 
International Commercial Arbitration’ in Walter Mattli and Thomas Dietz (eds), International 
Arbitration and Global Governance (1st edn, OUP 2014). 
801
  The decisive factor for contractual interpretation is the way a reasonable person would interpret 
the agreement. The plain-meaning rule excludes all extrinsic evidence in the case of a clear 
wording of the contract. Under the parol evidence rule evidence outside the contract, whether 
oral or written, may not be used in its interpretation. See e.g. Proforce Recruitment Limited v 
The Rugby Group Limited [2006] EWCA Civ 69 in which the Court of Appeal rules that it was 
arguable that pre contractual negotiations were admissible as part of the relevant background to 
the interpretation of a contract as well as to prove that the parties had negotiated on the basis of 
an agreed meaning of particular words. 
802
  See e.g. Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50. 
803
  See the French Code Civil, Art. 1188; CISG, Art. 8. 
804
  Karton, ‘The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation’ (n 768) 37, 38. 
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to the nature of the contract and the particular circumstances of the dispute. The 
more transnational the case is, i.e. the more foreign elements it involves, the more 
appropriate it is for an arbitrator to apply a comparative law analysis in ascertaining 
the applicable rules of law and interpreting the contract rather than to follow a 
formalistic approach to the sources of law.    
 
The analyses in Chapters 3 and 5 indicate that while the above method is appreciated 
by commentators
805
 and employed by some arbitrators
806
, many arbitral tribunals 
adopt a legalistic approach to the sources of law and the applicable rules of law. The 
judicialised approach is often preferred in view of policy consideration such as legal 
certainty, consistency and the public interest. While the latter are to be promoted 
when possible, it is to be noted that policy considerations do not play a significant 
role in international commercial arbitration. Arbitrator’s function is to deliver ad hoc 
justice, which does not transcend the contractual relationship between the parties. 
The evolving concept of arbitral jurisprudence and the endorsement of the notions of 
lis pendens and res judicata, however, demonstrate the increasing judicialisation of 
international commercial arbitration.  
 
With the growing popularity of transnational arbitration as the preferred dispute 
resolution mechanism for international commercial transactions
807
, it becomes 
difficult, and frankly futile, to argue that the concepts of lis pendens are not 
applicable to international commercial arbitration. In order to endorse the legitimacy 
of international commercial arbitration and uphold the rule of law this aspect of 
judicialisation should be acknowledged but its scope should be carefully considered. 
While, ILA has made recommendations on the issues of lis pendens
808
 and res 
judicata
809
 in international commercial arbitration, further research is in this area is 
strongly encouraged.  
                                                 
805
  See e.g. text to n 226. 
806
  See e.g. text to n 763. 
807
  See the speech by The Right Hon. The Lord of Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales ‘Developing Commercial Law through the Courts’ (n 535).  
808
  See Filip de Ly and Audley Sheppard, ‘ILA Final Report on Lis Pendens and Arbitration’ (2009) 
25 Arbitration International 3–34; see also Section 2.3. 
809
  See de Ly and Sheppard, ‘ILA Final Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration’ (n 241); see also 
Section 2.3.  
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Apart from the approach to the sources of law and their classification, this thesis 
finds evidence of the judicialisation process in both the arbitration proceedings 
themselves and the arbitral decision-making process. As suggested in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 there are various factors driving the judicialisation in international commercial 
arbitration, namely: considerations of legal certainty and consistency in arbitral 
decision-making, the pursuit of fair and just process, increasing regulation of 
international arbitration proceedings, proliferation of litigation-style practices, 
globalisation of international trade, professionalisation of arbitrator’s vocation and 
the commercialisation
810
 of international commercial arbitration. In view of the 
statistics cited in this thesis
811
, the role and effect of the process of 
commercialisation
812
 on the judicialisation of international commercial arbitration 
deserves particular attention and is identified as an area, which would benefit of 
further research. 
 
In conclusion, the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that the process of 
judicialisation is driven mainly by internal factors, particularly the 
professionalisation of arbitrator’s vocation and the pursuit of the truth in the arbitral 
process. It is suggested that, in order to maintain the alternative nature of 
international commercial arbitration, arbitration users and arbitration institutions 
should rethink the effect that the over-regulation and due process “paranoia” have on 
the arbitration proceedings and arbitral decision-making. While Chapter 5 considers 
the mechanics of arbitral decision-making, a more detailed analysis on the effect of 
arbitration procedure on the substantive rights of the parties is welcome. 
  
                                                 
810
  See n 589 and text to it. 
811
  See e.g. n 549. 
812
  See n 589 and text to it. 
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